Alvarez-Feliz et al v. Gonzalez et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
LUISA ANNETTE ALVAREZ-FELIX in
representation of Joan Alberto
Zorrilla-Lora.
Petitioners
v.
REBECCA GONZÁLEZ RAMOS, Special Agent
in 	Charge 	of 	Homeland 	Security
Investigations in San Juan, GARRET J.
RIPA 	is 	Miami 	Field 	Office 	Director
for 	U.S. 	Immigration 	and 	Customs
Enforcement, 	overseen 	Puerto 	Rico’s
Immigration 	and 	Removal 	Operations,
ICE 	Office 	in 	GSA 	Guaynabo 	Detention
Facility; TODD LYONS 	in his official
capacity, 	Acting 	Director 	for 	U.S.
Immigration 	and 	Customs 	Enforcement;
KRISTI 	NOEM, 	Secretary 	of 	Homeland
Security; PAMELA BONDI, United States
Attorney General; W. STEPHEN MULDROW,
US District Attorney for the District
of 	Puerto 	Rico; 	ROBERTO 	VAQUERO
Director 	of 	Field 	Operations 	Customs
and 	Border 	Protection; 	all 	in 	their
official capacities.
Respondents
CIVIL NO. 26-1041 (RAM)
OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Joan Alberto Zorrilla-
Lora’s (“Petitioner” or “Mr. Zorrilla-Lora”) Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”). (Docket No. 1). Neither party nor
the Court are writing on a blank slate. The statutory construction
question that is at the crux of this case has been the subject of
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Civil No. 26-1041(RAM) 	2
myriad 	lawsuits 	throughout 	the 	nation 	and 	dutiful 	judges 	have
reached 	divergent 	answers.1 	Having 	parsed 	through 	the 	statutes,
the 	parties’ 	submissions, 	and 	the 	authorities 	cited 	therein, 	the
Court 	finds 	that 	the 	mandatory 	detention 	provision 	of 	8 	U.S.C. 	§
1225 applies and hereby DENIES the Petition.
I. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND2
Mr. Zorrilla-Lora is a national and citizen of the Dominican
Republic who entered Puerto Rico on approximately October 13, 2021
without 	undergoing 	proper 	admission 	procedures. 	(Docket 	No. 	1 	at
4). 	On 	August 	20, 	2022, 	he 	married 	Luisa 	Anette 	Alvarez-Feliz, 	a
United States citizen. Id. at 5. The United States Citizenship and
Immigration 	Service 	(“USCIS”) 	approved 	his 	Petition 	for 	Alien
Relative (1-130) on September 13, 2024. Id. at 6. On June 12, 2025,
USCIS 	received 	his 	application 	for 	Provisional 	Unlawful 	Presence
Waiver 	(I-601A) 	and 	payment 	of 	the 	filing 	fee, 	as 	evinced 	by
receipt 	number 	YSC2590037159. 	Id. 	Petitioner’s 	I-601A 	waiver 	is
currently pending adjudication. Id.
1 For 	example, 	the 	following 	cases 	found 	that 	detention 	is 	discretionary 	in
analogous 	cases: 	Gomes 	v. 	Hyde, 	804 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	265, 	278 	(D. 	Mass. 	2025);
Armando Becerra Vargas v. Bondi, SA-25-cv-1023, 2025 WL 3300446 (W.D. Tex. Nov.
12, 2025); Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz, No. 25-CV-12664-PBS, 2025 WL 3033769 (D.
Mass. 	Oct. 	30, 	2025). 	By 	contrast, 	these 	cases 	determined 	that 	mandatory
detention is proper for petitioners with similar circumstances: Ramirez Melgar
v. Bondi, No. 8:25CV555, 2025 WL 3496721 (D. Neb. Dec. 5, 2025); Rojas v. Olson,
No. 25-CV-1437-BHL, 2025 WL 3033967 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 30, 2025); Alonzo v. Noem,
No. 1:25-CV-01519 WBS SCR, 2025 WL 3208284 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025).
2 The factual statements in this section are taken from the allegations set
forth in the Petition and the exhibits attached thereto.
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Civil No. 26-1041(RAM) 	3
On 	January 	8, 	2026, 	Petitioner 	was 	stopped 	by 	Carolina
Municipal 	Police 	Officer 	Bahamundi 	Requena 	(“Officer 	Bahamundi”)
for alleged violations of Municipal Ordinance 17 Series 2022-2023-
03. Id. at 2. Petitioner’s Puerto Rico Driver’s License, which he
provided 	to 	Officer 	Bahamundi, 	contains 	a 	distinctive 	purple 	bar
reserved 	for 	noncitizens. 	Id. 	Officer 	Bahamundi 	cited 	Petitioner
to appear at the Carolina Municipal Police Station on January 15,
2026. 	Id. 	Petitioner 	was 	detained 	by 	United 	States 	Border 	Patrol
agents 	(“BP 	Agents”) 	at 	the 	Carolina 	Municipal 	Police 	Station 	on
January 15, 2026. Id. at 2-3.
