Lin v. USA, et al.

4:22-cv-00055Txed25 mars 2026

Texte intégral

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
BINGLI LIN, ET AL.
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET
AL.
§
§
§
§
§
§
CIVIL NO. 4:22-CV-55-SDJ
MEMORANDUM ADOPTING IN PART THE REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pro se Plaintiffs BingLi Lin, Chuangui Chen, Joanna Chen, and Din Tai
Technology, LLC, sued the United States of America and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., for
the return of seized property, negligence, Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)
violations, 	a 	request 	for 	declaratory 	judgment, 	and 	other 	unspecified 	relief.
(Dkt. #46).1 Wells Fargo and the Government moved for dismissal of Plaintiffs’
claims.
A federal magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation (hereafter, the
“report”) concluding that all Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed, except for certain
claims asserted under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) for the return of coins
seized during the execution of search warrants. (Dkt. #74). For those Rule 41(g)
claims, the magistrate judge recommended that the case be stayed for thirty days to
allow the Government to institute forfeiture proceedings or any other judicial
proceeding regarding the seized coins. (Dkt. #74 at 21).
1 Plaintiffs’ operative complaint is their Second Amended Complaint. (Dkt. #46).
Case 4:22-cv-00055-SDJ-BD Document 87 Filed 03/25/26 Page 1 of 14 PageID #:
<pageID>
2
At the time the magistrate judge’s report was issued, it was unclear whether
the Government’s investigation of the seized coins remained ongoing and whether
criminal proceedings would be instituted against Plaintiffs. After the Court ordered
supplemental 	briefing 	on 	these 	issues, 	the 	Government 	confirmed 	that 	its
investigation is complete and that no criminal proceedings will be pursued against
Plaintiffs. The Government maintains, however, that Plaintiffs have no possessory
interest in the seized coins as a matter of law because the evidence submitted with
the Government’s dismissal motion, including the United States Mint’s analysis of
the coins, establishes that the coins are counterfeit.
The Court adopts the Report and Recommendation on all points except the
Rule 	41(g) 	analysis 	and 	related 	conclusion 	concerning 	Plaintiffs’ 	declaratory-
judgment claim. See (Dkt. #74). The Court overrules Plaintiffs’ objections, (Dkt. #75),
and grants both Defendant Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss, (Dkt. #48), and the
Government’s Motion to Dismiss, (Dkt. #56), as to all claims asserted by Plaintiffs.
I. B ACKGROUND
Plaintiffs claim that they are in the business of importing salvaged United
States coins from a recycling facility in China. (Dkt. #46 at 1). According to Plaintiffs,
the coins are collected from dump yards and metal recycling shipments in China and
shipped back to the United States to be redeemed by banks and coin-collecting
machines. (Dkt. #46 at 1). Previous shipments from Plaintiffs have been seized by the
Government and declared counterfeit by a federal district court. (Dkt. #46 at 2);
(Dkt. #56-1); see United States v. 5 Crates of Counterfeit Coins, No. CV20-8487-MWF,
Case 4:22-cv-00055-SDJ-BD Document 87 Filed 03/25/26 Page 2 of 14 PageID #:
<pageID>
3
2022 WL 18456983 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2022), aff’d, No. 23-55075, 2023 WL 6474456
(9th Cir. July 3, 2023).
In September 2021, the Government executed six warrants issued by this
Court against Plaintiffs. (Dkt. #18-1). During the searches, the Government seized
several items, including around $150,000 in suspected counterfeit coins. (Dkt. #46
at 6–7, 	14–16). 	Plaintiffs 	assert 	seven 	claims 	against 	the 	Government 	under
Rule 41(g) for the return of seized property, as well as negligence and FOIA-violation
claims. (Dkt. #46 at 14–17). Plaintiffs also seek a declaratory judgment that (1) “all
property seized or detained . . . was not counterfeit,” (2) “Plaintiff[s] did not engage
in illegal acts,” (3) Plaintiffs be removed “from all the blacklists [the Government]
maintains regarding counterfeit coins,” and (4) the Government notify all third
parties that it was mistaken that Plaintiffs were counterfeiters. (Dkt. #46 at 19). The
United States moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6), asserting that
Plaintiffs lack standing, filed certain claims in the wrong venue, assert claims that
are moot, and otherwise fail to assert facts that give rise to any liability on the part
of the Government. (Dkt. #56).
