Gonzalez v. Ladwig et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________________
LESTER JOSE GONZALEZ,
Petitioner,
v. 	Case No. 2:26-cv-02017-MSN-atc
SCOTT LADWIG, Acting Field Office
Director of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, New Orleans Field Office,
Respondent.
_____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS UNDER 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 AND DENYING EMERGENCY MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
______________________________________________________________________________
In the past several months, there has been a dramatic increase of habeas filings both in the
Western District of Tennessee and in district courts across the country. These petitions challenge
a change in policy and statutory interpretation at the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
regarding Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (“ICE”) authority to detain aliens present in—
but not lawfully admitted to—the United States. 	On July 8, 2025, ICE issued a policy memo
explaining that noncitizens who have resided in the interior of the United States are subject to
mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225.1 Prior to that memo, it was longstanding practice to
provide aliens apprehended in the interior with bond hearings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226. 	On
September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) issued a precedential decision
1 American Immigration Lawyers Association, ICE Memo: Interim Guidance Regarding
Detention 	Authority 	for 	Applications 	for 	Admission, 	AILA 	(July 	8, 	2025),
https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-
applications-for-admission (last visited Feb. 13, 2026), archived at https://perma.cc/VG23-GDJ2.
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upholding DHS’s interpretive shift, binding immigration judges nationwide to deny bond hearings
that had been previously available. Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 228 (BIA 2025)
(“Immigration Judges . . . have no authority to redetermine the custody conditions of an alien who
crossed the border unlawfully without inspection, even if that alien has avoided apprehension for
more than 2 years.”) 	Petitioner here, with many others across the country, challenges that
interpretation and his detention during pending removal proceedings.
DHS’s policy shift and the BIA’s ratification of it are, without a doubt, difficult changes
for Petitioner and the multitude of other similarly situated individuals nationwide. The Court is
sensitive to the impact this has on them, their families, and the ties that many of them have
developed in this country. But courts are not policymakers, nor are they empowered to unilaterally
change the plain text of a statute to avoid an outcome the law demands. Whatever this Court’s
feelings may be, Petitioner’s right to enter and reside in “the United States depends on the
congressional will, and courts cannot substitute their judgment for the legislative mandate.”
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 216 (1953).
BACKGROUND
On January 8, 2026, Petitioner Lester Jose Gonzalez filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1, “Petition.”) On the same day, Petitioner also filed
an Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No. 2,
“Emergency Motion.”) This Court then issued an Order directing the Government’s response and
setting a hearing on the request for a temporary restraining order. (ECF No. 11.) The Government
filed its Response on January 14, 2026 (ECF No. 18), and Petitioner filed his Reply on January
15, 2026 (ECF No. 19). On January 22, 2026, the Court held a hearing and took the matter under
advisement. (ECF No. 21.)
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The Petition is short on factual material, but the Emergency Motion provides more clarity.
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Nicaragua and not a United States citizen. (ECF No. 2-1 at
PageID 21.) He unlawfully entered the United States on December 22, 2021, at Eagle Pass, Texas,
and was arrested by United States Border Patrol on the same day. (Id. at PageID 22.) On December
24, 2021, a Notice to Appear was issued, charging Petitioner with being an “alien present in the
United States who has not been admitted or paroled.” (Id. at PageID 31.) He was then released
on his own recognizance “[p]ursuant to the authority contained in section 236 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act [“INA”].” 	(Id. at PageID 29.) 	Petitioner was arrested again while at the
Nashville Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Office on October 30, 2025.2 (Id. at
PageID 22, 33.) He is now detained at the West Tennessee Detention Facility in Mason, Tennessee.
(Id. at PageID 33.) 	At some point during his detention, Petitioner “requested a custody
redetermination pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1236,” which was denied by an Immigration Judge on
December 17, 2025. (Id. at PageID 36.) Petitioner is currently classified as an alien within the
meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), mandating detention. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.) He comes
before this Court seeking immediate release. (Id. at PageID 8.) He asserts that he is entitled to
relief for a variety of reasons, including that the Government has incorrectly interpreted and
applied the relevant statutory framework and that his continued detention violates due process.
(See generally id.)
2 Though not material, there is a discrepancy in the record regarding Petitioner’s arrest.
The Government’s Response indicates that he was taken into custody on October 20, 2025, and
that he was at the Nashville ICE Office to fulfill his reporting requirements. 	(ECF No. 18 at
PageID 180.) Petitioner’s counsel represented at the January 22 hearing, however, that Petitioner
was actually dropping his wife off to comply with her reporting requirements.
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JURISDICTION
This Court is authorized to issue a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C § 2241 when an
individual “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). And in certain circumstances, habeas corpus proceedings under § 2241
are available to aliens who want to challenge their detention. 	See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 687–88 (2001); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473–84 (2004); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 118 (2020) (noting that “the historic role of habeas is to secure
release from custody”); Munaf v. Green, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (“Habeas is at its core a remedy
for unlawful executive detention.”). Because Petitioner alleges that he is being held in violation
of the statutory provisions of the INA, i.e., laws of the United States, his claims are properly
brought pursuant to § 2241.
However, § 1252(b)(9) provides that:
[j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and
application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken
or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this
subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this
section.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).
As the Supreme Court recognized, it could be argued that Petitioner’s detention in this
matter “aris[es] from” an “action taken . . . to remove” him from the United States because “if
those actions had never been taken,” Petitioner “would not be in custody at all.” 	Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 292–93 (2018). But the Supreme Court expressly rejected “interpreting
‘arising from’ in this extreme way,” noting that doing so would “make claims of prolonged
detention effectively unreviewable.” Id. at 293. Applying the reasoning in Jennings, Petitioner’s
challenge here does not “arise from” an action taken to remove him, so § 1252(b)(9) does not
deprive the Court of jurisdiction.
