Crandol v. Ferree et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
VINCENT L. CRANDOL,
Plaintiff,
v.
KYLE FERREE, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 3:25-cv-00235
Judge Trauger
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Vincent Crandol, an inmate in custody at the Rutherford County Adult Detention
Center, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1) and an application
to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) (Doc. No. 2) supported by a prisoner trust fund account
certification (Doc. No. 8). The plaintiff also filed a motion to ascertain the status of this case. (Doc.
No. 7).
This case is before the court for ruling on the plaintiff’s IFP application and motion, and
for initial review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
I. PAUPER STATUS
Subject to certain statutory requirements, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)–(2), (g), a prisoner
bringing a civil action may be permitted to proceed as a pauper, without prepaying the $405 civil
filing fee. Because the plaintiff’s IFP application complies with the applicable statutory
requirements and demonstrates that he lacks the funds to pay the entire filing fee (see Doc. No. 8),
that application (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED.
Nevertheless, prisoners bringing civil lawsuits are “required to pay the full amount of a
filing fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Where the prisoner proceeds IFP, the fee is $350 instead of
$405, see id. § 1914(a)–(b) & Dist. Ct. Misc. Fee Schedule, provision 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023), and
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may be paid in installments over time via an assessment against his inmate trust account. Id.
§ 1915(b)(1)–(2).
Accordingly, the plaintiff is ASSESSED a $350 filing fee. The fee will be collected in
installments as described below.
The warden of the facility in which the plaintiff is currently housed, as custodian of his
trust account, is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, as an initial payment, the greater of:
(a) 20% of the average monthly deposits to the plaintiff’s credit at the jail; or (b) 20% of the
average monthly balance to the plaintiff’s credit for the six-month period immediately preceding
the filing of the Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Thereafter, the custodian shall submit 20% of
the plaintiff’s preceding monthly income (or income credited to the plaintiff for the preceding
month), but only when the balance in his account exceeds $10. Id. § 1915(b)(2). Payments shall
continue until the $350 filing fee has been paid in full to the Clerk of Court. Id. § 1915(b)(3).
The Clerk of Court MUST send a copy of this order to the warden of the facility in which
the plaintiff is currently housed to ensure compliance with that portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1915
pertaining to the payment of the filing fee. If the plaintiff is transferred from his present place of
confinement, the custodian must ensure that a copy of this order follows the plaintiff to his new
place of confinement, for continued compliance with the order. All payments made pursuant to
this order must be submitted to the Clerk of Court for the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee, 719 Church Street, Nashville, TN 37203.
II. INITIAL REVIEW
A. Legal Standard
In cases filed by prisoners, the court must conduct an initial screening and dismiss the
Complaint (or any portion thereof) if it is facially frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
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from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Review under the same criteria is also
authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) when the prisoner proceeds IFP.
To determine whether the Complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, the
court reviews for whether it alleges sufficient facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face,” such that it would survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009)). A viable claim is stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the Complaint plausibly
alleges (1) a deprivation of a constitutional or other federal right, and (2) that the deprivation was
caused by a “state actor.” Carl v. Muskegon Cnty., 763 F.3d 592, 595 (6th Cir. 2014).
At this stage, “the Court assumes the truth of ‘well-pleaded factual allegations’ and
‘reasonable inference[s]’ therefrom,” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 181 (2024)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79), but is “not required to accept legal conclusions or unwarranted
factual inferences as true.” Inner City Contracting, LLC v. Charter Twp. of Northville, Michigan,
87 F.4th 743, 749 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). The court must afford the pro se Complaint a
liberal construction, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), while viewing it in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff. Inner City, supra.
B. Analysis
The Complaint claims that Defendant Kyle Ferree, a Murfreesboro police officer, arrested
the plaintiff on June 19, 2024, in violation of his constitutional rights. (Doc. No. 1 at 6.) Ferree
allegedly charged the plaintiff with possessing drugs that were found not on his person, but in a
car that the plaintiff “was not even in when [Ferree] arrived.” (Id.) The Complaint further claims
that the arrest was based on racial profiling, given that the plaintiff was assumed to be a drug dealer
because he possessed three phones––and “[t]hat to [the plaintiff] is profiling (racial profiling).”
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(Id.) The plaintiff invites the court to examine his Rutherford County charges in “Case No. 93225.”
(Id.) As relief, he seeks an award of money damages. (Id. at 8.)
