USA v. Villatoro

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
WILFIDO ADAN HERRERA
VILLATORO
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CASE NUMBER 4:21-CR-52
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE
Pending before the undersigned is a pro se Motion for Compassionate Release pursuant to
18 U.S.C. ' 3582(c)(1)(A) (doc. #58) filed by Defendant.1 The Government responded to
Defendant’s motion in opposition. (Doc. #60.) Probation is also opposed to Defendant’s motion.
After reviewing all applicable facts and law, the undersigned recommends denying Defendant’s
motion without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant was convicted of the offense of Conspiracy to Manufacture and Distribute
Cocaine Intending, Knowing, and with Reasonable Cause to Believe that the Cocaine will be
Unlawfully Imported into the United States, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963 and 21 U.S.C. §
960(b)(1), a Class A felony. He was arrested initially in Huehuetenango, Guatemala on January
18, 2022, on a federal indictment warrant and extradited to the United States on June 23, 2022,
being ultimately detained since that time. He was sentenced on March 8, 2024, by The Honorable
Michael J. Truncale, to a term of 70 months’ imprisonment followed by a 2-year term of supervised
release.
1 This motion was referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for review, hearing if necessary,
and submission of a report with recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B);
E.D. TEX. LOCAL R. CR-59(a); (Doc. #62).
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Defendant is scheduled for release from the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) on August 11,
2026. See BOP INMATE LOCATOR, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited February 19,
2026). Probation reported that his projected satisfaction date for First Step Act Release (with his
current 120 days of First Step Act Credits included) is September 10, 2026, with a home detention
eligibility date of March 10, 2026.
Defendant argues that he should receive compassionate release based on “(1) the 2025
amendments to the United States Sentencing Guidelines that allow a presumption of a mitigating-
role adjustment for low-level, paid-task offenders; (2) Fifth and Ninth Circuit precedent applying
these amendments; (3) Defendant’s verified low level role and lack of proprietary interest; and (4)
his already overserved sentence under the newly applicable Guideline framework.” (Doc. #58.)
The Government responded to Defendant’s motion stating that Defendant failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies with the BOP and failed to meet his burden of showing extraordinary
and compelling circumstances. (Doc. #60.) Specifically, the Government alleges that the
amendment does not apply retroactively to his case, nor would his case be successful on the merits
as he took on more than a minor role in this drug trafficking operation. (Id.) The Probation
Department for the Eastern District of Texas also recommends denying Defendant’s motion for
the same reasons as well as a lack of evidence to support that he has any medical issues that would
qualify as an extraordinary and compelling circumstance.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Section 3582(c)(1)(A) “authorize[s] a sentence reduction where: (1) ‘extraordinary and
compelling reasons warrant such a reduction,’ (2) ‘such a reduction is consistent with applicable
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission,’ and (3) such a reduction is appropriate
‘after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.’”
United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 389 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)).
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Section 3582(c)(1)(A) does not define the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that may
merit compassionate release. The Sentencing Commission, however, has the authority to
“promulgate general policy statements … that describe what should be considered extraordinary
and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of
specific examples.” United States v. Williams, No. 3:18-CR-0291-B-2, 2021 WL 1865005, at *2
(N.D. Tex. 2021) (quoting Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 391). On November 1, 2023, the Sentencing
Commission issued an amended policy statement, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, setting forth the
circumstances that are considered “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” These include the
defendant’s medical circumstances, age, family circumstances, whether the defendant is a victim
of abuse, “other reasons,” and whether he is serving an unusually long sentence. See U.S.S.G. §
1B1.13(b).2 As of November 1, 2023, policy statement 1B1.13 applies to motions filed by the
Director of the BOP and motions filed by a defendant. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a).
In addition, the Fifth Circuit explained—after looking at the terms “extraordinary” and
“compelling” in the dictionary—that prisoners can seek relief under § 3582(c)(1) only when they
face some “extraordinarily severe exigency, not foreseeable at the time of sentencing, and unique
to the life of the prisoner.” United States v. Escajeda, 58 F.4th 184, 186 (5th Cir. 2023).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Before seeking relief from the court, a defendant must first submit a request to the warden
of the facility where he is housed to move for compassionate release on his behalf and then either
exhaust his administrative remedies or wait 30 days from the warden’s receipt of his request. 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Franco, 973 F.3d 465, 467 (5th Cir. 2020). After 30 days
2 Section six of this policy statement (for unusually long sentences) is not applicable in the Fifth Circuit as
its precedent precludes considering non-retroactive changes in any law as an extraordinary and compelling reason
justifying sentence reduction. United States v. Austin, 125 F.4th 688, 692 (5th Cir. 2025).
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have passed or the defendant has exhausted all administrative rights to appeal the BOP’s failure to
move on his behalf, a defendant may ask a court for a sentence reduction under section
3582(c)(1)(A).
Defendant asserts in a conclusory fashion that he filed a request with Bureau of Prisons
and more than 30 days have passed without relief. (Doc. #58, p. 2.) Attached to his motion is a
form for compassionate release filled out on October 13, 2025, stating that he has a debilitating
medical condition due to pain in his hip from two bullets inside his body. (Id., p. 6.) It is unclear
if this was a form submitted to BOP. Moreover, Defendant is not asserting medical grounds in his
current motion with the court.
In Defendant’s reply, he stated that he submitted a formal request to the warden of FCI
Miami on January 15, 2025, and he attached a copy of said request. (Doc. #61-1.) This request
sought a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(c), which provides for application of
time credits toward prerelease custody for prisoners who participate in recidivism reduction
programs or productive activities. (Id.) He also requested a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(1)(A) for extraordinary and compelling reasons, but he did not assert any specific grounds.
