Cactus Wellhead, LLC v. Cameron International Corporation et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION
CACTUS WELLHEAD, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAMERON INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION,
Defendant.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:24-CV-01010-JRG
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the Motion to Transfer Venue to the Southern District of Texas filed by
Defendant Cameron International Corp. 	(Dkt. No. 19 (“Motion”).) 	In the Motion, Defendant
moves the Court to transfer this case to the Southern District of Texas. (Id.) Having considered
the Motion, all associated briefing, and the documents submitted in support thereof, the Court finds
that the Motion should be DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Cactus Wellhead, LLC (“Cactus”) filed this lawsuit alleging Defendant Cameron
International Corp. (“Cameron”) infringes U.S. Patent No. 11,137,109 (“’109 Patent”). 	(Dkt.
No. 1.) 	Cactus claims that Cameron’s “Automated Valve Greasing System” infringes the ’109
Patent, which relates to systems for greasing valves in fracking and well applications. (Id. ¶¶ 17,
22–30, 32–33; Dkt. No. 1-1.)
Cameron filed the instant Motion to transfer, alleging among other issues that the Southern
District of Texas would be a “proper” venue for this case. (Dkt. No. 19 at 4–5.) Cameron does
not dispute that it uses accused systems in both of Texas’ Haynesville and Eagle Ford shale basins
(i.e., areas where subsurface rock contains oil and/or natural gas). 	(See Dkt. No. 35 at 2.) The
Case 2:24-cv-01010-JRG Document 55 Filed 03/12/26 Page 1 of 6 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
Eastern District of Texas covers the Haynesville basin in Texas; the Western and Southern Districts
of Texas cover the Eagle Ford basin. (Dkt. Nos. 38-1, 38-2.)
II. 	LEGAL AUTHORITY
A federal district court may transfer a case under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to “any other district
or division where it might have been brought.” 	Id. 	The applicable threshold inquiry for any
§ 1404(a) transfer is “whether the judicial district to which transfer is sought would have been a
district in which the claim could have been filed.” In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 203 (5th
Cir. 2004) (“Volkswagen I”).
28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) is the “sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in patent
infringement actions.” TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 581 U.S. 258, 266
(2017) (citing Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 229 (1957)). Under
§ 1400(b), venue lies “in the judicial district where the defendant resides” or “where the defendant
has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1400(b). “[A] domestic corporation ‘resides’ only in its [s]tate of incorporation.” TC Heartland,
581 U.S. at 262. A “regular and established place of business” must be a physical place in the
district; regular and established; and the place of the defendant. In re Cray, 871 F.3d 1355, 1360
(Fed. Cir. 2017).
The burden to prove that a case could have been properly brought in the proposed district
falls on the party seeking transfer. In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir. 2008)
(“Volkswagen II”) (“[A] moving party, in order to support its claim for a transfer, must satisfy the
statutory requirements.”); Iarnach Techs. Ltd. v. Charter Commc’ns Inc., No. 2:24-CV-00230-
JRG, 2025 WL 509445, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2025). Only if this burden is met must the Court
then determine whether convenience warrants a transfer. 	See Charter Commc’ns, 2025 WL
509445, at *4.
Case 2:24-cv-01010-JRG Document 55 Filed 03/12/26 Page 2 of 6 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
III. 	ANALYSIS
As a threshold matter, Cameron has failed to show that venue would have been proper in
the Southern District of Texas if this case had initially been filed there. This threshold inquiry is
“whether the judicial district to which transfer is sought would have been a district in which the
claim could have been filed.” Volkswagen I, 371 F.3d at 203. Cameron has failed to make this
threshold showing, which obviates the need for any further transfer analysis.
A. 	Cameron failed to establish that the Southern District of Texas venue would be
proper.
Cameron failed to carry its burden of showing that venue is proper in the Southern District
of Texas. See Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 315. It is undisputed that Cameron does not reside in the
Southern District of Texas. 	Cameron also has not shown that the alleged acts of infringement
occurred in that district.
i. 	Cameron resides in Delaware, not the Southern District of Texas.
Cameron somehow contends that it resides in the Southern District of Texas because Cactus
collectively referred to Cameron and Schlumberger Technology Corp. (“STC”) as acting together
in the complaint. (Dkt. No. 35 at 1–2.) Cameron also contends that under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2)
a defendant corporation resides “in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the
court’s personal jurisdiction.” (Dkt. No. 19 at 4–5.) Cameron then concludes that venue is proper
in this case, at least because Cameron is subject to personal jurisdiction in the Southern District of
Texas. 	(Id.) 	Cameron’s reliance on 28 U.S.C. § 1391 is misplaced. As noted above, the sole
statute for venue in patent cases is 28 U.S.C. § 1400.
In opposition, Cactus succinctly notes that Cameron is a Delaware corporation and resides
there under TC Heartland. (Dkt. No. 33 at 4.)
Case 2:24-cv-01010-JRG Document 55 Filed 03/12/26 Page 3 of 6 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
The Court agrees with Cactus. For patent venue purposes Cameron resides in Delaware,
not the Southern District of Texas. As Cactus identifies, “a domestic corporation ‘resides’ only in
its [s]tate of incorporation for purposes of the patent venue statute.” TC Heartland, 581 U.S. at
262. Cameron is incorporated in Delaware (Dkt. No. 35 at 1–2), and such confirms that it “resides”
there.
