Baker v. Thorn et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
WESTERN DIVISION
JOEL LUTHER BAKER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SHERIFF THORN,1 in his individual
and official capacity; COMMANDER
YANTIS, in his individual and official
capacity; LT. HOUSTON, in her
individual and official capacity; DR.
LONG, in his individual and official
capacity; MR. TRUAX, in his individual
and official capacity; MRS. KAYLA G., in
her individual and official capacity;
SEARGENT BOAL, in his individual and
official capacity; CAPTAIN ANDERSON,
in his official capacity,
Defendants.
5:21-CV-05084-KES
1915A SCREENING
Plaintiff, Joel Luther Baker, a pretrial detainee at the Pennington County
Jail, filed a pro se civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Docket 1. This
court granted Baker leave to proceed in forma pauperis and ordered him to pay
an initial filing fee. Docket 5. Baker timely paid his initial filing fee on
December 8, 2021. This court will now screen Baker’s amended complaint
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
1 Baker names Sheriff Thorn as a defendant in this lawsuit. The Sheriff’s actual
name is Thom. The court will refer to the Sheriff by his actual name in this
opinion.
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I. 	1915A Screening
A. 	Factual Background
The facts alleged in Baker’s complaint are: that several conditions at the
Pennington County Jail are unsafe and abusive. See Docket 1 at 5-14. Baker
alleges that the Pennington County Jail fails to properly pass out medication.
Docket 1 at 5. He claims that he was denied medication by Mr. Truax, a former
jail employee, because he went to the back of the medication line where he
could rest his sore leg. Id. He claims that Mrs. Kayla G., a jail employee who is
not a medical professional, regularly denies him his medication. Id. He alleges
that this has caused him “several painful symptoms and even withdrawals[.]”
Id.
Baker claims that Dr. Long, a medical provider at the Pennington County
Jail, has mistreated him by overprescribing medication that has caused
dependencies. Id. at 2, 6. He also claims that Dr. Long once asked him about
his Hepatitis C infection, weeks after he had been cleared of active Hepatitis C,
when he was complaining of back and leg pain. Id. at 6. Baker alleges that this
proves Dr. Long’s neglect because he was unaware of Baker’s health. Id. Baker
also alleges that Dr. Long ignored his leg and back pain, only stating that
Baker would be weaned off of his pain medication because it was not working.
Id. Baker claims that he still suffers from pain and that he no longer trusts the
medical staff. Id.
Baker claims that the Pennington County Jail has failed to safely handle
the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. at 7. He claims that family visitation has been
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denied because of the pandemic, but jail staff have no mask or vaccine
requirements, testing requirements, or safety protocols. Id. He also claims that
he has repeatedly brought this issue to the jail staff’s attention. Id. He
specifically alleges that he warned jail staff of the pandemic threat posed by
increased numbers of people in the region because of the Sturgis motorcycle
rally. Id. at 12-13. He alleges that jail staff required housing units to
quarantine but that the issue was with the staff themselves. Id. at 7. He also
alleges that he got COVID because of the jail’s failure to implement safety
protocols, although he acknowledges that the jail did eventually require masks.
Id. He claims that the jail failed to sanitize common surfaces and that inmates
were quarantined for a few days and only allowed out for one or two hours a
day. Id. at 13.
Baker claims that Pennington County Jail staff handle grievances “in an
unreasonable, unwinable [sic], and biased fashion.” Id. at 8. He also claims
that there is no emergency access to command staff for when inmates are hurt
or abused. Id. He alleges that he once was required to lock down2 because he
yelled to help other inmates get the attention of a correctional officer. Id. He
also alleges that Sergeant Boal, the appeals officer at the jail, is heavily biased
against inmates. Id. at 9. He claims that lockdowns have caused him atrophied
2 Baker does not explain what he means when he refers to a lockdown, but it
appears that he is referring to solitary confinement used as a disciplinary
measure. See Docket 1 at 8-9. He explains that he does not get enough exercise
in one hour to prevent leg cramps while locked down and that he is not allowed
to talk to anyone. Id. at 9.
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muscles and muscle cramps, as well as suicidal thoughts and thoughts of self-
harm. Id.
Baker claims that jail employees are quitting because of “too much strain
and too much mental assault from Mrs. Houston, Captain Anderson, and
Commander Yantis.”3 Id. at 10. He claims that the jail staff is now overworked,
beaten down, and exhausted. Id. He alleges that this causes mistakes and
security risks, including issues with medication. Id. He also alleges that violent
inmates may try to test security because of this issue. Id.
