USA v. DaCruz

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
)
v. 	) 	Cr. No. 23-52 WES
)
RYAN DACRUZ, 	)
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Defendant. 	)
)
___________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, District Judge.
Defendant 	Ryan 	DaCruz 	is 	charged 	with 	one 	count 	of 	felon 	in
possession 	of 	ammunition 	under 	18 	U.S.C. 	§§ 922(g)(1) 	and
924(a)(8). 	Indictment, ECF No. 21. 	Pending now is his motion to
suppress 	evidence 	obtained 	from 	his 	residence 	in 	Central 	Falls,
Rhode Island, pursuant to a search warrant issued on May 31, 2023.
Def.’s 	Mot. 	to 	Suppress 	(“Def.’s 	Mot.”) 	1, 	ECF 	No. 	32; 	Resp. 	to
Def.’s 	Mot. 	to 	Suppress 	(“Opp’n”) 	1-2, 	ECF 	No. 	34. 	Defendant
argues that a protective sweep conducted prior to the issuance of
the search warrant of his girlfriend’s apartment where he resided
was done in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. 	Def.’s Mot.
3. 	He 	further 	argues 	that, 	because 	the 	protective 	sweep 	was
illegal, the evidence obtained during the search should be excluded
as fruit of the poisonous tree. 	Id. 	For the reasons that follow,
Defendant’s Motion is DENIED.
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I. 	Facts
On May 31, 2023, officers from the Providence Field Office of
the 	Bureau 	of 	Alcohol, 	Tobacco, 	Firearms 	and 	Explosives 	(“ATF”),
with 	the 	Central 	Falls 	Police 	Department 	(“CFPD”), 	established
surveillance 	at 	Defendant’s 	alleged 	residence, 	991 	Lonsdale
Avenue, 	Apartment 	1, 	in 	Central 	Falls, 	Rhode 	Island. 	GXB,
Ventetuolo Aff. ¶ 3, ECF No. 34-2. 	Officers were there to execute
a 	federal 	search 	warrant 	for 	Defendant’s 	person 	and 	cellphone.
Id. 	A CFPD-marked cruiser drove to the parking area located behind
a 	multi-family 	structure 	where 	Defendant 	stood 	outside 	of 	his
vehicle. 	Id. 	CFPD 	officers 	approached 	Defendant, 	identified
themselves, and directed him to raise his hands. 	Id.
Upon 	questioning 	by 	the 	officers, 	Defendant 	stated 	that 	he
had marijuana in his backpack and that additional marijuana was in
the 	apartment, 	but 	no 	other 	drugs. 	Ventetuolo 	Aff. 	¶¶ 	9-10, 	ECF
No. 1-1. 	Officers handcuffed Defendant and located the marijuana
in 	the 	backpack. 	Id. 	¶ 	9. 	Officers 	also 	located 	the 	cellphone
that 	was 	the 	target 	of 	the 	search 	warrant. 	Id. 	When 	asked,
Defendant 	did 	not 	provide 	officers 	with 	consent 	to 	search 	the
apartment 	to 	retrieve 	the 	marijuana, 	explaining 	that 	it 	was 	his
girlfriend’s apartment and that he did not live there. 	Id. ¶ 10.
This 	assertion 	contradicted 	ATF’s 	surveillance 	of 	the 	address
showing Defendant regularly staying overnight there. 	GXA, Search
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Warrant 	¶ 	10, 	ECF 	No. 	34-1. 	Defendant 	offered 	to 	enter 	the
apartment 	and 	retrieve 	the 	remaining 	marijuana. 	Ventetuolo 	Aff.
¶ 10. 	The encounter lasted several minutes. 	Id. ¶ 11.
At 	the 	time, 	officers 	knew 	the 	dwelling 	contained 	multiple
apartments 	and 	that 	the 	front 	door 	opened 	to 	a 	common 	area. 	See
GXB 	¶¶ 	5-6. 	Other 	than 	that, 	officers 	were 	not 	aware 	of 	the
structure of Apartment 1 or whether other residents of the building
could access Apartment 1. 	Id. ¶ 6. 	And officers did not know if
anyone else lived in, or occupied at the time, Apartment 1 besides
Defendant 	and 	his 	girlfriend. 	Id. 	¶ 	7. 	Officers 	believed 	that
Apartment 1’s windows faced towards the driveway and rear parking
area where the encounter took place . 	Id. ¶ 5.