Plaintiffs further claim that the United States Secret Service “communicated
secretly” to Wells Fargo that Plaintiffs’ bank account “may have fruits of illegal
activity[.]” (Dkt. #46 at 17–18). They go on to assert that, as a result, Wells Fargo
closed Plaintiff Din Tai Technology, LLC’s (“DTT”) bank account, in alleged violation
of the bank’s “duty of care” to the customer. (Dkt. #46 at 17–18). Wells Fargo moved
to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiffs’
Case 4:22-cv-00055-SDJ-BD Document 87 Filed 03/25/26 Page 3 of 14 PageID #:
<pageID>
4
duty-of-care claim fails due to lack of standing and failure to state a cognizable legal
claim or any factual basis to support its allegations. (Dkt. #48).
The Government claims, and Plaintiffs have confirmed, that it has returned
all seized property except the coins. (Dkt. #67, #69). And as to the coins, the
magistrate judge correctly held that Plaintiffs lack capacity to recover coins belonging
to DTT and likewise cannot seek recovery in this Court of any coins seized at DFW
airport. See (Dkt. #74 at 12–13) (explaining that Rule 41(g) requires that a motion for
return of property “must be filed in the district where the property was seized,” and
that the Northern District of Texas is the proper venue to recover the ten boxes of
coins seized at the airport and referenced in the so-called “Abady letter”).
The report recommends that Wells Fargo’s dismissal motion be granted and
that Wells Fargo be dismissed. (Dkt. #74 at 9–10). The report further recommends
that the Government’s motion be granted as to (1) Plaintiffs’ claims against the
Government for return of property described in the “Abady letter,” (2) Plaintiffs’
negligence and FOIA claims, and (3) Plaintiffs’ request for declarations that Plaintiffs
are innocent of illegal acts and should be removed from “blacklists.” (Dkt. #74
at 10–13, 16–21). For the reasons described in the report, the Court adopts these
recommendations.
This 	Memorandum 	Opinion 	and 	Order 	addresses 	Plaintiffs’ 	remaining
Rule 41(g) claims concerning the return of coins seized during the execution of search
warrants issued by this Court. As to these coins, the report recommends that the case
be stayed for thirty days to allow the Government to institute forfeiture proceedings
Case 4:22-cv-00055-SDJ-BD Document 87 Filed 03/25/26 Page 4 of 14 PageID #:
<pageID>
5
or any other judicial proceeding regarding the coins. The report further recommends
that, as to Plaintiffs’ request for a declaratory judgment that the coins are not
counterfeit, the Government’s dismissal motion should be denied. (Dkt. #74 at 20).
Because the Government has established that the seized coins are counterfeit, these
recommendations are rejected.
II. LEGAL S TANDARD
A. Rule 41(g)
Rule 41(g) allows “[a] person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of
property or by the deprivation of property [to] move for the property’s return.” F ED.
R. CRIM . P. 41(g).2 “The Rule recognizes that the federal courts have equitable
jurisdiction to order the return of property.” Bertin v. United States, 478 F.3d 489,
492 (2d Cir. 2007). The Fifth Circuit has cautioned, however, that such jurisdiction
should be exercised with “caution and restraint.” Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29,
34 (5th Cir. 1974) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
To prevail on a Rule 41(g) motion, the moving party must demonstrate that:
“(1) [the party] is entitled to lawful possession of the seized property; (2) the property
is not contraband; and (3) either the seizure was illegal or the government’s need for
the property as evidence has ended.” United States v. Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F.Supp.3d
2 From its original adoption in 1944 until 2002, Rule 41 covered motions to return
property under subdivision (e). In 2002, the motion-to-return provision was redesignated
Rule 41(g). 3A Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 690 (4th ed. 2025). Courts
have recognized that case law interpreting former Rule 41(e) generally applies to current
Rule 41(g). Id.
Case 4:22-cv-00055-SDJ-BD Document 87 Filed 03/25/26 Page 5 of 14 PageID #:
<pageID>
6
287, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).3 The burden of proof for a Rule 41(g) motion turns on
whether the property is part of an ongoing criminal investigation or proceeding. See
United States v. Oduu, 564 F.App’x 127, 130 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (explaining
which party bears the evidentiary burden under Rule 41(g)). When the property
remains part of an ongoing criminal investigation or proceeding, the movant bears
the burden of proof to show that he or she is entitled to the property. Oduu,
564 F.App’x at 130 (citing United States v. Chambers, 192 F.3d 374, 377 (3d Cir.
1999)). “But when criminal proceedings have ended, that burden shifts to the
Government.” Id.; see also United States v. Gladding, 775 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir.
