Lobley v. Memphis Police Department

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
ISELA LOBLEY, on behalf of )
JAYLEN LOBLEY, deceased, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 25-cv-02539-SHL-tmp
)
MEMPHIS POLICE DEPARTMENT, )
)
)
Defendant. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the court is defendant City of Memphis’s (the “City”)
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, filed on May 29,
2025. (ECF No. 8.) Also before the court is pro se plaintiff Isela
Lobley’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, filed on
August 13, 2025 (ECF No. 13) and her Motion for Leave to File
Second Amended Complaint, filed on August 21, 2025 (ECF No. 15).
For the reasons below, the undersigned recommends that the City’s
Motion to Dismiss be granted, and Lobley’s Motion for Leave to
File Amended Complaint and Motion for Leave to File Second Amended
Complaint be denied.
I. PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
A. Factual Allegations
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Isela Lobley initiated this action on April 11, 2025, in the
Shelby County Circuit Court, asserting that her son, Jaylen Lobley,
was killed by Memphis police officers while he “was not a threat
to the officers.” (ECF No. 1-2.) This tragic event occurred on
April 12, 2024, when officers on duty responded to a call about a
suspicious car. Id. She claims her son was the driver and was
accompanied by a passenger. Id. She alleges that both occupants of
the car were asleep when the police arrived, and after the officers
attempted to wake them but failed, the officers “let the air out
of the rear tires” and “attempted to break the passenger window.”
Id. The passenger then pulled out his weapon and fired on the
officers, at which time Jaylen Lobley awakened to gunfire, tried
to drive away, and crashed. Id. Plaintiff alleges that her son
never fired a weapon nor pointed a weapon at any officers. Id.
Jaylen Lobley later died at the hospital. Id. On May 22, 2025, the
case was removed on the basis of federal question jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
B. Procedural History
After removal, the City filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure
to State a Claim on May 29, 2025. (ECF No. 8.) The City notes that
although Plaintiff did not name a specific statute, she based her
claim on allegations of excessive force by officers of the Memphis
Police Department arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 8 at
PageID 2.) The City argues that Plaintiff’s Complaint names some
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individual police officers and contains allegations regarding
events that led to her son’s death, but no factual allegations are
directed against the City or the Memphis Police Department. (ECF
No. 8 at PageID 3.)
On June 30, 2025, the undersigned entered an Order to Show
Cause based on Lobley’s failure to respond to the City’s Motion to
Dismiss. (ECF No. 9.) Lobley filed a Motion for Extension of Time
on July 11, 2025, which was granted on July 14, 2025. (ECF Nos.
10, 11.) She then filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on
August 4, a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint on August
13, and Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint on
August 21, 2025. (ECF Nos. 12, 13, 15.)
II. PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Motion to Dismiss
1. Standard of Review
To state a claim for relief, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2) requires that a pleading only contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, to
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he factual
allegations in the complaint need to be sufficient to give notice
to the defendant as to what claims are alleged, and the plaintiff
must plead ‘sufficient factual matter’ to render the legal claim
plausible, i.e., more than merely possible.” Fritz v. Charter Twp.
of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft
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v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009)); see also Chambers v. Sanders,
63 F.4th 1092, 1096 (6th Cir. 2023). “The plausibility standard is
not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
557 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. To satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff must plead more than
“labels and conclusions,” “a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action,” or “‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further
factual enhancement.’” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555, 557).
Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and are thus liberally
construed. Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011);
Kremer v. Unilever, PLC, No. 24-cv-01410, 2025 WL 2674556, at *6
(M.D. Tenn Sept. 18, 2025). Even so, pro so litigants must adhere
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Wells v. Brown, 891
F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989), and the court cannot create a claim
that has not been spelled out in a pleading. See Brown v.
Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011); Payne v. Sec’y
of Treas., 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003); Wooden v. Lee,
No. 24-cv-01052, 2025 WL 2678796, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 18,
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2025).
2. Section 1983 Claims
Plaintiff’s Complaint is styled as an action brought under §
1983. “To succeed on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must first
identify a constitutional right, then show that a person acting
under the color of state law deprived him of that right.” Susselman
v. Washtenaw Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 109 F.4th 864, 870 (6th Cir.
2024) (citing Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corr., 979
F.3d 472, 482 (6th Cir. 2020)). In a case brought against municipal
defendants such as the City, a plaintiff must plausibly allege the
existence of an unlawful policy or custom. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see also Hart v. City of Grand
Rapids, 138 F.4th 409, 425 (6th Cir. 2025). Even though Lobley’s
Complaint sufficiently alleges a constitutional violation, she
does not provide any factual allegations to plausibly allege the
municipal defendant had an unlawful policy or custom to deprive
Jaylen Lobley of that constitutional right.