When officers approached Apartment 1 (wearing ballistic vests
marked 	“ATF”), 	they 	knocked 	on 	the 	door, 	identified 	themselves,
and 	received 	no 	response. 	Ventetuolo 	Aff. 	¶ 	11; 	GXB 	¶ 	9; 	GXC,
Axon Body video of Task Force Officer Matthew McGloin at 0:05, ECF
No. 	34-3. 	“To 	prevent 	the 	destruction 	of 	evidence 	and 	preserve
the 	integrity 	of 	the 	residence,” 	while 	officers 	sought 	a 	search
warrant 	for 	the 	apartment, 	officers 	entered 	Apartment 	1.
Ventetuolo 	Aff. 	¶ 	11. 	They 	then 	conducted 	a 	protective 	sweep 	of
the 	apartment 	and 	saw 	in 	plain 	view 	on 	a 	storge 	rack 	a 	small 	bag
containing a white powder similar in appearance to crack cocaine.
Id. 	The protective sweep lasted less than one minute. 	GXB ¶ 10.
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Officers 	included 	the 	presence 	of 	cocaine, 	among 	other
evidence, 	in 	the 	affidavit 	in 	support 	of 	the 	search 	warrant 	to
establish probable cause to search the apartment, which was signed
and 	executed. 	See 	GXA 	¶ 	14. 	The 	officers 	ultimately 	discovered
and 	seized, 	inter 	alia, 	ammunition 	in 	the 	apartment 	during 	the
search 	authorized 	by 	the 	warrant. 	Ventetuolo 	Aff. 	¶¶ 	14-16.
Defendant only moves to suppress the ammunition. 	Def.’s Mot. 3.
II. 	Discussion
Defendant 	argues 	the 	protective 	sweep 	violated 	his 	Fourth
Amendment 	rights, 	and, 	under 	the 	fruit 	of 	the 	poisonous 	tree
doctrine, the subsequent granting of the search warrant, the search
of the apartment pursuant to the warrant, and the discovery of the
ammunition 	that 	forms 	the 	basis 	of 	the 	charges 	against 	him 	also
violated 	his 	Fourth 	Amendment 	rights. 	Def.’s 	Mot. 	3. 	Not 	only
does the government argue that the protective sweep was legal and
reasonable, but also, in the alternative, it argues the ammunition
found in the apartment is admissible under the inevitable discovery
and independent source doctrines. 	Opp’n. 10-22.
Starting 	with 	first 	principles, 	the 	Fourth 	Amendment 	of 	the
U.S. Constitution prohibits, inter alia, unreasonable searches of
peoples' 	homes 	and, 	with 	a 	few 	exceptions, 	requires 	police 	to
obtain 	a 	warrant 	prior 	to 	commencing 	such 	a 	search. 	U.S. 	Const.
amend. 	IV; 	Katz 	v. 	United 	States, 	389 	U.S. 	347, 	357 	(1986).
Defendant 	bears 	a 	threshold 	burden 	of 	showing 	a 	Fourth 	Amendment
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violation. 	United 	States 	v. 	Young, 	835 	F.3d 	13, 	19 	(1st 	Cir.
2016); 	see 	also 	Rakas 	v. 	Illinois, 	439 	U.S. 	128, 	130 	n.1 	(1978).
Only 	after 	Defendant 	has 	shown 	he 	was 	subjected 	to 	a 	warrantless
search 	does 	the 	burden 	shift 	to 	the 	government 	to 	establish 	the
intrusion 	was 	nonetheless 	lawful. 	United 	States 	v. 	Manubolu, 	13
F.4th 57, 69 (1st Cir. 2021).