On 	January 	16, 	2026, 	Petitioner 	received 	a 	Notice 	to 	Appear
from 	the 	Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security 	stating 	that 	Petitioner
is 	subject 	to 	removal 	from 	the 	United 	States 	pursuant 	to 	the
following 	provision 	of 	law: 	“212(a)(6)(A)(I) 	of 	the 	Immigration
and Nationality Act, as amended, in that you are an alien present
in 	the 	United 	States 	without 	being 	admitted 	or 	paroled, 	or 	who
arrived 	in 	the 	United 	States 	at 	any 	time 	or 	place 	other 	than 	as
designated 	by 	the 	Attorney 	General.” 	(Docket 	No. 	1-7 	at 	1). 	On
January 	21, 	2026, 	the 	Immigration 	Judge 	overseeing 	Petitioner’s
case 	issued 	an 	Order 	providing 	that 	his 	request 	for 	a 	custody
redetermination 	pursuant 	to 	8 	C.F.R. 	§ 	1236 	was 	denied 	“because
the Court does not have jurisdiction. Pursuant to Matter of YAJURE
HURTADO, 	29 	I. 	& 	N. 	Dec. 	216 	(BIA 	2025), 	respondent 	is 	an
application for admission and therefore is not eligible for bond.”
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Civil No. 26-1041(RAM) 	4
(Docket 	No. 	1-11 	at 	1). 	Petitioner 	reserved 	the 	right 	to 	appeal
this 	determination. 	Id. 	at 	2. 	Petitioner 	is 	currently 	in 	the
physical 	custody 	of 	Respondents 	at 	the 	Aguadilla 	Processing
Center. (Docket No. 1 at 2-3).
II. 	PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mr. Zorrilla-Lora filed his Petition on January 23, 2026. Id.
Therein 	he 	contends 	that 	per 	the 	terms 	of 	the 	Immigration 	and
Nationality 	Act, 	8 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	1101, 	et 	seq, 	(the 	“INA”) 	he 	should
not be subject to the mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C. §
1225 	but 	rather 	he 	is 	entitled 	to 	a 	bond 	hearing 	pursuant 	to 	8
U.S.C. § 1226. Id. at 6. Moreover, he asserts that he is protected
by 	a 	recently 	certified 	class 	in 	the 	case 	Maldonado 	Bautista 	v.
Santacruz, 	No. 	5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 	2025 	WL 	3713987 	(C.D. 	Cal.
Dec. 	18, 	2025), 	judgment 	entered 	sub 	nom. 	Maldonado 	Bautista 	v.
Noem, 	No. 	5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 	2025 	WL 	3678485 	(C.D. 	Cal. 	Dec.
18, 	2025). 	Id. 	Petitioner 	also 	claims 	that 	his 	Fifth 	Amendment
rights 	to 	due 	process, 	access 	to 	legal 	counsel, 	and 	adequate
conditions of confinement are being violated and that Respondents’
decision 	to 	detain 	him 	constitutes 	a 	violation 	of 	the
Administrative 	Procedure 	Act 	(“APA”). 	Id. 	at 	11-14. 	Accordingly,
Mr. 	Zorrilla-Lora 	asks 	that 	this 	Court 	issue 	a 	writ 	of 	habeas
corpus ordering Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from
their custody, or, in the alternative, order Petitioner be released
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Civil No. 26-1041(RAM) 	5
upon the posting of a reasonable bond or conditions of supervision.
Id. at 14.
Respondents 	filed 	their 	Memorandum 	in 	Opposition 	to
Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Opposition”) on
January 	30, 	2026. 	(Docket 	No. 	21). 	Respondents 	first 	argue 	the
Court lacks jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s detention pending
removal 	pursuant 	to 	8 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	1252(b)(9); 	1252(g); 	and
1252(e)(3). 	Id. 	at 	17-20. 	Second, 	Respondents 	assert 	that
Petitioner’s 	detention 	is 	not 	unconstitutional 	and 	that 	he 	is
properly detained under the applicable section of the INA, namely
8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1225. 	Id. 	at 	20-27. 	Moreover, 	because 	the 	INA
establishes the due process afforded to aliens, nothing other than
compliance with said statute is required to comply with the Fifth
Amendment. 	Id. 	Respondents 	contest 	Petitioner’s 	claim 	that 	he 	is
a member of the Maldonado Bautista class. Id. at 31. The Opposition
also 	maintains 	that 	Petitioner’s 	allegations 	regarding 	access 	to
counsel 	and 	the 	conditions 	of 	detention 	center 	lack 	specificity
that 	warrants 	relief 	and 	that 	Petitioner 	has 	not 	exhausted
administrative remedies. Id. at 6, 37-38.
On 	February 	4, 	2026, 	Petitioner 	filed 	his 	Response 	to
Respondents’ 	Opposition. 	(Docket 	No. 	25). 	Therein, 	Petitioner
asserts 	that 	there 	are 	no 	jurisdictional 	hurdles 	precluding 	the
Court 	from 	reviewing 	his 	petition. 	Id. 	at 	16-18. 	He 	reiterates
that 	he 	is 	a 	member 	of 	the 	Maldonado 	Bautista 	class 	and 	that 	his
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Civil No. 26-1041(RAM) 	6
detention 	should 	be 	discretionary 	pursuant 	to 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1226
because he is not an “applicant for admission” under the INA. Id.
at 	2-5, 	12. 	Therefore, 	Petitioner 	concludes 	that 	his 	continued
detention 	in 	the 	absence 	of 	a 	bond 	hearing 	violates 	due 	process
protections. Id. at 5.
Respondents 	filed 	a 	Surreply 	in 	Opposition 	on 	February 	6,
2026. (Docket No. 26).
III. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Habeas Corpus
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), writ of habeas corpus may
issue to individuals “in custody in violation of the Constitution
or 	laws 	or 	treaties 	of 	the 	United 	States.” 	The 	Supreme 	Court 	has
recognized 	that, 	under 	§ 	2241(c)(3), 	district 	courts 	possess
jurisdiction to consider habeas challenges to the legality of the
detention of noncitizens. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483–84
(2004) 	(“Petitioners 	contend 	that 	they 	are 	being 	held 	in 	federal
custody 	in 	violation 	of 	the 	laws 	of 	the 	United 	States...Section
2241, 	by 	its 	terms, 	requires 	nothing 	more.”). 	The 	First 	Circuit
has 	held 	that 	under 	§ 	2241, 	“[t]he 	burden 	of 	proof 	of 	showing
deprivation 	of 	rights 	leading 	to 	unlawful 	detention 	is 	on 	the
petitioner.” 	Espinoza 	v. 	Sabol, 	558 	F.3d 	83, 	89 	(1st 	Cir. 	2009)
(collecting cases).
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Civil No. 26-1041(RAM) 	7
B. Relevant Detention Provisions of the INA
The INA governs the admission, inspection, apprehension, and
removal 	of 	noncitizens 	within 	the 	United 	States, 	among 	other
aspects 	of 	immigration. 	The 	present 	case 	concerns 	two 	INA
provisions regarding detention, namely Sections 1225 and 1226.
i. Section 1225
Section 	1225 	specifies 	when 	certain 	noncitizens, 	namely
“applicants 	for 	admission,” 	are 	subject 	to 	mandatory 	detention.
Pursuant to this section, an “applicant for admission” is defined
as 	“[a]n 	alien 	present 	in 	the 	United 	States 	who 	has 	not 	been
admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a
designated 	port 	of 	arrival[)].” 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1225(a)(1) 	(emphasis
added). 	In 	its 	relevant 	part, 	Section 	1225 	provides 	that 	if 	the
examining 	immigration 	officer 	inspecting 	an 	applicant 	for
admission 	“determines 	that 	an 	alien 	seeking 	admission 	is 	not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall
be 	detained 	for 	a 	proceeding 	under 	section 	1229a 	of 	this 	title.”
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Section 	1225(a)(1) 	was 	added 	in 	1996 	when 	Congress 	enacted
the 	Illegal 	Immigration 	Reform 	and 	Immigrant 	Responsibility 	Act
(the 	“IIRIRA”), 	thereby 	“substantially 	amend[ing]” 	the 	INA. 	See
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 423 (2009); Torres v. Barr, 976 F.3d
918, 927 (9th Cir. 2020). Before the passage of the IIRIRA, “non-
citizens 	who 	had 	entered 	without 	inspection 	could 	take 	advantage
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Civil No. 26-1041(RAM) 	8
of 	the 	greater 	procedural 	and 	substantive 	rights 	afforded 	in
deportation 	proceedings, 	while 	non-citizens 	who 	presented
themselves 	at 	a 	port 	of 	entry 	for 	inspection 	were 	subjected 	to
more summary exclusion proceedings.” Hing Sum v. Holder, 602 F.3d
1092, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010). The IIRIRA “addressed this anomaly by
substituting ‘admission’ for ‘entry’ and by replacing deportation
and 	exclusion 	proceedings 	with 	a 	general 	‘removal’ 	proceeding.
Under 	the 	new 	regime, 	‘admission’ 	now 	determines 	whether 	a 	non-
citizen is subject to grounds of deportability or inadmissibility
within the context of a removal proceeding.” Id., see also Torres,
976 F.3d at 928 (noting that Section 1225(a)(1) “ensures that all
immigrants who have not been lawfully admitted, regardless of their
physical 	presence 	in 	the 	country, 	are 	placed 	on 	equal 	footing 	in
removal proceedings under the INA—in the position of an ‘applicant
for admission.’”).
ii. 	Section 1226
For 	its 	part, 	Section 	1226(a) 	governs 	the 	detention 	of
“aliens,” 	defined 	by 	the 	INA 	as 	“any 	person 	not 	a 	citizen 	or
national 	of 	the 	United 	States.” 	See 	8 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	1101; 	1226.
Specifically, this section provides that “[o]n a warrant issued by
the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending
a 	decision 	on 	whether 	the 	alien 	is 	to 	be 	removed 	from 	the 	United
States.” 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1226(a) 	(emphasis 	added). 	While 	the 	decision
regarding removal is pending, the Attorney General may continue to
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Civil No. 26-1041(RAM) 	9
detain 	the 	arrested 	alien 	or 	release 	the 	alien 	on 	bond 	or
conditional 	parole. 	Id. 	In 	other 	words, 	“[u]nlike 	§ 	1225(b), 	§
1226(a)(2)(A) permits, but does not require, the Attorney General
to 	release 	detained 	aliens 	on 	‘bond 	of 	at 	least 	$1,500 	with
security approved by, and containing conditions prescribed by, the
Attorney General.’” Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, No. 25-20496, 2026
WL 323330, at *2 (5th Cir. 2026) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8),
236.1(d), 1236.1(d)(1), 1003.19).
Notably, Section 1226(c) deems certain aliens ineligible for
bond, namely those that have committed specific offenses listed at
Section 	1226(c)(1)(E)(i)-(ii).3 	See 	also 	Chavez 	v. 	Noem, 	801 	F.