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Another “potential hurdle” to the Court’s jurisdiction is § 1226(e), which bars review of
“the Secretary’s discretionary judgment regarding the application of § 1226.” Nielsen v. Preap,
586 U.S. 392, 401 (2019) (citation modified). 	But, again, the Supreme Court has found that §
1226(e) “applies only to discretionary decisions about the application of § 1226 to particular cases.
It does not block lawsuits over the extent of the Government’s detention authority under the
statutory framework as a whole.” Nielsen, 586 U.S. at 401 (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 295–96)
(citation modified). Like the aliens in Nielsen, Petitioner’s claim does not challenge “discretionary
application” of § 1226, so his claim is not barred by § 1226(e). Id.
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Before seeking judicial review of adverse administrative determinations, parties may first
be required to exhaust their administrative remedies, i.e., pursue “all possible relief within the
agency itself.” Howell v. I.N.S., 72 F.3d 288, 291 (2d Cir. 1995). 	Sometimes Congress mandates
administrative exhaustion by including it in a statute governing judicial review. Perkovic v. I.N.S.,
33 F.3d 615, 619 (6th Cir. 1994). But “in most contexts, exhaustion of administrative remedies is
a prudential, court-created doctrine.” Id. (citation modified). The parties agree that exhaustion of
administrative 	remedies 	is 	not 	statutorily 	required 	here; 	instead, 	requiring 	administrative
exhaustion here is a prudential matter.
As a prudential matter, the Court agrees with the reasoning of other district courts in the
Sixth Circuit that requiring Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies would be futile given
the BIA’s decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado. See, e.g., Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-CV-
12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3–4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025); Cordova v. Ladwig, No. 1:25-CV-
03037-TLP-JAY, 2025 WL 3679764, at *4–5 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 18, 2025). Nothing in the record
or caselaw suggests that the BIA would depart from its reasoning in Hurtado if Petitioner here was
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to appeal. So the Court will not require Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies before
addressing the merits of his Petition.
ANALYSIS
Petitioner asks the Court to grant his immediate release from ICE custody and provides
four grounds purportedly justifying that relief. 3 First, he asserts that his detention is governed by
§ 1226, which permits the release of ICE detainees after a bond hearing, rather than § 1225, under
which detention is mandatory. (ECF No. 2 at PageID 14.) Second, Petitioner argues that continued
detention violates his rights under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 	(ECF No. 1 at
PageID 7.) Third, he asserts that, regardless of this Court’s independent interpretation of the INA,
the Court is bound by a declaratory judgment adopting his interpretation in Maldonado Bautista v.
Santacruz, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025). (ECF No. 2 at PageID 14–15.) Fourth
and finally, Petitioner claims entitlement to relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).
(ECF No. 1 at PageID 7.)
There are four main questions, then. 	The first is one of statutory interpretation: Is
Petitioner’s detention governed by § 1225, which mandates detention, or is it governed by § 1226,
which allows a bond hearing? The second is a constitutional one: Does continued detention of
Petitioner without a bond hearing violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause? The third
is one of intra-judicial preclusion: Is this Court bound by the decision of another judge in the
Central District of California? The fourth and final question concerns judicial review of agency
action: Has Petitioner stated a claim for relief under the APA? The Court will address each of the
3 The Parties agree that both the Petition and the Emergency Motion present the same,
purely legal issues. (ECF No. 18 at PageID 180, nn.2–3; ECF No. 19 at PageID 213.) Accordingly,
the January 22 hearing consolidated both consideration of the Emergency Motion and the merits
of the Petition.
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questions in turn, ultimately concluding, for the reasons given below, that Petitioner is not entitled
to relief.
A. 	First Question: Does § 1225 or § 1226 apply to Petitioner?
1. 	The Proper Construction of §§ 1225 & 1226
The analysis begins with familiar rules of statutory interpretation. “[T]he plain, obvious,
and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense
that nothing but the exigency of a hard case and the ingenuity and study of an acute and powerful
intellect would discover.” Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co, 267 U.S. 364, 370 (1925). 	Step one,
therefore, “is to examine the plain meaning of the statute’s text.” Perez v. Bondi, 160 F.4th 710,
714 (6th Cir. 2025). But courts do not examine “the language of a statute in a vacuum”; instead,
they do so while “look[ing] to the structure, history, and purpose of the statutory scheme.” Ebu v.
U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 134 F.4th 895, 898 (6th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted); Keen v.
Helson, 930 F.3d 799, 803 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Statutory interpretation is a ‘holistic endeavor’—the
structure and wording of other parts of a statute can help clarify the meaning of an isolated term.”
(citation omitted)). So different sections of the INA must be interpreted “as a harmonious whole,”
taking care “not to interpret a provision in a manner that renders other provisions of the same
statute inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous.” Ebu, 134 F.4th at 898–99 (citation omitted). If
the language is unclear, then step two is to “examine the relevant legislative history.” Perez, 160
F.4th at 715.
To start, who is an “applicant for admission”? That term is defined in § 1225(a)(1), which
provides as follows:
An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in
the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an
alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in
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international or United States waters) shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter
an applicant for admission.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).
So, § 1225(a)(1) deems two groups of aliens to be “applicants for admission”: (1) those
“present in the United States” who have “not been admitted,” and (2) those “arriving” in the United
States, whether or not at a designated port of arrival. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a). And “[a]ll aliens
(including crewmen) who are applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission or
readmission to or through the United States must be inspected by immigration officers,” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(a)(3), “to ensure that they may be admitted into the country consistent with U.S.
immigration law.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3)).
Next, § 1225(b) “divides these applicants into two categories.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297.
The first consists of “aliens initially determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation,
or lack of valid documentation,” along with “certain other aliens designated by the Attorney
General in his discretion.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) & (iii)).
