Garcia-Espinal v. Ripa et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
ANGEL LUIS GARCÍA ESPINAL,
Petitioner,
v.
GARRETT J. RIPA, TODD LYONS,
KRISTI NOEM, PAMELA BONDI, and the
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
Respondents.
Civ. No. 26-1039 (GMM)
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Angel Luis García Espinal’s
(“Petitioner” or “Mr. García”) Writ of Habeas Corpus, at Docket
No. 1; Emergency Motion Requesting Temporary Restraining Order
(“Emergency Motion”), at Docket No. 3; and Motion Requesting
Issuance of an Order to Show Cause (“Show Cause Order”), at Docket
No. 7.
Pursuant to the reasoning below, this Court GRANTS the
Emergency Motion as to Petitioner’s request for a Temporary
Restraining Order (“TRO”); GRANTS the Show Cause Order; and HOLDS
IN ABEYANCE the Writ of Habeas Corpus as to the remaining prayers
for relief. This Court hereby ORDERS that the United States, its
agencies, and employees shall not transfer Petitioner outside of
the jurisdiction of Puerto Rico and that he be granted a bond
hearing conducted by an Immigration Judge under the Department of
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Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”). The
Court also ORDERS the Government to show cause as to why the
petition for writ of habeas corpus should not be granted.
I. INTRODUCTION
“Freedom from imprisonment — from government custody,
detention, or other forms of physical restraint — lies at the heart
of the liberty” that is protected by the Due Process Clause. United
States v. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Upon analysis of the
two federal statutes — whose texts have recently been the subject
of scrutiny by both administrative and federal forums — the Court
concludes, for purposes of the requested temporary injunctive
relief, that Mr. García has demonstrated a strong likelihood of
entitlement to a bond hearing.
II. BACKGROUND
Mr. García, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, entered
Puerto Rico at the age of 18 without inspection on or about October
18, 2008. (Docket No. 1 at 1). On August 8, 2022, Mr. García
married Magali Vargas Ocasio, a U.S. citizen. (Docket No. 1-1 at
1). They have two U.S. citizen daughters. (Id. at 2; Docket No. 1
at 2). On September 1, 2022, Mr. García’s wife filed a I-130 Form,
or “Petition for [Noncitizen] Relative,” with the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), which is the
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initial step for a U.S. citizen to sponsor a relative for legal
residency in the United States. (Docket No. 1 at 1, 6). That
application is currently pending. (Id.).
On January 9, 2026, Mr. García was arrested by United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents at his place of
work during a nonviolent enforcement operation. (Id. at 2, 6).
According to the Writ of Habeas Corpus, Mr. García was relocated
to Aguadilla Processing Center, where he remains under custody.
(Id.). Mr. García alleges that the following federal officials
(collectively, “Government”) authorize his detention: Garrett J.
Ripa, Miami Field Office Director for ICE, who oversees Puerto
Rico’s Immigration and Removal Operations conducted at the ICE
Office in GSA Guaynabo Detention Facility; Todd Lyons, Acting
Director for ICE; Kristi Noem, Secretary of Homeland Security; and
Pamela Bondi, United States Attorney General. (Id. at 4-5). These
Government officials, according to Mr. García, have denied him the
opportunity for a custody redetermination hearing (“bond hearing”)
before an Immigration Judge, alleging that he has been informed
that his detention is being treated as governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1225
and that, on that basis, he is not entitled to a bond hearing under
recent administrative case law. (Id. at 3).
On January 23, 2026, Mr. García filed a verified Writ of
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Habeas Corpus. (Id.). Mr. García alleges his detention violates
his procedural due process rights to challenge his detention under
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Id. at 8-
9). Mr. García contends that, if he is afforded a bond hearing, he
would be able to demonstrate that he is not a flight risk, poses
no danger to the community, and would be eligible for Cancelation
of Removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(c) or under Section 240(b) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), as he has no criminal
history, has over ten years of residence within the United States,
and has strong family ties in the country. (Id. at 2).
Mr. García seeks, in part, an immediate TRO prohibiting the
Government, their agents, and employees from transferring
Petitioner out of the District of Puerto Rico until he receives a
bond hearing and until his writ of habeas corpus is fully reviewed
by this Court. (Id. at 10). In addition, Mr. García asks this Court
to grant his habeas petition and to award him reasonable costs and
attorney’s fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2412. (Id.). To accompany Mr. García’s habeas petition,
he has submitted copies of multiple government documents: his
marriage certificate; his eight-year-old daughter’s birth
certificate; his USCIS notice that his I-130 form was received in
2022; proof of remittances to the Dominican Republic; his Dominican
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Republic passport; evidence of his registration with the Puerto
Rico government including a water bill, his driving record, and
license; and a copy of his U.S. federal government tax returns.
See generally (Docket No. 1-1).
Three other motions were filed by Petitioner on January 23,
2026. First, an Emergency Motion was filed, which asks the Court
to grant an immediate TRO. (Docket No. 3). Second, Petitioner filed
a Motion Submitting Summons to Be Issued; said summons were then
promptly issued by the Clerk’s Office. (Docket Nos. 2, 4). Lastly,
Petitioner filed a Motion Submitting Summons Executed as to Mr.
