Huff v. City of Brookings Police Department et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
REGGIE D. HUFF,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF BROOKINGS POLICE DEPT.,
DAWN M. ELSHERE, DAVID ERICKSON,
JOEL PERRY, SEAN DOREMUS, MARISSA
D. MARSHALL, RICHELLE GUERRIERI,
THE SDSU FOUNDATION, STEVE
ERPENBACH, and JANE &/OR JOHN DOES,
Defendants,
and
DAWN M. ELSHERE,
Nominal Defendant.
4:22-CV-4020-LLP
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court are five separate motions to dismiss filed by the defendants in
this case. (Docs. 17, 22, 27, 41 and 49.) Plaintiff, Reggie Huff (“Huff”), filed pro se responses
and objections to each of the five motions to dismiss. Huff also filed motions for a preliminary
injunction, for a pleading practice order, and to disqualify certain defense counsel. 	(Docs. 3, 5
and 54.) 	For the following reasons, the motions to dismiss are granted and Huff’s motions are
denied as moot.
BACKGROUND
On Tuesday, November 26, 2019, Huff placed a call to Marissa Marshall (Marshall) at
her workplace, the South Dakota State University Foundation (“SDSU Foundation”). 	(Doc. 1-
1.) His main goal was to secure a “dating agreement.” (Doc. 1, p. 17, ¶ 71.) Marshall declined
the invitation, but Huff says he understood her to be interested in arranging another time to meet.
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On December 2, 2019, Huff called Marshall again while she was at work. 	(Doc. 1-1.)
This time Marshall revealed she had a boyfriend, that she would not be able to go out with Huff,
and she said they should go their separate ways. (Doc. 1, p. 18, ¶ 77.) Huff asserts that he later
found out Marshall’s boyfriend was Sean Doremus, a police officer with the Brookings Police
Department. (“BPD”). Huff alleges that Doremus encouraged Marshall to file a complaint with
the police. 	Officer Joel Perry called Huff and identified himself as a detective with the
Brookings Police Department. 	Perry asked Huff to come to the police station to discuss an
incident that needed to be resolved. When they spoke, Perry told Huff that he needed to accept
that Marshall was not interested in him, and to stop contacting her.
Subsequently, on December 6, 2019, Huff wrote a letter to Marshall. 	Among other
things, Huff accused Marshall of filing a false police report. Huff threatened legal action against
Marshall and asked her to pay damages to him in the amount of $750.00. 	After receiving the
December 6, 2019 letter from Huff, Marshall sought a protection order against him. In response,
Huff sought protection orders against Marshall, Perry and Doremus.
Huff alleges that Detective Perry told Huff that the December 6, 2019 letter could be
enough to have him charged with stalking. 	Huff contends that, as part of Perry’s ensuing
investigation, Perry called Richelle Guerrieri, a woman who obtained a protection order against
Huff in Ohio in 2012. 	Huff alleges that Perry obtained false information from Guerrieri about
Huff, and placed the information in a Police Report. Perry quoted Guerrieri as saying: “Richelle
said Reggie was declared a vexatious litigator in Trumbull County and not allowed to bring any
court action.” 	(Doc. 1, p. 28, 	¶ 114.) 	According to Huff, Perry also included in the Police
Report information about Huff being seen on SDSU Foundation surveillance video around the
end of November, 2019, including being inside the building looking for Marshall. Huff asserts
that is a lie - - that he was never around the SDSU Foundation building during that time period.
(Doc. 1, p. 20-21, 	¶¶ 	85-87.) 	The SDSU Foundation issued a “No Trespass Order” against
Huff. (Id. at 	87.)
On January 9, 2020, a hearing was held on all four of the requested protection orders at
the Brookings County Courthouse, with Judge Dawn Elshere presiding. 	Marshall and Huff
testified at the hearing. Judge Elshere entered a protection order in favor of Marshall and against
Huff after finding that Huff harassed Marshall with the two phone calls and the letter. 	Huff’s
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requests for protection orders against Marshall, Doremus and Perry were denied. Huff appealed
to the South Dakota Supreme Court, but his appeal was dismissed.