The “certain other aliens” included in this first category are those who have “not been admitted or
paroled into the United States,” and have “not affirmatively shown” that they have “been
physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the
date of the determination of inadmissibility” (subject to a specific exception not relevant here).4 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II). 	An alien in this first category is “normally ordered removed
‘without further hearing or review’ pursuant to an expedited removal process,” unless the “alien
‘indicates either an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution,’” at which point “that
4 	“Certain 	other 	aliens” 	does 	not 	include 	those 	aliens 	described 	in 	8 	U.S.C. 	§
1225(b)(1)(F)—natives 	or 	citizens 	of 	countries 	in 	the 	Western 	Hemisphere 	with 	whose
government the United States does not have full diplomatic relations and who arrive by aircraft at
a port of entry.
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alien is referred for an asylum interview.” 	Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287 (citing 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(1)(A)(i)–(iii)).
The second category is a “catchall,” consisting of all other applicants for admission who
are not covered by the first category. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. Aliens in this second category
are subject to removal pursuant to the process in § 1229a. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287–88 (citing 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)). Specifically, the relevant statutory language says that, “in the case of an
alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an
alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall
be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Aliens
in both categories are subject to “mandatory detention until the conclusion of the inspection
process—whether it is through expedited removal or the conclusion of § 1229a removal
proceedings.” Oliveira v. Patterson, No. 6:25-CV-01463, 2025 WL 3095972, at *4 (W.D. La. Nov.
4, 2025).
Now, compare the language and structure of § 1225 with § 1226(a), which provides in
relevant part as follows:
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.
Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such decision, the Attorney
General--
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on--
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and
containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or
(B) conditional parole; but
(3) may not provide the alien with work authorization (including an
“employment authorized” endorsement or other appropriate work permit),
unless the alien is lawfully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise
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would 	(without 	regard 	to 	removal 	proceedings) 	be 	provided 	such
authorization.
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
The most obvious difference between the two sections is their scope. The language of §
1226 speaks broadly about “an alien,” without qualification. But § 1225 is narrower. Its provisions
refer to only a specific subset of aliens—applicants for admission.
In this case, Petitioner insists he is not subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A) because he is not an
“applicant for admission” who is “seeking admission.” This Court respectfully disagrees.
Under the plain language of the statute, Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” as defined
in § 1225(a)(1). 	He is “an alien” and is “present in the United States.” And, he “has not been
admitted” because he did not lawfully enter the United States “after inspection and authorization
by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (“The terms ‘admission’ and ‘admitted’
mean, with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection
and authorization by an immigration officer.”).
As an “applicant for admission,” Petitioner is also “seeking admission.” 5 In the context of
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), “seeking admission” does not modify or limit the class of “applicants for
5 Other courts, however, have found to the contrary, reasoning that “seeking admission” in
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), “implies some sort of present-tense action.” Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-CV-
1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *5–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025) (citation omitted). Those courts
concluded that aliens already present in the United States were not “seeking admission,” and thus
construing § 1225(b)(2)(A) as applying to those aliens failed to give effect to all words in the
statute. See, e.g., Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 218 (D. Mass. 2025); Lopez Benitez v.
Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2025); Garcia v. Noem, No. 2:25-CV-00879-SPC-
NPM, 2025 WL 3041895, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2025); Ochoa Ochoa v. Noem, No. 25 CV
10865, 2025 WL 2938779, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2025) (concluding “those who have been
present in the country for years are not actively ‘seeking admission’”); see also Francisco T. v.
Bondi, No. 25-CV-3219 (JMB/DTS), 2025 WL 3490809, at *8 (D. Minn. Sept. 5, 2025), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 25-CV-03219 (JMB/DTS), 2025 WL 3236513 (D. Minn. Nov.
19, 2025) (reaching the same conclusion but recognizing that § 1225(a)(3) “can be read to suggest
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admission” to whom the section applies.6 	Instead, the structure of § 1225(b)(2)(A) indicates
“equivalent usage” of the two terms. As Judge Dishman explained,
[t]he prefatory language, “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission,”
sets the scope of what follows. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Had Congress meant to
imply a category of applicants for admission who might not be seeking admission,
the natural manner of doing so would read “in the case of an alien who is both an
applicant for admission and seeking admission.” Instead, the phrase “alien seeking
admission” comes after the operative language, “if the examining immigration
officer determines.” Id. This structure indicates that “alien seeking admission”
refers to the prior subject—it does not imply modification of the prior subject.
Montoya v. Holt, No. CIV-25-01231-JD, 2025 WL 3733302, at *10 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 26, 2025).
And reading the language in the context of the entire section confirms this understanding.
First, § 1225(a)(3) requires inspection of “[a]ll aliens (including alien crewmen) who are
applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3). As other
courts have explained, § 1225(a)(3) indicates a logical relationship between the phrases, so that all
aliens who are deemed “applicants for admission” in § 1225(a)(1) are also “seeking admission.”
See, e.g., Mejia Olalde v. Noem, No. 1:25-CV-00168-JMD, 2025 WL 3131942, at *3 (E.D. Mo.
Nov. 10, 2025); Shi v. Lyons, No. 1:25-CV-274, 2025 WL 3637288, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 12,
all applicants for admission are constructively treated as seeking admission,” and noting other
issues that make interpreting INA difficult).
On the other hand, in the context of inadmissibility waivers, the Fourth Circuit noted that,
although such waivers are limited “to those ‘seeking admission,’” that limitation did not
automatically preclude a waiver for Mr. Jimenez-Rodriguez, an alien who had been present in the
United States for almost 20 years. Jimenez-Rodriguez v. Garland, 996 F.3d 190, 194 n.2 (4th Cir.
2021) (citations omitted). 	The Fourth Circuit reasoned that “[b]ecause Jimenez-Rodriguez was
never lawfully admitted, he qualifies as someone ‘seeking admission[.]’” Id.
6 Admittedly, construing the statute in this manner renders “seeking admission” in §
1225(b)(2)(A) unnecessary. 	But this construction is still the best overall reading of the statute.
Nor is the superfluity surprising, and there is at least one other substantive redundancy in § 1225:
Both (a)(2) and (b)(2)(B)(iii) bar stowaways from being “applicants for admission” or receiving
hearings under § 1229a.
