Tarpley v. CITY OF MEMPHIS et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
HAROLD TARPLEY,
Plaintiff,
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No. 2:24-cv-02513-MSN-atc	v.
CITY OF MEMPHIS, et al.,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Before the Court by Order of Reference1 are the Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for
Summary Judgment of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint of Defendants City of Memphis,
City of Memphis Division of Public Works Department of Code Enforcement, Memphis Police
Department, and W. Lewis (collectively, “the City Defendants”), filed on March 10, 2025 (ECF
No. 22),2 and the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants Shelby County General Sessions Court Clerk
and Shelby County Attorney (collectively, “the County Defendants”), filed on April 9, 2025
(ECF No. 27). When Tarpley failed to timely respond to either Motion, the Court ordered him to
1 Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 2013-05, this case has been referred to the United States
Magistrate Judge for management and for all pretrial matters for determination and/or report and
recommendation as appropriate.
2 As noted in the City Defendants’ Motion, Plaintiff Harold Tarpley named “W. Lewis” as a
Defendant in his capacity as an employee of the City of Memphis, and thus the City Defendants
also move for dismissal on Lewis’s behalf. (ECF No. 22-1, at 1 n.1.) Tarpley only brings claims
against Lewis in his official capacity. (See generally ECF No. 12-1, 30-1.) Those official-
capacity claims “are treated as claims against [Lewis’s] employer—the City of Memphis.”
Carroll v. Nash, No. 2:24-cv-02808-SHM-tmp, 2025 WL 2466570, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 26,
2025) (citation omitted); see also Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2003) (“As long as
the governmental entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit
imposes liability on the entity that he represents.” (quotations omitted)).
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do so (ECF No. 28), and Tarpley then filed his Response to the City Defendants’ Motion on
May 28, 2025 (ECF No. 30), and his Response to the County Defendants’ Motion on May 30,
2025 (ECF No. 31). The City Defendants filed a Reply in support of their Motion on June 5,
2025. (ECF No. 33.) Without leave of Court, Tarpley filed a Sur-Reply to the City Defendants’
Motion on June 20, 2025. (ECF Nos. 34, 35.)
For the reasons below, it is recommended that the City’s Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss3
(ECF No. 22) and the County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 27) be granted and that
this case be dismissed.
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
Tarpley filed his original Complaint on July 19, 2024, which consisted of 496 pages of
claims and allegations. (ECF No. 2.) In response to the City Defendants’ original Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 11), Tarpley filed a Motion to Amend (ECF No. 12) and submitted a proposed
Amended Complaint, consisting of eighty-eight pages (ECF No. 12-1). On February 25, 2025,
the Court granted Tarpley’s Motion to Amend and deemed the proposed Amended Complaint as
3 The City’s Motion is filed under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 56(c).
They contend that, “if the court treats this motion under the summary judgment standards
because documents outside the amended complaint are being submitted, there is no genuine issue
of material fact” and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law under Rule 56(c). (ECF
No. 22-1, at 7.) Because the undersigned relies herein only on documents attached to or
referenced in the pleadings, as well as public records from Tarpley’s previous litigation with the
City, the City Defendants’ Motion is not converted into one for summary judgment. See Gavitt
v. Born, 835 F.3d 623, 640 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[A] court may consider exhibits attached to the
complaint, public records, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to
defendant’s motion to dismiss, so long as they are referred to in the complaint and are central to
the claims contained therein, without converting the motion to one for summary judgment.”)
(citation omitted).
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the operative Complaint.4 (ECF No. 21.) The City Defendants’ and the County Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 22, 27) followed.
Tarpley brings claims primarily under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 for a wide range of alleged
constitutional violations and related state-law claims concerning the condemnation and
demolition of his property—consisting of eight apartment units—located at 642 Danny Thomas
Boulevard, Memphis, Tennessee (“the Property”). (See generally ECF No. 12-1.) Though the
precise nature of Tarpley’s allegations and claims is extremely difficult to parse, the crux of his
case is that (1) Memphis Light, Gas, and Water (“MLGW”)5 damaged the Property in 2017
when making plumbing repairs; (2) the Property suffered some level of fire damage in 2019;
(3) Lewis, in his capacity as an inspector for the City of Memphis Public Works Division,
created a report dated February 2, 2023, that recommended the Property be condemned and
demolished primarily due to the 2019 fire damage; (4) the City instituted condemnation
proceedings, resulting in a condemnation hearing on March 30, 2023, that Tarpley failed to
attend (“the Condemnation Proceedings”), which resulted in an Order of Condemnation for the
Property (“the Condemnation Order”); (5) Tarpley filed a lawsuit against MLGW in Shelby
County Circuit Court, Case No. CT-1470-23, on April 13, 2023, relating to the water damage to
the Property and the City’s Condemnation Proceedings (“the Circuit Court Proceedings”); (6)
4 Tarpley re-filed an identical version of his Amended Complaint on March 23, 2025. (ECF
No. 23.) Because the Court already deemed that the Amended Complaint at ECF No. 12-1 is the
operative Complaint, the undersigned will cite herein to that version of the Amended Complaint.