On January 7, 2022, Huff filed a complaint against the same defendants named in this
lawsuit, but he voluntarily dismissed that case without prejudice on February 4, 2022. See CIV
22-4002.
On February 14, 2022, Huff filed a 45-page complaint against the City of Brookings
Police Department, Chief of Police David Erickson, Officer Doremus, Detective Perry, Marshall,
Guerrieri, Judge Elshere, the SDSU Foundation, and Steve Erpenbach, President and CEO of the
SDSU Foundation. (Doc. 1.) In his complaint, Huff alleges that the defendants violated his civil
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, he asserts state-law claims for abuse of process and
defamation.
Huff alleges that his entire case “turns on the fragile ego” of Doremus. (Doc. 1, p. 13,
¶ 52.) 	Huff asserts that when Doremus learned Huff called Marshall to ask her on a date,
Doremus “formed a plan and scheme” to use his position as a police officer to boost his ego and
turn his “would be rival,” Huff, into a “stalker.” (Id., p. 17, ¶ 74.) Huff alleges that Doremus
pressured Marshall into recording Huff’s second phone call to her, so that Huff “could be
charged with some kind of obsessive conduct akin to a ‘stalker’ and Doremus could use such to
justify court action to defame the character of Plaintiff Huff set him up for planned unwitting
encounter that could then be used to abduct Huff under the guise of a lawful arrest for violating a
fraudulently acquired” protection order. 	(Doc. 1, p. 18, 	¶ 77.) 	Huff asserts that Perry placed
false information in the police report to defame Huff and “make it appear as though he had a
potentially troubling obsession with Marshall.” (Id. at pp. 20-21, ¶¶ 85-87.)
On March 10, 2022, Defendants SDSU Foundation and Steve Erpenbach filed a motion
to dismiss the claims against them pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 	(Doc. 17.) 	SDSU Foundation and
Erpenbach also argue that the defamation claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
On March 14, 2022, Defendant Judge Dawn Elshere filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdciton pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. 22.)
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On March 21, 2022, Defendant Richelle Guerrieri filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) and for failure to properly serve Guerrieri
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5). (Doc. 27.)
On April 20, 2022, Defendant Marissa Marshall filed a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. 41.)
On May 11, 2022, Defendants Brookings Police Department, David Erickson, Joel Perry,
and Sean Doremus filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6). (Doc. 49.)
Huff has filed responses to each motion to dismiss, and most Defendants have filed reply
briefs.
DISCUSSION
Judge Dawn Elshere
Judge Elshere has moved for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
Plaintiff Huff, as the party asserting subject matter jurisdiction, has the burden of proving that
jurisdiction is proper. V S Ltd. P’ship v. Dept of Hous. and Urban Dev., 235 F.3d 1109, 1112
(8th Cir. 2000) (citing Nucor Corp. v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 891 F.2d 1343, 1346 (8th Cir.
1989)). 	“The district court has the authority to consider matters outside the pleadings on a
motion challenging subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).”
Drevlow v. Lutheran Church, Mo. Synod, 991 F.2d 468, 470 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Osborn v.
United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 (8th Cir. 1990)). “Because jurisdiction is a threshold issue for
the court, the district court has ‘broader power to decide its own right to hear the case than it has
when the merits of the case are reached.’ ” Bellecourt v. United States, 994 F.2d 427, 430 (8th
Cir. 1993) (quoting Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729). For purposes of this motion, the Court will take
judicial notice of documents from the proceedings before Judge Elshere in state court, including
docket sheets from each of the four consolidated protection order proceedings, and the transcript
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from the January 9, 2020 hearing held on the consolidated proceedings.1 (Doc. 23, Exhibits A-
M.)
It is well established that judges are protected by absolute immunity for their judicial
actions. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–554 (1967) (“Few doctrines were more solidly
established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts
committed within their judicial jurisdiction.”). The Supreme Court has explained:
Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity
from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). Accordingly,
judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the
existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved without engaging in discovery
and eventual trial. 	Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S., at 554, 87 S.Ct., at 1218
(“[I]mmunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and
corruptly”). See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–819, 102 S.Ct.