Baker claims that Lieutenant Houston has retaliated against him for his
“pursuit of justice.” Id. at 11. He claims that he “blew up” over being written up
the wrong way when they first met and that her “vendetta” against him has
continued ever since. Id. He alleges that she has told him that his complaints
would hold up in a court of law but not in the Pennington County Jail. Id. He
also alleges that Lieutenant Houston and Captain Anderson work together to
question inmates about their religion. Id.
Baker sues all defendants in their individual and official capacities
except for Captain Anderson. See id. at 2-3. Although Baker names Captain
Anderson as a defendant in the caption of his complaint, he does not indicate
the capacity in which he sues Anderson.4 See id. at 1-3. Baker asks the court
to award money damages. Id. at 14.
3 Baker refers to Houston as “Liutenant [sic] Houston” in the caption of his
complaint but as “Lt. Houston” and “Mrs. Houston” throughout his complaint.
Docket 1 at 1-2, 7-8, 10-13. The court will refer to her as Lieutenant Houston.
4 If a plaintiff does not specify the capacity in which he sues a defendant, the
suit is treated as only including official capacity complaints. Egerdahl v.
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B. 	Legal Background
The court must assume as true all facts well pleaded in the complaint.
Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 36 (8th Cir. 1995). Pro se and civil
rights complaints must be liberally construed. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007); Bediako v. Stein Mart, Inc., 354 F.3d 835, 839 (8th Cir. 2004). Even
with this construction, “a pro se complaint must contain specific facts
supporting its conclusions.” Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir.
1985); see also Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, 518 F. App’x 502, 504 (8th Cir.
2013). Civil rights complaints cannot be merely conclusory. Davis v. Hall, 992
F.2d 151, 152 (8th Cir. 1993); Parker v. Porter, 221 F. App’x 481, 482 (8th Cir.
2007).
A complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations . . . [but] requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not do[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) (internal citations omitted). If it does not contain these bare essentials,
dismissal is appropriate. Beavers v. Lockhart, 755 F.2d 657, 663 (8th Cir.
1985). Twombly requires that a complaint’s “[f]actual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the
assumption that all of the allegations in the complaint are true[.]” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555 (internal citation omitted); see also Abdullah v. Minnesota, 261
F. App’x 926, 927 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that a “complaint must contain either
Hibbing Cmty. Coll., 72 F.3d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1995); Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d
429, 431 (8th Cir. 1989). Thus, Baker sues Captain Anderson in his official
capacity only.
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direct or inferential allegations respecting all material elements necessary to
sustain recovery under some viable legal theory”). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,
the court must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss them if they “(1) [are]
frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;
or (2) seek[] monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
C. 	Legal Analysis
“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff
must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 676 (2009).
Thus, each Government official . . . is only liable for his or her own
misconduct. As we have held, a supervising officer can be liable for
an 	inferior 	officer's 	constitutional 	violation 	only 	if 	he 	directly
participated in the constitutional violation, or if his failure to train
or supervise the offending actor caused the deprivation.
Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). Baker’s
individual capacity claims must allege that each individual defendant either
participated in the unconstitutional conduct or caused the conduct to occur
through a failure to train or supervise the offending actor.
All defendants were employees of the Pennington County Jail at the time
of the incidents in question. “A suit against a government officer in his official
capacity is functionally equivalent to a suit against the employing
governmental entity.” Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257
(8th Cir. 2010). Baker’s official capacity claims are equivalent to claims against
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Pennington County. “[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an
injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “[I]t is when execution of a government’s policy or
custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may
fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government
as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id.; see also Clay v. Conlee, 815 F.2d
1164, 1170 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that “the [governmental] entity’s official
‘policy or custom’ must have ‘caused’ the constitutional violation” in order for
that entity to be liable under § 1983).
To establish governmental liability premised on an unofficial custom
rather than an official policy, a plaintiff must allege facts to support a finding of
“a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct
by the governmental entity’s employees” and “deliberate indifference to or tacit
authorization of such conduct by the governmental entity’s policymaking
officials after notice to the officials of that misconduct[.]” Brewington v. Keener,
902 F.3d 796, 801 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Corwin v. City of Independence, 829
F.3d 695, 700 (8th Cir. 2016)). A § 1983 complaint does not need to
“specifically plead the existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom to
survive a motion to dismiss.” Crumpley-Patterson v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp., 388
F.3d 588, 591 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Doe ex rel. Doe v. Sch. Dist., 340 F.3d 605,
614 (8th Cir. 2003)). But the complaint must still include some allegation,
reference, or language that creates an inference that the conduct resulted from
an unconstitutional policy or custom. Id.; see also Doe, 340 F.3d at 614 (“At a
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minimum, a complaint must allege facts which would support the existence of
an unconstitutional policy or custom.”).