5 Though MLGW is not specifically named as a Defendant in this case, Tarpley’s Amended
Complaint contains approximately seventy-five references to alleged misconduct by MLGW that
give rise to his claims. (See generally ECF No. 12-1.) “MLGW is a division of the City of
Memphis” and is “subject to the ultimate control of City government.” Casas v. La Quinta
Holdings, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-2951-JTF-dkv, 2018 WL 6433143, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 28,
2018) (citation omitted). Thus, the Court will construe Tarpley’s allegations against MLGW as
ultimately made against the City.
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Tarpley appealed the Condemnation Order to the Shelby County General Sessions
Environmental Court, Case No. 23400035, on April 17, 2023 (“the Environmental Court
Appeal”); (7) the Environmental Court Clerk allegedly promised to notify Tarpley of the appeal
hearing date and never did; (8) Tarpley failed to appear at his Environmental Court Appeal
hearing, and the Appeal was dismissed on June 29, 2023, rendering the Condemnation Order
final; (9) the Circuit Court Proceedings were dismissed with prejudice on September 5, 2023;
and (10) the Property was demolished pursuant to the Condemnation Order at some point in
2024. (See generally id.)6
Fleshing out that summary, Tarpley specifically contends that MLGW’s plumbing-repair
negligence caused the Property significant water damage in 2017. (ECF No. 12-1, at 4–7.) As to
the 2019 fire damage, Tarpley does not appear to attribute the fire itself to the actions of MLGW,
but he does allege that Lewis used the fire damage as a false pretext for the initiation of
condemnation proceedings in his February 2, 2023 report.7 (Id. at 3–9.) The City initiated the
Condemnation Proceedings—which Tarpley alleges were based on Lewis’s fraudulent
statements concerning fire damage and that he purportedly received no notice of—culminating in
the Condemnation Order. (Id.; ECF No. 22-3, at 1.)8 Then, on April 13, 2023, Tarpley filed the
6 Due to the convoluted and vague nature of Tarpley’s Amended Complaint, some of the facts in
this paragraph are taken from his Response to the City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, wherein
he clarifies some of the alleged dates and actions involved. (See generally ECF Nos. 30, 30-1,
30-2.)
7 Tarpley discusses whether or not Lewis is “blind” approximately ten times in his Amended
Complaint. (See generally id.)
8 The City Defendants attach numerous documents to their Motion to Dismiss, including the
March 30, 2023 Condemnation Order (ECF No. 22-3); Tarpley’s Notice of Appeal of that Order
to the Environmental Court (ECF No. 22-4); the Environmental Court’s Order of Dismissal (ECF
No. 22-5); Tarpley’s Amended Complaint in the Circuit Court Proceedings (ECF No. 22-6);
MLGW’s Motion to Dismiss in the Circuit Court Proceedings (ECF No. 22-7); and the Order of
Dismissal in the Circuit Court Proceedings (ECF No. 22-8). The Court takes judicial notice of
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Circuit Court Proceedings against MLGW, in which he primarily sought compensation for the
2017 water damage but also sought relief from the “negative action from Shelby County Code
Enforcement and Environmental Court” and made multiple claims for alleged constitutional
violations relating to the Condemnation Proceedings. (ECF No. 22-6, at 4–8.)
A few days after he filed the Circuit Court Proceedings, Tarpley filed the Environmental
Court Appeal on April 17, 2023, seeking to overturn the Condemnation Order based on, among
other things, his plans to repair the Property “upon completion of [the Circuit Court
Proceedings].” (ECF No. 22-4, at 1–2.) Tarpley claims that he
inquired to the Shelby County General Sessions Court Clerk regarding the date of
appeal. The Shelby County General Sessions Court Clerk took the Plaintiff’s
name and cell phone number and promised the Shelby County General Sessions
Court Clerk would call Plaintiff with the appeal date. Shelby County General
Sessions Court Clerk never called as promised.
(ECF No. 12-1, at 40.)9 When Tarpley failed to appear at the Environmental Court Appeal
hearing on June 29, 2023, the Appeal was dismissed, and the Environmental Court ordered that
“the City of Memphis may proceed with its demolition process.” (ECF No. 22-5.)
these documents from the Condemnation Proceedings, the Environmental Court Appeal, and the
Circuit Court Proceedings. See, e.g., Buck v. Thomas M. Cooley L. Sch., 597 F.3d 812, 816 (6th
Cir. 2010) (“A court may take judicial notice of other court proceedings.” (citing Winget v. JP
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 537 F.3d 565, 576 (6th Cir. 2008)); Stewart v. Brown, No. 23-3690,
2024 WL 3551151, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 2024) (holding that, when considering the Rooker‒
Feldman doctrine, “the district court properly relie[s] on public records showing what had
occurred in [the plaintiff’s] state-court proceedings,” even when the plaintiff does not attach or
mention them in the subsequent federal case (citations omitted)); see also Smith v. Bank of Am.,
No. 3:16-cv-391, 2017 WL 9482191, at *1 n.2 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 4, 2017) (relying on public
records from the underlying state-court foreclosure proceeding when considering the Rooker‒
Feldman doctrine (citing Wyser‒Pratte Mgmt. Co. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 560 (6th Cir.
