Davis v. Coyne-Fague

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
JOSHUA DAVIS, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	C.A. No. 21-315 WES
)
PATRICIA A. COYNE-FAGUE, Former 	)
Director of Rhode Island 	)
Department of Corrections, 	)
)
Respondent. 	)
___________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, District Judge.
Before 	the 	Court 	is 	Petitioner 	Joshua 	Davis’s 	Amended
Petition 	Under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2254 	for 	Writ 	of 	Habeas 	Corpus 	by 	a
Person 	in 	State 	Custody, 	ECF 	No. 	17 	(“Amended 	Petition”).
Respondent 	Patricia 	A. 	Coyne-Fague, 	former 	Director 	of 	Rhode
Island 	Department 	of 	Corrections,1 	filed 	an 	Answer 	in 	Opposition
to 	Amended 	Petition 	for 	Writ 	of 	Habeas 	Corpus, 	ECF 	No. 	20
(“Answer”). 	Davis 	replied 	to 	the 	Answer, 	ECF 	No. 	24 	(“Reply”).2
The 	Court 	has 	determined 	that 	no 	hearing 	is 	necessary. 	For 	the
following reasons, the Amended Petition is DENIED.
1 Wayne T. Salisbury, Jr. currently serves as the acting
director of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections.
2 Davis characterizes his Reply as a “Traverse.”
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I. 	BACKGROUND
On April 17, 2008, in Rhode Island Superior Court, Petitioner
Joshua 	Davis 	pleaded 	guilty 	to 	first-degree 	murder, 	first-degree
child 	molestation, 	and 	kidnapping 	of 	a 	minor. 	Am. 	Pet. 	¶¶ 	1-2;
see State v. Davis, No. P1-2006-2796A (R.I. Super. Ct.). 	On June
25, 	2008, 	Davis 	was 	sentenced 	to 	life 	without 	parole 	for 	first-
degree 	murder 	and 	consecutive 	life 	sentences 	for 	first-degree
child molestation and kidnapping of a minor. 	Am. Pet. ¶ 4. 	Davis
filed 	an 	appeal 	but 	then 	withdrew 	it. 	Answer 	2-3; 	see 	State 	v.
Davis, No. SU-09-0049 (R.I. Sup. Ct.).
On August 18, 2010, Davis applied pro se for post-conviction
relief 	(“PCR”). 	Am. 	Pet. 	¶ 	5. 	The 	Rhode 	Island 	Superior 	Court
appointed 	Davis 	an 	attorney. 	Id. 	¶ 	6. 	The 	attorney 	withdrew
shortly after his appointment, requiring Davis to proceed pro se.
Id. 	¶¶ 	6-7. 	The 	Rhode 	Island 	Superior 	Court 	denied 	his 	PCR
application. 	Id. ¶ 7.
Davis 	appealed 	that 	decision 	to 	the 	Rhode 	Island 	Supreme
Court, 	which 	remanded 	“with 	instructions 	to 	appoint 	new 	counsel
and 	conduct 	an 	evidentiary 	review 	of 	the 	application.” 	Id. 	¶ 	8;
see 	Davis 	v. 	State, 	124 	A.3d 	428, 	429 	(R.I. 	2015) 	(mem.)
(explaining that “an evidentiary hearing is required in the first
application 	for 	postconviction 	relief 	in 	all 	cases 	involving
applicants 	sentenced 	to 	life 	without 	the 	possibility 	of 	parole”
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(quoting 	Tassone 	v. 	State, 	42 	A.3d 	1277, 	1287 	(R.I. 	2012)). 	The
Rhode Island Superior Court appointed new counsel. 	Am. Pet. ¶ 9.
Davis then filed an amended PCR application, claiming that he was
incompetent 	at 	the 	time 	of 	the 	plea 	and 	his 	attorneys 	were
ineffective 	because 	they 	failed 	to 	raise 	the 	competency 	issue.
Id. 	¶ 	10; 	Answer 	3. 	Later, 	he 	again 	amended 	his 	PCR 	application
to 	add 	that 	his 	plea 	was 	not 	knowing, 	voluntary, 	and 	intelligent
because the court failed to inform him of sex offender registration
requirements 	and 	his 	attorneys 	were 	ineffective 	for 	failing 	to
inform him of the same. 	Am. Pet. ¶ 10; Answer 3-4.
The Rhode Island Superior Court held evidentiary hearings for
the first amended PCR application on November 15 and 27, 2018, and
for the second amended PCR application on July 10, 2019. 	Am. Pet.
¶ 	9; 	Answer 	3-4. 	Davis 	presented 	Dr. 	Wade 	Myers 	as 	an 	expert
witness, 	who 	issued 	a 	forensic 	psychiatric 	report, 	to 	argue 	that
“a 	combination 	of 	Mr. 	Davis’[s] 	psychotropic 	medication 	and
delusional 	thinking 	prevented 	him 	from 	entering 	a 	knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent plea.” 	Am. Pet. ¶ 9.
