USA v. Williams et al

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Case 1:24-cr-00109-MAC-CLS Document 406 Filed 11/11/25 Page 1 of 8 PagelD #:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §
§
versus § CASE NO. 1:24-CR-109(2)
§
DARRELL JOSHUA BENDY §

ORDER ADOPTING THE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the undersigned are two Motions to Suppress filed pro se by the Defendant,
Darrell Bendy, and two Second Amended Motions to Suppress (#311, #313, #353, #363). The
United States filed responses to the Defendant’s motions (#339, #375). These motions were
referred to United States Magistrate Judge Christine L. Stetson for review, hearing if necessary,
and submission of a report with recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law. United
States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681-84 (1980); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); E.D. TEX.
LOCAL R. CR-59(a). Judge Stetson heard testimony and oral argument on October 1, 2025, and
October 31, 2025. Judge Stetson concluded that the Defendant lacked standing to contest the
search on August 14, 2023, and that the search and seizure on April 20, 2024, was lawful. (#394.)
Therefore, she recommended denying the Defendant’s motions. (/d.)

The Defendant objected to Judge Stetson’s findings, arguing that she misapplied the law
regarding standing, failed to recognize the limits of third-party consent, overlooked the unlawful
extension of the traffic stop, and improperly relied on the automobile exception. (#401.)

STANDING
With regard to standing, the Defendant asserts that he has an expectation of privacy

because the evidence seized is being used against him and he has target standing. He cites to an