2005))).
9 Though repeated elsewhere in his Amended Complaint and Response to the County
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (see generally ECF Nos. 12-1, 31-1), these are Tarpley’s only
substantive allegations against the County Defendants.
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With respect to the Circuit Court Proceedings, MLGW filed a motion to dismiss on
August 18, 2023. (ECF No. 22-7.) Tarpley claims he had “no significant legal training [and] did
not know how to proceed after filing the [Circuit Court Proceedings]” and that he “was unaware
of the court hearing [on the motion to dismiss] and did not appear.” (ECF No. 30-1, at 12.)
However, in granting MLGW’s motion, the Circuit Court held that “Notice of Hearing [was]
provided to the Plaintiff,” and Tarpley’s claims were ultimately dismissed with prejudice. (ECF
No. 22-8, at 1–2.) The Record contains no indication that Tarpley ever appealed the dismissal of
his Environmental Court Appeal or the Circuit Court Proceedings.
At some point in 2024, the Property was demolished pursuant to the Condemnation Order
and the Order dismissing his Environmental Court Appeal. (See generally ECF Nos. 12-1; see
also ECF No. 30-1, at 2; ECF No. 30-2, at 13.)10 As to the City Defendants, Tarpley brings
§ 1983 claims and a wide variety of other federal and state-law claims for relief that essentially
boil down to a demand for damages relating to the demolition of the Property in 2024.11 (See
generally ECF Nos. 12-1; 30-1.) As to the County Defendants, Tarpley brings only § 1983 and
state-law promissory-estoppel claims relating solely to the Environmental Court Clerk’s alleged
failure to call him about the date of the Appeal hearing as promised. (See generally ECF
Nos. 12-1; 31-1.)
10 The Record does not indicate when in 2024 the demolition actually took place.
11 Other than the demolition of the Property in 2024, Tarpley’s only allegations that took place
after the 2023 state-court proceedings involve his assertion that, on June 8, 2024, he received a
“communication [that] depicted a phallic symbol. Plaintiff experienced severe emotional distress
as Plaintiff is a heterosexual man and should not have received Gay, LGBTQ or any other videos
without legitimate purpose from the City Code Enforcement.” (ECF No. 12-1, at 77–80.)
Tarpley asserts that this alleged communication violated his constitutional rights and includes
these violations with his § 1983 claims against the City Defendants. (Id.)
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PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The City and County Defendants seek dismissal based on, among other things, res
judicata,12 failure to state a claim for promissory estoppel, and failure to adequately plead Monell
liability for the § 1983 claims. (ECF No. 22-1, at 9–13; ECF No. 27-1, at 5–9, 16–18.) Tarpley
responds that res judicata does not apply because he is not challenging the results of the
Environmental Court Appeal or the Circuit Court Proceedings, that this case—purportedly
relating only to the 2024 demolition of the Property—stands on its own, and that his Monell and
promissory-estoppel pleadings are sufficient. (See generally ECF Nos. 30-1, 31-1, 34-1.)
Though not raised by any of the Defendants, the Court will also consider the Rooker–Feldman
doctrine sua sponte. See Saker v. Nat’l City Corp., 90 F. App’x 816, 818 n.1 (6th Cir. 2004)
(“Because Rooker–Feldman concerns federal subject matter jurisdiction, this court may raise the
issue sua sponte at any time.”) (citation omitted).
I. 	Standards of Review
A. 	Subject Matter Jurisdiction
“A complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) if the facts, accepted as true and
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction.” Nesselrode v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 17-4206, 2018 WL 6975166, at *2
12 The term “res judicata” has become ambiguous due its usage as both a synonym for, and a
type of, preclusion. See, e.g., Winderback v. King, 592 U.S. 209, 215 n.3 (2021) (“The terms res
judicata and claim preclusion often are used interchangeably. But res judicata comprises two
distinct doctrines. The first is issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel. . . . The
second doctrine is claim preclusion, sometimes itself called res judicata.” (quotations and
citations omitted)); J.Z.G. Res., Inc. v. Shelby Ins. Co., 84 F.3d 211, 214 (6th Cir. 1996)
(describing “true res judicata” as one of the two doctrines of res judicata). As used herein, res
judicata refers only to claim preclusion, distinct from the doctrine of issue preclusion/collateral
estoppel.
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(6th Cir. June 18, 2018). 	“Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers and are thus liberally construed.” Woodson v. Woodson, No. 2:22-
mc-00003-TLP-tmp, 2022 WL 16985602, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 18, 2022), report and
recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 16963997 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 16, 2022) (citing Williams v.
Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)). “Even so, pro se litigants must adhere to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, . . . and the court cannot create a claim that has not been spelled out in
a pleading.” Id. (citations omitted). “A district court may, at any time, sua sponte dismiss a
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure when the allegations of a complaint are totally implausible, attenuated,
unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Id. (quoting Apple v.
Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999)); see also Coleman v. Juvenile Court of Memphis,
No. 18-6245, 2019 WL 2298965, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 10, 2019) (affirming sua sponte dismissal
of the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine).