Supp. 	3d 	1133, 	1141 	(S.D. 	Cal. 	2025) 	(“Section 	1226(c) 	simply
removed 	the 	Attorney 	General’s 	detention 	discretion 	for 	aliens
charged with specific—but not all—crimes. The Attorney General may
still 	exercise 	her 	detention 	discretion 	under 	§ 	1226(a) 	for 	any
other 	aliens 	falling 	under 	that 	subsection 	who 	are 	not 	charged
with the specific crimes carved out by § 1226(c)”).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
Respondents 	allege 	that 	the 	Court 	lacks 	subject 	matter
jurisdiction 	over 	Petitioner’s 	claim 	pursuant 	to 	the 	following
3 Section 1226(c) was recently amended by the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-
1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025), “to expand the category of covered crimes, and to require
the detention not only of those who have been convicted of any of the newly
added crimes but also of anyone who has been accused of one.” Black v. Almodovar,
156 F.4th 171, 181 (2d Cir. 2025)(Nardini, J., Dissenting).
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Civil No. 26-1041(RAM) 	10
sections 	of 	the 	INA: 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1252(b)(9); 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1252(g);
and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3). The Court finds that none of the three
statutes divests this Court of jurisdiction.
i. Section 1252(b)(9)
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9):
Judicial 	review 	of 	all 	questions 	of 	law 	and
fact, 	including 	interpretation 	and
application 	of 	constitutional 	and 	statutory
provisions, 	arising 	from 	any 	action 	taken 	or
proceeding brought to remove an alien from the
United 	States 	under 	this 	subchapter 	shall 	be
available 	only 	in 	judicial 	review 	of 	a 	final
order under this section.
Respondents maintain that Petitioner’s challenge arises from
removal 	proceedings 	and 	thus 	cannot 	be 	reviewed 	by 	the 	Court 	in
the 	absence 	of 	a 	final 	order. 	(Docket 	No. 	21 	at 	17). 	In 	Jennings
v. 	Rodriguez, 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	rejected 	a 	similar 	contention,
finding that Section 1252(b)(9) does not bar courts from reviewing
claims 	regarding 	whether 	“certain 	statutory 	provisions 	require
detention without a bond hearing.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S.
281, 	292 	(2018). 	Section 	1252(b)(9) 	“does 	not 	present 	a
jurisdictional bar” where, as here and in Jennings, the petitioner
is “not asking for review of an order of removal; not challenging
the decision to detain them in the first place or to seek removal;
and 	not 	even 	challenging 	any 	part 	of 	the 	process 	by 	which 	their
removability will be determined.” Id. at 294-295 (cleaned up). See
also 	Aguilar 	v. 	U.S. 	Immigr. 	& 	Customs 	Enf’t 	Div. 	of 	Dep’t 	of
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Civil No. 26-1041(RAM) 	11
Homeland 	Sec., 	510 	F.3d 	1, 	10 	(1st 	Cir. 	2007) 	(“With 	respect 	to
section 1252(b)(9), th[e] words [‘arising from’] cannot be read to
swallow all claims that might somehow touch upon, or be traced to,
the government’s efforts to remove an alien.”).
ii. 	Section 1252(g)
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) establishes that:
Except 	as 	provided 	in 	this 	section 	and
notwithstanding 	any 	other 	provision 	of 	law
(statutory 	or 	nonstatutory), 	including
section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas
corpus 	provision, 	and 	sections 	1361 	and 	1651
of 	such 	title, 	no 	court 	shall 	have
jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or
on 	behalf 	of 	any 	alien 	arising 	from 	the
decision or action by the Attorney General to
commence 	proceedings, 	adjudicate 	cases, 	or
execute removal orders against any alien under
this chapter.
Respondents assert that the Secretary of Homeland Security’s
decision 	to 	commence 	removal 	proceedings, 	including 	the 	decision
to detain an alien pending said removal proceedings, falls squarely
within 	Section 	1252(g)’s 	jurisdictional 	bar. 	(Docket 	No. 	21 	at
17). 	However, 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	clarified 	that 	Section
1252(g)’s prohibition “applies only to three discrete actions that
the 	Attorney 	General 	may 	take: 	her 	‘decision 	or 	action’ 	to
‘commence 	proceedings, 	adjudicate 	cases, 	or 	execute 	removal
orders.’” 	Reno 	v. 	Am.-Arab 	Anti-Discrimination 	Comm., 	525 	U.S.
471, 	482 	(1999). 	In 	Reno, 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	reasoned 	“[i]t 	is
implausible that the [statute’s] mention of three discrete events
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Civil No. 26-1041(RAM) 	12
along the road to deportation was a shorthand way of referring to
all 	claims 	arising 	from 	deportation 	proceedings.” 	Id. 	(emphasis
added); 	see 	also 	Kong 	v. 	United 	States, 	62 	F.4th 	608, 	617 	(1st
Cir. 	2023) 	(concluding, 	in 	accordance 	with 	Reno, 	that 	Section
1252(g) 	does 	not 	bar 	judicial 	review 	of 	challenges 	to 	the
lawfulness of detention).
iii. Section 1252(e)(3)
8 	U.S.C. 	1252(e)(3), 	titled 	“challenges 	on 	validity 	of 	the
system,” specifies that “[j]udicial review of determinations under
section 1225(b) of this title and its implementation is available
in 	an 	action 	instituted 	in 	the 	United 	States 	District 	Court 	for
the 	District 	of 	Columbia” 	and 	limits 	challenges 	to 	the
constitutionality 	or 	lawfulness 	of 	Section 	1225(b), 	its
implementing 	regulations 	and/or 	related 	policies 	or 	procedures.
See also Castro v. United States Dep't of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d
422, 	427 	(3d 	Cir. 	2016). 	However, 	rather 	than 	challenging 	the
validity 	or 	constitutionality 	of 	Section 	1225(b), 	Petitioner
asserts 	in 	the 	case 	at 	bar 	that 	it 	is 	Section 	1226, 	not 	Section
1225, that governs his detention. Accordingly, Section 1252(e)(3)
is inapplicable and does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction.