A. Protective Sweep
An 	exception 	to 	the 	rule 	requiring 	a 	warrant 	to 	search 	an
individual’s 	house 	is 	for 	protective 	sweeps 	conducted 	in
conjunction 	with 	an 	individual’s 	arrest. 	Maryland 	v. 	Buie, 	494
U.S. 325, 327 (1990). 	A protective sweep is “a quick and limited
search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect
the 	safety 	of 	police 	officers 	or 	others.” 	Id. 	Such 	a 	sweep 	“is
narrowly 	confined 	to 	a 	cursory 	visual 	inspection 	of 	those 	places
in 	which 	a 	person 	might 	be 	hiding.” 	Id. 	Although 	protective
sweeps 	often 	take 	place 	following 	an 	arrest 	within 	the 	home, 	the
First Circuit has allowed protective sweeps “when an arrest ‘occurs
just outside the home,’ because such an arrest ‘can pose an equally
serious 	threat 	to 	arresting 	officers 	as 	one 	that 	occurs 	in 	the
home.’” 	United 	States 	v. 	Delgado-Perez, 	867 	F.3d 	244, 	251 	(1st
Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Lawlor, 406 F.3d 37, 41 (1st
Cir. 2005)). 	The doctrine has been extended to include protective
sweeps in conjunction with the execution of search warrants, Drohan
v. Vaughn, 176 F.3d 17, 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1999), and where exigent
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circumstances exist, United States v. Martins, 413 F.3d 139, 150-
51 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1011 (2005), abrogated
on other grounds by Hill v. Walsh, 884 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 2018).
Protective 	sweeps 	are 	permissible 	only 	where 	there 	are
“articulable 	facts 	which, 	taken 	together 	with 	the 	rational
inferences 	from 	those 	facts, 	would 	warrant 	a 	reasonably 	prudent
officer 	in 	believing 	that 	the 	area 	to 	be 	swept 	harbors 	an
individual 	posing 	a 	danger 	to 	those 	on 	the 	arrest 	scene.” 	Buie,
494 U.S. at 334. 	An officer needs reasonable suspicion to execute
a 	protective 	sweep. 	United 	States 	v. 	Daoust, 	916 	F.2d 	757, 	759
(1st 	Cir. 	1990). 	Though 	reasonable 	suspicion 	is 	“considerably
less 	demanding 	than 	the 	level 	of 	proof 	required 	to 	support 	a
finding 	of 	probable 	cause,” 	Martins, 	413 	F.3d 	at 	149, 	there 	must
be “more than an unfounded speculation,” United States v. Winston,
444 	F.3d 	115, 	118 	(1st 	Cir. 	2006) 	(citing 	United 	States 	v. 	Cook,
277 F.3d 82, 85 (1st Cir. 2002)).
The 	government 	heavily 	relies 	on 	Lawlor 	to 	support 	its
argument that the protective sweep was reasonable. 	See Opp’n. 11-
15. 	There, the First Circuit found the protective sweep was sound
because 	a 	“reasonably 	prudent 	officer” 	would 	have 	feared 	the
residence 	harbored 	a 	dangerous 	individual. 	Lawlor, 	406 	F.3d 	at
42. 	The sweep was justified by reports of gunshots at the scene,
the 	officer’s 	knowledge 	that 	the 	defendant 	and 	his 	brother 	were
involved 	in 	the 	drug 	trade, 	and 	observations 	of 	individuals
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routinely visiting the residence. 	Id. 	At the scene, the defendant
was 	outside 	the 	residence 	intoxicated 	with 	another 	intoxicated
individual 	with 	whom 	the 	officer 	was 	not 	familiar. 	Id. 	Outside
of the defendant’s residence were spent shotgun shells. 	Id. 	When
asked 	the 	location 	of 	the 	gun, 	the 	defendant 	shrugged 	his
shoulders. 	Id. 	The 	Court 	agreed 	the 	officer 	was 	justified 	in
entering 	the 	residence 	and 	conducting 	a 	protective 	sweep 	out 	of
fear 	there 	could 	be 	a 	third 	person 	who 	could 	attack 	the 	officer.
Id. at 42-43.
In Winston, another First Circuit case the government relies
on, 	see 	Opp’n 	15, 	the 	officers 	had 	knowledge 	to 	believe 	the
defendant 	and 	others 	were 	armed 	and 	dangerous, 	444 	F.3d 	at 	118.