B. 	Failure to State a Claim
To determine whether Tarpley has stated a claim for which relief may be granted, the
Court applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as articulated in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the
. . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations
and quotations omitted). The Court “construes the complaint in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff” and “accepts all factual allegations as true” to determine whether they plausibly
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suggest an entitlement to relief. HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608, 611 (6th Cir.
2012).
Pleadings provide facial plausibility when they present “factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. However, “pleadings that . . . are no more than conclusions[] are not
entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket
assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to
see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature
of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”).
“[A] pleading filed pro se is to be liberally construed and held to less stringent standards
than a pleading filed by counsel.” Kondaur Cap. Corp. v. Smith, 802 F. App’x 938, 945 (6th Cir.
2020) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)); see also Vandiver v. Vasbinder, 416
F. App’x 560, 562 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding the less stringent standard applies to pro se
complaints, “however inartfully pleaded”). Nevertheless, pro se litigants “are not exempt from
the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Wright v. Penguin Random House,
783 F. App’x 578, 581 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Fox v. Mich. State Police Dep’t, 173 F. App’x 372,
376 (6th Cir. 2006)); see also Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011)
(“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause of action on behalf
of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would transform the
courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While courts are
properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that responsibility does not
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encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should pursue.”); Brown v.
Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[A] court cannot ‘create a claim which a
plaintiff has not spelled out in his pleading.’”) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,
518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)). “A pro se complaint must still ‘contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Shelby v.
Greystar Mgmt. Servs., L.P., No. 2:17-cv-02650-SHM-cgc, 2018 WL 386647, at *2 (W.D. Tenn.
Jan. 11, 2018) (quoting Barnett v. Luttrell, 414 F. App’x. 784, 786 (6th Cir. 2011)).
II. 	Tarpley’s Claims Are Barred by the Rooker‒Feldman Doctrine
“The [Rooker–Feldman] doctrine—coming from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413 (1923) and D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)—restricts federal courts
from hearing claims seeking ‘relief from injury caused by the state court judgment.’” Robinson v.
Tansley, No. 2:23-cv-02589-SHL-atc, 2024 WL 4151160, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 11, 2024)
(quoting In re Hamilton, 540 F.3d 367, 371–72 (6th Cir. 2008)). “The Rooker‒Feldman doctrine
prohibits federal district courts from ‘consider[ing] cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments.’” Harvison v. Little, No.: 1:22-cv-
01103-JDB-jay, 2023 WL 3147905, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 28, 2023) (quoting Larry E. Parrish,
P.C. v. Bennett, 989 F.3d 452, 455 (6th Cir. 2021)). “The doctrine is derived from 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257, which ‘vests sole jurisdiction to conduct[] appellate review of final state-court judgments
in the Supreme Court.’” Id. (quoting Bennett, 989 F.3d at 456).
“To ascertain whether the doctrine applies, the Court ‘look[s] to the source of the injury
the plaintiff alleges in the federal complaint.’” Harvison, 2023 WL 3147905, at *2 (quoting
VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliott, P.C., 951 F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir. 2020)). “Other than the
Supreme Court of the United States, federal courts are barred from exercising appellate
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jurisdiction over state courts’ decisions and proceedings, ‘including claims that are “inextricably
intertwined” with issues decided in state court proceedings.’” Robinson, 2024 WL 4151160, at *7
(quoting Exec. Arts Studio, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 391 F.3d 783, 793 (6th Cir. 2004)). In
making this determination, “Plaintiffs’ subjective characterization of their claims is not
determinative. The court must determine whether Rooker‒Feldman bars a claim ‘by looking to
the source of the injury the plaintiff alleges in the federal complaint.’” Penn v. Ogg, No. 1:14-cv-
762014, 2014 WL 4450038, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 10, 2014) (quoting Evans v. Cordray, 424 F.
App’x 537, 538 (6th Cir. 2001)) (citations omitted) (finding that the Rooker‒Feldman doctrine
applied, even though the plaintiffs couched their federal case in terms of fraud and constitutional
violations, because it is the state-court proceeding and “corresponding judgment entry against
Plaintiffs that is the source of the injury alleged in the federal complaint . . . . This is precisely the
type of claim that is barred by Rooker–Feldman.”); see also Hicks-Bey v. Goodstein, 2:23-cv-
10771-TGB-eas, 2023 WL 3186945, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May 1, 2023) (dismissing under Rooker‒
Feldman, even though the plaintiff made fraud and § 1983 claims, because the claims all
challenged state-court foreclosure proceedings).
When the claims in a subsequent federal case essentially seek to set aside a state-court
judgment and are “the functional equivalent of an appeal from a state court judgment,” the
Rooker‒Feldman doctrine applies, and the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Untied
v. CIT Grp. Consumer Fin., Inc., 23 F. App’x 233, 234–35 (6th. Cir. 2001) (“The district court
appropriately concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Untied’s complaint because the claims
challenged the adequacy and result of state court proceedings that resolved the foreclosure sale of
the subject property.”); see also Givens v. Homecomings Fin., 278 F. App’x 607, 609 (6th Cir.