B. Exhaustion
Respondents claim that Petitioner has not exhausted available
administrative 	remedies. 	(Docket 	No. 	21 	at 	37). 	“There 	are 	two
species 	of 	exhaustion: 	statutory 	and 	common-law. 	The 	former
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Civil No. 26-1041(RAM) 	13
deprives 	a 	federal 	court 	of 	jurisdiction, 	while 	the 	latter 	cedes
discretion 	to 	a 	federal 	court 	to 	decline 	the 	exercise 	of
jurisdiction.” Brito v. Garland, 22 F.4th 240, 255 (1st Cir. 2021)
(cleaned 	up) 	(internal 	citations 	and 	quotations 	omitted). 	Courts
have 	routinely 	found 	that 	common-law 	prudential 	exhaustion
requirements 	extend 	to 	habeas 	petitions 	in 	immigration 	cases,
absent a relevant statutory requirement. See Kaweesa v. Ashcroft,
345 F. Supp. 2d 79, 97 (D. Mass. 2004) (collecting cases).
For 	his 	part, 	Petitioner 	alleges 	that 	exhaustion 	is 	futile
with 	regards 	to 	his 	detention 	claim 	in 	light 	of 	Matter 	of 	YAJURE
HURTADO, 29 I. & N. 216 (BIA 2025). (Docket No. 25 at 8). In Matter
of YAJURE HURTADO, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) issued
a 	precedential 	decision 	concluding 	that 	noncitizens 	“who
surreptitiously cross into the United States remain applicants for
admission until and unless they are lawfully inspected and admitted
by 	an 	immigration 	officer” 	and 	are 	thus 	subject 	to 	the 	mandatory
detention provision of Section 1225. Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29
I. & N. Dec. 216, 228 (BIA 2025).
The 	First 	Circuit 	has 	recognized 	that 	courts 	may 	waive 	an
exhaustion 	requirement 	(even 	one 	imposed 	by 	statute), 	“where 	a
resort to the agency would be futile because the challenge is one
that the agency has no power to resolve in the applicant’s favor.”
Sousa v. I.N.S., 226 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 2000). The Court agrees
that 	exhaustion 	with 	regards 	to 	Petitioner’s 	bond 	claim 	would 	be
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Civil No. 26-1041(RAM) 	14
futile, 	and 	thus 	should 	be 	waived, 	given 	that 	Matter 	of 	YAJURE
HURTADO is binding precedent for immigration judges.
However, as to Petitioner’s access-to-counsel and conditions-
of-confinement 	claims, 	Petitioners 	do 	not 	allege, 	and 	the 	record
does 	not 	reflect, 	that 	any 	attempts 	were 	made 	to 	exhaust
administrative 	remedies 	prior 	to 	filing 	the 	present 	Petition 	nor
that doing so would be futile. Crucially, First Circuit precedent
expressly 	requires 	exhaustion 	of 	administrative 	remedies 	for
analogous access-to-counsel claims. See Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. &
Customs 	Enf’t 	Div. 	of 	Dep’t 	of 	Homeland 	Sec., 	510 	F.3d 	1, 	12-14
(1st Cir. 2007). Accordingly, the Court hereby DENIES Petitioner’s
access-to-counsel 	and 	conditions-of-confinement 	claims 	WITHOUT
PREJUDICE, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
C. Maldonado Bautista
In 	Maldonado 	Bautista, 	the 	District 	Court 	for 	the 	Central
District 	of 	California 	determined 	that 	Section 	1225’s 	definition
of “applicants for admission” does not include noncitizens already
in 	the 	United 	States 	that 	have 	not 	been 	inspected 	and 	authorized
by an immigration officer. Maldonado Bautista, 2025 WL 3713987 at
*10. 	Accordingly, 	it 	concluded 	that 	said 	individuals 	are 	not
subject 	to 	the 	mandatory 	detention 	required 	by 	Section 	1225 	but
rather are eligible for bond under Section 1226. Id. The Maldonado
Bautista 	Court 	proceeded 	to 	certify 	a 	class 	action 	granting
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Civil No. 26-1041(RAM) 	15
declaratory relief to this effect. Id. at *29. The certified class
was defined as follows:
Bond 	Eligible 	Class: 	All 	noncitizens 	in 	the
United 	States 	without 	lawful 	status 	who 	(1)
have 	entered 	or 	will 	enter 	the 	United 	States
without 	inspection; 	(2) 	were 	not 	or 	will 	not
be 	apprehended 	upon 	arrival; 	and 	(3) 	are 	not
or 	will 	not 	be 	subject 	to 	detention 	under 	8
U.S.C. 	§ 	1226(c), 	§ 	1225(b)(1), 	or 	§ 	1231 	at
the 	time 	the 	Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security
makes an initial custody determination.
Id. at *32. The Maldonado Bautista Court subsequently issued
final 	judgment 	declaring 	that 	“Bond 	Eligible 	Class 	members 	are
detained 	under 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1226(a), 	are 	not 	subject 	to 	mandatory
detention 	under 	§ 	1225(b)(2), 	and 	are 	entitled 	to 	consideration
for release on bond by immigration officers and, if not released,
a custody redetermination hearing before an immigration judge” and
vacating “the Department of Homeland Security policy described in
the July 8, 2025, ‘Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority
for 	Applicants 	for 	Admission’ 	under 	the 	Administrative 	Procedure
Act.” Maldonado Bautista, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, Docket No. 94
¶ 2 (C.D. Cal. 2025).
Petitioner 	posits 	that 	he 	is 	a 	member 	of 	the 	Bond 	Eligible
Class 	certified 	in 	Maldonado 	Bautista 	and, 	as 	a 	beneficiary 	of
such, is entitled to a bond hearing in Puerto Rico. (Docket No. 1
at 	10). 	Respondents 	counter 	that 	decisions 	issued 	by 	the 	Central
District of California in habeas proceedings cannot be extended to
this district.