(Id); see United States v. York, No. 4:07-CR-181-SDJ, 2025 WL 1397198, at *2 (E.D. Tex. May
14, 2025), appeal dism’d, No. 25-40360, 2025 WL 3733894 (5th Cir. Aug. 6, 2025) (holding that
a broad, general request to the warden will not meet the exhaustion requirement because it fails to
give the BOP an opportunity to fairly evaluate the prisoner’s request).
Probation reported to the court on December 16, 2025, that a record check with the Bureau
of Prisons revealed no administrative remedy data available and provided the court with a printout
dated December 10, 2025, stating “no remedy data exists for this inmate.” Further, the probation
officer attempted to contact the Supervisory Attorney at the Bureau of Prisons Consolidated Legal
Center, Mr. Robert Clark, along with Defendant’s assigned case manager at the Bureau of Prisons,
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Mr. Mohamad Osman, Miami FCI, to verify the status of his administrative remedies, with no
response received from either source.
As such, there is no evidence to confirm that Defendant has satisfied the administrative
remedies requirement of § 3582(c)(1)(A). Furthermore, the court finds that Defendant’s motion
lacks merit as discussed below.
B. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons
Defendant argues that the court should grant compassionate release based upon “other
reasons” and points to Amendment 833, which amended sentencing guidelines 3B1.2 (mitigating
role) and 2D1.1(e)(2) (offense level for drug crimes) and went into effect on November 1, 2025.3
These guidelines were amended to provide favorable adjustments to the offense level of defendants
who played a minor role in a drug conspiracy and to make sure that drug quantity alone will not
defeat a minor-role reduction. This amendment, however, is not one of the selected amendments
to be applied retroactively. See U.S.S.G. 1B1.10(d).
The Fifth Circuit has held very clearly that “a non-retroactive change in the law is not an
extraordinary or compelling reason to reduce a prisoner’s sentence.” Austin, 125 F.4th at 692.
The court explained that a non-retroactive change in the law affects every prisoner previously
sentenced under that provision in the exact same way, so it cannot be an “extraordinarily severe
exigency” nor “unique to the life of the prisoner” as the court previously defined the phrase. As
such, this change in the law may not be considered an extraordinary and compelling circumstance.
Nonetheless, Defendant’s claim that he took on only a minor role in the multiple drug
trafficking organizations of which he was a member is without merit. As explained in detail in the
Government’s response and in the Presentence Investigation Report, Defendant was a high-level
cocaine dealer that facilitated, received, and purchased large quantities of cocaine in Guatemala
3 Defendant incorrectly states that this amendment went into effect on November 1, 2023.
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for distribution there as well as Mexico and the United States. (Docs. #44, #60.) He was identified
as a “right-hand man” for the heads of the organizations. (Id.) He conducted cocaine deals that
involved millions of dollars and hundreds of kilograms of cocaine. (Id.) Given these facts,
Defendant would not qualify for a minor role reduction under the guidelines.
C. Section 3553 Factors and Danger
Notwithstanding all previous analysis, compassionate release should be denied because it
is not justified by the Section 3553(a) factors and Defendant remains a possible danger to the
community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (requiring courts to consider the § 3553(a) factors
before granting compassionate release); United States v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 693–94 (5th
Cir. 2020). Even when a prisoner has demonstrated an extraordinary and compelling reason under
the compassionate-release statute, relief may still “be refused after weighing the sentencing factors
of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id.
The factors are as follows: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed (A) to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from
further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3)
the kinds of sentences available; (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established
for--(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as
set forth in the guidelines; (5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing
Commission; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide
restitution to any victims of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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In reference to the offense conduct, as discussed above, Defendant was a part of multiple
sophisticated drug trafficking operations, which distributed narcotics to several countries.
Although there is no evidence that Defendant has shown himself to be violent, his drug distribution
poses a danger to the community. See United States v. Morgan, No. 3:12-CR-220-L, 2013 WL
363437, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2013) (citing United States v. Hare, 873 F.2d 796, 799 (5th Cir.
1989)) (“A person’s continued drug dealing or distribution of drugs constitutes “a danger and
threat to the community.”).
Further, there is a need for Defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment, and to afford
adequate deterrence from future criminal conduct. The nature of the offense, his dangerousness,
and all other applicable factors fail to persuade the court that Defendant should receive
compassionate release in this case. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
IV. RECOMMENDATION
The “burden falls on the defendant to convince the [court] to exercise discretion to grant
the motion for compassionate release.” Ward v United States, 11 F.4th 354, 359–60 (5th Cir.
2021). The undersigned finds that Defendant has failed to meet his burden in demonstrating an
extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. Accordingly, the undersigned
recommends denying Defendant’s motion.
V. OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), each party to this action has the right to file
objections to this Report and Recommendation. Objections to this Report must (1) be in writing,
(2) specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the party objects, (3) be
served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report, and (4) be
no more than eight (8) pages in length. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); FED. R. CRIM. P. 59(b)(2);
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E.D. TEX. LOCAL R. CR-59(c). A party who objects to this Report is entitled to a de novo
determination by the United States district judge of those proposed findings and recommendations
to which a specific objection is timely made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); FED. R. CRIM. P. 59(b)(3).
A party’s failure to file specific, written objections to the proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in this report, within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy
of this report, bars that party from: (1) entitlement to de novo review by the United States district
judge of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, see Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276–
77 (5th Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error, of any such findings
of fact and conclusions of law accepted by the United States district judge, see Douglass v. United
Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
.
___________________________________
Christine L Stetson
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SIGNED this the 24th day of February, 2026.
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