2727, 2736–2739, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (allegations of malice are insufficient to
overcome qualified immunity).
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991).
Judges are generally immune from suit if the judge had jurisdiction over the party. See
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) (“[T]he necessary inquiry in determining whether
a defendant judge is immune from suit is whether at the time he took the challenged action he
had jurisdiction over the subject matter before him.”). “A judge will not be deprived of immunity
because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority;
rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all
jurisdiction.’” Id. at 356–57 (quoting Bradlev v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351 (1872)). Judges are
immune from suit with two narrow exceptions. 	See Schottel v. Young, 687 F.3d 370, 373 (8th
Cir. 2012). “ ‘First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not
taken in the judge’s judicial capacity. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial
in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.’ ” Id. (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at
11–12 (1991)). These exceptions do not apply here.
1
A federal court may take judicial notice of relevant state court documents. Knutson v. City of Fargo, 600 F.3d 992, 1000
(8th Cir. 2010). See also Eiler v. Avera McKennan Hospital, 2016 WL 1117441, *1 (D.S.D. 2016); Waldner v. North
American Truck & Trailer, Inc., 277 F.R.D. 401, 406 (D.S.D. 2011).
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Huff argues that Judge Elshere unlawfully acquired jurisdiction over the protection order
cases “so as to use the power of the state to deprive the Plaintiff of his civil rights under the color
of law regardless of the actual facts or law,” and that she did so “to acquire jurisdiction for a
preplanned or fixed outcome.” (Doc. 33, pp. 2-3.) 	However, it is clear that Judge Elshere had
jurisdiction and that, in presiding over the protective order proceedings and in entering a
protection order against Huff, Judge Elshere was acting within her judicial capacity. 	Thus,
Judge Elshere has absolute judicial immunity. Accordingly, Huff’s claims against Judge Elshere
are dismissed.
Richelle Guerrieri
Huff contends that Perry called Guerrieri during the course of his investigation into Huff
and his actions toward Marshall. Huff alleges in his complaint that Guerrieri provided false
background information about Huff to Detective Perry. According to Huff, Guerrieri is a “state
actor” because she is a court reporter for a state court in Ohio. (Doc. 1, p. 12, ¶ 50.) However,
Huff is suing her in “her personal capacity exclusively.” (Id., p. 13.)
Guerrieri asserts that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over her. An action can be
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). “To
survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must state sufficient facts
in the complaint to support a reasonable inference that [the defendants] can be subjected to
jurisdiction within the state.” Dever v. Hentzen Coatings, Inc., 380 F.3d 1070, 1072 (8th Cir.
2004) (internal quotations omitted). 	If personal jurisdiction is contested, “the plaintiff has the
burden of proving facts supporting personal jurisdiction.” 	Miller v. Nippon Carbon Co., Ltd.,
528 F.3d 1087, 1090 (8th Cir. 2008). The plaintiff “need[] only make a prima facie showing of
jurisdiction.” Id. This prima facie showing must be tested, not by the complaint alone, but by the
affidavits and exhibits presented with the motion to dismiss and in opposition to the motion to
dismiss. 	Block Indus. v. DHJ Indus., Inc., 495 F.2d 256, 260 (8th Cir. 1974). 	The court must
“view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all factual conflicts in
its favor in deciding whether the plaintiff made the requisite showing.” K–V Pharm. Co. v. J.
Uriach & CIA, S.A., 648 F.3d 588, 592 (8th Cir. 2011).
The determination of whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a person or entity is
normally 	a 	two-step 	analysis. 	Northrup 	King 	Co. 	v. 	Compania 	Productora 	Semillas
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Algodoneras Selectas, S.A., 51 F.3d 1383, 1387 (8th Cir. 1995). First, the applicable state long-
arm statute must be satisfied, and second, the court’s exercise of jurisdiction must comport with
due process. Id. South Dakota construes its long-arm statute to confer jurisdiction to the fullest
extent permitted by the Due Process Clause. Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Ever Best Ltd., 28 F.3d 910,
915 (8th Cir. 1994). As such, the analysis collapses into one step: the due process analysis. Id.