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Civil No. 26-1041(RAM) 	16
The 	Court 	finds 	that 	although 	Petitioner 	falls 	within 	the
technical definition of the Bond Eligible Class, this Court is not
bound by the holding in Maldonado Bautista.
Pursuant 	to 	the 	federal 	habeas 	corpus 	statute, 	courts 	may
only 	grant 	writs 	of 	habeas 	corpus 	“within 	their 	respective
jurisdictions.” 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2241(a). 	Given 	this 	plain 	language,
the 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	held 	“with 	respect 	to 	habeas 	petitions
designed to relieve an individual from oppressive confinement, the
traditional 	rule 	has 	always 	been 	that 	the 	Great 	Writ 	is 	issuable
only 	in 	the 	district 	of 	confinement.” 	Rumsfeld 	v. 	Padilla, 	542
U.S. 426, 442 (2004) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, the
Supreme Court recently clarified that “[r]egardless of whether the
detainees formally request release from confinement, because their
claims 	for 	relief 	necessarily 	imply 	the 	invalidity 	of 	their
confinement and removal...their claims fall within the core of the
writ 	of 	habeas 	corpus 	and 	thus 	must 	be 	brought 	in 	habeas.” 	Trump
v. 	J. 	G. 	G., 	604 	U.S. 	670, 	672, 	(2025) 	(quotations 	omitted); 	see
also 	Rumsfeld, 	542 	U.S. 	at 	443 	(“[F]or 	core 	habeas 	petitions
challenging 	present 	physical 	confinement, 	jurisdiction 	lies 	in
only one district: the district of confinement”).
Accordingly, 	the 	only 	district 	with 	jurisdiction 	over
Petitioner’s 	habeas 	corpus 	claim 	is 	the 	district 	of 	confinement,
that is, the District of Puerto Rico, and not the Central District
of California. The Court thus concludes that it is neither divested
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Civil No. 26-1041(RAM) 	17
of 	jurisdiction 	nor 	bound 	by 	Maldonado 	Bautista’s 	ruling. 	See
Alberto Rodriguez v. Jeffreys, No. 8:25CV714, 2025 WL 3754411, at
*9 (D. Neb. Dec. 29, 2025).
Aside 	from 	asserting 	that 	he 	is 	a 	class 	member, 	Petitioner
does 	not 	identify 	any 	basis 	for 	giving 	the 	holding 	in 	Maldonado
Bautista preclusive effect here. See United States v. Zannino, 895
F.2d 	1, 	17 	(1st 	Cir. 	1990) 	(“issues 	adverted 	to 	in 	a 	perfunctory
manner, 	unaccompanied 	by 	some 	effort 	at 	developed 	argumentation,
are deemed waived”). Nevertheless, the Court notes that nonmutual
offensive 	collateral 	estoppel 	does 	not 	apply 	against 	the
government. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162 (1984).
In 	reaching 	this 	conclusion, 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	identified
important 	reasons 	for 	this 	limitation. 	The 	government 	is 	not 	in
the same position as a private litigant and given the “panoply of
important public issues raised in governmental litigation[,] [it]
may 	quite 	properly 	lead 	successive 	Administrations 	of 	the
Executive 	Branch 	to 	take 	differing 	positions 	with 	respect 	to 	the
resolution 	of 	a 	particular 	issue.” 	Mendoza, 	464 	U.S. 	at 	161.
Moreover, “[a] rule allowing nonmutual collateral estoppel against
the 	government 	in 	such 	cases 	would 	substantially 	thwart 	the
development 	of 	important 	questions 	of 	law 	by 	freezing 	the 	first
final decision rendered on a particular legal issue. Allowing only
one 	final 	adjudication 	would 	deprive 	[the 	Supreme] 	Court 	of 	the
benefit 	it 	receives 	from 	permitting 	several 	courts 	of 	appeals 	to
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Civil No. 26-1041(RAM) 	18
explore 	a 	difficult 	question 	before 	th[at] 	Court 	grants
certiorari.” 	Id. 	at 	160. 	Additionally, 	other 	districts 	have
rejected 	the 	argument 	that 	the 	Declaratory 	Judgment 	Act 	can 	be
used 	to 	bind 	other 	district 	judges 	from 	review 	of 	hypothetical
future 	habeas 	corpus 	proceedings 	involving 	litigants 	whose
individual 	circumstances 	the 	courts 	have 	yet 	to 	consider. 	See
Onosamba-Ohindo 	v. 	Searls, 	678 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	364, 	372 	(W.D.N.Y.
2023).
For these reasons, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not
warranted relief pursuant to Maldonado Bautista.
D. Detention under Section 1225 or 1226
Because 	Maldonado 	Bautista’s 	judgment 	is 	not 	binding, 	the
Court must address whether Section 1225 or 1226 of the INA applies
to Petitioner’s case. Petitioner asserts that Section 1225(b)(2)’s
mandatory 	detention 	only 	applies 	to 	applicants 	for 	admission
arriving 	at 	the 	border 	whereas 	Section 	1226’s 	discretionary
detention 	applies 	to 	those 	already 	present 	in 	the 	United 	States
that are subsequently arrested and detained. (Docket Nos. 1 at 9;
25 	at 	6). 	Petitioner 	further 	argues 	that 	under 	the 	INA, 	a
noncitizen 	should 	only 	be 	subject 	to 	mandatory 	detention 	if 	they
(1) are convicted of certain crimes; (2) are subject to expedited
removal; 	or 	(3) 	have 	been 	previously 	ordered 	removed 	from 	the
United 	States. 	(Docket 	No. 	1 	at 	6) 	(citing 	8 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	1226(c),
1225(b)(1) 	and 	1231, 	respectively). 	He 	contends 	that 	he 	does 	not
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Civil No. 26-1041(RAM) 	19
fall within any of these three categories. Id. On the other hand,
Respondents maintain that Petitioner is an applicant for admission
per 	the 	terms 	of 	Section 	1225(a)(1) 	and 	is 	thus 	ineligible 	for
bond under Section 1226. (Docket No. 21 at 23-24).
