Barr v. City of Humboldt et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
TIMOTHY JACOB BARR,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 1:25-cv-01263-JDB-jay
CITY OF HUMBOLDT et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION IN PART AND DENYING IT IN
PART
Before the Court are the objections of Plaintiff, Timothy Jacob Barr, to the report and
recommendation of Magistrate Judge Jon York. (Docket Entry (“D.E.”) 18.)1 The report
recommended that this Court dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims
(Counts IV, V, and VI) and Defendant, City of Humboldt, and, as to the remaining claims, direct
the Clerk to issue process for the remaining Defendants and deliver process to the Marshal for
service. For the foregoing reasons, the report is ADOPTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arose out of an alleged traffic stop that took place on September 21, 2025. (D.E.
15 at PageID 252.) Barr avers that Officer Jonnie Yarbrough initiated the traffic stop due to a non-
functioning tag light. (Id. at PageID 255.) After two additional officers arrived at the scene,
1 Plaintiff filed a motion for extension of time to file objections to the report and
recommendation on September 10, 2026 “solely as a precaution against delay in the United
States mail.” (D.E. 19 at PageID 320.) However, Plaintiff filed his objections that same day and
they were timely. (See D.E. 19.) Accordingly, the motion for extension of time to file objections
(D.E. 19) is DENIED AS MOOT.
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Yarbrough asked for Plaintiff’s consent to search his vehicle, which he gave. (Id. at PageID 255-
56.) The search did not yield any evidence of a crime and Yarbrough proceeded to perform field
sobriety tests. (Id. at PageID 256.) After stating that Plaintiff performed poorly on the tests,
Yarbrough arrested and later charged him with a DUI. (Id. at PageID 256-57.)
Plaintiff filed this suit against the City of Humboldt and various city employees challenging
the conduct surrounding his arrest (id. at 270-71) and alleging interference with his attempts to
defend his criminal charge. (Id. at PageID 272-85.) While Barr’s DUI charge was pending at the
time he filed his complaint and subsequent amended complaints, he has since pleaded guilty. (D.E.
18 at PageID 311.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When an objection is made to a magistrate judge’s recommendation, the district judge must
apply a de novo standard of review. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Under
such a review, the district judge may accept, reject, or modify any of the magistrate judge’s
findings and recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667,
673–74, 680 (1980); Lyons v. Holden-Selby, 729 F. Supp. 2d 914, 918 (E.D. Mich. 2010). A district
judge is free to follow or ignore the recommendation and retains “the responsibility to make an
informed, final determination . . . .” Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 271 (1976). Moreover, this
Court is not obligated to review any portion of the recommendation to which no specific objection
is made. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149–50 (1985); United States v. Robinson, 352 F.
App’x 27, 28–29 (6th Cir. 2009).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff objects only to the recommendation that Counts IV and VI be dismissed in full.
(D.E. 18 at PageID 311; see also id. at PageID 316 (stating “Plaintiff does not object to the
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recommended dismissal of Count V in its entirety without prejudice” despite earlier objections).)
He instead asks the Court to “dismiss only the damages components of those counts while
permitting the prospective declaratory and injunctive relief components to proceed.” (Id. at
PageID 311.) He first argues that such relief is permissible under recent case law and then asserts
that Count VI, specifically, should survive screening to the extent it is predicated on First
Amendment arguments. (Id. at PageID 312, 314.) The Court addresses both arguments below.
A. Whether Counts IV and VI Should Proceed Under Olivier v. City of Brandon
Barr agrees with the recommendation to dismiss his request for monetary damages under
Counts IV and VI. (See id. at PageID 312.) However, he asks the court to sever it from his request
for declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the non-monetary relief is prospective in nature
and therefore permissible under Olivier v. City of Brandon, 607 U.S. 552 (2026). (Id. at PageID
313-14.)
In Olivier, the United States Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could “sue under § 1983
to enjoin future prosecutions under [a] city ordinance, despite his prior conviction” under the same
ordinance. 607 U.S. at 567. This was because the plaintiff was not concerned with challenging
his prior conviction and only sought to prevent future enforcement of the ordinance. Id. at 566.
The Supreme Court determined that where a plaintiff’s § 1983 suit is “[b]oth in the allegations
made, and in the relief sought . . . future-oriented,” it may proceed. See id.
Barr seeks identical relief under Counts IV and VI: “an order requiring the City of
Humboldt to designate a Public Records Coordinator under [Tennessee Code Annotated] § 10-7-
504(a)(1), [to] establish written public records policies, train employees on public records law,
produce records responsive to Plaintiff’s requests going forward, and establish independent
internal affairs procedures.” (D.E. 18 at PageID 313.) His assertion that this requested relief does
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not require “looking back to conduct involved in a prior conviction, and offering contradictory
proof” is correct. See Olivier, 607 U.S. at 566. Consequently, the remedy sought may be
considered “future-oriented.”