“Unlike states, . . . local governments, municipalities, and
counties are considered ‘persons’ within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983[.]” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 814 (6th Cir. 2003);
see also Wright v. Louisville Metro Gov’t, 144 F.4th 817, 827 (6th
Cir. 2025). However, a municipality cannot be held liable under §
1983 for the constitutional violations of its employees on a theory
of respondeat superior. Morris v. City of Memphis, No. 19-cv-2874-
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MSN-tmp, 2021 WL 1878357, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 20, 2021) (citing
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). “Rather, the City may be held only
directly liable ‘for unconstitutional policies, practices, or
customs that were the moving force behind the deprivation of
plaintiffs’ rights.” Id. (quoting Pethel v. State Dep’t of Children
Servs., No. 3:10-cv-469-TAV-HBG, 2020 WL 6827791, at *16 (E.D.
Tenn. Nov. 20, 2020) and citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694) (internal
quotations omitted).
The Sixth Circuit has identified “at least four avenues”
through which a plaintiff may prove the existence of a
municipality’s unlawful policy or custom. Franklin v. Franklin
Cnty., 115 F.4th 461, 470 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Thomas v. City
of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005)). These include:
“(1) the municipality’s legislative enactments or official agency
policies; (2) actions taken by officials with final decision-
making authority; (3) a policy of inadequate training or
supervision; or (4) a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of
federal rights violations.” Id. “In the context of [§] 1983
municipal liability, district courts in the Sixth Circuit have
interpreted Iqbal’s standards strictly.” Epperson v. City of
Humboldt, Tenn., 140 F. Supp. 3d 676, 685 (W.D. Tenn. 2015)
(quoting Hutchison v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty.,
685 F. Supp. 2d 747, 751 (M.D. Tenn. 2010)) (additional citations
omitted).
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At the motion to dismiss stage, the Sixth Circuit has
routinely found that conclusory, speculative allegations are
insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief against a
municipality. See, e.g., Brent v. Wayne Cnty. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 901 F.3d 656, 698 (6th Cir. 2018) (affirming dismissal of
plaintiff’s municipal liability claim where complaint failed to
allege “a single fact” suggesting that Fourth Amendment violations
were the result of defendant city’s custom or policy); D’Ambrosio
v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 387-88 (6th Cir. 2014) (applying four-
prong custom of tolerance standard to hold that plaintiff’s “lone,
conclusory allegation” of employee’s misconduct did not state a
plausible claim of municipal liability). By contrast, in cases
where the Sixth Circuit has found that complaints satisfied the
plausibility requirement, those complaints contained at least some
details as to the custom or practice challenged and identified
specific instances of similar past conduct. See, e.g., Osberry v.
Slusher, 750 F. App’x 385, 398 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 680) (finding that six prior cases of alleged
unconstitutional conduct identified in plaintiff’s amended
complaint “nudge[d] Osberry’s Monell claim ‘across the line from
conceivable to plausible’” under Iqbal’s pleading standard); Green
v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cnty., 482 F. App’x 63,
65-66 (6th Cir. 2012) (reversing dismissal of municipal liability
claim where plaintiff “did not merely allege a policy of enforcing
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facially invalid state court order,” but offered discrete
statements from two county employees that this was the county’s
policy in amended complaint).
Here, Isela Lobley does not identify any discrete examples of
similar constitutional violations within the four corners of her
original Complaint. She instead relies on conclusory allegations
with no further explanation that her son “was killed by Memphis
police officers” and “[a]s a consequence of the off[ic]er[’]s
actions,” her family suffered harm. (ECF No. 1-2.) “Allowing
Plaintiff’s single incident to support a finding of municipal
liability would ‘result in the collapsing of the municipal
liability standard into a simple respondeat superior standard.’”
Doe v. Shelby Cnty. Gov’t, No. 2:18-cv-02637-JPM/tmp, 2020 WL
5995507, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Oct 9, 2020) (quoting Thomas, 398 F.3d
at 432-33). Because “[t]his path to municipal liability has been
forbidden by the Supreme Court,” Lobley’s conclusory allegations,
without more, are not sufficient to state a claim under § 1983.
Thomas, 398 F.3d at 433 (citations omitted); see also Bickerstaff
v. Lucarelli, 830 F.3d 388, 402 (6th Cir. 2016) (“With no factual
allegations showing a formal policy or any prior incidents to
support the [City’s] adoption of such an informal practice or
custom, [Plaintiff’s] Monell municipal-liability claim accordingly
fails.”).
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In sum, Lobley has not plausibly alleged that the City so
inadequately failed to train its officers or ignored a pattern of
sufficiently similar constitutional violations for municipal
liability to attach. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that
Plaintiff’s claims under § 1983 be dismissed.
B. Motion to Amend Complaint
Lobley’s first Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint
attempts to correct the deficiencies that the City’s Motion to
Dismiss highlights. (ECF No. 13-1.) In Count One, Lobley elaborates
upon her § 1983 claim that the officers’ “use of force was
unreasonable and caused Jaylen’s death.” (Id. at PageID 37.) In
Count Two, Lobley also claims “[t]he City maintained policies or
customs that failed to train and supervise officers on
constitutional use of force.” (Id.) However, formulaic recitation
of the elements of a § 1983 cause of action is insufficient to
state a claim. Birgs v. City of Memphis, 686 F. Supp. 2d 776, 779
(W.D. Tenn. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also
Jones v. Couvreur, No. 17-CV-11185, 2017 WL 1543703, at *4 (E.D.
