USA v. Walking Eagle

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
CENTRAL DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 3:20-CR-30117-RAL
Plaintiff,
vs.
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING
MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT
JOSHUA WALKING EAGLE,
Defendant.
On September 9, 2020, Joshua Walking Eagle (Walking Eagle) was indicted for second-
degree murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1153 and 1111 and using and carrying a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Doc. 1. Walking Eagle's initial appearance on the
indictment was on October 28,2020. Doc. 9. Walking Eagle is accused ofkilling Lloyd Walking
Eagle on the afternoon of May 29,2020 in Todd County,South Dakota, located within the Rosebud
Sioux Indian Reservation. Doc. 30 at 1-2. Walking Eagle has filed a pro se motion to dismiss the
indictment, arguing that his case should be dismissed because this Court lacks jurisdiction. Doc.
24. Walking Eagle also asserts his right to a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act and the United
States Constitution. Doc. 24. The Government has responded in opposition to Walking Eagle's
motion. Doc. 30. For the reasons stated herein, Walking Eagle's motion to dismiss is denied.
I. Lack of Jurisdiction
Walking Eagle argues that this Court lacks Jurisdiction over the case. Under the Major
Crimes Act(MCA), federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over certain crimes committed by
1
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an "Indian"' in "Indian country." 18 U.S.C. § 1153; United States v. Azure. 801 F.2d 336, 338
(8th Cir. 1986). Section 1153 ofthe MCA provides as follovys:
Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other
person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping,
maiming, a felony under chapter 109A, incest, a felony assault under section 113,
an assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years, felony
child abuse or neglect, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of
this title within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same law and penalties
as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive
jurisdiction ofthe United States.
18U.S.C.§ 1153(a). As the statute makes clear, any Indian who commits murder in Indian country
falls within the purview ofthe federal courts. 18 U.S.C. §1153. Under the MCA,the term "Indian
country," includes "all land within the limits ofany Indian reservation under thejurisdiction ofthe
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-
way running through the reservation." 18 U.S.C. § 1151. As the Eighth Circuit has stated,
"Section 1151(a) confirms that reservations are properly considered Indian country and are
therefore under the primary jurisdiction of the federal government and the relevant tribes."
Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Podhradskv. 606 F.3d 994, 1007 (8th Cir. 2010). While the MCA does
not define the term "Indian," courts have "judicially explicated" its meaning. United States v.
Zepeda. 792 F.3d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 2015)(cleaned up and citation omitted). Several circuit
courts, including the Eighth Circuit, have defined an "Indian" as an individual that(1)is a member
ofa federally recognized tribe and(2)has some quantum ofNative American blood. United States
'The statute uses the word "Indian." The word "Indian" stems from the mistaken belief of early
Europeans that they had encountered people of the East Indies when landing ships on islands off
the coasts of North and South America,two continents that had a population the rough equivalent
ofEurope at the time and many differentigroups ofpeople more properly called Native Americans.
This Opinion and Order uses the word "Indian" nevertheless as that word is used in the statute.
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V. Stvmiest. 581 F.3d 759,762(8th Cir. 2009); Zepeda.792 F.3d at 1110; United States v. Prentiss.
273 F.3d 1277, 1280(10th Cir. 2001).
Here, this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the case under the MCA. First, a grand
Jury indicted Walking Eagle with second-degree murder, an enumerated offense under the MCA.^
Second, the offense was allegedly committed within the exterior boundaries ofthe Rosebud Sioux
Indian Reservation; therefore, it was committed within "Indian country." Finally, Walking Eagle
is an "Indian," as he is an enrolled member of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe and 1/2 degree of Native
American blood. In sum, all the requirements are met under the MCA for this Court to assert
Jurisdiction over the case.
Nonetheless, Walking Eagle argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction over crimes
committed within reservation boundaries. In support ofthis argument. Walking Eagle cites Flving
Horse v. South Dakota Department of Corrections. 16-CR-50076-JLV. In that case, the petitioner
Joseph Flying Horse, a prisoner at the Pennington County Jail, filed a pro se motion in the Western
Division of the Federal District Court for the District of South Dakota seeking removal of all
criminal prosecutions of Native Americans by the State of South Dakota. Flving Horse. 16-CR-
50076-JLV, Doc. 4. The Honorable Jeffrey L. Viken conducted a § 1915A screening of the case
and dismissed the case as frivolous. Flving Horse. 16-CR-50076-JLV, Doc. 4. Flying Eagle
appealed and, without issuing an opinion, the Eighth Circuit vacated the Judgment of the district
court and remanded to the district court with instructions to remand the case to the state court.
Flving Horse. 16-CR-50076-JLV, Doc. 10.
^ Walking Eagle was also indicted for using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime
of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Of course, federal courts have Jurisdiction
over any person charged with this offense regardless of whether that person is an "Indian" or the
offense was committed in "Indian country."
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Walking Eagle's reliance on this case is puzzling. Walking Eagle asserts that Flying Horse
stands for the proposition that state courts as well as this Court lack jurisdiction over crimes
committed on Indian reservations. Doc. 24 at 3-5. That is simply incorrect; the Eighth Circuit
never so ruled. And indeed, as the Court discussed above, the MCA expressly grants federal courts
exclusive Jurisdiction over cases ofthis kind. 18 U.S.C. § 1153. The United States Supreme Court
and the Eighth Circuit have made clear that Indian country includes reservation land. See McGirt
V. Oklahoma. 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2470(2020)("In conjunction with the MCA,§ 1151(a). .. sends
to federal court certain major crimes committed by Indians on reservations."); Podhradskv. 606
F.3d at 1006 ("Reservation land is by definition 'Indian country,' and as a general rule Indian
country falls under the primary civil, criminal, and regulatory jurisdiction of the federal
government and the resident Tribe rather than the states."). This Court has jurisdiction over this
case.
