USA v. Haynes et al

4:16-cr-00093Txed28 avr. 2026

Texte intégral

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
HECTOR ROMERO
Defendant.
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Case No. 4:16-cr-93-ALM-AGD-3
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Pro Se Motion for Compassionate Release
(the “Motion”) (Dkt. #270). Having considered the Motion and the relevant pleadings, the Court
finds that the Motion should be DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On October 12, 2016, a United States Grand Jury indicted Hector Romero (“Defendant”)
and two codefendants in a one-count indictment for conspiracy to possess with the intent to
manufacture and distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Dkt. #30).
On September 15, 2017, Defendant appeared before U.S. District Judge Marcia A. Crone
for sentencing pursuant to his plea of guilty and was subsequently sentenced to a 262-month term
of imprisonment followed by a five-year term of supervised release (Dkt. #197).
On July 8, 2025, Defendant filed the instant Motion (Dkt. #270). The Government did not
respond.1 The Court considered all of Defendant’s arguments and construed them liberally. See
1 	The United States Probation Office did note its opposition to Defendant’s request for compassionate release in a
letter sent to the Court on August 5, 2025 (the “Probation Office Letter”).
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United States v. Mitchell, No. 4:04-CR-106-31, 2023 WL 3075941, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2023)
(noting that courts construe pro se motions liberally).
LEGAL STANDARD
I. 	18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)
A judgment of conviction imposing a sentence of imprisonment “‘constitutes a final
judgment’ and may not be modified by a district court except in limited circumstances.” Dillon v.
United States, 560 U.S. 817, 824 (2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b)). “Often referred to as
‘compassionate release,’ § 3582(c)(1)(A) embodies a rare exception to a conviction’s finality.”
United States v. Wilson, No. 1:07-CR-236-MAC-CLS-1, 2024 WL 4267923, at *3 (E.D. Tex.
Sept. 23, 2024). The statute gives the Court discretion, under certain circumstances, to reduce a
defendant’s term of imprisonment. Id. The First Step Act of 2018, in part, states:
(A) 	the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons
[(“BOP”)], or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully
exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring
a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt
of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is
earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of
probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not
exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after
considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they
are applicable, if it finds that—
(i) 	extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; or
(ii) 	the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years
in prison, pursuant to a sentence imposed under section 3559(c), for
the offense or offenses for which the defendant is currently
imprisoned, and a determination has been made by the Director of
the [BOP] that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any
other person or the community, as provided under section 3142(g);
and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by
the Sentencing Commission . . . .
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Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, codified as 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A).2
Instead of defining “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” Congress delegated its
authority to the United States Sentencing Commission (“Commission”) to define the term. See
28 U.S.C. § 994(t) (directing the Commission to “describe what should be considered
extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied
and a list of specific examples”); see also Wilson, 2024 WL 4267923, at *3 (collecting cases); United
States v. Jean, 108 F.4th 275, 278 (5th Cir. 2024). “Although the Commission issued a policy
statement prior to the passage of the [First Step Act] that described the reasons that qualify as
extraordinary and compelling, that policy statement referenced only those motions filed by the
Director of the [Bureau of Prisons] . . . .” Wilson, 2024 WL 4267923, at *3. Accordingly, the Fifth
Circuit held that the policy statement was inapplicable to motions filed by defendants on their own
behalf. United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 2021).
This changed on November 1, 2023, when the amendments to the United States
Sentencing 	Guidelines 	(“Guidelines”) 	became 	effective. 	The 	Commission 	amended 	the
Guidelines to extend the applicability of the policy statement set forth in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 to
defendant-filed motions and to broaden the scope of what qualifies as “extraordinary and
compelling” reasons potentially warranting compassionate release. Wilson, 2024 WL 4267923,
at *4 (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13). Section 1B1.13(b), as amended, identifies six categories of
circumstances that may qualify as “extraordinary and compelling.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b). The
categories are: (1) the medical circumstances of the defendant; (2) the age of the defendant; (3) the
2 	This provision is often referred to as “compassionate release.” See Wilson, 2024 WL 4267923, at *3 (citing United
States v. Escajeda, 58 F.4th 184, 186 (5th Cir. 2023)).
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family circumstances of the defendant; (4) whether the defendant was a victim of abuse while in
custody; (5) other reasons similar in gravity to those previously described; and (6) an unusually
long sentence. Id. § 1B1.13(b)(1)–(6). Notably, rehabilitation alone is insufficient to grant a
defendant’s motion for compassionate release. Jean, 108 F.4th at 279.