Mich. Apr. 28, 2017) (dismissing complaint that relied on “mere
boilerplate language” to establish alleged failure to train
theory).
Lobley also attempts to add individual officers to be “sued
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in their individual and official capacities.”1 (ECF No. 13-1 at
PageID 36-37.) When a government official is sued in their official
capacity, courts treat it as “the equivalent of a suit against the
governmental entity,” so the Monell requirements would still
apply. Lane v. City of Lafollette, 490 F.3d 410, 423 (6th Cir.
2007); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994); see
also Lee v. Mayfield, No. 25-5233, 2025 WL 726856, at *2 (6th Cir.
Aug. 26, 2025); Enoch v. Hamilton Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 818 F.
App’x 398, 406 (6th Cir. 2020). Since Lobley’s Amended Complaint
still fails to adequately state a § 1983 claim that would meet the
Monell standard, the amendment would be futile as to the claims
against the City and the officers in their official capacity.
Riverview Health Inst. LLC v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 512
(6th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a proposed amendment is futile if
the amendment could not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss); see also Greer v. Strange Honey Farm, LLC, 114 F.4th
605, 617 (6th Cir. 2024).
Regarding the suit against the named officers individually,
1Although names are listed in the facts section of her the original
Complaint, Lobley attempts to add the following Memphis police
officers as defendants in her Amended Complaint: Joseph McKenny,
Mamdou Diallo, Steven Dortch, Deangelo Hodges, Katie Alaya, Jacob
Nidetz, Francisco Torres, Michael Austin, Benjamin Howell,
Corderrius Stone, Anthony Weeden, Raul De La Cueva, and Keith Wort.
However, based on her original Complaint, Memphis Police
Department (the City of Memphis) is the only named defendant in
this case.
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Lobley writes only that they “violated Jaylen’s Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments.” (ECF No. 13-1 at PageID 37.) However,
“damages claims against government officials arising from alleged
violations of constitutional rights must allege, with
particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to
violate the . . . right . . . . [and] separately analyz[ing] the
constitutionality of the individual actions of each defendant.”
Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing
Terrance v. Northville Reg’l Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842
(6th Cir. 2002)); see also Mobley v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No.
2:22-cv-02860-SHM-tmp, 2024 WL 712889, at *6 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 21,
2024). Lobley does not identify how any specific officer acted to
violate her son’s constitutional rights, nor does she provide facts
alleging which of the named officers were personally responsible
for which parts of the police encounter. Thus, her proposed Amended
Complaint does not meet the standard to establish individual
liability against the officers.
In her Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, Lobley
mentions a “wrongful death claim under Tennessee law” arising out
of the same encounter that forms the basis of her § 1983 claims,
labeling it as Count Three.2 (ECF No. 13-1 at PageID 37.) In the
2Lobley makes a passing reference to wrongful death in the heading
of her original complaint (ECF No. 1-2), but her Motion to Amend
Complaint is the first time she separately alleges wrongful death
as a standalone count.
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City’s response in opposition to her motion to amend, they argue
that because the wrongful death count is based on the same factual
allegations as her § 1983 counts, the amendment would be futile.
(ECF No. 16 at PageID 4-5.) The undersigned agrees. It is well
established in the Sixth Circuit that the City is immune from suit
for wrongful death where, as here, the basis for such a claim
arises out of the § 1983 claim. See Johnson v. City of Memphis,
617 F.3d 864, 872 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Pheap v. City of
Knoxville, 687 F. Supp. 3d 807, 819 (E.D. Tenn. 2023) (discussing
the civil rights exception under the Tennessee Governmental Tort
Liability Act). Thus, this proposed amendment would be futile.
C. Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint
Lobley also filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended
Complaint. (ECF No. 15.) In the City’s opposition to the motion,
it correctly argues that Plaintiff failed to attach her proposed
Second Amended Complaint to her motion, as required by Local Rule
15.1(a). (ECF No. 16.) Without the substance of the proposed
amended complaint, the undersigned was unable to determine whether
leave should be granted. As such, on September 30, 2025, Lobley
was ordered to file her proposed second amended complaint within
ten days. (ECF No. 17.) As of the date of this report and
recommendation, Plaintiff has not filed her second amended
complaint. Therefore, this motion should be denied.
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III. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that
the City’s Motion to Dismiss be granted, and Lobley’s Motion for
Leave to File Amended Complaint and Motion for Leave to File Second
Amended Complaint be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
s/ Tu M. Pham
TU M. PHAM
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
December 12, 2025
Date
NOTICE
WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A COPY OF THIS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION, ANY PARTY MAY SERVE AND FILE
SPECIFIC WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS. ANY PARTY MAY RESPOND TO ANOTHER PARTY’S
OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A
COPY. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2); L.R.
72.1(g)(2). FAILURE TO FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS
MAY CONSTITUTE A WAIVER AND/OR FORFEITURE OF OBJECTIONS,
EXCEPTIONS, AND FURTHER APPEAL.
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