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2025); Garibay-Robledo v. Noem, No. 1:25-CV-177-H, 2026 WL 81679, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9,
2026); Montoya, 2025 WL 3733302, at *7; Altamirano Ramos v. Lyons, No. 2:25-CV-09785-SVW-
AJR, 2025 WL 3199872, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025). 	Judge Dishman again provides a
particularly cogent explanation:
The better reading starts with the period-correct definitions of “otherwise,” which
are “[i]n a different manner; in another way, or in other ways.” Otherwise, Black’s
Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990). Those definitions imply that the condition preceding
“otherwise” shares a category with the condition following it.
Two examples show the impact of the word “otherwise” in “applicants for
admission or otherwise seeking admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3). Consider an
inventory list that includes the following two entries:
(1) “Animals that are housecats or otherwise canine.”
(2) “Animals that are housecats or otherwise feline.”
The first entry is absurd—no canines are housecats, or vice versa. But the second
entry makes sense because the word “otherwise” creates a formal logical syllogism,
and that syllogism is valid. Not all felines are housecats, but all housecats are feline.
And critically, housecats are housecats in the first instance, involuntarily. Using the
plain language definition of “otherwise” in the context of an involuntary legal
status, the preceding noun must share the condition that follows.
Now apply this logic from the start: Section 1225(a)(1) “deem[s]” “an alien present
in the United States who has not been admitted ... an applicant for admission.” The
statute doesn’t describe what the alien is doing. It imposes a status by operation of
law. Section 1225(a)(3) then says “[a]ll aliens ... who are applicants for admission
or otherwise seeking admission” shall be inspected. The word “otherwise”
establishes that “aliens ... seeking admission” is the category to which “applicants
for admission” belong. If “applicants for admission” are subject to inspection
because they fall within the broader class of those “seeking admission,” then the
statute necessarily treats “seeking admission” as a condition that attaches to anyone
deemed an “applicant for admission.”
. . .
So, all “applicants for admission” are “seeking admission.” The former is sufficient
(but not necessary) for the latter, and the latter is necessary (but not sufficient) for
the former. Congress used a straightforward logical syllogism. Stated another way,
§ 1225(a)(3) leaves open the possibility that some aliens who are not applicants for
admission may nonetheless be “seeking admission.” But it does not leave open the
possibility that some “applicants for admission” are not “seeking admission.”
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Montoya, 2025 WL 3733302, at *8–9.
Second, § 1225(a)(5) provides that “[a]n applicant for admission may be required to state
under oath any information sought by an immigration officer regarding the purposes and intentions
of the applicant in seeking admission to the United States.” 8 U.S.C § 1225(a)(5) (emphasis added).
“The logical import of this phrasing is that an ‘applicant for admission’ is also ‘seeking admission’
under the statute.” Garibay-Robledo, 2026 WL 81679, at *5; see also Singh v. Noem, No. 2:25-
CV-00157-SCM, 2026 WL 74558, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 9, 2026) (“[I]t makes no sense to think of
an ‘applicant for admission’ as anything other than a person who is ‘seeking admission.’ What
else would an applicant for admission be doing if not seeking admission?”).
Third, other subsections in § 1225 specifically say, “arriving alien,” or “an alien . . . who
is arriving.” See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(2) (“arriving alien who is a stowaway is not eligible to
apply for admission or to be admitted”); id. § 1225(d)(2) (addressing “authority to order detention
and delivery of arriving aliens” coming to the United States via vessel or aircraft); id. § 1225(c)(1)
(“If an immigration officer or an immigration judge suspects that an arriving alien may be
inadmissible . . .”); id. § 1225(b)(1)(a)(i) (“if an immigration officer determines that an alien . . .
who is arriving in the United States . . . .”); id. § 1225(b)(1)(a)(ii) (same). The absence of similar
language in § 1225(b)(2)(A) indicates Congress did not intend for it to apply only to arriving aliens.
See, e.g. Garibay-Robledo, 2026 WL 81679, at *5; Mejia Olalde, 2025 WL 3131942, at *4.
Finally, construing § 1225(b)(2)(A) as inapplicable to unadmitted aliens who have been
present in the United States for several years by reasoning that those individuals are not “seeking
admission” creates an implied third category of aliens, who are not explicitly addressed anywhere
in the statutory scheme: unadmitted aliens present in the United States who are not seeking
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admission.7 	Or, to put it in more absurd terms: applicants for admission who are not seeking
admission.8 See Garibay-Robledo, 2026 WL 81679, at *5; Montoya, 2025 WL 3733302, at *2,
*11 & n. 9; Mejia Olalde, 2025 WL 3131942, at *3.
Because the language of the statute is clear, there is no need to examine relevant legislative
history. See Perez, 160 F.4th at 715. After all, “the objective indication of the words, rather than
the intent of the legislature, is what constitutes the law.” Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation
29–30 (1997). 	Nevertheless, the relevant legislative history also supports that aliens, like
Petitioner, remain “applicants for admission,” even when present in the United States for long
periods of time:
In 1996, Congress added the broad definition of “applicant for admission” to the
INA in 	the 	Illegal 	Immigration 	Reform 	and 	Immigrant 	Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA). Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. “Prior to the [IIRIRA], the INA
assessed status on the basis of ‘entry’ as opposed to ‘admission.’” Martinez v. Att’y
Gen., 693 F.3d 408, 413 n.5 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1994)).
Under this so-called entry doctrine, aliens who snuck into the United States without
inspection were entitled to the procedural and substantive protections afforded in
deportation proceedings. Id. Yet aliens who presented themselves to immigration
officials for inspection—say, at a port of entry—were subject to “more summary
exclusion proceedings.” Id. (quotation omitted). This distinction—where aliens
who followed the rules and presented for inspection were worse off than those who
broke the law—created “a perverse incentive to enter at an unlawful rather than a
7 And ironically, Petitioner’s interpretation treats this group more favorably. By “refus[ing]
to do anything that would constitute ‘seeking admission,’” these aliens “would not be subject to
mandatory detention, while those who do seek permission to stay in the United States would be
subject to mandatory detention. That makes no sense.” Singh, 2026 WL 74558, at *5; Chen v.