When resolving a dispute over the meaning of a statute, courts
“begin 	with 	the 	language 	of 	the 	statute 	itself” 	and 	must 	“first
‘determine whether the language has a plain and unambiguous meaning
with 	regard 	to 	the 	particular 	dispute 	in 	the 	case.’” 	In 	re 	Fin.
Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for Puerto Rico, 919 F.3d 121, 128 (1st Cir.
2019) 	(quoting 	Robinson 	v. 	Shell 	Oil 	Co., 	519 	U.S. 	337, 	340
(1997)). 	“The 	plainness 	or 	ambiguity 	of 	statutory 	language 	is
determined 	by 	reference 	to 	the 	language 	itself, 	the 	specific
context in which that language is used, and the broader context of
the statute as a whole.” Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341. Consequently,
the 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	affirmed 	several 	times 	“that 	identical
language 	may 	convey 	varying 	content 	when 	used 	in 	different
statutes, 	sometimes 	even 	in 	different 	provisions 	of 	the 	same
statute.” 	Yates 	v. 	United 	States, 	574 	U.S. 	528, 	537 	(2015)
(collecting cases). “If the statute’s language is plain, the sole
function 	of 	the 	courts 	is 	to 	enforce 	it 	according 	to 	its 	terms.
If, 	however, 	the 	language 	is 	not 	plain 	and 	unambiguous, 	[courts]
then 	turn 	to 	other 	tools 	of 	statutory 	construction, 	such 	as
legislative history.” In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for Puerto
Rico, 919 F.3d at 128 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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Civil No. 26-1041(RAM) 	20
In the case at bar, the Court finds that Section 1225(a)(1)’s
definition of “applicants for admission” is unambiguous. As noted
above, this section defines applicants for admission as “[a]n alien
present 	in 	the 	United 	States 	who 	has 	not 	been 	admitted 	or 	who
arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port
of 	arrival[)].” 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1225(a)(1). 	The 	INA 	also 	defines 	the
terms 	“admitted” 	and 	“admission” 	with 	respect 	to 	a 	noncitizen 	as
“the 	lawful 	entry 	of 	the 	alien 	into 	the 	United 	States 	after
inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(13)(A). In other words, an applicant for admission is a
noncitizen 	present 	in 	the 	United 	States 	who 	either: 	(1) 	has 	not
been 	given 	lawful 	entry 	into 	the 	United 	States 	after 	inspection
and authorization by an immigration officer; or (2) arrives in the
United States, independent of whether they are at a point of entry.
Per 	the 	plain 	and 	unambiguous 	language 	of 	the 	statute, 	the 	term
“applicant of admission” is not limited only to noncitizens seeking
entry 	at 	a 	border 	given 	the 	distinction 	between 	those 	who 	are
“present” 	and 	those 	who 	“arrive”. 	Rather, 	it 	includes 	all
noncitizens 	in 	the 	United 	States 	who 	have 	not 	been 	inspected 	and
granted admission, whether at a point of entry or elsewhere.
Petitioner 	necessarily 	falls 	within 	this 	definition, 	as 	he
admittedly is: (1) not a citizen of the United States; (2) entered
the 	United 	States 	without 	undergoing 	proper 	admission 	procedures
(i.e., 	without 	being 	inspected 	and 	admitted); 	and 	(3) 	present 	in
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Civil No. 26-1041(RAM) 	21
the United States. (Docket No. 1 at 4). As such, he is thus subject
to 	the 	mandatory 	detention 	provisions 	of 	“applicants 	for
admission” 	under 	Section 	1225(b)(2). 	See 	Chavez, 	801 	F. 	Supp. 	3d
at 1140.
The 	Court’s 	interpretation 	that 	“applicants 	for 	admission”
also 	encompasses 	noncitizens 	present 	within 	the 	United 	States
beyond ports of entry who have not been admitted and that they are
subject 	to 	mandatory 	detention 	is 	further 	supported 	by 	the 	INA’s
accompanying 	regulations. 	8 	C.F.R. 	§ 	235.3(b)(1)(ii) 	provides
that:
An alien who was not inspected and admitted or
paroled 	into 	the 	United 	States 	but 	who
establishes 	that 	he 	or 	she 	has 	been
continuously physically present in the United
States for the 2–year period immediately prior
to 	the 	date 	of 	determination 	of
inadmissibility 	shall 	be 	detained 	in
accordance 	with 	section 	235(b)(2) 	[(8 	U.S.C.
§ 	1225(b)(2)] 	of 	the 	Act 	for 	a 	proceeding
under section 240 of the Act.
Said 	1997 	regulatory 	provision 	evinces 	that 	the 	BIA’s
interpretation 	in 	Matter 	of 	YAJURE 	HURTADO 	and 	adopted 	today 	is
not a recent nor a new development. See Buenrostro-Mendez, 2026 WL
323330, at *8. 	Nevertheless, it is ultimately the Court’s duty to
come to its own conclusion as to the meaning of the statute. Loper
Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 6043 U.S. 369, 413 (2024) (“Courts
must 	exercise 	their 	independent 	judgment 	in 	deciding 	whether 	an
agency has acted within its statutory authority”).