2014) (the “burden of proof changes when the property in question is no longer needed
for evidentiary purposes, either because trial is complete, the defendant has pleaded
guilty, or . . . the government has abandoned its investigation”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The Fifth Circuit has recognized that Rule 41(g) motions filed after criminal
proceedings have concluded should be treated as a civil action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Oduu, 564 F.App’x at 130; see also Serrano v. Customs & Border Patrol, U.S.
Customs & Border Patrol, 975 F.3d 488, 499 (5th Cir. 2020) (same); Lavin v. United
3 The Fifth Circuit has provided guidance on additional considerations applicable to
cases involving a suit for the return of property “prior to the initiation of any civil or criminal
proceedings flowing from the seizure of property.” Richey v. Smith, 515 F.2d 1239, 1243
(5th Cir. 1975). Such considerations include whether “the motion for return of property
accurately alleges that government agents . . . in seizing the property displayed a callous
disregard for the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff],” the plaintiff’s “individual interest in
and need for the material” to be returned, whether the plaintiff “would be irreparably injured
by denial of the return of the property,” and whether an adequate remedy at law is available
to address plaintiff’s grievance. Id. at 1243–44; see also Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29,
34 (5th Cir. 1974) (same).
Case 4:22-cv-00055-SDJ-BD Document 87 Filed 03/25/26 Page 6 of 14 PageID #:
<pageID>
7
States, 299 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that, once a criminal case has
concluded, courts construe a Rule 41(g) motion as “initiating a civil action in equity”).
The denial of such a post-criminal-proceeding Rule 41(g) motion is treated as a grant
of summary judgment in favor of the Government. Oduu, 564 F.App’x at 130 (citing
Clymore v. United States, 217 F.3d 370, 373 (5th Cir. 2000)).
B. No Possessory Interest in Contraband
“The general rule is that seized property, other than contraband, should be
returned to its rightful owner once the criminal proceedings have terminated.”
Cooper v. City of Greenwood, 904 F.2d 302, 304 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Contraband is of two types: contraband per se and
derivative contraband. Contraband per se consists of objects which are “intrinsically
illegal in character,” “the possession of which, without more, constitutes a crime.” One
1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699–700, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 1250,
14 	L.Ed.2d 	170 	(1965). 	Derivative 	contraband 	“includes 	items 	which 	are 	not
inherently unlawful but which may become unlawful because of the use to which they
are put—for example, an automobile used in a bank robbery.” Cooper, 904 F.2d
at 305.
The seized coins at issue here, if established to be counterfeits, are contraband
per se. The forfeiture statute provides that “[a]ll counterfeits of any coins . . . of the
United States . . . shall be forfeited to the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 492. In addition,
49 U.S.C. § 80302 defines counterfeit coins as contraband. 49 U.S.C. § 80302(a)(3)(A)
(explaining that contraband includes “a forged, altered, or counterfeit . . . coin or an
Case 4:22-cv-00055-SDJ-BD Document 87 Filed 03/25/26 Page 7 of 14 PageID #:
<pageID>
8
obligation or other security of the United States Government”). “Items that are
considered ‘contraband’ or ‘counterfeit’ under Section 492 are deemed illegal per se
and automatically forfeited without having to satisfy the otherwise applicable
forfeiture procedures.” United States v. Von Nothaus, No. 5:09CR27-RLV, 2014 WL
6750312, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 1, 2014); see also Boggs v. Merletti, 987 F.Supp. 1, 10
(D.D.C. 1997) (same). Courts will not consider a claim contesting the confiscation of
contraband per se because “one cannot have a property right in that which is not
subject to legal possession.” Cooper, 904 F.2d at 305; see also, e.g., Oquendo v. City of
New York, 492 F.Supp.3d 20, 29 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (“It is blackletter law that an
individual does not have a possessory interest in contraband.”).
* 	* 	* 	*
The framework for evaluating Rule 41(g) motions is unusual, to be sure. As
presented 	here, 	the 	Court 	construes 	Plaintiffs’ 	motion 	as 	arising 	after 	the
Government’s criminal investigation had concluded. Accordingly, the motion will be
treated as a civil action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, invoking the Court’s equitable power
to return property. In its dismissal motion the Government argues that, because the
coins are counterfeit, they are forfeited as a matter of law and Plaintiffs have no
legitimate interest in them. In this post-criminal-investigation equitable proceeding,
the Government has the burden of proof to show that the coins are contraband.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Rule 41(g) and Related Declaratory Judgment Claims
The Government’s Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal motion argues that, because the
seized coins are counterfeit, Plaintiffs have no legal right to possess them and no
Case 4:22-cv-00055-SDJ-BD Document 87 Filed 03/25/26 Page 8 of 14 PageID #:
<pageID>
9
standing to seek their return. A motion to dismiss for lack of standing may be either
“facial” or “factual.” Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1981). An
attack is “factual” rather than “facial” if the defendant “submits affidavits, testimony,
or other evidentiary materials.” Id.