Due process requires that a defendant have “minimum contacts” with the State such that
maintaining the suit “does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ”
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 	(1945). 	The nonresident defendant’s conduct and connection
with the forum state must be such that she “should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297.
The Eighth Circuit summarized these due process requirements:
In a series of cases following International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), the Supreme Court has elucidated the
“minimum contacts” standard that must be satisfied before a nonresident can be
subjected to the jurisdiction of a state's courts. Due process requires that out-of-
state defendants have “ ‘fair warning’ ” that they could be “haled into” court in a
foreign 	jurisdiction. 	This 	requirement 	“is 	satisfied 	if 	the 	defendant 	has
‘purposefully directed’ his activities at residents of the forum ... and the litigation
results from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities.
The contacts with the forum state must be more than “ ‘random,’ ”
“‘fortuitous,’ 	” 	or 	“ 	‘attenuated.’ 	” 	The 	due 	process 	clause 	forecloses
personal jurisdiction unless the actions of the “defendant himself ... create [d] a
‘substantial connection’ with the forum State.” Once the court has found that the
defendant purposefully established the requisite minimum contacts with the
forum 	state, 	the 	court 	still 	must 	determine 	whether 	the 	assertion
of jurisdiction comports with “ ‘fair play and substantial justice.’ ”
Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384, 1389 	(8th Cir. 1991) (citations
omitted). In assessing the defendant’s “reasonable anticipation” of being haled into court, “there
must be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Bell
Paper Box, Inc. v. U.S. Kids, Inc., 22 F.3d 816, 818 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Soo Line R.R.. Co.
v. Hawker Siddeley Canada, Inc., 950 F.2d 526, 528–29 (8th Cir. 1991)).
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To evaluate personal jurisdiction under the due process clause, the Court must consider
five factors: 	(1) the nature and quality of the defendant’s contacts with South Dakota; (2) the
quantity of her contacts with this state; (3) the relation of the cause of action to the contacts; (4)
the interest of South Dakota in providing a forum for its residents; and (5) the convenience of the
parties. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Maples Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 1100, 1102 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing
Land-O-Nod Co. v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 708 F.2d 1338, 1340 (8th Cir. 1983)). 	The
latter two issues are secondary and of less importance than the first three factors. Land-O-Nod,
708 F.2d at 1340. 	When judging minimum contacts, a court should focus on “the relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” 	Id. (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 204 (1977)).
Here, the only contact between Guerrieri and South Dakota alleged by Huff is her phone
conversation with Detective Perry when he inquired about Guerrieri’s interactions with Huff in
Ohio. 	The allegations in the complaint are that Perry initiated this contact. 	In support of her
motion to dismiss, Guerrieri submitted an affidavit stating that she is and was an Ohio resident at
all relevant times. (Doc. 28.) She has never been to South Dakota. She does not own property
here, does not work here, and does not conduct any business in South Dakota. Guerrieri does not
know any other defendant in this case. Her only connection to South Dakota is this lawsuit and
her prior history with Huff. 2
Guerrieri’s uncontroverted evidence shows that, other than answering Detective Perry’s
questions about Huff, she has no contacts with the state of South Dakota. There is no evidence
that Guerrieri purposely directed activities toward South Dakota, or that she conducted activities
here. 	The secondary considerations of the convenience of the parties and South Dakota’s
interest in providing a forum for its residents do not compel the Court to exercise jurisdiction
over Guerrieri in this case.
In short, Huff has not made a prima facie showing of jurisdiction over Guerrieri
sufficient to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over her in this Court. 	Having
determined that no minimum contacts exist to exercise jurisdiction over Guerrieri, after
2 Guerrieri sought and obtained a protection order against Huff in Ohio in 2012. A copy of the pleadings relating to
her protection order are attached to Guerrieri’s affidavit. (Doc. 28‐1.) The Court takes judicial notice of those
documents.
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considering the totality of the circumstances, the applicable law and specific factors for
evaluation, this Court determines that due process considerations preclude it from having
jurisdiction over Guerrieri in this case. Her motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) for lack
of jurisdiction is granted.