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Civil No. 26-1041(RAM) 	22
Contrary 	to 	Petitioner’s 	allegations, 	this 	interpretation
does 	not 	render 	Section 	1226 	redundant. 	(Docket 	No. 	21 	at 	6).
“Because 	§ 	1226 	is 	not 	limited 	to 	applicants 	for 	admission, 	it
also 	covers 	numerous 	grounds 	of 	deportability, 	including 	for
admitted aliens who overstay or violate the terms of their visas,
engage in conduct that renders them removable, or were improperly
admitted.” 	Buenrostro-Mendez, 	2026 	WL 	323330, 	at 	*2. 	Conversely,
if Section 1226(a) was applied to Petitioner and others similarly
situated, 	it 	would 	nullify 	the 	plain 	meaning 	of 	Section
1225(a)(1)’s 	definition 	of 	applicant 	for 	admission 	by 	exempting
non-citizens 	who 	have 	not 	been 	admitted 	into 	the 	United 	States
from 	Section 	1225(b)(2)’s 	mandatory 	detention 	provision. 	See
Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 587 U.S. 1, 12 (2019) (Courts should
be 	“hesitant 	to 	adopt 	an 	interpretation 	of 	a 	congressional
enactment 	which 	renders 	superfluous 	another 	portion 	of 	that 	same
law.”).
By the same token, this ruling does not contradict the Supreme
Court’s 	findings 	in 	Jennings 	v. 	Rodriguez, 	583 	U.S. 	281 	(2018).
Therein, the Supreme Court similarly concluded that an “alien who
arrives in the United States or is present in this country but has
not 	been 	admitted, 	is 	treated 	as 	an 	applicant 	for 	admission.
Applicants for admission must be inspected by immigration officers
to 	ensure 	that 	they 	may 	be 	admitted 	into 	the 	country 	consistent
with 	U.S. 	immigration 	law.” 	Jennings, 	583 	U.S. 	at 	287 	(emphasis
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Civil No. 26-1041(RAM) 	23
added). 	Said 	applicants 	for 	admission 	may 	fall 	into 	different
categories 	but 	all 	are 	subject 	to 	detention 	absent 	“urgent
humanitarian 	reasons 	or 	significant 	public 	benefit.” 	Id. 	at 	287-
288. 	The 	Supreme 	Court 	notes 	that 	“[e]ven 	once 	inside 	the 	United
States, 	aliens 	do 	not 	have 	an 	absolute 	right 	to 	remain 	here. 	For
example, 	an 	alien 	present 	in 	the 	country 	may 	still 	be 	removed 	if
he or she falls within one or more classes of deportable aliens.”
Id. 	at 	288 	(cleaned 	up). 	In 	other 	words, 	even 	if 	admitted,
noncitizens may be subject to removal under the INA. The Jennings
Court proceeds to explain that “Section 1226 generally governs the
process 	of 	arresting 	and 	detaining 	that 	group 	of 	aliens 	pending
their removal.” Id. Therefore, per Jennings, Section 1226 applies
noncitizens inspected and authorized to lawfully enter the United
States. 	Nothing 	in 	Jennings 	limits 	Section 	1225(b)(2)’s
application to individuals at the border or other points of entry.
See also Alberto Rodriguez, 2025 WL 3754411, at *12 (finding that
there may be overlap between Sections 1225 and 1226 because aliens
present in the United States who have not been admitted defined in
Section 	1225(a)(1) 	and 	to 	whom 	Section 	1225(b)(2) 	applies
“include—as a matter of plain language—the same group of aliens to
whom 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	[in 	Jennings] 	stated 	§ 	1226(a) 	applies,
that is ‘aliens already present in the United States’”).
Lastly, 	the 	Court 	notes 	Respondents 	concede 	that 	Section
1225(b)(2) is not a license for indefinite detention. See (Docket
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Civil No. 26-1041(RAM) 	24
No. 	21 	at 	21) 	(recognizing 	that 	a 	brief 	period 	of 	detention 	for
removal 	proceedings 	amounting 	to 	less 	than 	three 	months 	does 	not
violate 	the 	constitution). 	Likewise, 	nothing 	in 	this 	opinion
should be read as authorization to do so.
V. CONCLUSION
According to the evidence before the Court, and save for his
illegal entry into the country, Petitioner appears to be generally
law-abiding and is a husband and father of United States citizens.
If 	the 	decision 	could 	be 	based 	purely 	on 	sympathy, 	a 	different
result 	might 	be 	warranted. 	And 	based 	on 	social 	policy 	and 	other
considerations, 	reasonable 	minds 	might 	make 	arguments 	against 	or
in 	favor 	of 	mandatory 	detention 	of 	noncitizens 	present 	in 	the
United 	States 	without 	having 	been 	admitted. 	But 	the 	Court’s 	duty
is “to interpret the law not to re-write it.” In re Fin. Oversight
& Mgmt. Bd. for Puerto Rico, 919 F.3d at 132. This Court is of the
view 	that 	the 	plain 	meaning 	of 	Section 	1225(a)(1) 	and 	Section
1225(b)(2) 	compels 	Petitioner’s 	detention 	and 	renders 	him
ineligible for a bond hearing under Section 1226. Considering the
foregoing, 	Petitioner’s 	Petition 	for 	Writ 	of 	Habeas 	Corpus 	at
Docket No. 1 is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan Puerto Rico, this 17 th day of February 2026.
S/ RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH
United States District Judge
Case 3:26-cv-01041-RAM Document 32 Filed 02/17/26 Page 24 of 24