11. The Right to a Speedy Trial
Aside from arguing that his case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, Walking
Eagle also asserts his right to a speedy trial, seemingly invoking both the Speedy Trial Act and the
Sixth Amendment. Doc. 24 at I, 6. It is unclear whether Walking Eagle is claiming that his right
to a speedy trial has been violated or is merely clarifying that he has not waived his right to a
speedy trial. To the extent that he clairns his speedy trial right has been violated, this Court will
address why that is not so.
Under the Speedy Trial Act, a federal criminal defendant must be brought to trial within
70 days of his indictment or arraignment, whichever is later. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c); United States
V. Aldaco. 477 F.3d 1008, 1016 (8th Cir. 2007)(citation omitted). However, certain days may be
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excluded from this 70-day ealculation. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h); Aldaco, 477 F.3d at 1016. For
example, the calculation may exclude:
Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge ... at the
request ofthe defendant or his counsel... ifthe Judge granted such continuance on
the basis of his findings that the ends of Justice served by talcing such action
outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). When the Judge finds that the ends ofjustice served by granting such
a continuance outweigh the best interest ofthe public and the defendant in a speedy trial, the Judge
must explain his or her findings either orally or in writing. Id; United States v. Johnson.990 F.3d
661, 667(8th Cir. 2021). The defendant bears the burden of showing that his statutory right to a
speedy trial has been violated. United States v. Williams. 557 F.3d 943, 950 (8th Cir. 2009).
Here, the 70-day deadline has not lapsed. Walking Eagle's first appearance on the
indictment was on October 28,2020,Doc.9, and his trial was scheduled to begin 69 days thereafter
on January 5, 2021, Doc. 10. But on December 21, 2020, Walking Eagle filed a motion to
continue, and this Court granted the motion^ and rescheduled the trial for February 16,2021. Doc.
22. When Walking Eagle filed his first motion to continue, the speedy trial clock stopped. 18
U.S.C. S 3161(hlf7irAJ: United States v. Jones.23 F.3d 1307. 1311 (8th Cir. 1994). Then Walking
Eagle filed this pretrial motion, which also stopped the speedy trial clock. 18 U.S.C. §
3161(h)(l)P); United States v. Titlbach. 339 F.3d 692, 698-99 (8th Cir. 2003). After Walking
Eagle filed this motion, he filed a second motion for continuance as well as a waiver of his speedy
trial rights. Docs. 25, 26. Once again, this Court granted the motion for continuance.'^ Doc. 28.
^ This Court found that "the ends of Justice served by continuing this trial outweigh the best
interests of the public and the Defendant in a speedy trial insofar as defense counsel has made
known to the Court that additional time is need to investigate this matter and review discovery
with the Defendant." Doc. 22 at I.
^ This Court found that "the ends of Justice served by continuing this trial outweigh the best
interests of the public and the Defendant in a speedy trial insofar as defense counsel has made to
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Excluding the period of delays caused by Walking Eagle's motions for continuances as well as his
motion to dismiss,the 70-day speedy trial period has not lapsed. Jones.23 F.3d at 1311 (noting
that the speedy trial clock stopped from date the defendant's motion to continue was filed until the
date the trial was rescheduled); United States v. Faulkner. CR. 17-50144-JLV, 2019 WL 529510,
at *4(D.S.D. Feb. 11, 2019)(same); United States v. Hessman. No. CR 02-3038-LRR, 2006 WL
572049, at *4(N.D.Iowa Mar. 7, 2006)(same). Indeed, by this Court's calculation, only 54 days
have elapsed from Walking Eagle's first appearance on October 28, 2020 to his first motion to
continue on December 21, 2020, which stopped the speedy trial clock.
While Sixth Amendment challenges are reviewed separately from challenges under the
Speedy Trial Act,"[i]t would be unusual to find the Sixth Amendment has been violated when the
Speedy Trial Act has not." Titlbach. 339 F.3d at 699. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial." U.S. Const,
amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial "attaches at the time of arrest or
indictment, whichever comes first, and continues until the trial commences." United States v.
Erenas-Luna. 560 F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). To determine whether a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated, the Supreme Court has
instructed courts to examine the following four factors:(1)the length of the delay,(2) the reason
for the delay,(3)the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4)the prejudice to the
defendant. Barker v. Wingo.407 U.S. 514, 530(1972).
Here, Walking Eagle's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has not been violated.
Walking Eagle was indicted on September 9, 2020, Doc. 1, and his trial is currently scheduled for
known to the Court that defense counsel recently hired a private investigator therefore additional
time is needed to investigate the matter." Doc. 28 at 1.
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May 18,2021, Doc.28. This means he will have his trial about eight months after he was indicted.
See Titlbach. 339 F.3d at 699 (eight-month delay not presumptively unreasonable). All delays in
this case are attributable to Walking Eagle as he sought to continuances to allow him to ftirther
prepare his case and then sought a ruling on a motion to dismiss. Williams. 557 F.3d at 949
("Delays which have been caused by the accused himself can not, of course, be complained of by
him." (citation omitted)). Thus, any delay has only been to his benefit, not detriment. Finally,
although he asserts the right to a speedy trial in the motion at hand, he has since executed a waiver
ofthe right in conjunction with his second motion to continue. Doc. 26. In consideration ofthese
factors, the Sixth Amendment does not require this Court to dismiss the indictment.
lU. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Walking Eagle's Motion to Dismiss Indictment, Doc. 24, is denied.
DATED this ^o'*' day of April, 2021.
BY THE COURT:
ROBERTO A. LANG!
CHIEF JUDGE
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