A few months later, the court denied Davis’s PCR application
as 	to 	the 	murder 	and 	kidnapping 	convictions 	but 	granted 	it 	as 	to
the 	child 	molestation 	conviction. 	Id. 	¶ 	11; 	Answer 	4; 	see 	Davis
v. State, No. PM-2010-4824, 2019 WL 5396138 (R.I. Super. Ct. Oct.
16, 2019). 	The State moved for reconsideration, and, after another
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hearing, the court reversed its original decision as to the child
molestation 	conviction, 	therefore 	denying 	the 	PCR 	application 	on
all grounds. 	Am. Pet. ¶¶ 12-13; Answer 4; see Davis v. State, No.
PM-2010-4824, 	2020 	WL 	2617242 	(R.I. 	Super. 	Ct. 	May 	18, 	2020).
Davis 	sought 	a 	writ 	of 	certiorari 	to 	the 	Rhode 	Island 	Supreme
Court, 	which 	was 	denied. 	Am. 	Pet. 	¶ 	14; 	Answer 	4; 	see 	Davis 	v.
State, No. SU-2020-0186-MP (R.I. Sup. Ct.).
Davis filed his first Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with
this 	Court 	on 	August 	2, 	2021. 	Pet., 	ECF 	No. 	1. 	Davis 	filed 	an
Amended 	Petition 	on 	May 	15, 	2023, 	claiming 	that 	he 	(1) 	did 	not
plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently (“Ground One”); and
(2) 	received 	ineffective 	assistance 	of 	counsel 	(“Ground 	Two”).
Am. Pet. 6-7.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Under 	the 	Antiterrorism 	and 	Effective 	Death 	Penalty 	Act 	of
1996 	(“AEDPA”), 	federal 	courts 	are 	authorized 	to 	grant 	writs 	of
habeas corpus for state prisoners held in violation of federal law
or the United States Constitution. 	28 U.S.C. § 2254; see Ferrell
v. Wall, 935 F. Supp. 2d 422, 425 (D.R.I. 2013). 	AEDPA restricts
federal courts’ review of state court convictions and sentences to
prevent 	federal 	courts 	from 	becoming 	“vehicles 	for 	relitigating
state trials.” 	Sanna v. DiPaolo, 265 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2001).
The purpose of habeas corpus relief is to protect against “extreme
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malfunctions” 	in 	a 	state’s 	criminal 	justice 	system, 	“not 	[to 	be]
a 	substitute 	for 	ordinary 	error 	correction 	through 	appeal.”
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011) (quoting Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment)).
To succeed on a habeas petition, a petitioner must show that
his 	claim 	“was 	adjudicated 	on 	the 	merits” 	and 	such 	adjudication
was (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law;” or (2) “based on an unreasonable
determination 	of 	the 	facts 	in 	light 	of 	the 	evidence 	presented 	in
the State court proceeding.” 	28 U.S.C § 2254(d).
Under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2254(d)(1), 	a 	state 	court 	decision 	is
“contrary 	to” 	clearly 	established 	federal 	law 	if 	it 	reaches 	a
conclusion 	“opposite” 	to 	that 	of 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	on 	a 	legal
question or reaches a different result as the Supreme Court “on a
set 	of 	materially 	indistinguishable 	facts.” 	Williams 	v. 	Taylor,
529 	U.S. 	362, 	412-13 	(2000). 	A 	state 	court’s 	application 	of
Supreme 	Court 	precedent 	is 	“unreasonable” 	if 	it 	“identifies 	the
correct 	governing 	legal 	rule” 	but 	applies 	that 	rule 	unreasonably
to 	the 	facts, 	such 	that 	“there 	could 	be 	no 	‘fairminded
disagreement’ 	on 	the 	question.” 	White 	v. 	Woodall, 	572 	U.S. 	415,
425, 	427 	(2014) 	(first 	quoting 	Williams, 	529 	U.S. 	at 	407-08, 	and
then quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103).
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Under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2254(d)(2), 	the 	unreasonableness 	standard
may 	be 	satisfied 	where 	the 	state 	court 	decision 	is 	“devoid 	of
record 	support 	for 	its 	conclusion 	or 	is 	arbitrary.” 	McCambridge
v. Hall, 303 F.3d 24, 37 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing O’Brien v. Dubois,
145 	F.3d 	16, 	25 	(1st 	Cir. 	1998)). 	A 	federal 	court 	“may 	not
characterize 	. 	. 	. 	state-court 	factual 	determinations 	as
unreasonable 	‘merely 	because 	[it] 	would 	have 	reached 	a 	different
conclusion 	in 	the 	first 	instance.’” 	Brumfield 	v. 	Cain, 	576 	U.S.
305, 	313-14 	(2015) 	(quoting 	Wood 	v. 	Allen, 	558 	U.S. 	290, 	301
(2010)). 	Rather, 	there 	is 	“substantial 	deference” 	to 	the 	state
trial court’s factual findings. 	Id. at 314; see also 28 U.S.C. §
2254(e)(1) (“[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State
court 	shall 	be 	presumed 	to 	be 	correct. 	The 	applicant 	shall 	have
the 	burden 	of 	rebutting 	the 	presumption 	of 	correctness 	by 	clear
and convincing evidence.”).