2008) (affirming dismissal of federal claims because the plaintiff was “effectively attempting to
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appeal from the state order granting possession to [the mortgagee], [and thus] his suit was
properly dismissed under Rooker‒Feldman”); Kafele v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss, L.P.A., 161
F. App’x 487, 489–90 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal because, “[b]esides being utterly
frivolous, the plaintiffs’ claims are predicated on their conviction that the state courts were wrong
and, therefore, satisfy the very definition of a case requiring Rooker‒Feldman abstention”
(quotation omitted)).
At its core, this case is the functional equivalent of an appeal from the Condemnation
Proceedings, the Environmental Court Appeal, and the Circuit Court Proceedings and an attempt
to collaterally attack issues that were litigated by Tarpley in those 2023 state-court proceedings.
The Environmental Court Appeal concluded with an Order of Dismissal that affirmed the
Condemnation Proceedings and allowed “the City of Memphis [to] proceed with its demolition
process.” (ECF No. 22-5.) And the Circuit Court Proceedings concluded with an Order that
dismissed with prejudice Tarpley’s claims regarding the 2017 water damage, the “negative
action from Shelby County Code Enforcement and Environmental Court,” and related alleged
constitutional violations concerning the Condemnation Proceedings. (ECF No. 22-6, at 4–8;
ECF No. 22-8, at 1–2.) Though Tarpley strenuously argues that this case stands on its own (see
generally ECF Nos. 30-1, 31-1, 34-1), the only substantive distinction here is that the demolition
of the Property took place at some point in 2024, whereas the Condemnation Proceedings, the
Environmental Court Appeal, and the Circuit Court Proceedings all concluded in 2023. But that
is a distinction without a difference, because the demolition of the Property is the very result that
was ordered and affirmed by those 2023 state-court proceedings, which Tarpley lost and failed to
appeal. Because the Rooker‒Feldman doctrine prohibits federal district courts from
“consider[ing] cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
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judgments,” Bennett, 989 F.3d at 455, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Tarpley’s
claims.
III. 	Tarpley’s Claims Against the City Defendants Are Barred by Res Judicata
As discussed above, the crux of Tarpley’s case is his challenges to the results of the
Condemnation Proceedings, the Environmental Court Appeal, and the Circuit Court Proceedings
and his myriad allegations concerning the City Defendants’ conduct in those 2023 proceedings,
which resulted in the demolition of the Property in 2024. Because those issues were or could
have been litigated in the 2023 state court proceedings, res judicata bars Tarpley’s claims in this
case against the City Defendants.
Res judicata or “claim preclusion prevents parties from raising issues that could have
been raised and decided in a prior action—even if they were not actually litigated.” Lucky Brand
Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., 590 U.S. 405, 412 (2020). Parties may not
“relitigat[e] the same ‘claim’ or ‘cause of action,’ even if certain issues were not litigated in the
prior action.” Winderback, 592 U.S. at 215 n.3; see also J.Z.G., 84 F.3d at 214 (“Claim
preclusion applies not only to bar the parties from relitigating issues that were actually litigated
but also to bar them from relitigating issues that could have been raised in an earlier action.”);
see also Johnson v. Belvedere Gardens Condo. Ass’n, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-02118-SHM-tmp, 2013
WL 4056356, at *11 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 12, 2013) (“In Tennessee, res judicata ‘broadly refers to
an issue that has been definitively settled by judicial decision . . . that bars a second suit between
the same parties or their privies on the same cause of action with respect to all issues which were
or could have been raised in the former suit.’” (quoting In re Estate of Goza, 397 S.W.3d 564,
570 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012))).
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“Suits involve the same claim or cause of action if the later suit arises from the same
transaction or involves a common nucleus of operative facts.” Winderback, 592 U.S. at 215 n.3
(internal quotations omitted); see also Nichols v. Knox Cnty., Tenn., 718 F. App’x. 338, 344 (6th
Cir. 2017) (“Tennessee res judicata bars ‘a second suit between the same parties or their privies
on the same cause of action with respect to all issues which were or could have been litigated in
the former suit.’ Two suits are deemed the same cause of action when they arise ‘out of the same
transaction or series of connected transactions.’ The concept of a transaction ‘connotes a natural
grouping or common nucleus of operative facts.’” (quoting Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d
363, 376 (Tenn. 2009)). If a claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, “[t]he weight of
authority supports dismissal for failure to state a claim.” Owens v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Bd. of
Educ., No. 2:18-cv-02345-JTF-dkv, 2018 WL 4374238, at *8 (W.D. Tenn. Jul. 18, 2018), report
and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 4179076 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 31, 2018) (collecting Sixth
Circuit cases affirming Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal based on res judicata). Courts may consider res
judicata on a motion to dismiss and are even “empowered to raise res judicata sua sponte . . . in
the interests of, inter alia, the promotion of judicial economy.” Holloway Constr. Co. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Labor, 891 F.2d 1211, 1212 (6th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted); see also Leirer v. Ohio
Bureau of Motor Vehicles Compliance Unit, 246 F. App’x 372, 374 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming
dismissal based on res judicata pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) because the plaintiff “could have
made all of the same allegations and claims he makes in his current lawsuit in that earlier second
lawsuit”).