However, the allegations stated in the complaint cannot be considered as such. Under
Counts IV and VI, Barr’s assertion was solely to support the criminal defense of his DUI charge
by alleging deliberate withholding of exculpatory evidence, denial of access to courts, and
fabrication of evidence. (See D.E. 15 at PageID 277-79, 282, 284-85.) He acknowledges that,
following his guilty plea to the DUI charge, these claims are no longer viable. (D.E. 18 at PageID
312.) See also Jordan v. Blount Cnty., 885 F.3d 413, 415 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding a Brady claim
is analogous to malicious prosecution of which “termination of the prior criminal proceeding in
favor of the accused” is an element (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994))).
However, his requests for relief are still attached to these Fourteenth Amendment claims, thus
necessarily challenging his conviction. Otherwise, there is no injury.
Unlike Olivier, where the plaintiff had plans to engage in the specific conduct prohibited
by the challenged ordinance, Barr’s only reasoning to request records would be to challenge his
conviction, which would, in its nature, require a retrospective inquiry. To the extent that he argues
he may have a future need to engage with the public records process outside of the allegations in
his complaint, or that he merely wants to hold the City of Humboldt accountable, issues of standing
arise. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408, 410 (2013) (holding plaintiffs must
establish standing to sue in federal court which requires a “threatened injury [to] be certainly
impending”); Yeager v. Gen. Motors Corp., 265 F.3d 389, 395 (6th Cir. 2001) (ruling “[plaintiff’s]
claim of potential future injury [was] too speculative to grant him standing”). Accordingly, the
objections that rely on an Olivier theory are OVERRULED.
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B. Whether Count VI Should Proceed if Predicated on First Amendment Violations
Plaintiff asserts that Count VI can proceed as a “claim predicated on the First Amendment
retaliation violations alleged” earlier in his complaint. (D.E. 18 at PageID 314.) The pleading
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, and the standard established under Bell Atlantic
Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), place “an emphasis on the facts pled rather than the
title of the legal remedy asserted.” West v. Americare Long Term Specialty Hosp., No. 2:10-cv-
02064-JPM-dkv, 2010 WL 2985798, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. July 26, 2010). Thus, the Court “must look
to the substance of the claim and not limit [its] review to how the plaintiff pleaded the cause of
action.” Milligan v. United States, 670 F.3d 686, 695 (6th Cir. 2012).
Although Plaintiff does not expressly incorporate the First Amendment retaliation claims
under Count VI, he does so as to earlier paragraphs which include retaliation violations. (D.E. 15
at PageID 282; see id. at PageID 257-70.) Barr also asserts retaliation violations under Count VI.
(Id. at PageID 283-84.) The Court therefore finds these “allegations to be sufficient to provide
[City of Humboldt] with notice under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 8.” See In re Nat’l
Prescription Opiate Litig., 440 F. Supp. 3d 773, 803-04 n. 30 (N.D. Ohio 2020).
Still, municipal liability under § 1983 only arises when a local government’s official policy
or custom acts “as the moving force of the constitutional violation” presented by the plaintiff.
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Otherwise stated, the City of Humboldt
cannot be vicariously liable under § 1983 for the injuries caused exclusively by its employees or
agents. See id. Instead, Plaintiff must demonstrate that an official policy or custom has been
established either (1) by a government’s lawmakers; (2) through “actions taken by officials with
final decision-making authority;” (3) as a result of “inadequate training or supervision;” or (4) due
to “a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.” Thomas v. City of
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Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005).
Barr insists that the City of Humboldt is engaging in an “official policy of noncompliance”
with Tennessee law by failing to designate a Public Records Coordinator which has allowed the
First Amendment violations to occur. (D.E. 15 at PageID 282-83.) He also maintains that
decisions made by the City Mayor and the Chief of Police resulted in First Amendment violations
and because these officials were “final policymaker[s],” their actions constituted an official
municipal policy. (Id. at PageID 283.) He further avers that the City of Humboldt was aware of
free public records training but elected not to utilize it, leading to the alleged constitutional
violations. (Id. at PageID 284.) At the initial screening stage, these allegations are sufficient to
establish Monell liability. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Count VI is permitted to proceed, only insofar
as it is predicated on allegations of First Amendment retaliation violations.
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, the Court ADOPTS the report and recommendation (D.E. 16)
in part and DENIES it in part. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims, Counts IV and V, are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Clerk is DIRECTED to issue process for Defendants
as to the remaining claims and deliver that process to the Marshal for service.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 15th day of October 2026.
s/ J. DANIEL BREEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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