For 	evidence 	in 	habeas 	cases, 	federal 	courts’ 	consideration
is 	generally 	limited 	to 	the 	record 	presented 	before 	the 	state
court. 	Shoop 	v. 	Twyford, 	596 	U.S. 	811, 	812 	(2022). 	Courts 	may
admit new evidence in “two quite limited situations”: “Either the
claim 	must 	rely 	on 	a 	‘new’ 	and 	‘previously 	unavailable’ 	‘rule 	of
constitutional 	law’ 	made 	retroactively 	applicable 	. 	. 	. 	, 	or 	it
must 	rely 	on 	‘a 	factual 	predicate 	that 	could 	not 	have 	been
previously 	discovered 	through 	the 	exercise 	of 	due 	diligence.’”
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Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)). 	“And even if a prisoner
can 	satisfy 	one 	of 	those 	two 	exceptions, 	he 	must 	also 	show 	that
the 	desired 	evidence 	would 	demonstrate, 	‘by 	clear 	and 	convincing
evidence,’ 	that 	‘no 	reasonable 	factfinder’ 	would 	have 	convicted
him of the charged crime.” 	Id. (quoting § 2254(e)(2)(B)).
III. DISCUSSION
For 	Ground 	One 	– 	incompetent 	and 	involuntary 	plea 	- 	Davis
argues he is entitled to habeas relief for three reasons: (1) the
plea 	colloquy 	did 	not 	adequately 	evaluate 	Davis’s 	competency 	at
the 	time 	of 	the 	plea; 	(2) 	the 	evidence 	was 	insufficient 	to
establish 	Davis’s 	mental 	state 	at 	the 	time 	of 	the 	plea; 	and 	(3)
Dr. 	Myers 	did 	not 	err 	in 	concluding 	that 	“a 	combination 	of 	Mr.
Davis’[s] 	psychotropic 	medication 	and 	delusional 	thinking
prevented him from entering a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
plea.” 	See Am. Pet. 6. 	For Ground Two, he argues his counsel was
ineffective. 	Id. at 7.
In her Answer, Coyne-Fague indicates that “[i]t is not clear
that 	Davis 	exhausted 	his 	state 	court 	remedies.” 	Answer 	6.
Specifically, 	for 	Ground 	One, 	although 	Davis 	challenged 	the
voluntariness 	of 	his 	plea 	in 	his 	amended 	PCR 	application, 	“when
Davis filed a memorandum in support of his certiorari petition on
October 	29, 	2020, 	the 	only 	issue 	that 	he 	addressed 	was 	the
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” 	Id. 	Further, she argues
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Davis 	is 	not 	entitled 	to 	habeas 	relief 	because 	he 	applies 	the
incorrect standard – specifically, he states that the Rhode Island
Superior Court “erred” in making its findings, but “habeas review
is not de novo review.” 	Id. at 8.
The Court reviews each issue in turn, including Davis’s Reply
to the Answer.
A. 	Exhaustion
“[A] 	federal 	court 	will 	not 	entertain 	an 	application 	for
habeas relief unless the petitioner first has fully exhausted his
state remedies in respect to each and every claim contained within
the application.” 	Adelson v. DiPaola, 131 F.3d 259, 261 (1st Cir.
1997). 	Courts 	enforce 	the 	exhaustion 	requirement 	“consistently
and 	rigorously.” 	Id. 	at 	262. 	To 	satisfy 	the 	exhaustion
requirement, a “petitioner must demonstrate that he tendered each
claim 	[to 	the 	state 	court] 	‘in 	such 	a 	way 	as 	to 	make 	it 	probable
that a reasonable jurist would have been alerted to the existence
of the federal question.’” 	Id. (quoting Scarpa v. Dubois, 38 F.3d
1, 	6 	(1st 	Cir. 	1994)). 	“To 	do 	so, 	the 	petitioner 	must 	present
both 	the 	facts 	and 	legal 	theory 	underlying 	his 	federal 	claim 	to
the state court.” 	Sullivan v. Saba, 840 F. Supp. 2d 429, 434 (D.
Mass. 2012) (citing Gagne v. Fair, 835 F.2d 6, 7 (1st Cir. 1987)).
Presenting 	the 	legal 	theory 	can 	mean 	“reliance 	on 	a 	specific
provision 	of 	the 	Constitution, 	substantive 	and 	conspicuous
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presentation of a federal constitutional claim, on-point citation
to 	federal 	constitutional 	precedents, 	identification 	of 	a
particular right specifically guaranteed by the Constitution, and
assertion 	of 	a 	state-law 	claim 	that 	is 	functionally 	identical 	to
a federal constitutional claim.” 	Coningford v. Rhode Island, 640
F.3d 478, 482 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Scarpa, 38 F.3d at 6).