In Tennessee, res judicata is applicable if four elements are satisfied:
(1) that the underlying judgment was rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction, (2) that the same parties or their privies were involved in both suits,
(3) that the same claim or cause of action was asserted in both suits, and (4) that
the underlying judgment was final and on the merits.
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Johnson, 2013 WL 4056356, at *11 (quoting Jackson v. Smith, 387 S.W.3d 486, 491 (Tenn.
2012)). The Environmental Court Appeal and the Circuit Court Proceedings satisfy each of
these elements.
As to the first element, in April 2023, Tarpley initiated both the Environmental Court
Appeal—to directly challenge the results of the Condemnation Proceedings—and the Circuit
Court Proceedings—to sue MLGW for the 2017 water damage, the “negative action from Shelby
County Code Enforcement and Environmental Court,” and related alleged constitutional
violations concerning the Condemnation Proceedings. (ECF No. 22-4; ECF No. 22-6, at 4–8.)
Judgments were entered against Tarpley in both cases, such that there is no question that the first
element is satisfied. See MacPherson v. Metro. Gov’t. of Nash., No. M2023-01372-COA-R3-
CV, 2024 WL 4603019, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2024) (holding that a final order
concerning city ordinances from a General Sessions Environmental Court is a judgment from a
court of competent jurisdiction for purposes of res judicata).
With respect to the second element, Tarpley brought the Environmental Court Appeal
against the City of Memphis and the Circuit Court Proceedings against MLGW. Though
MLGW is not specifically named as a Defendant in this case, “MLGW is a division of the City
of Memphis” and is “subject to the ultimate control of City government.” Casas, 2018 WL
6433143, at *2. 	Thus, all of Tarpley’s claims in this case and in the prior state court
proceedings are ultimately claims against the City of Memphis, satisfying the second element.
As to the third element, Tarpley’s claims and allegations in this case overlap
predominantly, if not completely, with those litigated in the Environmental Court Appeal and the
Circuit Court Proceedings. (See generally ECF Nos. 12-1, 30-1, 34-1.) Though the precise
allegations and claims he raises here may differ slightly—with the only substantive distinction
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being the demolition of the Property in 2024 based on the results of the 2023 state-court
proceedings—the common nucleus of operative facts across Tarpley’s cases is that the City
Defendants improperly condemned the Property. See generally MacPherson, 2024 WL
4603019, at *4 (holding that an “enforcement decision of the environmental court in August
2019” and a subsequent permit application in November 2020 concerning similar ordinances
sufficiently arose “out of the same transaction or series of connected transactions” for purposes
of res judicata (quoting Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 380 (Tenn. 2009))). In any event,
res judicata does not require perfect factual overlap to bar subsequent claims. See, e.g., J.Z.G.,
84 F.3d at 214 (“Claim preclusion applies not only to bar the parties from relitigating issues that
were actually litigated but also to bar them from relitigating issues that could have been raised in
an earlier action.”); Johnson, 2013 WL 4056356, at *11 (“In Tennessee, res judicata . . . bars a
second suit between the same parties or their privies on the same cause of action with respect to
all issues which were or could have been raised in the former suit.’”). Thus, the third element is
satisfied.
With respect to the fourth element, the Environmental Court Appeal concluded with an
Order of Dismissal that affirmed the Condemnation Proceedings and allowed “the City of
Memphis [to] proceed with its demolition process.” (ECF No. 22-5.) And the Circuit Court
Proceedings concluded with an Order that dismissed Tarpley’s claims with prejudice. (ECF No.
22-6, at 4–8; ECF No. 22-8, at 1–2.) Tarpley’s arguments that that he did not have notice of the
2023 state-court proceedings are unavailing. Though he blames his failure to appear in
Environmental Court on the Clerk’s alleged promise to call him with the hearing date (ECF No.
30-1, at 3), even if true, that fact does not absolve Tarpley of his responsibility to remain
apprised of the Environmental Court’s hearing schedule, even as a pro se litigant. See generally
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Garrison v. Camber Pharm., Inc., No. 19-cv-12536, 2020 WL 5810054, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept.
30, 2020) (“Plaintiff’s pro se status does not change the outcome. He has been granted leniency
but is still responsible for adhering to court-ordered deadlines.”) (citation omitted); Bunting v.
Hansen, No. 05-10116-BC, 2007 WL 1582236, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May 31, 2007) (“[P]ro se
litigants are not to be accorded any special consideration when they fail to adhere to readily-
comprehended court deadlines.”) (citation omitted). And though Tarpley argues he was unaware
of the Circuit Court’s hearing on MLGW’s motion to dismiss, the Circuit Court expressly held
that “Notice of Hearing [was] provided to the Plaintiff.” (ECF No. 22-8, at 1.) And even if these
complaints concerning lack of notice were valid, Tarpley failed to raise them before the
Environmental Court and the Circuit Court, and the Record contains no indication that he ever
appealed those dismissals in state court. This Court is simply not the correct jurisdiction for
those arguments, and they do nothing to call into question the finality or validity of the state-
court judgments. Thus, the fourth element is satisfied.