Almodovar, No. 1:25-CV-8350-MKV, 2025 WL 3484855, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2025) (Courts
“ruling that ‘seeking admission’ is an additional requirement for mandatory detention . . . establish
a perverse system in which an alien becomes subject to harsher treatment only upon actively
seeking ‘lawful’ status.”).
8 The absurdity of this is highlighted even more when framed in the context of § 1225(a)(4).
This third category would be “applicants for admission” who are “applying” for admission “yet
not necessarily ‘seeking’ admission. But this simply cannot be. What individual is ‘applying’ for a
given legal status without ‘seeking’ such a status?” Montoya, 2025 WL 3733302, at *10.
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lawful location.” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 140, 140
S.Ct. 1959, 207 L.Ed.2d 427 (2020).
IIRIRA did away with this anomaly. Congress replaced the entry doctrine with a
criterion based on admission, which it defined as “lawful entry . . . after inspection
and authorization.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (emphasis added). Congress also
added Section 1225(a)(1)—the definition of “applicant for admission”—and
mandated detention for all such applicants while their removal proceedings play
out. 	See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). By defining “applicant for admission” to
include all aliens who have not been admitted, Congress thus eliminated the
previous incentives to enter the country illegally.
Garibay-Robledo, 2026 WL 81679, at *6; see also Chen, 2025 WL 3484855, at *3, *5; Altamirano
Ramos, 2025 WL 3199872, at *5.
In sum, under the plain language of the statute, Petitioner is an “applicant for admission.”
He is not covered by first category of aliens described in § 1225(b)(1); instead, he falls into the
second “catchall” category described in § 1225(b)(2)(A). As a result, he is subject to mandatory
detention pending the completion of removal proceedings under § 1229a.
2. 	Other Courts’ Contrary Constructions
At first blush, it appears that a majority of the courts addressing this issue have interpreted
§§ 1225 and 1226 differently from this Court, and they have generally granted bond hearings to
the alien petitioners.9 See, e.g., Cordova, 2025 WL 3679764, at *8; Godinez-Lopez v. Ladwig, No.
2:25-CV-02962-SHL-ATC, 2025 WL 3047889, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 31, 2025); Lopez Benitez,
795 F. Supp. 3d at 491; Hasan v. Crawford, 800 F. Supp. 3d 641, 657 (E.D. Va. 2025); Chogllo
Chafla v. Scott, 804 F. Supp. 3d 247, 257 (D. Me. 2025) (collecting cases); Francisco T., 2025 WL
3490809, at *11; Maldonado Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 2:25-CV-01542-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL
2676082, at *13–14 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025); Garcia, 2025 WL 3041895, at *3; Maldonado v.
9 This tide, however, may yet begin to turn. 	See Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, No. 25-
20496, --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL 323330 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026) (confirming the Government’s
interpretation of § 1225 and reversing the lower court’s order to provide bond hearings).
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Baker, No. CV 25-3084-TDC, 2025 WL 2968042, at *7 (D. Md. Oct. 21, 2025).10 The thoughtful
analyses of these other courts was valuable to the Court in refining its understanding of the
statutory scheme but, ultimately, the Court is unpersuaded by their reasoning.
For example, some courts ruling for the petitioners have found the titles of §§ 1225 and
1226 to be persuasive. See, e.g., Cobix, 2025 WL 3562651, at *5–6; Maldonado Vazquez, 2025
WL 2676082, at *13–14; Mendoza Gutierrez v. Baltasar, No. 25-CV-2720-RMR, 2025 WL
2962908, at *6 (D. Colo. Oct. 17, 2025); Maldonado, 2025 WL 2968042, at *7. But even though
“the title of a statute and the heading of a section are tools available for the resolution of a doubt
about the meaning of a statute,” they cannot “override the plain words of a statute.” 	Dubin v.
United States, 599 U.S. 110, 120–21 (2023) (citation modified). 	The plain words of § 1225(a)
define “applicant for admission” to include aliens present in the United States who have not been
admitted—full stop. The definition is broad; there is no geographic or temporal limitation. Also,
courts persuaded by the title of § 1225 have generally focused only on the second clause,
“expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens,” reasoning that the alien petitioner was not an
“arriving alien” who was subject to “expedited removal.” See, e.g., Cobix, 2025 WL 3562651, at
*5–6. But that reasoning “fails to appreciate the remainder of the title. The latter portion of the
10 Other judges in this District have granted bond hearings under a different reading of the
statutory provisions at issue. But “[d]ecisions made by district courts within the same district are
not binding on one another.” 	Raymond James & Assocs., Inc. v. 50 N. Front St. TN, LLC, No.
2:18-CV-02104-JTF-TMP, 2020 WL 6694299, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 13, 2020) (citing Chinn v.
Jenkins, No. 3:02-CV-512, 2018 WL 488159, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 19, 2018)). See also Robertson
v. Univ. of Memphis, No. 2:24-CV-02429-TLP-cgc, 2025 WL 929220, at *8 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 27,
2025) (acknowledging that “district courts’ decisions are not binding on this Court”); Nationwide
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hatton, 357 F. Supp. 3d 598, 605 (E.D. Ky. 2019) (“The opinions of other
federal district courts, while persuasive, are not binding authority that this Court must follow.”);
Chen, 2025 WL 3484855, at *4 (acknowledging “that a number of judges in [the same] District”
ruled differently).