1. 	Medical Care Claims
Baker brings claims against Mr. Truax, Mrs. Kayla G., Sheriff Thom, and
Dr. Long, in their individual and official capacities, for failing to provide
medication and medical care. Docket 1 at 2-3, 5-6. A pretrial detainee’s claims
of inadequate medical care are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
due process protections, rather than the Eighth Amendment. Davis v. Hall, 992
F.2d 151, 152 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). But because the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals has not established a different standard for this analysis,
these claims are examined under the same deliberate indifference standard as
Eighth Amendment claims by convicted inmates. Id. at 152-153.
“[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners
constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the
Eighth Amendment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (quoting Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). “This is true whether the indifference is
manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by
prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or
intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Id. at 104-05
(footnotes omitted). “This conclusion does not mean, however, that every claim
by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a
violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 105. “[A] prisoner must allege acts
or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious
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medical needs.” Id. at 106. Allegations of negligence will not suffice, nor will
mere disagreement with treatment decisions. See Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d
1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000).
The deliberate indifference standard includes both an objective and
subjective component. Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir.
1997) (citing Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997)). The
plaintiff “must demonstrate (1) that [he] suffered objectively serious medical
needs and (2) that the prison officials actually knew of but deliberately
disregarded those needs.” Id. (citing Coleman, 114 F.3d at 784). “A serious
medical need is ‘one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring
treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’ ” Coleman, 114 F.3d at 784
(quoting Camberos v. Branstad, 73 F.3d 174, 176 (8th Cir. 1995)). To be liable
for deliberately disregarding medical needs, “the official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
Baker alleges sufficient facts to state a claim for deliberate indifference to
his serious medical needs regarding medication at the Pennington County Jail.
He claims that he is on medication, including pain medication, showing serious
medical needs. He claims that Mr. Truax and Mrs. Kayla G. knew of his
medical needs and deliberately refused to provide him with his medication. He
does not allege that Sheriff Thom directly participated in the deliberate
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indifference or that Sheriff Thom’s failure to train Mr. Truax or Mrs. Kayla G.
caused their indifference. Thus, Baker’s claims for deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs regarding medication against Mr. Truax and Mrs. Kayla
G. in their individual capacities survive § 1915A screening, but his claim
against Sheriff Thom in his individual capacity is dismissed without prejudice
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(l).
Baker alleges that the Pennington County Jail often has non-medical
staff pass out medication and that this has caused him to be denied
medication. Docket 1 at 5. Baker alleges sufficient facts to show that the
Pennington County Jail has an unofficial custom of allowing or requiring non-
medical staff to pass out medication. But Baker claims that Mr. Truax no
longer works at the Pennington County Jail.5 Thus, Baker’s claims for
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs regarding medication against
Mrs. Kayla G. and Sheriff Thom in their official capacities survive § 1915A
screening, but his claim against Mr. Truax in his official capacity is dismissed
without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(l).
Baker fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs against Dr. Long and Sheriff Thom for
the medical treatment that he received from Dr. Long. He claims that Dr. Long
has prescribed too much medication, has been inattentive to his recovery from
5 Normally, an official capacity claim against a public official who is no longer
employed in that capacity continues against the official’s successor. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 25(d). But Baker makes no claims naming a successor to Mr. Truax,
and his official capacity claims remain against other jail officials. Thus, this
court will dismiss the official capacity claims against Mr. Truax.
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Hepatitis C, and has weaned him off pain medications that Baker believes he
should still be taking. Docket 1 at 6. At most, these are allegations of
negligence and disagreement with treatment decisions, which are not deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs under Jolly. Thus, Baker’s claims for
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs regarding Dr. Long’s treatment
against Dr. Long and Sheriff Thom in their individual and official capacities are
dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A(b)(l).