Cameron’s arguments, stressing that Cactus initially sued both STC and Cameron, are
inapt. (See id.) Whether Cactus referred to “Cameron and STC” collectively in its complaint, see
id. at 2, is irrelevant because “a domestic corporation ‘resides’ only in its [s]tate of incorporation”;
Cameron resides in Delaware regardless of Cameron’s effort to latch onto STC’s residence. See
TC Heartland, 581 U.S. at 262 (emphasis added). Even so, the Court has previously dismissed
STC from this case. (Dkt. No. 31.) See Andra Grp., LP v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, L.L.C., 6 F.4th
1283, 	1287 	(Fed. 	Cir. 	2021) 	(noting 	venue 	must 	be 	established 	for 	“each” 	defendant);
Magnacoustics, Inc. v. Resonance Tech. Co., No. 97-1247, 1997 WL 592863, at *2 (Fed. Cir.
Sept. 25, 1997) (nonprecedential) (“[A]s firmly established by judicial decisions, in an action
involving multiple defendants venue and jurisdiction requirements must be met as to each
defendant.”).
Cameron’s reliance on the general venue statute is clearly erroneous. (See Dkt. No. 19 at
4–5.) Cameron’s opening brief cites 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2) when arguing that venue would be
proper in the Southern District of Texas because Cameron is subject to personal jurisdiction there.
Cameron mistakenly identifies the law. See TC Heartland, 581 U.S. at 266 (citing Fourco Glass,
353 U.S. at 229) (explaining that 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) is the “sole and exclusive provision
controlling venue in patent infringement actions” and is not supplemented by the general venue
statutes).
Case 2:24-cv-01010-JRG Document 55 Filed 03/12/26 Page 4 of 6 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
ii. 	Cameron has not met its burden of showing that the alleged acts of
infringement occurred in the Southern District of Texas.
Cameron contends that it has a principal place of business in Houston and that this warrants
transfer. (Dkt. No. 35 at 1–2; Dkt. No. 19 at 5.) Cameron also argues for the first time in its Reply
that it generally “us[es] the Accused Systems in the Eagle Ford and Haynesville basins” and that
“the significant majority of the counties in these basins are located outside” the Eastern District of
Texas. (Dkt. No. 35 at 1–2.)
Cactus argues that Cameron may have used the accused systems in the Eagle Ford and
Haynesville basins, but it has “failed [to] identify a single location where the Accused Systems
were used in the Southern District.” (Dkt. No. 38 at 1–2.) As such it failed to meet its threshold
burden. Id.
The Court agrees with Cactus. Cameron has not met its burden of showing that the alleged
acts of infringement occurred in the Southern District of Texas. See Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d 315;
Charter Commc’ns, 2025 WL 509445, at *4. 	Even if, arguendo, Cameron’s Houston office
establishes that Cameron has a regular and established place of business in the Southern District
of Texas, Cameron’s Motion does not establish that it used the accused systems in the Southern
District of Texas. (Dkt. No. 19.) The general vicinity is not sufficient for venue.
The Court also disregards Cameron’s arguments regarding the Eagle Ford and Haynesville
basins because they were raised for the first time in its reply briefing. See Mullen Indus. LLC v.
Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:24-CV-00049-JRG, 2025 WL 904389, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2025)
(“While Defendants attempt to cure this deficiency in their Reply by introducing new evidence
. . . , Defendants are prohibited from doing so.”).
Even if the Court were to consider Cameron’s new arguments regarding these basins, they
simply fail to establish that Cameron has used the accused systems in the Southern District of
Case 2:24-cv-01010-JRG Document 55 Filed 03/12/26 Page 5 of 6 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
Texas. (See Dkt. No. 35 at 1–2.) The Eastern District of Texas covers the Haynesville basin in
Texas. Both the Western and Southern Districts of Texas cover the Eagle Ford basin. (Dkt. Nos.
38-1, 38-2.) 	Although Cameron may have used the accused systems in the Eastern District of
Texas (i.e., the Haynesville basin) and somewhere in the Western or Southern District of Texas
(i.e., the Eagle Ford basin), Cameron has failed to make the statutorily required threshold showing.
See Charter Commc'ns, 2025 WL 509445, at *3 (denying transfer when “Defendants fail[ed] to
allege in the Motion that they have committed any acts of infringement in Colorado”).1
B. 	Cameron’s failure moots the public and private factor analysis.
Since Cameron failed to carry its burden on the threshold issue establishing that venue
would be proper in the Southern District of Texas, the Court need not analyze the private and
public interest venue factors. See Charter Commc’ns, 2025 WL 509445, at *4.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the Court finds that the Motion (Dkt. No. 19) should be
and hereby is DENIED.
1 Cameron attached a list of wellheads to its briefing that lists the accused systems. (Dkt. No. 35-
2.) Such does not identify where those wellheads are located. (Id.) Without such information, the
Court cannot ascertain whether such wellheads are in the Southern District of Texas, the Western
District of Texas, or elsewhere.
.
____________________________________
RODNEY GILSTRAP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
So ORDERED and SIGNED this 12th day of March, 2026.
Case 2:24-cv-01010-JRG Document 55 Filed 03/12/26 Page 6 of 6 PageID #:
<pageID>