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title reads ‘referral for hearing,’ which relates to aliens subject to ‘full removal proceedings,’ like
Petitioner.” Montoya, 2025 WL 3733302, at *6; see also Mejia Olalde, 2025 WL 3131942, at *3.11
Court have also reasoned that applying § 1225(b)(2)(A) to aliens who have been present in
the United States for years, like Petitioner, would make all or part of § 1226 superfluous. See, e.g.,
Lopez Benitez, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 490–91; Maldonado Vazquez, 2025 WL 2676082, at *14; Chogllo
Chafla, 804 F. Supp. 3d at 259 (reasoning that if § 1225(b)(2) applies to aliens already present in
the country, “it would preclude the need for § 1226(a) to exist at all”); Patel v. Crowley, No. 25 C
11180, 2025 WL 2996787, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2025) (“Respondent’s interpretation of Section
1225(b)(2)(A) would largely nullify Section 1226(a) because it is not clear under what
circumstances § 1226(a)’s authorization of detention on a discretionary basis would ever apply.”
(citation omitted)); Villa v. Normand, No. 5:25-CV-89, 2025 WL 3095969, at *9 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 4,
2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:25-CV-100, 2025 WL 3188406 (S.D. Ga. Nov.
14, 2025). But many of those cases err in assessing the amount of overlap between the statutes.
The statutes are not wholly redundant. For example, the facts of Jennings, which involved a lawful
permanent resident, illustrate circumstances where § 1225(b)(2)(A) and § 1226 differ in their
application: Section 1226 can apply to aliens who have been admitted to the United States and are
therefore no longer “applicants for admission.” 	See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288. 	Two other
examples of aliens to whom § 1226 applies, but § 1225(b)(2)(B) does not, are erroneously admitted
aliens, see Montoya, 2025 WL 3733302, at *11, and lawfully admitted aliens “who then remain
present unlawfully.” Chen, 2025 WL 3484855, at *7 (citation omitted); see also Coronado v. Sec’y,
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-CV-831, 2025 WL 3628229, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 2025).
11 “Aliens subject to expedited removal do not receive any hearing, while unadmitted aliens
subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A) receive a removal hearing under § 1229a, though not a bond hearing.”
Montoya, 2025 WL 3733302, at *6.
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It is true that some overlap was created when Congress passed the Laken Riley Act
(“LRA”), Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025), last year. The LRA added subparagraph (E) to §
1226(c)(1), which requires the Attorney General to detain without bond aliens who (1) are present
in the United States without being admitted or paroled, and (2) commit certain crimes. So, aliens
present in the United States who have not been admitted are subject to detention under §
1225(b)(2)(A), and if they commit certain crimes, could also be subject to detention under §
1226(c)(1)(E). But this limited redundancy is not enough to persuade the Court that Petitioner’s
interpretation of the statutes is correct for several reasons.
First, as other courts have noted, prior presidential administrations have consistently
provided bond hearings for aliens, like Petitioner, who were present in the United States and had
not been admitted, despite the language in § 1225(b)(2)(A) requiring mandatory detention. See,
e.g., Cabanas v. Bondi, No. 4:25-CV-04830, 2025 WL 3171331, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2025);
Garibay-Robledo, 2026 WL 81679, at *8; Chen, 2025 WL 3484855, at *6; Coronado, 2025 WL
3628229, at *11. 	Because the LRA eliminated the possibility of these unadmitted aliens being
released on bond if they were arrested for, convicted of, or admitted committing certain crimes, it
limited the effect of the Executive’s decision to treat these aliens as eligible for bond under §
1226(a) (instead of mandatory detention under §1225(b)(2)(A)). See Cabanas, 2025 WL 3171331,
at *6; Garibay-Robledo, 2026 WL 81679, at *8; Chen, 2025 WL 3484855, at *6.
Second, the LRA’s addition of § 1226(c)(3) suggests not just an intention to guarantee
detention, but a desire that detention be achieved in a timely manner. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(3) (“[I]f
the alien is not otherwise detained . . . [the Secretary of Homeland Security] shall effectively and
expeditiously take custody of the alien.” (emphasis added)); see also Singh, 2026 WL 74558, at
*5–6 (“The point of the Laken Riley Act is not to mandate the detention of aliens who otherwise
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would not be subject to mandatory detention, but instead to mandate the timing of the detention of
certain aliens.”); Garibay-Robledo, 2026 WL 81679, at *8 (“It is entirely reasonable, then, to
interpret the LRA as providing a temporal gloss on the Executive’s detention authority.”). On a
temporal reading, then, there is potentially no redundancy.
Third, and most importantly, without more, the limited redundancy does not provide “a
license to rewrite or eviscerate another portion of the statute contrary to its text.” Barton v. Barr,
590 U.S. 222, 239 (2020); see Garibay-Robledo, 2026 WL 81679, at *8; Montoya, 2025 WL
3733302, at *12. “[R]edundancies are common in statutory drafting,” so “[s]ometimes the better
overall reading of the statute contains some redundancy.” Barton, 590 U.S. at 239 (citation
omitted). And the Court is convinced that is the case here.
On the whole, the INA, IIRIRA, and the LRA collectively strengthen the Executive’s
immigration enforcement authority—requiring a bond hearing or ordering Petitioner’s immediate
release would eviscerate that authority with a reading of §§ 1225 and 1226 that fights the plain
text, defies common sense, and ignores congressional intent. 	For those reasons, “[t]his Court
declines to participate in that alchemy.” Chen, 2025 WL 3484855, at *6.
3. 	Estoppel Against the Government
Though not directly addressed in the briefing, during the January 22 hearing, the issue of
estoppel was raised. The Parties agreed that the Government obviously retains an ability to change
its litigating position, even in the same case, particularly during a transition between presidential
administrations. There was, however, some question about whether that flexibility empowers the
Government to detain (and then release) an alien present unlawfully under one statutory provision
(§ 1226), but then, at its own discretion, re-detain the same alien pursuant to a different statutory
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provision (§ 1225) such that he is no longer eligible for release. Having examined the issue, the
Court concludes that the Government may do so.
The general (and seemingly universal) rule is that “equitable estoppel will not lie against
the Government as it lies against private litigants.” 	Off. of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S.