2. 	Grievance Process Claims
Baker brings claims against Sheriff Thom, Commander Yantis,
Lieutenant Houston, and Sergeant Boal in their individual and official
capacities for the Pennington County Jail’s grievance procedures. Docket 1 at
2-3, 8. “While a violation of a state-created liberty interest can amount to a
violation of the Constitution, not every violation of state law or state-mandated
procedures is a violation of the Constitution.” Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494,
495 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (holding that a refusal to process grievances
alone did not state a constitutional deprivation). In Buckley, the Eighth Circuit
explained that a prison grievance procedure “is a procedural right only, it does
not confer any substantive right upon the inmates. Hence, it does not give rise
to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections envisioned
by the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment.” Id. (quotation omitted); see also King v.
Houston, 556 F. App’x 561, 563 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Buckley for the
proposition that “prison officials’ failure to process or investigate grievances,
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without more, is not actionable under § 1983”). Here, Baker alleges that the
way grievances are processed or remedied violates his rights, but this alone
does not arise to the level of a constitutional violation. Thus, Baker’s grievance
process claims are dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(l).
3. 	Conditions of Confinement Claims
Baker brings claims against Commander Yantis, Lieutenant Houston,
and Sheriff Thom in their individual and official capacities and against Captain
Anderson in his official capacity, arguing that the conditions of his confinement
are unsafe. See Docket 1 at 1-2, 7-10, 12-13. Specifically, Baker alleges that
the understaffed jail poses threats to his safety, that the jail uses lockdowns in
a punitive manner, and that the jail’s failure to implement pandemic protocols
caused him to get COVID. Id. at 7-10, 12-13.
A pretrial detainee’s conditions of confinement claims are analyzed under
the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protections. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 535 n.16 (1979). “[T]he proper inquiry is whether those conditions amount
to punishment of the detainee.” Id. at 535. In Bell, the United States Supreme
Court held that:
A court must decide whether the disability is imposed for the
purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other
legitimate governmental purpose. Absent a showing of an expressed
intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials, that
determination generally will turn on “whether an alternative purpose
to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable
for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned [to it].”
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Id. at 538-39 (alterations in original) (internal citation and footnote omitted)
(quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)). If a
condition is “reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does
not, without more, amount to ‘punishment.’ ” Id. at 539 (footnote omitted). But
if the condition is arbitrary or purposeless, the court can infer that the
condition is a “punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon
detainees[.]” Id. “The Government has legitimate interests that stem from its
need to manage the facility in which the individual is detained.” Smith v.
Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 540). The
Eighth Circuit has held that “placing a pretrial detainee in segregation prior to
a hearing did not violate his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due
process because the purpose of the segregation was ‘for institutional security’—
a legitimate governmental objective.” Hall v. Ramsay Cnty., 801 F.3d 912, 919
(8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Whitfield v. Dicker, 41 F. App’x 6, 7 (8th Cir. 2002) (per
curiam)).
Baker fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for violation of his
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights regarding Pennington County Jail
understaffing. Baker alleges that the jail is understaffed, posing a threat to his
safety. Docket 1 at 10. Baker does not allege sufficient injury to state a
conditions of confinement claim. He only claims that understaffing could cause
threats to his safety. Id. Although he alleges that understaffing is the reason
why non-medical staff are asked to hand out medicine, this claim is better
addressed as a deliberate indifference claim above. Thus, this claim does not
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allege sufficient facts to raise it above the speculative level as required by
Twombly. Baker’s claims for conditions of confinement in violation of his
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights regarding jail understaffing are
dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A(b)(l).
Baker alleges that the conditions of his confinement violate his
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights regarding lockdown usage and
pandemic protocols. Baker alleges that jail staff use lockdowns in a punitive
manner and that the jail’s handling of the pandemic exposed him to COVID. Id.
at 7, 8, 12-13. Under Ashcroft, each government official is only individually
liable for his or her own unconstitutional conduct, and under Parrish, a
supervisory official can also be individually liable for a failure to train or
supervise that results in unconstitutional conduct. Although Baker describes
conditions at the Pennington County Jail that may constitute a violation of his
due process rights, he does not make specific allegations that the individual
defendants either caused these conditions or failed to train or supervise those
that caused them. See Docket 1 at 7-9, 12-13. Thus, Baker’s claims for
conditions of confinement in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights against Commander Yantis, Sheriff Thom, and Lieutenant
Houston in their individual capacities are dismissed without prejudice under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(l).