In his Reply, Davis asserts that he exhausted his Ground One
claim 	because 	the 	competency 	issue 	“was 	fully 	integrated 	in 	the
Superior Court decision” and “the Petition for Writ of Certiorari
[“Certiorari Petition”] . . . explicitly state[d] the grounds upon
which the Superior Court’s decision was taken.” 	Reply 2. 	He also
argues 	that 	his 	Memorandum 	supporting 	the 	Certiorari 	Petition
(“Supporting 	Memorandum”) 	“did 	raise 	the 	Plea’s 	analysis 	as
grounds.” 	Id. at 3.
Reviewing 	Davis’s 	Certiorari 	Petition 	and 	Supporting
Memorandum, 	the 	Court 	finds 	Davis 	exhausted 	his 	state 	court
remedies as to Ground One. 	Although Davis did not lay out a legal
framework 	for 	his 	Ground 	One 	claim, 	he 	clearly 	referred 	to 	the
issues of competency and voluntariness of his plea, which suffices
as 	“identification 	of 	a 	particular 	right 	specifically 	guaranteed
by the Constitution.” 	Coningford, 640 F.3d at 482; see Indiana v.
Edwards, 	554 	U.S. 	164, 	169-70 	(2008) 	(outlining 	the 	competency
standard); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (describing
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the voluntariness requirement for pleas); Cert. Pet. ¶ 14, ECF No.
6-3; Supp. Mem. 4, 14-15, ECF No. 6-4. 	The Court also notes that
consideration 	of 	competency 	and 	voluntariness 	is 	“functionally
identical” 	under 	federal 	and 	Rhode 	Island 	law. 	Coningford, 	640
F.3d at 482; see State v. Figueroa, 639 A.2d 495, 498 (R.I. 1994)
(citing 	Boykin, 	395 	U.S. 	at 	243). 	Ultimately, 	it 	is 	likely 	that
a 	reasonable 	jurist 	would 	have 	been 	alerted 	to 	the 	federal
question. 	Adelson, 131 F.3d at 262. 	Thus, the Court proceeds to
the merits of Davis’s Amended Petition.
B. 	Plea Colloquy and Competency
“A 	criminal 	defendant 	may 	not 	. 	. 	. 	plead 	guilty 	unless 	he
does 	so 	‘competently 	and 	intelligently.’” 	Godinez 	v. 	Moran, 	509
U.S. 389, 396-99 (1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
468 	(1938)). 	A 	defendant 	is 	competent 	to 	plead 	guilty 	or 	stand
trial 	if 	he 	“has 	‘sufficient 	present 	ability 	to 	consult 	with 	his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding’ and has
‘a 	rational 	as 	well 	as 	factual 	understanding 	of 	the 	proceedings
against him.’” 	Id. (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402,
402 (1960) (per curiam)).
In 	addition 	to 	determining 	competency 	to 	plead 	guilty, 	“a
trial 	court 	must 	satisfy 	itself 	that 	the 	waiver 	of 	[the
defendant’s] constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary.” 	Id.
at 400 (citing Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28-29 (1992)); see id.
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at 401 n.12 (noting that competency is the “ability to understand
the proceedings” while “the ‘knowing and voluntary’ inquiry . . .
is to determine whether the defendant actually does understand the
significance and consequences of a particular decision and whether
the 	decision 	is 	uncoerced” 	(emphasis 	in 	original)). 	When 	a
defendant 	pleads 	guilty, 	he 	waives 	“three 	fundamental
constitutional 	rights: 	the 	right 	to 	a 	jury 	trial; 	the 	right 	to
confront 	one’s 	accusers; 	and 	the 	privilege 	against 	self-
incrimination.” 	Restucci 	v. 	Spencer, 	249 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	33, 	42-43
(D. 	Mass. 	2003) 	(citing 	Boykin, 	395 	U.S. 	at 	243). 	Thus, 	“if 	a
defendant’s 	guilty 	plea 	is 	not 	equally 	voluntary 	and 	knowing, 	it
has 	been 	obtained 	in 	violation 	of 	due 	process 	and 	is 	therefore
void.” 	McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). 	“The
question 	is 	‘whether 	the 	plea 	represents 	a 	voluntary 	and
intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to
the 	defendant.’” 	Restucci, 	249 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	at 	43 	(quoting 	North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)).
In 	determining 	whether 	a 	plea 	was 	voluntary, 	the 	reviewing
court 	looks 	for 	an 	“affirmative 	showing” 	of 	voluntariness 	in 	the
trial 	court 	record 	based 	on 	“the 	totality 	of 	the 	circumstances
surrounding 	the 	plea.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Ward, 	518 	F.3d 	75, 	81,
83-84 	(1st 	Cir. 	2008) 	(citing 	Brady 	v. 	United 	States, 	397 	U.S.
742, 	749 	(1970)). 	Such 	an 	affirmative 	showing 	need 	not 	follow 	a
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“specific 	script.” 	Id. 	at 	86 	(“Although 	compliance 	with 	a 	state
version of [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 11 in a state plea
proceeding 	will 	almost 	surely 	constitute 	such 	an 	affirmative
showing, Boykin does not constitutionalize Rule 11 for state plea
proceedings.” (citation omitted)).