The 	defendant 	had 	already 	been 	indicted 	for 	his 	participation 	in
a 	“large-scale 	cocaine 	trafficking 	ring” 	and 	officers 	were
informed 	the 	defendant 	purchased 	two 	handguns 	and 	a 	bullet-proof
vest. 	Id. 	Additionally, 	the 	defendant’s 	girlfriend 	deceived
officers 	as 	to 	the 	location 	of 	the 	defendant’s 	car, 	possibly 	to
give 	the 	defendant 	and 	his 	associates 	time 	to 	escape, 	hide, 	and
prepare 	an 	ambush. 	Id. 	Finally, 	when 	officers 	called 	out 	the
defendant’s 	name, 	his 	response 	made 	officers 	believe 	he 	and 	his
associates were attempting to escape or incite an ambush. 	Id. at
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118-19. 	Those 	circumstances, 	the 	court 	held, 	gave 	the 	officers
reasonable suspicion to conduct a protective sweep.1 Id. at 119
Here, unlike in Lawlor and Winston, the government failed to
meet its burden of showing it was entitled to conduct a protective
sweep. 	The government argues the sweep was justified based on the
ATF’s knowledge that Defendant had a history of gang violence, was
part 	of 	a 	gang 	feud, 	was 	involved 	in 	the 	drug 	trade, 	and 	had 	a
prior 	conviction 	for 	unlawfully 	carrying 	a 	firearm. 	Opp’n. 	13-
14. 	Further, the government emphasizes the officers executed the
initial 	search 	warrant 	because 	of 	Defendant’s 	alleged 	role 	in 	a
suspected gang violence incident, so the government had reason to
believe Defendant was a dangerous person and associated with other
dangerous people. 	See id. at 13, 13 n.5.
The 	officer’s 	above-described 	knowledge 	in 	conjunction 	with
what 	transpired 	on 	May 	31 	did 	not 	give 	officers 	reasonable
suspicion 	that 	they 	were 	in 	danger 	such 	that 	a 	protective 	sweep
was 	warranted. 	It 	is 	true 	that, 	when 	the 	officers 	executed 	the
1 A 	similar 	set 	of 	circumstances 	established 	reasonable
suspicion 	to 	conduct 	a 	protective 	sweep. 	In 	United 	States 	v.
Martins, 	the 	First 	Circuit 	stated 	that, 	taken 	together, 	the
following set of facts were sufficient for the officers to conduct
a warrantless sweep in the name of officer safety: “the high-crime
area, 	the 	shootings, 	their 	connection 	with 	the 	apartment, 	the
officer’s 	experience 	and 	knowledge 	anent 	gang 	behavior, 	the
evasive 	action 	of 	the 	adult 	known 	to 	be 	present 	behind 	the 	door,
and the seeming attempt to misinform.” 	413 F.3d 139, 150-51 (1st
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1011 (2005), abrogated on other
grounds by Hill v. Walsh, 884 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 2018).
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search 	warrant, 	they 	reasonably 	believed 	drugs 	were 	inside 	the
apartment. 	See 	id. 	at 	14. 	And 	the 	officers 	were 	not 	familiar
with Apartment 1 or how the multi-family residence was structured,
and did not know whether there was anyone else in the apartment or
if anyone could access the apartment. 	Id. at 14-15. 	But ATF had
been 	surveilling 	the 	apartment 	since 	April 	20, 	2023, 	and 	made 	no
assertion 	that 	they 	observed 	anyone 	other 	than 	Defendant 	and 	his
girlfriend 	enter 	the 	apartment. 	See 	GXA 	¶¶ 	10-11. 	At 	the 	same
time, 	officers 	had 	access 	to 	windows 	they 	believed 	(and 	later
confirmed) were associated with Apartment 1. 	Opp’n.at 4.
Taken 	together, 	unlike 	the 	officers 	in 	Lawlor 	and 	Winston,
the 	officers 	here 	did 	not 	have 	reasonable 	suspicion 	to 	believe 	a
person 	in 	the 	apartment 	posed 	a 	danger 	to 	them. 	There 	was 	no
evidence 	of 	violence 	at 	or 	near 	991 	Lonsdale 	Avenue, 	no
particularized reason to believe Defendant’s girlfriend or anyone
else was armed and dangerous, and no particularized evidence that
anyone was in the residence. 	See Delgado-Perez, 867 F.3d at 253.