Because each res judicata element is satisfied, Tarpley’s claims against the City
Defendants in this case should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Though the Court has no
doubt that Tarpley believes that he has been wronged, his filings establish that his claims are
barred by res judicata.
IV. 	Tarpley Has Failed to Adequately Plead Monell Liability for His § 1983 Claims
Tarpley’s § 1983 claims against the City Defendants relate to the 2023 condemnation of
the Property and its subsequent demolition in 2024 (and, to a lesser extent, to the purported
inappropriate sexual communication from the City on June 8, 2024).13 (See generally ECF
13 Because the City Defendants are clearly entitled to dismissal based on the Rooker–Feldman
doctrine and res judicata, the undersigned does not address the merits of Tarpley’s other federal
and state-law claims against them.
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No. 12-1.) Tarpley’s § 1983 against the County Defendants relate solely to the Environmental
Court Clerk’s alleged failure to call him about the date of the Appeal hearing. (Id. at 40–41.)
The City and County Defendants move to dismiss the § 1983 claims due to, among other things,
Tarpley’s failure to adequately plead Monell liability. (ECF No. 22-1, at 8–9; ECF No. 27-1, at
16–17.)
“A municipality ‘cannot be held liable under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its
employees or agents.’” Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corr., 979 F.3d 472, 489 (6th Cir.
2020) (quoting Gregory v. Shelby Cnty., 220 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2000))). Thus, a plaintiff
must “identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff’s injury.” Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at
694 (1978); Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989)). “[T]he touchstone of ‘official policy’
is designed ‘to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality,
and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is
actually responsible.’” Harris v. Shelby Cnty. Schs., No. 2:17-cv-2309-SHL-dkv, 2017 WL
3403813, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. May 12, 2017), report and recommendation adopted sub nom.
Harris ex re. I.H. v. Shelby Cnty. Schs., 2017 WL 3401305 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 8, 2017) (quoting
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 138 (1988)). “To demonstrate municipal liability,
a plaintiff ‘must (1) identify the municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the
municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was incurred due to execution of that
policy.’” Id. (quoting Alkire, 330 F.3d at 815). A plaintiff may satisfy the first prong of the test
by showing “(1) the existence of an illegal official policy, (2) that an official with final decision-
making authority ratified illegal actions, (3) a policy of inadequate training or supervision, or (4)
a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.” Gomez v. City of Memphis,
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Nos. 21-5473/5644, 2023 WL 7287100, at *6 (6th Cir. Aug. 4, 2023) (cleaned up) (quoting
Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005)).
Tarpley has failed to identify an official municipal policy or custom that caused or is
related to his claims. (See generally ECF Nos. 12-1, 30-1, 31-1, 34-1.) Nor has he adequately
alleged a failure to train by Defendants or a history of tolerance of constitutional violations. See,
e.g., Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (“A failure-to-train claim . . . requires
a showing of ‘prior instances of unconstitutional conduct demonstrating that the [municipality]
ha[d] ignored a history of abuse and was clearly on notice that the training in this particular area
was deficient and likely to cause injury.’ Similarly, a custom-of-tolerance claim requires a
showing that there was a pattern of inadequately investigating similar claims.” (citing Miller v.
Sanilac Cnty., 606 F.3d 240, 255 (6th Cir. 2010); Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426,
433 (6th Cir. 2005); Leach v. Shelby Cnty. Sherriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1248 (6th Cir. 1989))); see
also Cousino v. Twp. of Marshall, No. 17-1922, 2018 WL 3854027, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 6, 2018)
(affirming dismissal of the pro se plaintiff’s § 1983 claims where the plaintiff failed to allege “an
official policy or custom of the Township [that] resulted in a violation of his constitutional
rights”); Lovelace v. City of Memphis Police Dep’t, No. 2:08-cv-2776-SHM, 2010 WL 711190,
at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 24, 2010) (dismissing § 1983 claims where the plaintiff “fail[ed] to
allege that any specific policy or custom was the moving force directly causing the alleged
constitutional violations”); Roberts v. Wayne Cnty., Ky., No. 6: 22-63-HRW, 2022 WL 1085767,
at *1 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 11, 2022) (dismissing § 1983 claims when the pro se plaintiff failed to
“allege that the assertedly unconstitutional condition about which he complains is the product of
a clearly-identified county policy or custom”).