Davis 	argues 	that 	the 	plea 	colloquy 	did 	not 	adequately
evaluate his competency at the time of his guilty plea. 	Am. Pet.
6. 	The 	first 	post-remand 	PCR 	decision 	(hereinafter 	“Decision”)
was 	issued 	by 	Judge 	Susan 	McGuirl 	of 	the 	Rhode 	Island 	Superior
Court, wherein she reviewed the plea proceedings before then-Judge
Gilbert 	Indeglia. 	See 	id. 	at 	1, 	4; 	see 	generally 	Davis, 	2019 	WL
5396138.
In 	the 	Decision, 	Judge 	McGuirl 	noted 	that 	Judge 	Indeglia
“questioned 	Petitioner 	thoroughly 	before 	accepting 	his 	plea 	as
knowing 	and 	voluntary.” 	Davis, 	2019 	WL 	5396138, 	at 	*3-4. 	She
emphasized how, during the plea proceedings, Davis’s counsel, John
Hardiman, 	said 	he 	was 	satisfied 	that 	Davis 	was 	competent 	to
understand 	the 	rights 	he 	was 	giving 	up, 	based 	on 	several
“extensive[]” discussions. 	Id. at *3. 	Hardiman confirmed that he
explained the possible penalties to Davis, and then Judge Indeglia
received 	Davis’s 	confirmation 	that, 	based 	on 	those 	possible
penalties, he still wished to proceed with the plea. 	Id. 	“Next,
the trial justice reviewed the possible sentences which Petitioner
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may 	receive, 	including 	the 	possibility 	of 	life 	without 	parole,
which the Petitioner then acknowledged.” 	Id.
Of note, Judge Indeglia “established that the Petitioner had
his GED, could read and write, and was not under the influence of
alcohol 	or 	drugs 	at 	the 	time 	of 	the 	plea.” 	Id. 	Davis 	contended
that 	Judge 	Indeglia 	failed 	to 	specify 	that 	“drugs” 	also 	included
“medications,” 	and 	such 	failure 	“affected 	his 	ability 	to 	make 	a
knowing 	and 	voluntary 	plea.” 	Id. 	at 	*4. 	On 	this 	point, 	Judge
McGuirl noted, “the record is silent as to any indication or notice
to the trial justice that the Petitioner was taking medication at
the 	time 	of 	his 	plea; 	therefore, 	no 	duty 	can 	be 	imposed 	on 	the
trial 	justice 	to 	question 	dosage 	and 	effect,” 	as 	held 	in 	United
States 	v. 	Parra-Ibanez, 	936 	F.2d 	588, 	595-96 	(1st 	Cir. 	1991).
Davis, 	2019 	WL 	5396138, 	at 	*5. 	Judge 	McGuirl 	noted 	that 	Davis
“failed to raise the issue of any medications he was taking” during
the plea hearing or sentencing hearing and “remained consistent in
his remorse and indicated that his guilty plea was entered to ‘help
[the 	victim’s 	family] 	find 	some 	closure.’” 	Id. 	(alteration 	in
original).
Ultimately, 	Judge 	McGuirl 	determined 	that 	Judge 	Indeglia’s
colloquy adequately evaluated that Davis was competent to plea and
that his plea was knowing and voluntary. 	Id. at *4-5. 	Though she
primarily 	invoked 	state 	law, 	that 	law 	more 	than 	adequately 	meets
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the 	federal 	criteria 	because, 	for 	competency, 	it 	requires, 	inter
alia, that the defendant has capacity to understand the nature of
the charges and the “purpose and object of the trial proceedings,”
as 	well 	as 	the 	capacity 	“to 	assist 	reasonably 	and 	rationally 	his
counsel 	in 	preparing 	and 	putting 	forth 	a 	defense 	to 	the 	criminal
charges.” 	Id. 	at 	*2 	(quoting 	State 	v. 	Thomas, 	794 	A.2d 	990, 	994
(R.I. 2002)). 	And to ensure a plea is knowing and voluntary, “the
trial 	justice 	must 	speak 	with 	the 	defendant 	. 	. 	. 	to 	establish
that 	the 	defendant 	understood 	the 	nature 	of 	the 	charge 	and 	the
consequences 	of 	the 	plea” 	and 	to 	ensure 	“the 	plea 	is 	made
voluntarily.” 	Id. (first quoting Njie v. State, 156 A.3d 429, 434
(R.I. 2017), and then quoting Rhode Island Superior Court Rule of
Criminal 	Procedure 	11). 	Judge 	McGuirl’s 	application 	of 	these
principles 	reasonably 	complies 	with 	federal 	law.3 	Additionally,
presuming a correct factual basis without a rebuttal of clear and
convincing 	evidence 	from 	Davis, 	the 	Court 	finds 	Judge 	McGuirl
correctly 	applied 	Parra-Ibanez 	with 	respect 	to 	the 	medication
3 	Davis 	argues 	that 	Judge 	McGuirl 	“appl[ied] 	the 	competency
to stand trial standard without the more far-reaching requirements
of 	waiver 	of 	a 	constitutional 	right.” 	Reply 	8. 	However, 	Judge
McGuirl 	stated 	that 	“Petitioner 	acknowledged 	the 	rights 	he 	would
be 	giving 	up 	. 	. 	. 	from 	his 	decision 	to 	plead 	guilty.” 	Davis 	v.