Baker alleges that misuse of lockdowns occurs repeatedly and that he
has filed grievances that notify policymaking officials of this misuse. Thus, he
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states sufficient facts to allege an unofficial custom of lockdown misuse. Baker
states sufficient facts regarding COVID because the jail’s pandemic protocols,
or lack thereof, are official policy. Thus, his conditions of confinement claims
regarding lockdown use and pandemic protocols against Commander Yantis,
Lieutenant Houston, Sheriff Thom, and Captain Anderson survive § 1915A
screening.
4. 	Retaliation Claims
Baker brings claims against Lieutenant Houston, Commander Yantis,
and Sheriff Thom in their individual and official capacities and against Captain
Anderson in his official capacity for retaliating against him in violation of his
First Amendment rights. See id. at 1-2, 11. To allege a First Amendment
retaliation claim, a plaintiff must “show (1) he engaged in a protected activity,
(2) the government official took adverse action against him that would chill a
person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the activity, and (3) the adverse
action was motivated at least in part by the exercise of the protected activity.”
Spencer v. Jackson Cnty., 738 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Revels v.
Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876 (8th Cir. 2004)). “[T]he plaintiff must show the
official took the adverse action because the plaintiff engaged in the protected
speech.” Revels, 382 F.3d at 876. Here, Baker claims that Lieutenant Houston
has retaliated against him, but he does not provide specific allegations of
mistreatment. He mentions that Lieutenant Houston and Captain Anderson
question inmates about their religion, but he does not allege retaliatory actions
based on answers to these questions. Thus, Baker’s retaliation claims are
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dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A(b)(l).
II. 	Missing Pages in Complaint
The court notes that some pages appear to be missing from Baker’s
complaint. Specifically, pages 10, 11, and 13 end mid-sentence, suggesting
that some of Baker’s allegations contained in counts 5, 6, and 8 either failed to
reach the court or failed to be scanned by the court. See Docket 1 at 10-11, 13.
The court directs Baker to refile the missing pages by February 28, 2022, at
which time the court will rescreen those claims. Failure to refile the missing
pages by February 28, 2022, will result in Baker losing the ability to pursue his
claims that did not survive this screening order.
Thus, it is ORDERED:
1. 	That Baker’s claims for deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights
regarding medication against Mrs. Kayla G. in her individual and
official capacity, against Mr. Truax in his individual capacity, and
against 	Sheriff 	Thom 	in 	his 	official 	capacity 	survive 	§ 1915A
screening.
2. 	That Baker’s claims for conditions of confinement in violation of his
Fourteenth 	Amendment 	due 	process 	rights 	regarding 	lockdown
usage 	and 	pandemic 	protocols 	against 	Commander 	Yantis,
Lieutenant Houston, Sheriff Thom, and Captain Anderson in their
official capacities survive § 1915A screening.
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3. 	That all of Baker’s remaining claims against all defendants are
dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A(b)(l).
4. 	That Baker shall resubmit the pages missing after pages 10, 11, and
13 so that the court can fully screen his claims by February 28,
2022. Failure to do so will result in Baker only being able to pursue
claims that survived screening in this order.
5. 	That the Clerk shall send blank summons forms and Marshal Service
Form (Form USM-285) to Baker so that he may cause the complaint
to be served upon defendants Mrs. Kayla G., Mr. Truax, Sheriff Thom,
Commander Yantis, Lieutenant Houston, and Captain Anderson.
6. 	That Baker shall complete and send the Clerk of Court a separate
summons and USM-285 form for defendants Mrs. Kayla G., Mr.
Truax, Sheriff Thom, Commander Yantis, Lieutenant Houston, and
Captain Anderson. Upon receipt of the completed summons and
USM-285 forms, the Clerk of Court will issue the summons. If the
completed 	summons 	and 	USM-285 	form 	are 	not 	submitted 	as
directed, the complaint may be dismissed.
7. 	The 	United 	States 	Marshal 	Service 	shall 	serve 	the 	completed
summonses, together with a copy of the complaint (Docket 1) and
this order, upon defendants Mrs. Kayla G., Mr. Truax, Sheriff Thom,
Commander Yantis, Lieutenant Houston, and Captain Anderson.
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8. 	Defendants Mrs. Kayla G., Mr. Truax, Sheriff Thom, Commander
Yantis, Lieutenant Houston, and Captain Anderson will serve and
file an answer or responsive pleading to the complaint on or before
21 days following the date of service or 60 days if the defendants fall
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(2) or (3).
9. 	Baker will keep the court informed of his current address at all
times. All parties are bound by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and by the court’s Local Rules while this case is pending.
Dated January 28, 2022.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen E. Schreier
KAREN E. SCHREIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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