Hooghe v. TK Health et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
THOMAS J. HOOGHE,
Plaintiff,
v.
TK HEALTH, et al.,
Defendants.
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NO. 3:25-cv-00823
JUDGE CAMPBELL
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Thomas Hooghe, an inmate of the Sumner County Jail proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1 (“the Complaint”)) and an application for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). (Doc. No. 7.) On October 29, 2025, the Court denied Plaintiff’s
IFP application without prejudice and ordered him to file a new IFP application or pay the filing
fee within 30 days. (Doc. No. 9.) Plaintiff filed a new IFP application on November 18, 2025.
(Doc. No. 11.)
This case is before the Court for ruling on Plaintiff’s new IFP application and for initial
review of the Complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
I. PAUPER STATUS
Subject to certain statutory requirements, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)–(2), (g), a prisoner
bringing a civil action may be permitted to proceed as a pauper, without prepaying the $405 filing
fee. Because Plaintiff’s new IFP application complies with the applicable statutory requirements
and demonstrates that he lacks the funds to pay the entire filing fee, that application (Doc. No. 11)
is GRANTED.
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Nevertheless, prisoners bringing civil lawsuits or appeals are “required to pay the full
amount of a filing fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Where the prisoner proceeds IFP, the fee is $350
instead of $405, see id. § 1914(a)–(b) & Dist. Ct. Misc. Fee Schedule, provision 14 (eff. Dec. 1,
2023), and may be paid in installments over time via an assessment against his inmate trust
account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2).
Accordingly, Plaintiff is ASSESSED a $350 filing fee. The fee will be collected in
installments as described below.
The warden of the facility in which Plaintiff is currently housed, as custodian of his trust
account, is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, as an initial payment, the greater of: (a)
20% of the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s credit at the jail; or (b) 20% of the average
monthly balance to Plaintiff’s credit for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of
the Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Thereafter, the custodian shall submit 20% of Plaintiff’s
preceding monthly income (or income credited to Plaintiff for the preceding month), but only when
the balance in his account exceeds $10. Id. § 1915(b)(2). Payments shall continue until the $350
filing fee has been paid in full to the Clerk of Court. Id. § 1915(b)(3).
The Clerk of Court MUST send a copy of this Order to the warden of the facility in which
Plaintiff is currently housed to ensure compliance with that portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 pertaining
to the payment of the filing fee. If Plaintiff is transferred from his present place of confinement,
the custodian must ensure that a copy of this Order follows Plaintiff to his new place of
confinement, for continued compliance with the Order. All payments made pursuant to this Order
must be submitted to the Clerk of Court for the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Tennessee, 719 Church Street, Nashville, TN 37203.
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II. INITIAL REVIEW
A. Legal Standard
In cases filed by prisoners, the Court must conduct an initial screening and dismiss the
Complaint (or any portion thereof) if it is facially frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Review under the same criteria is also
authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) when the prisoner proceeds IFP.
To determine whether the Complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, the
Court reviews for whether it alleges sufficient facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face,” such that it would survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009)). A viable claim is stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the Complaint plausibly
alleges (1) a deprivation of a constitutional or other federal right, and (2) that the deprivation was
caused by a “state actor.” Carl v. Muskegon Cnty., 763 F.3d 592, 595 (6th Cir. 2014).
At this stage, “the Court assumes the truth of ‘well-pleaded factual allegations’ and
‘reasonable inference[s]’ therefrom,” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 181 (2024)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79), but is “not required to accept legal conclusions or unwarranted
factual inferences as true.” Inner City Contracting, LLC v. Charter Twp. of Northville, Michigan,
87 F.4th 743, 749 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). The Court must afford the pro se Complaint
a liberal construction, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), while viewing it in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff. Inner City, supra.
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B. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff sues TK Health, the company which provides healthcare personnel and services
for the Sumner County Jail; Nursing Supervisor Sharon Harris, who is employed by TK Health;
and Jerry Scott, the Jail Administrator. (Doc. No. 1 at 2–3.) Plaintiff claims that his rights under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments are being violated while he serves a misdemeanor
sentence in the Jail, because Defendants are refusing to treat his “obviously broken right ankle”
(except by providing a walking boot) and refusing to refer him for a medically necessary surgery
despite knowing (1) that he is in excruciating pain and (2) that failure to operate could result in a
catastrophic outcome. (Id. at 3–5.) Plaintiff was scheduled to have an operation on his ankle in
May 2025, prior to arriving at the Jail on May 22. (Id. at 5.) He accuses Defendants of “trying to
run out the clock to avoid surgery expenses before [his] sentence expiration in February.” (Id. at
5.) He refers to an “attached motion for a preliminary injunction . . . to order them to perform the
required surgery,” and further seeks an award of compensatory and punitive damages. (Id.).