II. 	Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Section 3582(c)(1)(A) states that the Court may not grant a defendant’s motion for
compassionate release unless the defendant has complied with the administrative exhaustion
requirement. Wilson, 2024 WL 4267923, at *4 (first citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); then citing
United States v. Garrett, 15 F.4th 335, 337 (5th Cir. 2021); and then United States v. Franco, 973
F.3d 465, 467 (5th Cir. 2020)).3 That is, a defendant may not seek relief from a court before first
exhausting each administrative avenue available to the defendant. See Wilson, 2024 WL 4267923,
at *4. “Accordingly, before seeking relief from the [C]ourt, a defendant must first submit a request
to the warden of his facility to move for compassionate release on his behalf and then either exhaust
his administrative remedies or wait for the lapse of 30 days after the warden received the request.”
Id. (first citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); then citing Garrett, 15 F.4th at 338).
This exhaustion requirement is a “mandatory claim-processing rule,” which means a
defendant may not waive it himself. Franco, 973 F.3d at 468; see also United States v. Rivas, 833
F. App’x 556, 558 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“Because the statutory language is
mandatory . . . we must enforce this procedural rule . . . .”). However, that is not to say the
exhaustion requirement can never be waived. Section 3582(c)’s exhaustion requirement is a claim-
3 	The exhaustion requirement applies whether the motion is styled as one for compassionate release or merely for a
sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Wilson, 2024 WL 4267923, at *4.
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processing rule—not a jurisdictional prerequisite. Ward v. United States, 11 F.4th 354, 361 (5th Cir.
2021). Thus, like other claim-processing rules, “the Government must properly raise the rule
before it will be enforced.” Id. (citation modified); see also Fort Bend County. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct.
1843, 1849 (2019) (citation modified) (“A claim-processing rule may be ‘mandatory’ in the sense
that a court must enforce the rule if a party properly raises it . . . But an objection based on a
mandatory claim-processing rule may be forfeited if the party asserting the rule waits too long to
raise the point.”). In turn, if the Government does not invoke the exhaustion requirement, the
Court 	will 	deem 	the 	matter 	waived 	for 	the 	purposes 	of 	a 	defendant’s 	motion
under § 3582(c)(1)(A). See Ward, 11 F.4th at 361; see also United States v. McLean, No. 21-40015,
2022 WL 44618, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 5, 2022) (finding abuse of discretion where the failure to
exhaust administrative remedies was raised sua sponte).
III. 	U.S.S.G.’s Policy Statement
A. 	Defendant’s medical circumstances (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1))
The Sentencing Commission has enumerated four separate medical circumstances to
consider in evaluating a compassionate release request. U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.13(b)(1)(A)–(D).
First, whether the defendant is “suffering from a terminal illness (i.e., a serious and
advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory).” Id. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(A). Although a life-expectancy
prognosis is not required, the provided examples make clear how serious the illness must be:
“metastatic solid-tumor cancer, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), end-stage organ disease, and
advanced dementia.” Id. Fifth Circuit precedent is in accord. See, e.g., United States v. McMaryion,
No. 21-50450, 2023 WL 4118015, at *2 (5th Cir. June 22, 2023) (per curiam) (“We have said that
a late-stage, terminal prognosis can constitute an extraordinary and compelling basis for a
§ 3582(c)(1) motion.”). Generic conditions like hypertension or high cholesterol are insufficient.
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See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 984 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 2021) (finding neither hypertension
nor high cholesterol to be terminal conditions); United States v. Koons, 455 F. Supp. 3d
285, 291-92 (W.D. La. 2020) (similar, but for high cholesterol, hypertension, and acid reflux).
Second, whether the defendant is “(i) suffering from a serious physical or medical
condition, (ii) suffering from a serious functional or cognitive impairment, or (iii) experiencing
deteriorating physical or mental health because of the aging process.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B).
This condition must be so severe that it “substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to
provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not
expected to recover.” Id. When the defendant’s conditions are “managed effectively by
medication and do not substantially diminish the ability of the defendant to provide self-care,” the
defendant’s medical condition is not an “extraordinary and compelling reason[] warranting
compassionate release . . . .” United States v. Love, 853 F. App’x 986, 987 (5th Cir. 2021) (per
curiam) (unpublished) (citation modified).