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Tarpley alleges a pattern by Defendants of violating his civil rights, but “the Sixth Circuit
‘ha[s] never found notice of a pattern of misconduct (or the pattern itself) solely from the
mistreatment of the plaintiff.’” Curtis v. Lauderdale Cnty., No. 2:23-cv-02528-TLP-atc, 2025
WL 367405, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 27, 2025) (quoting Nouri v. Cnty. Of Oakland, 615 F. App’x
291, 296 (6th Cir. 2015)). Tarpley cannot “rel[y] exclusively on his own personal experience as
the basis for his claim that Defendant has a policy or custom” that violated only his constitutional
rights. Id.; see also Nouri, 615 F. App’x at 296 (holding that a plaintiff cannot point solely to his
own alleged experiences with a municipality as the basis for an illegal pattern or practice because
“to do so risks collapsing the municipal liability standard into a simple respondeat superior
standard” (quotation omitted)); Thomas v. City of Circleville, No. 2:23-cv-1474, 2023 WL
3742988, at *6 (S.D. Ohio May 31, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL
4366544 (S.D. Ohio July 6, 2023) (dismissing the pro se plaintiff’s Monell claims because,
among other things, “[the plaintiff] has not alleged a widespread pattern. At best, [the plaintiff]
alleges various iterations of . . . conduct directed solely to him.”). Tarpley has failed to specify
any pattern of civil rights violations by Defendants other than those allegedly committed against
him, and thus Tarpley’s allegations are insufficient to support his § 1983 claims. Because he has
failed to allege any basis for municipal liability, Tarpley’s § 1983 claims against the City
Defendants and the County Defendants should be dismissed.14
V. 	Tarpley Has Failed to Adequately Plead a Promissory-Estoppel Claim Against the
County Defendants
“Promissory estoppel has frequently been defined as follows: ‘a promise which the
promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial
14 Because Tarpley’s § 1983 claims should be dismissed for failure to adequately plead Monell
liability, the undersigned does not address Defendants’ other arguments for dismissing his
§ 1983 claims.
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character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.’” In re AME Church
Emp. Ret. Fund Litig., 2023 WL 2562784, at *38 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 17, 2023) (quoting Chavez
v. Broadway Elec. Serv. Corp., 245 S.W.3d 398, 404 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007)). “Tennessee does
not liberally apply the doctrine of promissory estoppel. To the contrary, it limits application of
the doctrine to exceptional cases.” Id. (quoting Barnes & Robinson Co. v. OneSource Facility
Servs., Inc., 195 S.W.3d 637, 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006)). “An ‘exceptional case’ is found only
when a defendant’s conduct ‘verges on actual fraud.’” Id. (quoting Shedd v. Gaylord Ent. Co.,
118 S.W.3d 695, 700 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)); see also Sparton Tech., Inc. v. Util-Link, LLC, 248
F. App’x 684, 689 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Such exceptional cases are found only where defendant’s
conduct is akin to fraud.” (citing Shedd, 118 S.W.3d at 700)).
“A promissory estoppel claim in Tennessee sounds in fraud and is governed by the Rule
9(b) pleading standard,” such that “the ‘circumstances constituting fraud’ [must] be pled with
‘particularity.’” Id. (quoting Alsbrook v. Concorde Career Colls., Inc., 469 F. Supp. 3d 805,
848–49 (W.D. Tenn. 2020)). Among other pleading requirements, a claim for promissory
estoppel requires a plaintiff to specifically allege that the defendant made a false representation
“‘knowingly’ or ‘without belief in its truth,’ or ‘recklessly’ without regard to its truth or falsity.”
Pugh v. Bank of Am., No. 2:13-cv-2020, 2013 WL 3349649, at *13 (W.D. Tenn. July 2, 2013)
(quoting Asbury v. Lagonia–Sherman, No. W2001-01821-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 31306691, at
*5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2002); see also Alsbrook, 469 F. Supp. 3d at 850 (holding that the
plaintiffs adequately pled a promissory-estoppel claim because, among other things, the
defendant’s alleged misrepresentations were made “with knowledge that they were false or
misleading”).
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Here, Tarpley’s promissory estoppel claim is based solely on the Environmental Court
Clerk’s alleged failure to call him about the date of the Appeal hearing as promised. (ECF
No. 12-1, at 40–41; ECF No. 31-1, at 2.) Among other pleading deficiencies, nowhere does
Tarpley contend that the Environment Court Clerk’s alleged promise was “intentional, made
knowingly or recklessly, or without an intention to perform . . . . The inferences from
[Tarpley’s] allegations do not support fraudulent motives.” Pugh, 2013 WL 3349649, at *13. At
most, Tarpley has vaguely alleged that the Environmental Court Clerk negligently forgot to call
him about the Appeal hearing setting. Thus, Tarpley has “not pled with particularity and [his]
allegations are not ‘akin to fraud,’” id. (quoting Sparton Tech., 248 F. App’x at 689), and, as a
result, his promissory-estoppel claim against the County Defendants should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim.15
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court RECOMMENDS that the City Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 22) and the County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 27)
be granted and that this case be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of February, 2026.
s/Annie T. Christoff
ANNIE T. CHRISTOFF
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
15 Because Tarpley’s promissory-estoppel claim should be dismissed for his failure to adequately
plead a misrepresentation akin to fraud, the undersigned does not address the County
Defendants’ other arguments for dismissing this claim.
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NOTICE
Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report and recommendation
disposition, a party may serve and file written objections to the proposed findings and
recommendations. A party may respond to another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days
after being served with a copy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file objections within
fourteen (14) days may constitute forfeiture/waiver of objections, exceptions, and further appeal.
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