A “[l]ack of information cannot provide an articulable basis upon
which to justify a protective sweep.” 	Id. at 256 (quoting United
States 	v. 	Colbert, 	76 	F.3d 	773, 	778 	(6th 	Cir. 	1996)); 	see 	also
United 	States 	v. 	Carter, 	360 	F.3d 	1235, 	1242-43 	(10th 	Cir. 	2004)
(“Of 	course, 	there 	could 	always 	be 	a 	dangerous 	person 	concealed
within 	a 	structure[,] 	. 	. 	. 	that 	in 	itself 	cannot 	justify 	a
protective sweep, unless such sweeps are simply to be permitted as
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a matter of course, a result hardly indicated by the Supreme Court
in 	Buie.”). 	Moreover, 	the 	general 	relationship 	between 	firearms
and 	drug 	trafficking 	is 	insufficient, 	on 	its 	own, 	to 	demonstrate
a 	danger 	to 	officers. 	See 	Delgado-Perez 	at 	254. 	Unlike 	the
defendant 	in 	Winston, 	although 	Defendant 	here 	had 	an 	alleged
history 	of 	being 	dishonest 	and 	told 	officers 	he 	did 	not 	live 	in
Apartment 1, GXA ¶ 6; Ventetuolo Aff. ¶ 10, there was no evidence
to give officers a reasonable belief Defendant was using deception
to endanger them, see Winston, 44 F.3d at 117.
Because officers subjected Defendant to a warrantless search,
and the government has failed to meet its burden of showing there
was 	reasonable 	suspicion 	for 	a 	protective 	sweep, 	the 	Court
concludes that the protective sweep was unlawful.2
B. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
As a result of the unlawful protective sweep, Defendant argues
the ammunition seized pursuant to the warrant should be suppressed
because it is fruit of the poisonous tree. 	The government argues
that, 	even 	if 	the 	protective 	sweep 	was 	legally 	defective, 	the
evidence 	should 	nonetheless 	be 	admitted 	under 	the 	inevitable
discovery3 and independent sources doctrines.
2 Because the Court has concluded the officers did not have a
sufficient basis to conduct its initial search, the Court need not
decide whether the sweep was more than cursory.
3 The “inevitable discovery doctrine” allows the admission of
unlawfully 	obtained 	evidence 	where 	the 	“evidence 	. 	. 	. 	‘would
inevitably 	have 	been 	discovered 	without 	reference 	to 	the 	police
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The 	Fourth 	Amendment 	not 	only 	requires 	the 	suppression 	of
evidence 	seized 	during 	an 	unlawful 	search 	“but 	also 	of 	evidence
‘that is the product of the primary evidence, or that is otherwise
acquired 	as 	an 	indirect 	result 	of 	the 	unlawful 	search.’” 	United
States v. Dent, 867 F.3d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Murray v.
United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536–37 (1988)). 	One exception to the
exclusionary 	rule 	is 	the 	“independent 	source 	doctrine” 	which
allows the admission of “evidence acquired by an untainted search
which is identical to . . . evidence unlawfully acquired.” 	Murray,
487 	U.S. 	at 	538 	(emphasis 	omitted). 	Accordingly, 	“[w]hether 	the
initial 	entry 	[into 	a 	home] 	was 	illegal 	or 	not 	is 	irrelevant 	to
the admissibility of the challenged evidence” where “there was an
independent 	source 	for 	the 	warrant 	under 	which 	that 	evidence 	was
seized.” 	Segura 	v. 	United 	States, 	468 	U.S. 	796, 	813–14 	(1984)
(plurality opinion).
To 	determine 	if 	the 	exception 	applies, 	the 	Court 	must
determine “first, whether the decision to seek a warrant was made
error 	or 	misconduct[.]’” 	United 	States 	v. 	Hughes, 	640 	F.3d 	428,
440 	(1st 	Cir. 	2011) 	(quoting 	Nix 	v. 	Williams, 	467 	U.S. 	431, 	448
(1984)). 	“Such evidence is admissible ‘so long as (i) the lawful
means of its discovery are independent and would necessarily have
been employed, (ii) discovery by that means is in fact inevitable,
and 	(iii) 	application 	of 	the 	doctrine 	in 	a 	particular 	case 	will
not sully the prophylaxis of the Fourth Amendment.’” 	Id. (quoting
United 	States 	v. 	Zapata, 	18 	F.3d 	971, 	978 	(1st 	Cir. 	1994)).