The Government’s motion to dismiss is factual. It has provided proof that the
seized coins are counterfeit and therefore contraband per se that cannot be returned
to Plaintiffs. The United States Mint (the “Mint”) conducted an analysis of a
representative sample of the seized coins. The Mint tested the coins’ electromagnetic
properties, chemical properties, and analyzed the struck image and accompanying
surface features of the coins. Based on that analysis, the Mint found the sample of
coins to be inconsistent with the visual/physical characteristics, chemistry, and
physics of U.S. coinage. These conclusions were made at a 99.9% confidence interval.
(Dkt. 	#56–2) 	(Declaration 	of 	J.B. 	Christian 	with 	Laboratory 	Report). 	The
Government’s methodology and findings are consistent with findings accepted by
courts in prior cases, including a case involving these same Plaintiffs. See 5 Crates of
Counterfeit Coins, 2022 WL 18456983, at *1–3. In 5 Crates, the Eastern District of
California accepted a similar analysis to the methodology employed here. See id.;
(Dkt. #56 at 11); (Dkt. #56-1 at 4–5).
In response, Plaintiffs failed to provide any affirmative evidence to the
contrary. Instead, Plaintiffs submitted a report from their own expert that merely
attempts to challenge the Mint’s methodology and process as unreliable by levying
objections with little to no explanation as to their relevance. For example, Plaintiffs’
Case 4:22-cv-00055-SDJ-BD Document 87 Filed 03/25/26 Page 9 of 14 PageID #:
<pageID>
10
report objects that “[t]here is no explanation why it took one year and one month from
the last test until the [Mint’s] report was created and signed.” (Dkt. #60-1 at 1).
However, Plaintiffs do not explain the relevance of this observation or how it casts
doubt on the Mint report’s validity. And, as described in the Government expert’s
declaration, all the testing that forms the basis of the Mint’s report was performed
within a month after the Mint received the samples. (Dkt. #56–2 ¶ 8).
Plaintiffs, through their expert, also complain that the Mint’s report did not
include the raw data supporting the test results on the coins. But as the Government
correctly notes, it is unsurprising that the Mint’s report does not include raw data,
particularly as to genuine coins and Mint specifications, because publicizing such
specific data concerning genuine currency would serve as a blueprint to other
counterfeiters. Further, the Mint’s report, together with the declaration of its expert
who performed the analysis, outlines the thoroughness of its testing, which included
twelve separate tests on each coin covering three test areas—physical, chemistry, and
physics—resulting in the conclusion that the seized coins did not occupy the same
data 	space 	as 	authentic 	coins. 	(Dkt. 	#56–2 	¶¶ 	16–18). 	Plaintiffs 	present 	no
meaningful challenge to the Mint’s testing method or its conclusions.4
4 Plaintiffs’ expert suggests that the weights and compositions of the coins in this case
were consistent with standard currency, undermining the Mint’s conclusions. (Dkt. #60–1).
But the weight and composition of coins are publicly available in a statute, 31 U.S.C. § 5112,
and therefore may be mimicked. Such an appearance of consistency with genuine coins does
not mean that the coins are genuine. In this regard, Plaintiffs have no answer to the Mint
report’s analysis demonstrating that the coins at issue were made by a manufacturer other
than the Mint. (Dkt. #56–2 at 10) (Figure 3).
Case 4:22-cv-00055-SDJ-BD Document 87 Filed 03/25/26 Page 10 of 14 PageID #:
<pageID>
11
As explained herein, see supra Part II.A, the denial of a post-criminal-
proceeding Rule 41(g) motion is treated as a grant of summary judgment in favor of
the Government. Summary judgment is not proper if the nonmovant shows that there
are genuine disputes of material fact and the movant is not entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. F ED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see also Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656–57,
134 S.Ct. 1861, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014). To show that the asserted facts are genuinely
disputed, the nonmovant must show that (1) the materials cited by the movant do not
establish the absence of a genuine dispute or (2) the movant cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the material fact. F ED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(B).