State, No. PM-2010-4824, 2019 WL 5396138, at *4 (R.I. Super. Oct.
16, 2019). 	The Court finds this to be a reasonable application of
the 	federal 	standard 	regarding 	voluntariness 	of 	plea. 	McCarthy
v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
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issue. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Further, the record supports her determination that Davis was
competent, 	and 	his 	plea 	was 	voluntary, 	particularly 	with 	respect
to 	Davis’s 	direct 	engagements 	with 	the 	court 	and 	his 	attorney.
Davis, 2019 WL 5396138, at *4-5; see Ex. 2 Mem. Opp’n Pet. Issuance
Writ Cert., Apr. 17, 2008 Tr. 7-19, ECF No. 6-5. 	The Court finds
Judge McGuirl’s assessment of the plea colloquy aligns with federal
law 	and 	is 	reasonably 	based 	on 	the 	facts. 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2254(d).
Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	denies 	Davis’s 	Amended 	Petition 	on 	this
ground.
C. 	Evidence at Sentencing
Davis claims Judge McGuirl erred in finding that “the evidence
and 	findings 	by 	the 	state 	court 	. 	. 	. 	at 	the 	sentencing 	hearing
were sufficient to establish the mental state of the Petitioner at
the time of his plea.” 	Am. Pet. 6.
In Judge McGuirl’s Decision, she acknowledged that the record
available 	during 	the 	sentencing 	hearing 	indicated 	Davis’s
“ingestion 	of 	medication 	and 	possible 	mental 	health 	issues.”
Davis, 	2019 	WL 	5396138, 	at 	*5. 	She 	noted 	Judge 	Indeglia’s
observation 	that 	Davis’s 	“‘condition 	and 	behavior 	have 	improved
dramatically’ 	as 	a 	result 	of 	these 	medications.” 	Id. 	Judge
McGuirl 	further 	acknowledged 	that 	during 	the 	sentencing 	hearing,
Hardiman informed Judge Indeglia of Davis’s “psychiatric history,
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hospitalizations 	and 	attempted 	suicides,” 	and 	“sexual 	abuse 	as 	a
child.” 	Id. 	“Regardless of Attorney Hardiman’s representations,
[Davis] 	addressed 	the 	[c]ourt 	and 	again 	indicated 	his 	desire 	to
plead 	guilty 	in 	order 	to 	spare 	the 	victim’s 	family 	the 	trauma 	of
trial.” 	Id. 	“When presented with an opportunity to elaborate on
any 	mental 	illness 	or 	medication 	that 	may 	have 	clouded 	his
judgment, [Davis] remained silent in that respect, yet adamant in
his 	desire 	to 	plead 	to 	spare 	the 	victim’s 	family.” 	Id.
Ultimately, 	Judge 	McGuirl 	was 	“satisfied 	that 	the 	evidence 	and
findings . . . at the sentencing hearing shed[] light upon” Davis’s
mental state at the time of his plea. 	Id.
Factually, 	Judge 	McGuirl’s 	assessment 	is 	not 	“arbitrary” 	or
“devoid of record support.” 	McCambridge, 303 F.3d at 37; see Ex.
3 	Mem. 	Opp’n 	Pet. 	Issuance 	Writ 	Cert., 	June 	25, 	2008 	Tr. 	87-89,
91-95, 	ECF 	No. 	6-5. 	The 	Court 	finds 	Judge 	McGuirl’s 	assessment
aligns with federal law and is reasonably based on the facts. 	28
U.S.C. 	§ 	2254(d); 	see 	Parke, 	506 	U.S. 	at 	36 	(declining 	to 	apply
the 	sufficiency 	of 	evidence 	standard 	set 	out 	in 	Jackson 	v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), with respect to a guilty plea where
the facts were fairly supported by the record). 	Accordingly, the
Court denies Davis’s Amended Petition on this ground.
D. 	Expert Dr. Myers
Davis 	posits 	that 	Judge 	McGuirl 	erred 	in 	finding 	that 	Dr.
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Myers 	“erred 	in 	his 	conclusion 	that 	a 	combination 	of 	[Davis’s]
psychotropic medication and delusional thinking prevented him from
entering a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea either to the
offense conduct and the criteria for the imposition of Life without
the possibility of Parole.” 	Am. Pet. 6.
Judge 	McGuirl 	thoroughly 	reviewed 	Dr. 	Myers’s 	diagnoses 	of
Davis, 	as 	well 	as 	Dr. 	Myers’s 	resulting 	assessment 	that 	the
diagnoses prevented Davis from entering a knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent 	plea. 	Davis, 	2019 	WL 	5396138, 	at 	*6-7. 	She 	also
reviewed 	the 	observations 	of 	other 	clinicians, 	which 	she 	found
indicative 	that 	“[Davis] 	understood, 	accepted, 	and 	explained 	his
motivation 	for 	his 	plea.” 	Id. 	at 	*8. 	She 	acknowledged 	Davis’s
argument that his “magical thinking,” a symptom identified by Dr.