Remaining Defendants and Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
Having addressed the jurisdictional issues, the Court will turn to the motions to dismiss
for failure to state a claim filed by the seven remaining Defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the factual allegations
of a complaint are assumed true and construed in favor of the plaintiff, “even if it strikes a savvy
judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and
unlikely.” 	See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (internal quotations
omitted). 	“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment]
to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555 (internal citations omitted). The complaint must allege
facts, which, when taken as true, raise more than a speculative right to relief. Id.; Benton v.
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged—but has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). “Determining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on
its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. (citation omitted).
Complaints by pro se plaintiffs must “be given liberal construction.” Solomon v. Petray,
795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). “When we say that a pro se complaint should be given liberal
construction, we mean that if the essence of an allegation is discernible . . . then the district court
should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered
within the proper legal framework.” Id. at 787 (quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th
Cir. 2004)).
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court generally must
ignore materials outside the pleadings, but it may consider “ ‘some materials that are part of the
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public record or do not contradict the complaint,’ as well as materials that are ‘necessarily
embraced by the pleadings.’ ” Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir.
1999) (citations omitted). 	In general, material embraced by the complaint include “documents
whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which
are not physically attached to the pleadings.” Ashanti v. City of Golden Valley, 666 F.3d 1148,
1151 (8th Cir. 2012).
1. 	42 U.S.C. § 1983
Defendants BPD, Erickson, Perry, and Doremus argue that Huff has failed to establish a
viable § 1983 claim because he has failed to show a violation of a federal right. “Standing alone,
section 1983 does not establish any substantive rights. Rather, it simply serves as a vehicle for
vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution
and federal statutes that it describes.” 	Henley v. Brown, 686 F.3d 634, 640 (8th Cir. 2012)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must
establish two essential elements: (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States, and (2) the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the
color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “[G]enerally, a public employee
acts under color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his
responsibilities pursuant to state law.” Id. at 50 (citations omitted).
“The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit,” the Supreme Court has explained, is “to isolate the
precise constitutional violation with which [the defendant] is charged.” Baker v. McCollan, 443
U.S. 137, 140 (1979). 	In his complaint, Huff states that the civil rights violated by the various
defendants include:
The right to free speech the right to be free from unreasonable search and
governmental intrusion into a law abiding citizen’s private affairs including but
not limited to the right move about freely with full liberty and without an
unwarranted threat of jeopardy by incidental proximity, the right to be free from
governmental slander and defamation per se for the purpose of covering up
serious and including criminal police misconduct and the right to an appeal to a
higher court for review on the merits and the right to not be forced to expend ones
own lawfully acquired financial resources and life resource to preserve and
defend said rights which are guaranteed in both the US and State of South Dakota
constitutions.
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(Doc. 1, p. 44.) This statement is the archetype of a “[t]hreadbare recital[ ] of [an] element[ ] of
a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” that is insufficient to plead a cause
of action. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 	Huff does not contend that he was arrested, detained,
prosecuted, or convicted of a crime. 	Rather, the facts pled by Huff critique the BPD’s
investigation of Marshall’s complaints about Huff, assail assertions made in the police report,
and lambaste the ensuing protection order proceedings, but Huff’s account does not reflect that
he sustained a constitutional injury. The due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment
apply to deprivations of life, liberty, or property. To trigger these safeguards, Huff must assert
an interest that merits constitutional protection. Huff may feel he has been treated unfairly, but
he has not alleged any injury that would support a § 1983 claim.
Huff’s allegations of defamation in the complaint are not actionable under § 1983.
Defamatory publications by a state official, however seriously they may harm someone, do not
deprive 	that 	person 	of 	any 	liberty 	interests 	protected 	by 	the 	due 	process 	clause.
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (recognizing that, while a state may protect against
injury to reputation by virtue of its tort law, a person’s reputation does not implicate a “liberty”
or “property” interest of the sort protected by the Due Process Clause); Underwood v. Pritchard,
638 F.2d 60, 62 (8th Cir. 1981) (defamation per se is not actionable under § 1983). Simply put,
§ 1983 does not provide a means by which a plaintiff can seek redress for violations of state law.
See Baker, 443 U.S. at 146.
Huff alleges that some of the defendants conspired to violate his constitutional rights.