Third, whether the defendant is “suffering from a medical condition that requires
long-term or specialized medical care that is not being provided and without which the defendant
is at risk of serious deterioration in health or death.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(C). This subcategory
focuses on the lack of resources and medical care available in some correctional facilities. Courts
have found insufficient general complaints about long-term issues without medical proof of the
condition or how it is deteriorating. See, e.g., United States v. Ani, No. 21-00147, 2024 WL 50775,
at *4 (D. Haw. Jan. 4, 2024) (“BOP is providing him with medical care, such as medication. There
is no evidence that his medical conditions are deteriorating; that his medical conditions require
long-term or specialized medical care that is not being provided and without which he is at risk of
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serious deterioration in health or death; or that his ability to care for himself has been seriously
diminished.”); United States v. Dessaure-Outlaw, No. CR 122-023, 2024 WL 83327, at *2 (S.D.
Ga. Jan. 8, 2024) (finding general complaints about surgery complication and diabetes insufficient).
Fourth, whether the defendant is in a facility that is “at imminent risk of being affected by
(I) an ongoing outbreak of infectious disease, or (II) an ongoing public health emergency declared
by the appropriate federal, state, or local authority.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(D)(i). In addition,
the defendant’s “personal health risk factors and custodial status” must put them “at increased
risk of suffering severe medical complications or death . . . .” Id. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(D)(ii). The facility
must also be unable to “adequately mitigate[]” the defendant’s increased risk “in a timely
manner.” Id. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(D)(iii).
Courts have repeatedly denied motions related to the COVID-19 pandemic under this
section.4 In fact, the Fifth Circuit has “repeatedly denied relief in cases where prisoners sought
compassionate release due to fear of communicable disease, even when those prisoners were in
poor health.” McMaryion, 2023 WL 4118015, at *2 (citing Thompson, 984 F.3d at 432–34 (denying
relief to a hypertensive stroke survivor concerned by COVID-19)); see also United States v.
Rodriguez, 27 F.4th 1097, 1098–1101 (5th Cir. 2022) (denying relief where movant fearing COVID-
19 suffered from heart failure). Indeed, “the mere existence of COVID-19 in society and the
possibility that it may spread to a particular prison alone 	cannot independently justify
compassionate release . . . .” United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir. 2020); see also Koons,
4 	See, e.g., United States v. Blair, No. 5:19-CR-50058, 2023 WL 8223470, at *3 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 6, 2023) (finding the
mere risk of COVID-19 infection was too speculative to serve as an extraordinary and compelling medical
circumstance); United States v. Williams, No. GLR-97-355, 2023 WL 8019023, at *4 (D. M.D. Nov. 20, 2023)
(“Hypertension and high BMI were not sufficient to warrant a prisoner’s relief when the BOP facility’s COVID-19
numbers were low, and the inmate did not show that he would not receive appropriate treatment if he were to
contract the virus.”).
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455 F. Supp. 3d at 290 (“[A] prisoner cannot satisfy his burden of proof by simply citing to
nationwide COVID-19 statistics, asserting generalized statements on conditions of confinement
within the BOP . . . .”).
Further, the increased risk from an outbreak or emergency must exist at the time relief
would be granted. The Sentencing Commission drafted this section using words that convey the
necessary, continuous nature of the risk—“at imminent risk of being affected,” “ongoing
outbreak,” “ongoing public health emergency,” and “increased risk of suffering.” U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(b)(1)(D). As applied to COVID-19, this is no longer the case: both international and
domestic health authorities, including the World Health Organization,5 the United States Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention,6 and the U.S. Federal Government,7 have made clear that the
COVID-19 pandemic has ended.8 Thus, the COVID-19 pandemic no longer constitutes an
“extraordinary and compelling reason” for compassionate release.
B. 	Defendant’s age (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(2))
There are three requirements for the defendant’s age to constitute an extraordinary and
compelling reason for release. First, the defendant must be “at least 65 years old.” U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(b)(2). Second, they must be “experiencing a serious deterioration in physical or mental
5 	Statement on the Fifteenth Meeting of the IHR (2005) Emergency Committee on the COVID-19 Pandemic, W ORLD
HEALTH O RG . (May 5, 2023), https://www.who.int/news/item/05-05-2023-statement-on-the-fifteenth-meeting-
of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-regarding-the-coronavirus-disease-(covid-
19)-pandemic [https://perma.cc/MR64-X7UV].