414, 419 (1990). Indeed, even when the Government has misled or misinformed a party about the
law to that party’s detriment, the Supreme Court has declined to credit estoppel theories. See, e.g.,
Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States,
243 U.S. 389, 408–09 (1917) (“Of this it is enough to say that the United States is neither bound
nor estopped by acts of its officers or agents in entering into an arrangement or agreement to do or
cause to be done what the law does not sanction or permit.”). The Supreme Court has succinctly
summarized this practice: “we have reversed every finding of estoppel that we have reviewed.”
Richmond, 496 U.S. at 422; see also id. at 423 (indicating that the arguments for a blanket rule
against estoppel of the Government “are substantial”); Gutierrez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 688, 691
(7th Cir. 2006) (“The Supreme Court has never affirmed a finding of estoppel against the
government.”).
Some courts have nevertheless concluded that the Government has effectively forfeited its
opportunity to detain an alien pursuant to § 1225 after initially proceeding under § 1226. See, e.g.,
J.G.O. v. Francis, No. 25-CV-7233 (AS), 2025 WL 3040142, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2025) (“It
has detained noncitizens pursuant to § 1226(a), then, only afterward, argued that they were instead
detained under § 1225(b)(2) and ineligible for bond.”); Lopez Benitez, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 485–86
(determining that the petitioner could not have been reclassified to fall under § 1225 when the
Government had consistently invoked § 1226). 	But even if the Court were inclined to take a
favorable view of estoppel claims against the Government, this case would be a poor vehicle for
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creating such an exception. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Petitioner was promised
anything or that the Government committed to continue treating him as an alien within the
provisions of § 1226.
Moreover, whatever other courts have held, estoppel does not allow “an agency [to]
effectively rewrite a statute by enforcing it contrary to its plain language for a long time.” Singh,
2026 WL 73558, at *6. 	This is particularly true in “the immigration context, where . . . the
Executive’s enforcement discretion implicates not only ‘normal domestic law enforcement
priorities’ but also ‘foreign-policy objectives.’” United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 679 (2023)
(quoting Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 490–491 (1999)).
Judge Vyskocil aptly sums it up:
A failure by the Executive Branch to enforce a statutory provision, or its conclusion
that the law does not apply, does not nullify a duly-enacted law. See U.S. Const.,
art. I, § 7; see also Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 392 (2024).
There 	is 	simply 	no 	authority 	for 	the 	proposition 	that 	if 	one 	presidential
administration fails to enforce a statute, the next administration cannot enforce it,
even though the statute clearly applies, according to its plain terms, and no promises
not to enforce it have been made.
Chen, 2025 WL 3484855, at *7.
B. 	Second Question: Does Continued Detention Violate the Due Process Clause?
Petitioner also contends that his detention without a bond hearing violates protections
afforded by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 	(ECF No. 1 at PageID 7.) 	The
Constitution guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. There is no question—and the parties do not dispute—
that “the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno
v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). Nevertheless, it is also true that, “[i]n the exercise of its broad
power over . . . immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied
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to citizens.” Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976). Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently
commented that “the through line of history is recognition of the Government’s sovereign authority
to set the terms governing the admission and exclusion of noncitizens.” Dep’t of State v. Muñoz,
602 U.S. 899, 911–12 (2024). “Courts have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens
as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely
immune from judicial control.” Mezei, 345 U.S. at 210.
To that end, the Government treats aliens in Petitioner’s circumstances according to the so-
called “entry fiction” theory of immigration law. Aliens who have not “entered the United States
within the meaning of the law,” i.e., who were never lawfully admitted and do not have leave to
remain, are “still in theory of law at the boundary line.” Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 231, 230
(1925). Accordingly, Petitioner, who was not lawfully admitted to the United States, is properly
considered 	“on 	the 	threshold” 	of 	the 	border, 	regardless 	of 	his 	literal 	physical 	location.
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 140 (quoting Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212). And consistent with the statutory
definition of “applicant for admission” discussed above, “an alien seeking initial admission to the
United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application.”
Landon v. Plascentia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982).
In the absence of any constitutionally defined “amount” or “form” of process, the question
is whether any process has been afforded by legislative grace, that is, by Congress. 	See
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 140 (explaining that an alien detained after illegal entry “has only those
rights regarding admission that Congress has provided by statute”); U.S. ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is
due process . . . .”). In the present case, removal proceedings have been initiated by a Notice to
Appear, and Petitioner has been detained pursuant to § 1225. (ECF No. 2-1 at PageID 22; ECF
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No. 1 at PageID 2.) And “detention during deportation proceedings [i]s a constitutionally valid
aspect of the deportation process.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003).
Though Petitioner is not, therefore, entitled to the bond hearing permitted by § 1226, he is
entitled to the full panoply of statutory rights and procedures authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a,
because that is what has been afforded by Congress. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (“[I]n the case
of an alien who is an applicant for admission . . . the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under
section 1229a of this title.” (emphasis added)). Because there is nothing in the record to suggest
that this process is not being afforded, Petitioner’s due process claim necessarily fails.
C. 	Third Question: Is the Court Bound by the Decisions in Maldonado Bautista?
Next, Petitioner contends that, notwithstanding any analyses to the contrary, the Court is
bound by orders out of the Central District of California in Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz. (ECF
No. 1 at PageID 7.) In that case, Judge Sykes granted class certification and declaratory relief to
a “Bond Eligible Class” of individuals situated similarly to Petitioner, Maldonado Bautista v.
Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-1873, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (“Class Cert.
Order”), and then entered a partial final judgment, Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-
CV-1873, 2025 WL 3713982, at *6–7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025) (“Partial Judgment”). 	The
declaratory relief purportedly extended to all class members was “an individualized bond hearing
or release [] from detention.” 	Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-1873, 2025 WL
3713987, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025) (“Consolidated Order”). Judge Sykes also indicated her
intention to grant “classwide vacatur of the unlawful DHS policy.” Maldonado Bautista (Partial
Judgment), 2025 WL 3713982, at *4.