Liberally construed, the Complaint claims a false arrest in violation of the plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment rights. The existence of probable cause to arrest is the “decisive” question for a Fourth
Amendment false arrest claim. Weser v. Goodson, 965 F.3d 507, 513 (6th Cir. 2020). However,
where the claim for damages concerns an arrest that has resulted in a criminal conviction, it is
prone to the bar of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Under Heck, “a Section 1983 suit is
not cognizable if it would ‘necessarily’ invalidate the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence, unless the
plaintiff can show the conviction or sentence had been set aside.” Sanders v. Detroit Police Dep’t,
490 F. App’x 771, 773 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). Thus, if the plaintiff was
convicted in state court, and a favorable ruling in this federal case would necessarily invalidate his
conviction, “Heck will require dismissal.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 394 (2007) (citing
Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 649 (1997)).
The court, following the plaintiff’s citation to “Case No. 93225,” takes judicial notice of
the Rutherford County Online Court Records System, which shows that the plaintiff pled guilty to
drug charges in case number 75CC1-2024-CR-93225 on March 13, 2025, two weeks after filing
this lawsuit. Those charges of conviction list a “violation date” of June 19, 2024. See
https://rutherford.tncrtinfo.com/crCaseForm.aspx?id=28D14677-41D1-4CB1-8C83-
7EC8693327E0&dsid=23e44664 (last visited Feb. 25, 2026).1 The court has not found any record
of the plaintiff challenging this conviction on direct appeal, or on collateral review in state or
1 The court may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts at any stage of the proceedings, Fed. R. Evid. 201,
including facts contained in “public records and government documents available from reliable sources on
the Internet,” ARJN #3 v. Cooper, 517 F. Supp. 3d 732, 747 (M.D. Tenn. 2021) (quoting Roane Cnty.,
Tennessee v. Jacobs Eng’g Grp., Inc., No. 3:19-CV-206-TAV-HBG, 2020 WL 2025613, at *3 (E.D. Tenn.
Apr. 27, 2020), and facts concerning “proceedings in other courts of record.” Lyons v. Stovall, 188 F.3d
327, 332 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999).
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federal court. It thus appears that the plaintiff’s claim to damages resulting from his allegedly
unlawful arrest on June 19, 2024 would, if successful, necessarily invalidate an extant conviction.
The rule of Heck prohibits pursuit of such a claim.
III. CONCLUSION AND INSTRUCTIONS TO PLAINTIFF
Within 30 DAYS of this order’s entry on the docket, the plaintiff must SHOW CAUSE
why this case should not be dismissed under the rule of Heck v. Humphrey.2 Any filing in response
to this order must be designated for Case No. 3:25-cv-00235 and must be delivered to the Clerk of
Court, U.S. District Court, Middle District of Tennessee, 719 Church Street, Ste. 1300, Nashville,
TN 37203.
The plaintiff is warned that the court will dismiss this action if he does not comply with
the instruction to show cause. The plaintiff is also warned that failure to keep the court informed
of his current address at all times may result in dismissal of this action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Local
Rule 41.01(b).
In light of the foregoing explanation of this case’s status, the plaintiff’s motion to ascertain
status (Doc. No. 7) is GRANTED.
It is so ORDERED.
____________________________________
Aleta A. Trauger
United States District Judge
2 See, e.g., Ocasio v. Turner, 19 F. Supp. 3d 841, 852 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (“[A] Fourth Amendment false arrest
claim is not automatically Heck-barred by a subsequent conviction for the same offense, but, in those cases
in which the grounds for the conviction flow from the same facts underlying the allegations of false arrest,
the claim is barred.”); see also El v. City of Livonia, No. 17-13190, 2018 WL 4223500, at *5 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 28, 2018) (applying Heck bar because “El’s conviction necessarily implies that probable cause was
sustained at multiple stages of the state court proceedings[,] [t]hose proceedings resulted in a final judgment
against El[,] [and] El has not asserted that the state court conviction was somehow invalid . . . [or] subject
to appeal”); Hutson v. Felder, No. CIV.A. 5:07-183-JMH, 2008 WL 4186893, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 10,
2008) (“Even where probable cause does not exist on the offense for which the plaintiff was arrested, Heck
bars the claim so long as probable cause exists for arrest on a closely-related charge. The existence of
probable cause will bar a Section 1983 claim even where the arrest was prompted by malice or other
improper motives.”) (citations omitted).
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