Because the Court holds the government established that there was
an independent source for the search warrant for Apartment 1, the
Court 	need 	not 	decide 	whether 	the 	inevitable 	discovery 	doctrine
applies here.
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independently of what was discovered during the illegal entry, and
second, 	whether 	the 	affidavit 	contains 	a 	sufficient 	basis 	for
probable 	cause 	when 	stripped 	of 	illegally 	obtained 	material.”
United States v. Ramos, No. 18-092-JJM-PAS, 2019 WL 3037586, at *5
(D.R.I. 	July 	11, 	2019) 	(citing 	United 	States 	v. 	Flores, 	888 	F.3d
537, 	546 	(1st 	Cir. 	2018)); 	see 	also 	United 	States 	v. 	Dessesaure,
429 F.3d 359, 367 (1st Cir. 2005).
Here, 	as 	to 	the 	first 	inquiry, 	the 	evidence 	suggests 	the
officers on the scene made an independent judgment to seek a search
warrant 	of 	Apartment 	1 	before 	the 	officers 	identified 	the 	crack
cocaine during the protective sweep. 	In his affidavit, Ventetuolo
describes 	how 	the 	purpose 	of 	the 	initial 	entrance 	into 	Apartment
1 	was 	“[t]o 	prevent 	the 	destruction 	of 	evidence 	and 	preserve 	the
integrity of the SUBJECT PREMISES while we sought a search warrant
. . . .” GXA ¶ 14 (emphasis added); see also Ventetuolo Aff. ¶ 11.
The sworn statement of Venteteuolo reflects the officers’ primary
concern 	of 	preserving 	the 	evidence 	inside 	the 	apartment 	(rather
than 	to 	mitigate 	any 	perceived 	danger, 	see 	supra 	pp. 	8-10).
Moreover, 	after 	the 	officers 	completed 	their 	sweep 	in 	less 	than
one 	minute, 	an 	officer 	stood 	by 	the 	front 	door 	to 	secure 	the
apartment 	while 	the 	officers 	prepared 	a 	warrant. 	GXB 	¶ 	10; 	see
Flores, 888 F.3d 537 at 546-47.
Additionally, 	Ventetuolo’s 	affidavit 	contains 	a 	sufficient
basis 	for 	probable 	cause 	even 	without 	mentioning 	the 	presence 	of
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crack cocaine. 	Before the execution of the warrant to search and
seize 	Defendant, 	officers 	had 	been 	surveilling 	Defendant 	and
determined 	he 	regularly 	stayed 	overnight 	in 	Apartment 	1. 	GXA 	¶
11. 	Prior 	to 	the 	search, 	Ventetuolo 	received 	information 	from 	a
confidential 	source 	that 	Defendant 	was 	one 	of 	several 	members 	of
the 	East 	Side 	gang 	and 	was 	involved 	in 	the 	distribution 	of
fentanyl, crack cocaine, and marijuana. 	Id. ¶ 15. 	After officers
searched 	and 	seized 	Defendant 	pursuant 	to 	the 	initial 	warrant,
officers 	found 	marijuana 	in 	different 	quantities 	and 	bundles 	of
money 	in 	Defendant’s 	backpack. 	Id. 	¶ 	12. 	Upon 	being 	arrested,
Defendant admitted to the officers that there was marijuana in the
apartment. 	Id. 	¶ 	13. 	Thus, 	even 	without 	mentioning 	in 	the
affidavit in support of the search warrant that officers observed
“a 	small 	bag 	with 	white 	powder, 	similar 	in 	appearance 	to 	crack
cocaine,” id. ¶ 14, the above evidence gave officers an independent
basis to establish probable cause to search Apartment 1 where they
reasonably believed Defendant had been living.
Based 	on 	the 	independent 	source 	doctrine, 	the 	ammunition
seized 	is 	not 	fruit 	of 	the 	poisonous 	tree, 	and 	thus 	it 	is
admissible evidence.
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III. Conclusion
For 	the 	reasons 	above, 	Defendant’s 	Motion 	to 	Suppress, 	ECF
No. 32, is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
William E. Smith
District Judge
Date: September 25, 2023
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