6 	End of the Federal COVID-19 Public Health Emergency (PHE) Declaration, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention (May 5, 2023),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/your-health/end-of-phe.html#:~:text=The%20federal%20COVID-
19%20PHE,share%20certain%20data%20will%20change [https://perma.cc/3S43-2VNT].
7 See National Emergencies Act, PL 118-3, April 10, 2023, 137 Stat 6.
8 	See also United States v. Ford, No. 1:16-CR-19, 2023 WL 3477168, at *5 (N.D. Ind. May 15, 2023) (noting that “on
May 11, 2023, the federal government ended the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency based on widespread
prevention and control measures like vaccination”) (quotations omitted).
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health because of the aging process.” Id. Third, the defendant must have “served at least 10 years
or 75 percent of his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is less.” Id.
C. 	Defendant’s family circumstances (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3))
The Sentencing Commission enumerates four potential reasons for a defendant’s family
circumstances to constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for release:
(A) 	The death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant’s minor child
or the defendant’s child who is 18 years of age or older and incapable of self-
care because of a mental or physical disability or a medical condition.
(B) 	The incapacitation of the defendant’s spouse or registered partner when the
defendant would be the only available caregiver for the spouse or registered
partner.
(C) 	The incapacitation of the defendant’s parent when the defendant would be
the only available caregiver for the parent.
(D) 	The defendant establishes that circumstances similar to those listed in
paragraphs (3)(A) through (3)(C) exist involving any other immediate
family member or an individual whose relationship with the defendant is
similar in kind to that of an immediate family member, when the defendant
would be the only available caregiver for such family member or individual.
For purposes of this provision, “immediate family member” refers to any
of the individuals listed in paragraphs (3)(A) through (3)(C) as well as a
grandchild, grandparent, or sibling of the defendant.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)(A)–(D).
Conclusory assertions that the defendant must now serve as the primary caretaker for a
family member are insufficient. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, No. CR 122-031, 2024 WL
812041, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 27, 2024) (finding unsupported assertions that defendant’s wife was
disabled and that his father required caretaking were “conclusory statements” that were
“insufficient to carry his burden of persuasion”). Rather, courts require specific evidence of the
defendant’s need to serve as a primary caretaker. For example, the defendant must prove with
medical support that the family member is incapacitated. See United States v. Zermeno,
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No. 1:16-CR-79(1), 2024 WL 4043445, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2024) (collecting cases); United
States v. Romano, 707 F. Supp. 3d 233, 237–38 (E.D.N.Y. 2023) (“Without medical evidence [of
the] father’s incapacitation and medical evidence detailing [defendant’s] mother’s inability to
provide his father the necessary assistance, the Court cannot conclude that [the mother] would be
an inadequate caregiver.”). Statements that a family member is elderly and needs care are
insufficient. Romano, 707 F. Supp. 3d at 237–38. The defendant must also demonstrate why they
are the only available caregiver for that family member. United States v. Lopez, No. 23-50404, 2024
WL 244935, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 23, 2024) (noting that the defendant “failed to explain why his
other siblings could not care for his parents”). There must be a reason for the change in that family
member’s caretaker status. Id. (noting the defendant’s failure to “allege the death or incapacitation
of any current caretaker”).
When the caretaking role relates to minors like children, additional requirements apply.
For instance, the defendant must show that they would likely gain custody of the child if released.
See, e.g., Zermeno, 2024 WL 4043445, at *5 (collecting cases). In such a situation, the court should
evaluate whether “release of the inmate to care for the inmate’s child is the best interest of the
child.” U.S. Dep’t of Just., Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement 5050.50 (Jan. 17, 2019).
D. 	Victim of abuse (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(4))
Under this section, the defendant must establish that, while in custody, they were a victim
of (1) “sexual abuse involving a ‘sexual act,’ as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2)”; or (2) “physical
abuse resulting in ‘serious bodily injury,’ as defined in the Commentary to §1B1.1.” U.S.S.G.
§§ 1B1.13(b)(4)(A)–(B). The abuse must have been inflicted by either a correctional officer,
employee, or contractor of the BOP, or “any other individual who had custody or control over the
defendant.” Id. § 1B1.13(b)(4). Finally, the alleged misconduct “must be established by a
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conviction in a criminal case, a finding or admission of liability in a civil case, or a finding in an
administrative proceeding . . . .” Id. But if such proceedings are unduly delayed or the defendant
faces imminent danger, a formal adjudication is unnecessary. Id.