Such a conspiracy claim requires a showing “that the defendant conspired with others to deprive
[the plaintiff] of constitutional rights.” White v. McKinley, 519 F.3d 806, 814 (8th Cir. 2008)
(applying this standard to a § 1983 claim). 	The plaintiff is additionally required to prove a
deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege. 	Id. 	Huff’s conspiracy claim fails because no
constitutional right has been violated.
Even if Huff had asserted a violation of a federal statutory or constitutional right, his
conspiracy claim would still fail. 	To establish a conspiracy, a plaintiff must allege “specific
facts tending to show a meeting of the minds among the alleged coconspirators.” Lawrence v.
City of St. Paul, 740 F. 	Supp. 	2d 1026, 1049 (D. Minn. 2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Murray v. Lene, 595 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2010)). Allegations that the
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parties had an “opportunity to communicate” or “acted in a manner that was consistent with the
existence of a conspiracy” are insufficient alone to suggest a conspiracy. 	Lawrence, 740 F.
Supp. 2d. at 1050 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The plaintiff’s “[f]actual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and push the “claims across the
line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. 	The allegations in Huff’s
complaint are insufficient to support a § 1983 conspiracy claim. They do not include “specific
facts tending to show a meeting of the minds among the alleged conspirators.” Lawrence, 740 F.
Supp. 2d at 1049. Rather, Huff recounts a series of discrete acts by different parties.
For these reasons, the Court finds that Huff’s allegations of a conspiracy to deprive him
of his constitutional rights do not raise a right to relief above the speculative level or push his
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Huff’s §
1983 claim.
2. 	State Law Claims for Defamation and Abuse of Process
Having dismissed the only federal claim over which the Court had original jurisdiction,
the Court needs to decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-
law claims against Defendants. 	28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) provides that “[t]he district courts may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if [. . .] the
district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 	See Innovative
Home Health Care, Inc. v. P.T.-O.T. Assocs. of the Black Hills, 141 F.3d 1284, 1287–88 (8th
Cir. 1998) (noting the section and affirming district court’s use of its discretion in declining to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction).
The United States Supreme Court has advised:
[A] federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of
the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity
in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in that
court involving pendent state-law claims. When the balance of these factors
indicates that a case properly belongs in state court, as when the federal-law
claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law
claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by
dismissing the case without prejudice. 	Id., at 726–727, 86 S.Ct., at 1139. As
articulated by Gibbs, the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction thus is a doctrine of
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flexibility, designed to allow courts to deal with cases involving pendent claims in
the manner that most sensibly accommodates a range of concerns and values.
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (citing Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 726–27 (1966)).
In this case, the Court concludes that the values of judicial economy, convenience,
fairness, and comity weigh in favor of declining supplemental jurisdiction over the state law
claims. The litigation is in its early stages, and neither the values of economy nor convenience
would be disserved by dismissing the case for re-filing in state court. 	Fairness supports
dismissing the action without prejudice, as this Court would not have had original jurisdiction as
the case now stands with only state-law claims. Finally, comity suggests that the state courts of
South Dakota should be allowed to interpret and apply South Dakota law to the remaining state
law claims. 	See, e.g., Thomas v. Dickel, 213 F.3d 1023, 1026 (8th Cir. 2000) (explaining that
“federal courts should exercise judicial restraint and avoid state law issues wherever possible’ ”
(quoting Condor Corp. v. City of St. Paul, 912 F.2d 215, 220 (8th Cir. 1990)). For these reasons,
the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED:
1. 	That Defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted. (Docs. 17, 22, 27,
41, and 49.)
2. 	That Plaintiff’s motions for a preliminary injunction, for a pleading
practice order, and to disqualify certain defense counsel are denied as
moot (Docs. 3, 5, and 54.)
3. 	That this case is dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to
refile the remaining state-law claims in state court within 30 days from
the date of this Order, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), unless state
law provides for a longer period in which state law claims can be
made.
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Dated this 6th day of July, 2022.
BY THE COURT:
________________________________
Lawrence L. Piersol
ATTEST: 	United States District Judge
MATTHEW W. THELEN, CLERK
_____________________________
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