Without getting too far into the substance of the Maldonado Bautista orders, the Court has
serious reservations about the reasoning contained therein. 	But it is abundantly clear that the
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universal nature of the relief ordered is unacceptable for at least two reasons, both aptly laid out
by Judge Hendrix in the Northern District of Texas:
There are two possible implications to draw from the Central District’s claim to
authority and from its class-wide declaratory and vacatur relief. Neither is
consistent with Supreme Court precedent. Because this Court must follow Supreme
Court precedent, it cannot grant the relief requested by the petitioner and bind itself
to the Central District’s orders.
The first implication from the Central District’s order is that, as in any class action,
the petitioner’s claim here should be denied so that he can bring his claim in the
same litigation as his fellow class members. See, e.g., Ramirez Melgar, 2025 WL
3496721, at *15 (denying habeas relief in part because, assuming the Central
District’s orders are binding, relief is appropriate in the Central District only) . . . .
But this approach, though graced with the virtue of a single vehicle for litigation,
runs counter to the traditional posture of a habeas claim. When challenging
detention, a petitioner by “default” must sue “the warden of the facility where [he]
is being held, not the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory
official.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2024). Indeed, “[t]he plain
language of the habeas statute . . . confirms the general rule that for core habeas
petitions challenging present physical confinement, jurisdiction lies in only one
district: the district of confinement.” Id. at 443.
There are ninety-four United States District Courts. Ninety-three of them are not
the Central District of California. It is impossible to reconcile the Supreme Court’s
requirement of suit within the district of detention with a system whereby individual
class members from the other ninety-three districts must file in the Central District
to secure individual habeas relief. See id. Even then, the wardens who detain these
men and women are not currently defendants in the Maldonado Bautista class
action. This approach is thus inconsistent with binding Supreme Court precedent.
The second implication fares no better . . . [and] runs as follows: the petitioners,
consistent with the immediate-custodian rule, will continue to sue in the district of
their confinement, but the nationwide class requires that the local federal district
judge accept the Central District’s declarations of law as binding. Then, having
done so, the local district judge must order the class member relief in the form of
an individualized bond hearing. In other words, the petitioner asserts that this Court
submit to a type of “Simon Says” arrangement with the Central District.
That proposition is even less acceptable than the last. It would require courts to
neuter the Supreme Court’s holding in Aleman Gonzalez that the INA prohibits
class-wide injunctive relief. Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, 596 U.S. 543, 554–55
(2022). Petitioners would use the Bond Eligible Class as a vehicle to order district
courts to grant as individual relief that which is barred by the INA and Supreme
Court precedent. The INA would only narrowly stop technical intrusions into
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federal immigration policy and flood district courts with the binding orders of
whichever judge certifies a class and first asserts authority over petitioners in the
other ninety-three districts.
Calderon Lopez v. Lyons, No. 1:25-CV-226-H, 2025 WL 3683918, at *12–13 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 19,
2025). Accordingly, the only acceptable conclusion is that the Maldonado Bautista relief, to the
extent it purported to be universal, was ultra vires. Thus this Court is not precluded from arriving
at contrary conclusions of law and is not required to grant the relief that the Maldonado Bautista
court believed appropriate.
D. 	Fourth Question: Is the Petitioner Entitled to Relief under the APA?
Finally, the Petition makes only the barest mention of the APA. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 7.)
None of the briefing addresses a claim under the APA, nor was it discussed at the January 22
hearing. Nevertheless, the Court will address any potential relief Petitioner might be entitled to
under the APA.
Agency action is “subject to judicial review” when “there is no other adequate remedy in
a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704; see also Haines v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 814 F.3d 417, 427
(6th Cir. 2016) (citing Bangura v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 487, 500 (6th Cir. 2006)) (“[T]o state a claim
for relief under the APA, a plaintiff must allege that his or her injury stems from a final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in court.”). But when a petitioner challenges
the validity of his confinement and seeks immediate release, his claim falls “within the core of the
writ of habeas corpus and thus must be brought in habeas.” Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 672
(2025). 	In such a case, habeas is more than an adequate remedy. 	Because Petitioner here
challenges the basis for his confinement and seeks immediate release, habeas is the proper remedy
and any APA claim necessarily fails.
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CONCLUSION
As the Court heard at the January 22 hearing, Petitioner’s situation is a difficult one. The
weight of these proceedings and the Government’s position regarding his detention have taken a
toll on him and his family. And there is nothing in the record to suggest that Petitioner is anything
other than a hardworking, otherwise law-abiding individual. But whether the Court likes it or not,
Petitioner’s circumstances do not determine the outcome of his claims; § 1225 does, and it
mandates detention. “Inquiry beyond that, as to whether such position is the best or wisest use of
executive enforcement priorities, or whether it is in line with the priorities of prior Administrations,
simply is not the remit of an Article III court. It is instead the subject of legislation and the result
of elections, both of which have consequences.” Cabanas, 2025 WL 3171331, at *6. And though
district court judges leave politics behind, “[t]here is hardly a political question in the United States
which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one.” Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in
America 99 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., 1969). But the Court cannot let the political
environment out of which this matter arises obscure the reality of its responsibility.
“The hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do not like. We make them
because they are right, right in the sense that the law and the Constitution, as we see them, compel
the result.” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420–21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Similarly,
Justice Scalia once said, “[i]f you’re going to be a good and faithful judge, you have to resign
yourself to the fact that you’re not always going to like the conclusions you reach. If you like them
all the time, you’re probably doing something wrong.” Justice Antonin Scalia, Annual Madison
Lecture at Chapman University Fowler School of Law (2005).
The Court’s earnest consideration of the issues here compels this result.
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For the reasons set forth above, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (ECF No. 1) and Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction (ECF No. 2) are DENIED. A judgment will be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 13th day of February, 2026.
s/ Mark S. Norris
MARK S. NORRIS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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