USA v. Nguyen et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	§
§
VS. 	§ 	NO. 4:24-cr-00110-ALM-BD-4
§
TUAN LE 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant Tuan Le moved to reopen the question of his pretrial detention and requests release
on conditions. Dkt. 111 (sealed); see Dkt. 113 (response). The motion will be denied.
BACKGROUND
Le was arrested on a complaint alleging violations of 21 U.S.C. 846 (conspiracy to distribute
and possess with intent to distribute amphetamine, methamphetamine over 500 grams, and
cocaine over 500 grams). Dkt. 1 at 1. At his initial appearance, the government moved to detain
him. Docket Entry for May 2, 2024. He waived his right to a detention hearing and “agree[d] to
be held in custody pending disposition of this matter.” Dkt. 20; see Dkt. 21 (detention order). He
was later arraigned on an indictment charging a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (conspiracy to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and cocaine). Dkt. 42; Minute
Entry for May 21, 2024. He now seeks to reopen the question of his pretrial detention, arguing that
he should be released on conditions. Dkt. 111.
LAW
The court may reopen a detention hearing if it “finds that information exists that was not
known to the movant at the time of the hearing and that has a material bearing” on “whether there
are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of such person as required and
the safety of any other person and the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2). If the movant’s
evidence is not newly discovered, was not previously unavailable, or is not material, the court
should deny the motion to reopen the question of detention. See United States v. Stanford, 341
Case 4:24-cr-00110-ALM-BD Document 114 Filed 01/12/26 Page 1 of 5 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
F. App’x 979, 984 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Stanford I”); United States v. Hare, 873 F.2d 796, 799 (5th
Cir. 1989).
“Courts 	interpreting 	. . . 	§ 3142(f) 	require 	ʻtruly 	changed 	circumstances, 	something
unexpected, or a significant event,’ and [they] have interpreted the requirements of this provision
strictly,” such that a “defendant cannot re-open detention to present evidence that he could have
investigated before the detention hearing.” United States v. Jacob, No. 21-31, 2023 WL 2867324,
at *5 (E.D. La. Apr. 10, 2023) (citations omitted). Section “3142(f)’s ʻnot known to the movant at
the time of the hearing’ language [means] not just actual knowledge, but also constructive
knowledge, i.e., knowledge that one using reasonable care or diligence should have.” United States
v. Munguia, No. 3:19-cr-191-B (03), 2020 WL 1471741, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2020) (quotation
marks omitted). The existence of friends or family members willing to testify in support of a
defendant’s release does not constitute new information within the meaning of the statute, see, e.g.,
United States v. Stanford, 367 F. App’x 507, 510–11 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Stanford II”); Stanford I, 341
F. App’x at 984; United States v. Bennett, No. 94–6590, 1995 WL 25412, at *1 (6th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Dillon, 938 F.2d 1412, 1415 (1st Cir. 1991); Hare, 873 F.2d at 799, and a party cannot
be “less than diligent in bringing forth all material evidence the first time a [detention] hearing is
held,” United States v. Flores, 856 F. Supp. 1400, 1406 (E.D. Cal. 1994). “[C]onclusory allegations
that information is newly discovered do not suffice; a party seeking to reopen detention must show
how the evidence was discovered and why it was previously unavailable.” United States v. Morris,
452 F. Supp. 3d 484, 487 (N.D. Tex. 2020) (Ramirez, J.).
As to whether evidence has “material bearing,” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2), the new evidence
“must relate in some significant or essential way to the decision whether to detain.” United States
v. Worrell, No. 1:21-cr-00292-RCL, 2021 WL 2366934, at *9 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021) (emphasis
removed) (citing United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 614 (10th Cir. 2003)). “[T]he purpose of
[18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)] . . . is to allow parties to present unknown information that increases the
chances the defendant appears for [his or her] criminal hearing[] or decrease[s] the danger the
Case 4:24-cr-00110-ALM-BD Document 114 Filed 01/12/26 Page 2 of 5 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
defendant poses to an individual or the community as a whole.” United States v. Martin, No. 13-
00466 JSW (KAW), 2015 WL 1738362, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2015). For that reason, a
successful motion to reopen the question of detention must show that the new or previously
unknown evidence on which the motion is based establishes that the movant is “less likely to be a
flight risk or a danger to any person or the community.” United States v. James, No. 23-50044,