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

Eighth Circuit case for support, which found standing for the homeowner as to the search of the
luggage of two overnight guests because the luggage was located in his home and he had a
legitimate expectation of privacy that any personal property brought into the house by his
overnight guests would be free from government intrusion. 	United States v. Perez, 700 F.2d
1232, 1236 (8th Cir. 1983). 	This case is distinguishable from the search of Shelby Andrews’s
vehicle on August 14, 2023. As found by Judge Stetson, the Defendant here had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in that vehicle. He did not own it, was not a passenger in the vehicle, and
there is no evidence that he had any luggage or other items in the vehicle.
The Defendant also alleges that the doctrine of target standing is applicable. This doctrine
refers to an argument sometimes raised in Fourth Amendment cases where a defendant claims
standing to challenge a search or seizure solely because he was the “target” or intended focus of
a government investigation. However, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected target standing.
In Alderman v. United States, and later in Rakas v. Illinois, the Court held that Fourth Amendment
rights are personal and cannot be asserted vicariously. Alderman, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Rakas,
439 U.S. 128 (1978). 	Thus, even if a search was directed at or intended to gather evidence
against a specific person, that person lacks standing and cannot suppress that evidence unless his
own reasonable expectation of privacy was infringed. Alderman, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Rakas,
439 U.S. 128 (1978).
CONSENT
Next, the Defendant argues that the search of the vehicle on April 20, 2024, exceeded the
scope of consent and lacked probable cause. He argues that Jonathan Austin’s consent to search
did not extend to a K-9 search. As discussed by Judge Stetson in her report, Austin did not speak
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up to limit or withdraw his consent at any time during the entirety of the search of the vehicle.
The Trooper told Austin that he called for a K-9 and asked him to keep the children away from
the dog. Austin also saw the K-9 arrive to search the vehicle with the door and trunk still open.
Given these circumstances, the court finds that Austin’s consent extended to the K-9 search. See
United States v. Woods, 445 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1332–33 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (finding consent
included the canine search of the interior of car where defendant was aware of dog’s presence and
purpose before the search and he did not limit the area the officers could search or ask that the
search be discontinued).
In any event, probable cause also existed for the K-9 search. The Government introduced
evidence 	of 	interceptions 	of 	wireless 	communications 	between 	the 	Defendant 	and 	other
conspirators about an upcoming drug distribution event, and surveillance operations indicated that
Austin would be traveling from Houston to Beaumont to supply another conspirator with
methamphetamine from the Defendant. 	DPS Trooper Ricardo Cibrian was aware of this
investigation and was asked to locate the black Camero Austin was reported to be driving. Once
he did, he pulled Austin over for a defective left side tail lamp. Upon questioning Austin, Cibrian
observed him to be shaky, nervous, and sweating profusely. After receiving consent to search the
vehicle, Cibrian also found evidence of stripped screws and a trunk modification. These facts are
more than enough to provide probable cause to perform a K-9 search of the interior of the vehicle.
Although not raised at the hearing or in his motions, the Defendant also argues that
pursuant to United States v. Matlock, Austin lacked the common authority to consent to the search
of all of the vehicle. 	415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974). 	Matlock held that a third party who
possesses “common authority” over premises or effects may validly consent to a search, and that
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consent is effective against an absent, non-consenting co-occupant. 	Id. 	The Court noted that
common authority does not depend on property rights, but rather on mutual use of the property
by persons generally having joint access or control. Id. Applying these principles, the court finds
that Austin had joint access or control of the vehicle. The Defendant does not dispute that Austin
had permission to drive the vehicle. Courts have long held that the non-owner driver of a vehicle
has the authority to consent to a search of that vehicle. United States v. Crain, 33 F.3d 480 (5th
Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Varona-Algos, 819 F.2d 81, 83 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that
the driver’s consent to search vehicle was valid against passenger who later claimed to be vehicle’s
owner)); see also Johnson v. United States, 358 F.2d 139, 140 (5th Cir. 1966) (“The person in
lawful possession of an automobile has authority to grant permission to search it.”).
PROLONGED STOP
The Defendant argues that the traffic stop of Austin was prolonged in violation of the
Fourth Amendment because Cibrian had completed his checks and the time it took to wait for the
K-9’s arrival transformed the stop into an unconstitutional seizure. As noted by Judge Stetson,
the Defendant did not present evidence of this issue at the hearing. He did, however, introduce
the video of the traffic stop at the hearing and the Government briefed this issue in its response.
The time from when the K-9 was requested and the time it arrived at the scene was only eight
minutes, and the K-9 arrived within thirty-five minutes of the initial stop.
For a traffic stop, the “[a]uthority for the seizure ends when tasks tied to the traffic
infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” 	Rodriguez v. United States, 575
U.S. 348, 354 (2015). However, “additional investigation unrelated to the safe and responsible
operation of the vehicle” is permissible only “if that investigation does not lengthen the driver’s
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detention or is supported by reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity.” United States
v. Reyes, 963 F.3d 482, 487 (5th Cir. 2020). To assess reasonable suspicion, courts look to the
totality of the circumstances. United States v. Rodriguez, 564 F.3d 735, 741 (5th Cir. 2009).
Here, not only was there reasonable suspicion (in addition to consent and probable cause,
as discussed above) to continue the stop due to the stripped screws on the paneling of the car and
the trunk modification found by Cibrian, but there was also a concern regarding the safe operation
of the vehicle. Cibrian testified that Austin did not have a driver’s license to operate the vehicle
and there were multiple children in the vehicle who did not have proper booster seats. During the
stop, Cibrian was waiting for someone to arrive to pick up the children with the proper booster
seats. Austin can be heard on the video of the stop calling someone and asking that person to go
purchase booster seats to pick up the children.
Moreover, the court finds that the time elapsed was not unreasonable for this type of law
enforcement activity. See United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 345-46 (5th Cir. 2010), modified
on denial of reh’g, 622 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity that developed after the initial stop justified a 35-minute stop).
COLLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE
Finally, the Defendant asserts that the collective knowledge doctrine was misapplied
because the Government did not produce evidence that the Trooper had this information at the time
of the stop.
“Under the collective knowledge doctrine, it is not necessary for the arresting officer to
know all of the facts amounting to probable cause, as long as there is some degree of
communication between the arresting officer and an officer who has knowledge of all the necessary
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facts.” 	United States v. Ibarra, 493 F.3d 526, 530 (5th Cir. 2007). 	This information can be
obtained through police channels, such as a radio dispatch. 	United States v. Alvarez, 40 F.4th
339, 351-52 (5th Cir. 2022); see 22 C.J.S. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND R IGHTS OF A CCUSED § 78
(stating that the information received must be through “official channels” in order for collective
knowledge to form the basis upon which the police may establish reasonable suspicion or probable
cause).
In United States v. Garza, the court found this doctrine applied where detectives instructed
a police officer, who was aware of and involved in the drug trafficking investigation, to stop Garza
for a traffic violation and continue to detain him for drug trafficking. 833 F. App’x 601, 602 (5th
Cir. 2021). Applying the automobile exception, the court found probable cause existed, given the
officer’s knowledge of the controlled buy with the cooperating source, as well as the discovery of
methamphetamine paraphernalia on Garza’s person during a consensual search. Id.
Similar to Garza, Cibrian had collective knowledge of the investigation into Austin as the
Defendant’s courier in a drug trafficking investigation and the planned trip from Houston to
Beaumont to transport methamphetamine. Moreover, collective knowledge aside, there was also
probable cause to stop Austin for a traffic violation—defective left side tail lamp. After the stop,
Austin’s behavior and his consent allowed Cibrian to search the vehicle. 	Further, the trunk
modification and stripped screws and scratches, as well as the K-9 alert, provided further
independent evidence of probable cause to search the vehicle.
CONCLUSION
The court conducted a de novo review of the objections in relation to the parties’ filings
and the applicable law. 	See F ED. R. CRIM . P. 59; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 	After careful
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consideration, the court finds the objections have no merit and that Judge Stetson correctly
concluded that the Defendant lacked standing as to the August 14, 2023, search and seizure, and
that the April 20, 2024, search and seizure was lawful.
Accordingly, the Defendant’s objections are OVERRULED. 	Judge Stetson’s findings,
conclusions and analysis are correct, and her report is ADOPTED. It is further ORDERED that
the Defendant’s motions to suppress (#311, #313, #353, #363) are DENIED.
7
Signed this date
Nov 11, 2025
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