Included with the Complaint was a notice that Plaintiff was being sent to the Knox County
Jail “for court.” (Doc. No. 3.) On September 30, 2025, the Court received a letter from Plaintiff
stating that he was “back in the Sumner Co[unty] Jail after two months in Knox Co[unty].” (Doc.
No. 7.)
On November 18, 2025, the Court received a letter from Plaintiff stating that he had been
seen by an orthopedic surgeon on October 29, and that the surgeon had opined that Plaintiff is in
danger of losing his right foot if surgery is not performed on his broken ankle, due to the onset of
gangrenous necrosis. (Doc. No. 10.)
C. Analysis
As an initial matter, Plaintiff twice refers to a motion for injunctive relief that was
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purportedly filed with his Complaint in July 2025 (Doc. No. 1 at 5; Doc. No. 10), but no such
motion is reflected on the docket of this case, and the Complaint seeks only damages.
Based on Plaintiff’s letters to the Court, it appears that he was transported from Sumner
County to Knox County at or around the time he filed his Complaint, and that he was seen by an
orthopedic surgeon within roughly a month after returning to Sumner County. Nevertheless, as
explained below, the allegations of the Complaint are sufficient to support a plausible claim of
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs beginning when Plaintiff arrived at the Sumner
County Jail, in May 2025.
For purposes of initial review, the Court presumes that Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee for
a portion of his time at the Sumner County Jail; his Complaint, filed on July 22, 2025, states that
he is “serving a misdemeanor sentence” but was “originally a pretrial detainee” upon arriving at
the Jail on May 22, 2025. (Doc. No. 1 at 4.) He appears to have been in Knox County from late
July to late September 2025 to attend court (see Doc. Nos. 3, 7), perhaps for purposes of resolving
pending criminal charges there. As a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff had a Fourteenth Amendment right
to be free from deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Hyman v. Lewis, 27 F. 4th
1233, 1237 (6th Cir. 2022). To state a claim for a violation of this right, Plaintiff must allege that:
(1) he had a sufficiently serious medical need; and (2) a defendant “acted deliberately (not
accidentally), [and] also recklessly in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either
known or so obvious that it should be known.” Helphenstine v. Lewis Cnty., Ky., 60 F. 4th 305,
317 (6th Cir. 2023) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
At this initial stage, the Court construes the Complaint liberally and in Plaintiff’s favor. He
alleges that he arrived at the Jail on May 22, 2025, with his ankle obviously broken and causing
him excruciating pain. He told the Jail medical staff upon arrival that he had previously been
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informed by a surgeon in Mississippi that surgery was necessary to avert “catastrophic
consequences,” but Defendants refused to refer him for surgery or provide an x-ray or any
treatment at all, other than “sending a walking boot to [his] cell.” (Id. at 5.) For purposes of initial
review, the Court finds these allegations sufficient to establish both elements of a Fourteenth
Amendment deliberate indifference claim.
This claim will proceed for further development against all named Defendants. At this early
stage where all reasonable inferences must be drawn in Plaintiff’s favor, Defendants Harris and
Scott are reasonably implicated as officials with the decision-making authority to forestall
necessary treatment in order “to avoid surgery expenses before [Plaintiff’s] sentence expiration in
February [2026].” (Doc. No. 1 at 5.) And, while Plaintiff does not explicitly link this decision to a
policy of TK Health that privileges cost-savings over expenditures when inmates with medical
needs are close to their release date,1 such a claim is reasonable to infer from his allegations.
III. CONCLUSION
As explained above, the Complaint in this case will be allowed to proceed.2
The Clerk is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff a service packet (a blank summons (AO 440)
and USM 285 form) for each named defendant. Plaintiff MUST complete the service packets and
return them to the Clerk’s Office within 30 DAYS of the entry of this Order. Failure to do so may
result in the dismissal of this case. Upon return of the properly completed service packets, the
1 	For TK Health to be liable, Plaintiff must establish that a corporate policy or custom was a cause
of the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Starcher v. Corr. Med. Sys., Inc., 7 F. App’x 459, 465 (6th Cir.
2001) (liability of corporate provider of healthcare at county jail must, like liability of county itself, “be
premised on some policy that caused a deprivation of Starcher’s Eighth Amendment rights”).
2 	The Court’s determination that the Complaint states a colorable claim for purposes of this initial
screening does not preclude the Court from dismissing any claim at any time for the reasons set forth in 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), nor does it preclude any defendant from filing a motion to dismiss any claim under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12.
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Clerk is DIRECTED to issue summons to the U.S. Marshals Service for service on the defendants.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(b) and (c)(3).
This action is REFERRED to the Magistrate Judge to oversee service of process, to enter
a scheduling order for the management of the case, to dispose or recommend disposition of any
pretrial motions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), and to conduct further proceedings, if
necessary, under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Court.
It is so ORDERED.
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WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, JR.
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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