E. 	Other reasons (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5))
The “other reasons” category is a catchall that allows the defendant to “present[] any
other circumstance or combination of circumstances” that is “similar in gravity to” the four
extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	reasons 	described 	in 	U.S.S.G. 	§§ 	1B1.13(b)(1)–(4). Id.
§ 1B1.13(b)(5). 	Although 	some 	courts 	invoked 	this 	provision 	to 	grant 	COVID-19-related
compassionate release motions, this reasoning no longer applies because the pandemic is over. See
supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text.
F. 	Unusually long sentences (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6))
A defendant must meet three requirements under this section. First, the defendant must
be serving an unusually long sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). Second, they must have served
at least ten years of that sentence. Id. Third, there must have been a change in law that “produce[s]
a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the
time the motion is filed.” Id. This section explicitly excludes non-retroactive changes “to the
Guidelines Manual.” Id. And Fifth Circuit precedent precludes considering non-retroactive
changes in any law. United States v. Austin, No. 24-30039, 2025 WL 78706, at *3 (5th Cir. Jan. 13,
2025) (“A non-retroactive change in the law cannot constitute an extraordinary and compelling
reason justifying sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1).”). Thus, in this circuit, non-retroactive
changes are irrelevant.
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IV. 	The 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) Factors
Section 	3553(a) 	directs 	courts 	to 	consider 	the 	following 	factors: 	the 	nature 	and
circumstances of the offense and the defendant’s history and characteristics; the need to reflect
the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for
the offense; the need to deter criminal conduct; the need to protect the public; the need to provide
the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner; the kinds of sentences and sentencing ranges established
for defendants with similar characteristics under applicable United States Sentencing Guidelines
provisions and policy statements; any pertinent policy statement of the United States Sentencing
Commission in effect on the date of sentencing; the need to avoid unwarranted disparities among
similar defendants; and the need to provide restitution to the victim. Wilson, 2024 WL 4267923,
at *3 n.7 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
Importantly, the district court has broad discretion in considering these factors. As the
Supreme Court has explained, “the ‘sentencing judge is in a superior position to find facts and
judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual case . . . .’” United States v. Rollins, 53 F.4th
353, 359 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). Consistent with the
broad discretion granted district courts, the Fifth Circuit has “regularly affirmed the denial of a
compassionate-release motion . . . where the district court’s weighing of the Section 3553(a) factors
can independently support its judgment.” Id. at 358 (citation omitted). In short, “compassionate
release is discretionary, not mandatory, and could be refused after weighing the sentencing factors
of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 2020).
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V. 	The Defendant’s Burden
In sum, when seeking compassionate release on their own motion, the defendant must
demonstrate that: (1) the defendant exhausted administrative remedies; (2) “extraordinary and
compelling reasons” justify the defendant’s sentence reduction or the defendant satisfies the
requirements of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii);9 (3) the reduction is consistent with the policy statement of
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; and (4) the court should exercise its discretion to grant the motion after
considering the § 3553(a) factors. Wilson, 2024 WL 4267923, at *4 (citing United States v. Jackson,
27 F.4th 1088, 1089 (5th Cir. 2022); Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 392; United States v. Rollins, 53 F.4th
353, 358 (5th Cir. 2022)).
ANALYSIS
I. 	The Exhaustion Requirement
Before seeking relief from the Court, Defendant is bound by a threshold requirement to
exhaust administrative remedies by submitting a request to the warden to move for compassionate
release on their behalf, or by waiver after a “lapse of 30 days” after a request to the warden has
been made. Wilson, 2024 WL 4267923, at *4 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)). However, if the
Government does not invoke the exhaustion requirement argument, the Court will deem the
matter 	waived 	for 	the 	purposes 	of 	considering 	a 	defendant’s 	motion
under § 3582(c)(1)(A). See Ward, 11 F.4th at 361; see also McLean, 2022 WL 44618, at *1 (finding
abuse of discretion where the failure to exhaust administrative remedies was raised sua sponte).
Here, Defendant filed a request to his facility’s warden on May 1, 2025, which was denied on June
9 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii) states that “the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in
prison, pursuant to a sentence imposed under section 3559(c), for the offense or offenses for which the defendant
is currently imprisoned, and a determination has been made by the Director of the [BOP] that the defendant is not
a danger to the safety of any other person or the community, as provided under section 3142(g).”