Myers, caused him to assume that he would receive a lesser sentence
if he pleaded guilty. 	Id. at *6-7. 	Judge McGuirl was not persuaded
by this argument because “the record is silent as to any promises
or indications that a plea bargain absent life without parole was
ever 	offered,” 	“Petitioner 	was 	repeatedly 	informed 	by 	his
attorneys that no deal or promises had been made which would lessen
the high probability that he may receive life without parole,” and
“Petitioner acknowledged in open Court at his plea hearing that no
promises had been made to him.” 	Id. at *7. 	Further, Judge McGuirl
noted that Dr. Myers relied on Davis’s self-reporting, rather than
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records, 	to 	assess 	alleged 	side 	effects 	of 	his 	medications. 	Id.
at *10. 	Ultimately, Judge McGuirl “place[d] greater weight on the
observations 	and 	diagnoses 	of 	medical 	professionals 	prior 	to,
contemporaneous 	with, 	and 	immediately 	following” 	Davis’s 	guilty
plea, as opposed to Dr. Myers’s, which was first presented for PCR
purposes. 	Id. at *10.
This 	Court 	cannot 	make 	a 	credibility 	judgment 	regarding 	Dr.
Myers’s 	assessment. 	Marshall 	v. 	Lonberger, 	459 	U.S. 	422, 	434
(1983) (“28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) gives federal habeas courts no license
to 	redetermine 	credibility 	of 	witnesses 	whose 	demeanor 	has 	been
observed by the state trial court, but not by them.”). 	The
Court 	finds 	Judge 	McGuirl’s 	consideration 	of 	Dr. 	Myers’s
assessment is reasonably based on the facts. 	28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	denies 	Davis’s 	Amended 	Petition 	on 	this
ground.
E. 	Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right
to 	effective 	assistance 	of 	counsel.” 	Lema 	v. 	United 	States, 	987
F.2d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 	668, 	687 	(1984)). 	However, 	“[t]he 	Constitution 	does 	not
guarantee 	a 	defendant 	a 	letter-perfect 	defense 	or 	a 	successful
defense; 	rather, 	the 	performance 	standard 	is 	that 	of 	reasonably
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effective 	assistance 	under 	the 	circumstances 	then 	obtaining.”
United States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302, 309-10 (1st Cir. 1991).
To 	succeed 	on 	an 	ineffective 	assistance 	of 	counsel 	claim, 	a
defendant must first show that “in light of all the circumstances,
[counsel’s] 	identified 	acts 	or 	omissions 	were 	outside 	the 	wide
range 	of 	professionally 	competent 	assistance” 	under 	the 	Sixth
Amendment. 	Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 	Second, a defendant must
show 	that 	counsel’s 	deficient 	performance 	caused 	him 	prejudice,
meaning that “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive [him]
of 	a 	fair 	trial, 	a 	trial 	whose 	result 	[was] 	reliable.” 	Id. 	at
687. 	A 	showing 	of 	prejudice 	requires 	a 	“reasonable 	probability
that, 	but 	for 	counsel’s 	unprofessional 	errors, 	the 	result 	of 	the
proceeding would have been different.” 	Id. at 694. 	In the context
of 	a 	guilty 	plea, 	for 	the 	prejudice 	factor, 	the 	defendant 	must
show 	there 	is 	“a 	reasonable 	probability 	that, 	but 	for 	counsel’s
errors, 	he 	would 	not 	have 	pleaded 	guilty 	and 	would 	have 	insisted
on going to trial.” 	Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
Davis alleges “Judge McGuirl erred in her holding that trial
counsel 	provided 	effective 	assistance 	of 	counsel, 	and 	that 	their
actions (or inactions) failed to raise to the level of prejudicing
Mr. Davis’ defense.” 	Am. Pet. 7.
In 	the 	state-level 	PCR 	proceedings, 	Davis 	argued 	his
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attorneys were ineffective because they:
(1) 	failed 	to 	question 	Petitioner’s 	competency 	or
request 	a 	competency 	evaluation 	prior 	to 	Petitioner’s
change 	of 	plea; 	(2) 	failed 	to 	advise 	the 	Court 	that
Petitioner 	was 	being 	prescribed 	anti-psychotic
medications at the time of the plea hearing; (3) failed
to 	raise 	the 	issue 	of 	the 	impact 	of 	the 	anti-psychotic
medications on Petitioner’s competency to plead guilty;
(4) 	failed 	to 	advise 	the 	Petitioner 	of 	required 	sex
offender 	registration; 	and 	(5) 	failed 	to 	advise 	the
Petitioner 	about 	the 	imposition 	of 	the 	community
supervision statute.