The Government has presented admissible evidence with its dismissal motion
that conclusively establishes the coins at issue are not genuine, and Plaintiffs have
failed to present any evidence that undermines this finding or shows that there is a
genuine issue of material fact. The Court concludes that the seized coins are
counterfeit. As such, the coins are contraband and Plaintiffs have no lawful right to
possess them. See Boggs, 987 F.Supp. at 10 (“Individuals have no property right in
contraband materials and contraband materials may not be returned to them.”). The
Government’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Rule 41(g) motion as to the seized coins is
granted.
Plaintiffs’ request for a declaratory judgment that the coins are not counterfeit
is also dismissed. The Declaratory Judgment Act does not extend the jurisdiction of
federal courts; it only enlarges the range of potential remedies available. See Skelly
Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671, 70 S.Ct. 876, 94 L.Ed. 1194 (1950)
Case 4:22-cv-00055-SDJ-BD Document 87 Filed 03/25/26 Page 11 of 14 PageID #:
<pageID>
12
(“The operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural only. Congress
enlarged the range of remedies available in the federal courts but did not extend their
jurisdiction.”) (cleaned up); see also Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Crescent Ford Truck
Sales, Inc., 666 F.3d 932, 938 (5th Cir. 2012) (same). The Declaratory Judgment Act
does not establish an independent basis for subject-matter jurisdiction. In re B-727
Aircraft Serial No. 21010, 272 F.3d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 2001). Instead, in a case
asserting a claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act, the cause of action that
provides a footing for the court to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction “must arise
under some other federal law.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here, Plaintiffs have no
standing to assert any claim regarding the seized coins, which the Court has
determined are counterfeit. Accordingly, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’
request for a declaratory judgment that the coins are not counterfeit.
B. Plaintiffs’ Objections
Plaintiffs 	made 	objections 	to 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge’s 	Report 	and
Recommendation. As to the objections to the portions of the report adopted by the
Court, a de novo review was conducted of the objections and the portions of the report
to which Plaintiffs specifically object, and the Court is of the opinion that the findings
and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge are correct and that the objections are
without merit as to the ultimate findings of the Magistrate Judge. As to the objections
leveled by Plaintiffs to the findings and recommendations of the report that have been
rejected by the Court, such objections are overruled as moot given the Court’s
holdings in this order.
Case 4:22-cv-00055-SDJ-BD Document 87 Filed 03/25/26 Page 12 of 14 PageID #:
<pageID>
13
IV. C ONCLUSION
It is ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation of the United States
Magistrate Judge, (Dkt. #74), is ADOPTED in part and MODIFIED in part. The
Court adopts the following findings and conclusions:
• 	Plaintiffs lacked capacity to represent DTT’s interest as pro se plaintiffs in
federal court and lacked standing for their claims against Wells Fargo.
• 	Plaintiffs’ Rule 41(g) claims are moot as to all property that has already been
returned, and Plaintiffs lack standing to assert any Rule 41(g) claims based on
property described in the Abady letter.
• 	Plaintiffs’ negligence claim fails due to failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.
• 	Plaintiffs’ FOIA claim fails due to lack of jurisdiction.
The Court modifies the following findings and conclusions:
• 	Plaintiffs’ Rule 41(g) motion as to the coins seized during execution of the
search 	warrants 	is 	construed 	to 	arise 	after 	the 	Government’s 	criminal
investigation had concluded. Accordingly, the motion is treated as a civil action
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, invoking the Court’s equitable power to return
property.
• 	The Court finds that the Government has established that the coins are
counterfeit. Under 18 U.S.C. § 492, the coins are forfeited to the United States
as a matter of law. Plaintiffs’ Rule 41(g) motion as to the coins is DISMISSED.
Case 4:22-cv-00055-SDJ-BD Document 87 Filed 03/25/26 Page 13 of 14 PageID #:
<pageID>
14
• 	The Court DISMISSES all of Plaintiffs’ requests for declaratory relief. There
is no underlying claim on which to support a declaratory judgment action.
It is therefore ORDERED that Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, (Dkt. #46), and Brief in Support,
(Dkt. #48), is 	GRANTED 	and that 	Plaintiffs’ claims 	against 	Wells Fargo are
DISMISSED.
It is further ORDERED that Defendant United States’s Motion to Dismiss,
(Dkt. #56), is GRANTED and that Plaintiffs’ claims against the United States are
DISMISSED.
A final judgment will follow by separate order.
Case 4:22-cv-00055-SDJ-BD Document 87 Filed 03/25/26 Page 14 of 14 PageID #:
<pageID>

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.