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2, 2025 (Dkt. #270-1). Accordingly, Defendant has satisfied the administrative exhaustion
requirement.
II. 	The Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons Requirement
The Court will next address the merits of the Motion. Defendant argues that “[t]he
changes in relevant law, along with unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct, are extraordinary and compelling
circumstances that warrant a sentence reduction” (Dkt. #270 at p. 6). Specifically, Defendant
argues the Court should reduce his sentence because the sentence guidelines’ reliance on drug
purity as a factor for determining an individual’s role within the organization is outdated and
irrelevant (Dkt. #270 at pp. 7–11).
The Court adopted the presentence investigation report without change (Dkt. #198 at p. 1).
As such, Defendant received an adjustment under USSG §3B1.1(b) for his aggravating role in the
offense (Dkt. #180 at p. 6). Defendant argues in his Motion that his “leadership role” should be
removed 	because 	the 	Court 	determined 	his 	role 	adjustment 	“due 	to 	purity 	of 	[the]
methamphetamine,” thereby entitling him to a “sentence reduction” (Dkt. #270 at p. 11). This is
not the case. Defendant was identified by investigators as having a managerial rule in the
conspiracy—he organized the transportation of the drugs, purchased the truck that was used to
transport the drugs, and paid and instructed his co-defendants to remove and replace the drive
shaft in which the drugs were stored (Dkt. #180 at p. 7). Moreover, in the Factual Basis, Defendant
stipulated to being responsible for methamphetamine that was imported from Mexico (Dkt. #122
at p. 2). Additionally, the issue of methamphetamine purity was not a factor in the Court’s
determination of his role because Defendant also stipulated that he conspired with others to
distribute and dispense at least “45 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a
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detectable amount of methamphetamine or 4.5 kilograms or more of methamphetamine (actual)”
(Dkt. #122).
Finally, Defendant does not argue he faces any of the medical circumstances the Court can
consider in evaluating a compassionate release request. See U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.13(b)(1)(A)–(D). In
fact, according to BOP records, Defendant does not require significant mental health care and is
considered a stable outpatient, requiring regular clinician evaluations for chronic conditions that
can be managed with routine appointments and community resources. Thus, Defendant’s medical
issues are considered stable and not life-threatening.
Accordingly, having no other “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to consider, the
Court finds Defendant’s Motion should be DENIED.
VI. 	The § 3553(a) Factors
Even if “extraordinary and compelling” reasons existed, the sentencing factors under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) support denying Defendant’s Motion. Under § 3553(a)(2)(A), the Court must
address the seriousness of Defendant’s offense, respect for the law, and providing a just
punishment. United States v. Bravo-Ziranda, No. 3:18-CR-00415-K-1, 2023 WL 4494348, at *5
(N.D. Tex. July 10, 2023).
Defendant pled guilty to one count of Conspiracy to Possess with the Intent to Manufacture
and Distribute Methamphetamine (Dkt. #197). Again, in the Factual Basis, Defendant stipulated
that he conspired with others to distribute and dispense at least “45 kilograms or more of a mixture
or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine or 4.5 kilograms or more of
methamphetamine (actual)” (Dkt. #122).
The nature of circumstances of the offense are serious. Illegal narcotics and their trade
create the potential for violent conflicts, sometimes between dealers and buyers, dealers and law
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enforcement, or buyers and law enforcement. And Illegal narcotics devastate communities by
fostering addiction. See United States v. Wedgeworth, No. 1:18-CR-87(8), 2024 WL 4988370, at *10
(E.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2024) (citing United States v. Hare, 873 F.3d 796, 799 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Courts
have long recognized, however, that drug dealing constitutes a danger and threat to the
community.”); United States v. Bolton, No. 4:15-CR-207-SDJ, 2025 WL 1520621, at *1 (E.D. Tex.
May 22, 2025) (“As courts have consistently recognized, the proliferation of dangerous addictive
narcotics is a significant public and societal harm.”) (citation modified). Furthermore, Defendant
is tentatively scheduled to be released from BOP custody on April 13, 2036, and has served less
than half of his Statutory Time.
After weighing the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the Court finds that granting Defendant’s
release would not reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just
punishment for his offense, nor adequately deter criminal conduct or protect the public. Chambliss,
948 F.3d at 693; see also Wilson, 2024 WL 4267923, at *3 n.7 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion should be DENIED.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore ORDERED that Defendant’s Pro Se Motion for Compassionate Release
(the “Motion”) (Dkt. #270) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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