Davis, 	2019 	WL 	5396138, 	at 	*17. 	In 	addressing 	each 	of 	these
arguments, Judge McGuirl correctly applied the Strickland standard
on 	a 	reasonable 	interpretation 	of 	the 	facts. 	First, 	regarding 	a
competency 	evaluation, 	Judge 	McGuirl 	reviewed 	the 	numerous
meetings 	between 	Davis 	and 	his 	attorneys 	leading 	up 	to 	his 	plea
and, 	based 	on 	those 	interactions 	and 	“absent 	any 	evidence 	which
tends to indicate outward signs of an issue of competency,” found
that “trial counsel acted reasonably in not requesting a competency
evaluation.” 	Davis, 	2019 	WL 	5396138, 	at 	*20. 	Further, 	Judge
McGuirl found no prejudice because even if a competency evaluation
had 	been 	ordered, 	“this 	Court 	is 	confident 	that 	. 	. 	. 	the
Petitioner would be found competent to stand trial based upon the
record 	from 	that 	time.” 	Id. 	at 	*21 	(referring 	to 	Davis’s
statements 	confirming 	intent 	to 	plea 	against 	his 	attorneys’
advice, 	and 	the 	silence 	of 	the 	record 	“as 	to 	any 	outward
indications 	that 	could 	provide 	pause 	to 	multiple 	medical
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professionals, seasoned trial attorneys, and the trial justice”).
Second, 	regarding 	medications 	at 	the 	time 	of 	plea, 	Judge
McGuirl 	found 	Davis’s 	counsel 	acted 	reasonably 	by 	obtaining
Davis’s medical records in advance of his plea and sentencing and
proceeding 	in 	absence 	of 	any 	indication 	of 	side 	effects 	to 	the
medications. 	Id. 	As for prejudice, Judge McGuirl was “satisfied
there is not a reasonable probability that the Petitioner would be
found 	incompetent 	had 	the 	issue 	of 	the 	medications 	been 	raised
during 	the 	plea 	hearing” 	because 	“informing 	the 	Court 	that
Petitioner was on certain medications does not on its own indicate
that 	Petitioner 	would 	not 	be 	found 	competent 	had 	a 	hearing
occurred.” 	Id. at *22.
Third, 	regarding 	Davis’s 	competency 	to 	plead 	guilty, 	Judge
McGuirl 	found 	Davis’s 	counsel 	acted 	reasonably 	by, 	again,
obtaining 	and 	reviewing 	Davis’s 	medical 	records 	before 	the 	plea
and sentencing hearings. 	Judge McGuirl noted several observations
in 	those 	records 	indicative 	of 	competency. 	Id. 	at 	*22. 	She
explained,
the 	Court 	believes 	the 	fact 	that 	Petitioner 	was
prescribed Haldol only seven days prior to his change of
plea 	is 	of 	no 	moment 	after 	his 	continued 	assertions 	of
his desire to plead guilty “from day one,” which predates
the 	medication. 	The 	Court 	acknowledges 	that 	the
Petitioner 	was 	taking 	certain 	medications 	other 	than
Haldol 	during 	the 	pendency 	of 	the 	plea, 	but 	this 	fact
alone 	should 	not 	distort 	the 	views 	held 	by 	medical
professionals 	and 	veteran 	attorneys 	when 	no 	outward
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signs of competency issues were present.
Id. 	Further, Judge McGuirl found no prejudice. 	Id.
Fourth, 	regarding 	failure 	to 	advise 	as 	to 	sex 	offender
registration, Judge McGuirl found, “[e]ven assuming arguendo that
the 	imposition 	of 	sex 	offender 	registration 	is 	a 	direct
consequence, this Court is unpersuaded that Petitioner’s counsels’
failure 	to 	advise 	him 	of 	said 	requirement 	resulted 	in 	actual
prejudice under Strickland.” 	Id. at *23.
Finally, 	regarding 	failure 	to 	advise 	as 	to 	the 	community
supervision statute, Judge McGuirl found Davis’s counsel erred in
failing to inform Davis of such but that “Petitioner has failed to
demonstrate that but for his counsels’ ineffective representation,
he would not have entered a plea and proceeded to trial.” 	Id. at
*24.
The 	Court 	finds 	Judge 	McGuirl’s 	assessment 	as 	to 	all 	five
arguments regarding ineffective assistance of counsel aligns with
federal 	law 	and 	is 	reasonably 	based 	on 	the 	facts. 	28 	U.S.C 	§
2254(d), 	(e)(1). 	Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	denies 	Davis’s 	Amended
Petition on this ground.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Petitioner Joshua
Davis’s Amended Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas
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Corpus by a Person in State Custody, ECF No. 17.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
William E. Smith
District Judge
Date: February 8, 2024
RULING ON CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Pursuant 	to 	Rule 	11(a) 	of 	the 	Rules 	Governing 	Section 	2254
Cases in the United States District Courts, this Court hereby finds
that this case is not appropriate for the issuance of a certificate
of appealability (COA) because Davis failed to make a substantial
showing 	of 	the 	denial 	of 	a 	constitutional 	right 	as 	to 	any 	claim,
as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 	Davis is advised that any
motion to reconsider this ruling will not extend the time to file
a notice of appeal in this matter. 	See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases.
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