2023 WL 3300973, at *1 (5th Cir. May 8, 2023).
DISCUSSION
Le asserts that, when he waived his right to a detention hearing, he “had no one to stay with
and vouch for his continued appearance at future court hearings.” Dkt. 111 at 1. His motion states
that he has now “found [a person] who would be responsible for [his] lodging. [The person] has a
three-bedroom home he has resided in for 10 years. [Le] has a bedroom in his home and [the
person] would ensure that [Le] would appear at all future court appearances and adhere to all of
his conditions of release.” Id. After providing the person’s name and contact information and
stating that “he is willing to speak with probation and have them visit his home,” the motion
asserts that “[Le]’s changed circumstances . . . demonstrate he is no longer a flight risk nor is he a
danger to the community. As such, [Le] respectfully moves this Court reconsider its order of
detention and grant [Le] pre-trial release.” Id. at 2. It provides no further detail.
In response, the government first recounts the circumstances of Le’s arrest and the
investigation that led to it. Dkt. 113 at 1–4. It notes that, on the day of his arrest, Le was one of three
people inside a residential property being used as a clandestine laboratory for controlled
substances—and was the only one who refused “clear law enforcement commands to exit the
residence,” which contained “over 96 kilograms of methamphetamine,” “approximately 1.6
kilograms of cocaine,” “[t]housands of pills” in “rooms . . . [to] which Le had access,”
“[f]irearms, money counters, shipping materials, GPS devices, . . . safes,” “[g]as masks[,] and
protective gear.” Id. at 3. The motion also states that two cooperators provided information about
Case 4:24-cr-00110-ALM-BD Document 114 Filed 01/12/26 Page 3 of 5 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
Le’s participation in the criminal activity being conducted at the residence, describing some of that
information. Id. at 3–4.
After identifying the legal standard that governs Le’s motion and noting that Le is
presumptively subject to pretrial detention by virtue of the crime he is accused of committing, id.
at 4–5 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(e)(3)(A), 3142(f)), the government argues that Le has not met his
burden to show that the question of detention should be reopened. It notes that the pretrial-services
report that was prepared the month of Le’s arrest identifies a friend who lives in the same city as
the person identified in the motion, suggesting that the information noted in the motion is not new.
Id. at 5. But even if the person identified in the motion is someone other than the person mentioned
in the pretrial-services report, the government contends that Le’s motion does not
overcome[] the presumption that Le is a flight risk or presents a danger to the
community based on the nature of the charged crime. Le’s motion also makes no
attempt to address the factors delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) that the Court must
take into account when considering the issue of detention, namely: the nature and
circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against him, the
history and characteristics of the person, and finally the nature and seriousness of
the danger to any persons or the community that would be posed by the person’s
release.
Id. at 6.
The government’s response goes on to address each of those topics. Id. at 6–9. It provides
detailed information about the residence that served as a clandestine laboratory and credibly
asserts, among other things, that (1) the evidence against Le is “overwhelming”; (2) Le was
previously convicted of, and served prison time for, two other federal offenses; (3) he was
imprisoned again for violating the terms of his supervised released imposed in connection with one
of those prior convictions; (4) he had been unemployed and residing at the residence associated
with the present offense for several months leading up to his arrest; (5) he “has shown himself to
be dishonest in the past based on two federal convictions for fraud”; and (6) “[h]e is a convicted
felon, yet firearms were readily accessible in [his] residence.” Id. It argues that Le’s “past behavior
coupled with the illegal pill press he actively participated in, to include procuring the
Case 4:24-cr-00110-ALM-BD Document 114 Filed 01/12/26 Page 4 of 5 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
methamphetamine to produce the counterfeit Adderall, show that he poses an ongoing danger to
the community if released.” Id. at 9.
That demonstration carries the day here. To succeed on his motion, Le would have needed to
provide the type of detail the government provided—but in support of, rather than in opposition
to, the findings that the statute and case law require. See supra pp. 1–3. His short motion does not
identify newly discovered material evidence that would support reopening the question of his
pretrial detention, and he did not file a reply to the government’s response.
CONCLUSION
It is ORDERED that Le’s motion to reopen the question of pretrial detention, Dkt. 111, is
DENIED.
Case 4:24-cr-00110-ALM-BD Document 114 Filed 01/12/26 Page 5 of 5 PageID #:
<pageID>