Ripa, Mr. Lyons, and Secretary Noem, and affirming that Attorney
General Bondi was served via certified mail. (Docket No. 6).
At this emergency juncture, the Court only addresses whether
to issue a TRO.1
1 To the extent that this Court must review Petitioner’s Writ of Habeas Corpus
– without deciding the merits of the habeas petition - to review Petitioner’s
prayer for a TRO, it has the jurisdiction to do so. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)
(providing federal courts with jurisdiction to review habeas petitions filed by
immigration detainees who assert that they are “in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”). Moreover, as pled,
Petitioner alleges having exhausted his administration remedies by filing a
Motion for Bond. See (Docket No. 1 at 9). Nevertheless, this Court currently
refrains from deciding the habeas. See also Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs
Enf’t, 510 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2007).
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III. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) controls this Court’s
analysis. TROs can be issued with or without notice to the adverse
parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).
Courts have interpreted the standard for issuing a TRO “the
same as [those] for a preliminary injunction.” Servicios Legales
de P.R., Inc. v. Unión Independiente de Trabajadores de Servicios
Legales, 376 F. Supp. 3d 163, 166 (D.P.R. 2019) (citation omitted).
In order for a district court to grant a TRO, a plaintiff “‘must
establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that
he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his
favor, and [4] that the injunction is in the public interest.”
Peoples Fed. Sav. Bank v. People’s United Bank, 672 F.3d 1, 8-9
(1st Cir. 2012) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). Petitioner “bears the burden of
demonstrating that these four factors weigh in its favor.” Esso
Standard Oil Co. v. Monroig-Zayas, 445 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2006).
A TRO, like a preliminary injunction, is “an extraordinary
and drastic remedy that is never awarded as of right.” Peoples
Fed. Sav. Bank, 672 F.3d at 8-9 (quoting Voice of the Arab World,
Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2011);
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accord Mass. Coal. of Citizens with Disabilities v. Civ. Def.
Agency & Off. of Emergency Preparedness, 649 F.2d 71, 76 n.7 (1st
Cir. 1981). “[T]rial courts have wide discretion in making
judgments regarding the appropriateness of” TRO relief. Sanchez v.
Esso Standard Oil Co., 572 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2009). Thus,
granting a TRO is “a matter for the discretion of the district
court and is reversible, of course, only for an abuse of
discretion.” Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 641
F.2d 1006, 1009 (1st Cir. 1981) (citation omitted).
IV. APPLICATION OF LAW
Notice has been provided consistent with Rule 65(b). See
(Docket Nos. 5, 6) (demonstrating summons has been issued and
executed as to all Government officials); see also Muñiz-Negrón v.
Worthington Cylinder Corp., No. 17-CV-1985-RAM, 2021 WL 5313002,
at *2 (D.P.R. Aug. 16, 2021). As such, the Court proceeds to the
TRO analysis.
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
To assess whether Petitioner is likely to succeed on the
merits in requesting a bond hearing, the Court must first address
the threshold question of which statute provides the Government
with the legal basis to detain Mr. García.
The INA affords the Government the authority to detain certain
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noncitizens. Importantly, the INA differentiates between mandatory
detention and discretionary detention. Only the latter provides a
detainee with an entitlement to a bond hearing before an
Immigration Judge. Two statutory provisions control this
distinction: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226.
Section 1225 governs the detention of noncitizens who have
not been “admitted” under the INA. As relevant here, Section 1225
provides for inspection of “[a]ll [noncitizens] . . . who are
applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission or
readmission to or transit through the United States.” 8 U.S.C. §
1225(a)(3). An “applicant for admission” is defined as “[a
noncitizen] present in the United States who has not been admitted
or who arrives in the United States . . . .” Id. § 1225(a)(1).
Notably, Section 1225(b)(2) marshals a mandatory detention scheme
by providing that, for noncitizens who are “applicant[s] for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that a
[noncitizen] seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to be admitted, the [noncitizen] shall be detained for a
proceeding under section 1229a [for full removal proceedings].”
Id. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Detention under Section 1225(b)(2) is
generally mandatory, and the statute does not authorize bond
hearings. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018).
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Section 1226, by contrast, governs the “usual removal
process” and affords noncitizens procedural protections not
available in expedited removal proceedings. See Dep’t of Homeland
Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 108 (2020). Under Section
1226, a noncitizen who is “arrested and detained” faces three
potential outcomes: the Attorney General “may continue to detain
the arrested [noncitizen]”; the Attorney General “may release the
[noncitizen] on bond of at least $1,500”; or the Attorney General
“may release the [noncitizen] on conditional parole.” 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a). Section 1226(a) therefore “establishes a discretionary
detention framework for noncitizens.” Gomes v. Hyde, No. 25-CV-
11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299, at *1 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025).
Where removal and detention of a noncitizen is discretionary,
rather than mandatory, Section 1226(a) entitles a noncitizen to an
initial bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, the
opportunity to be represented by counsel and to present evidence,
the right to appeal, and the right to seek a new hearing when
circumstances materially change. See also Rodriguez Diaz v.
Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1202 (9th Cir. 2022); Doe v. Tompkins, 11
F.4th 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2021) (holding that the Government bears the
burden of proving at an initial bond hearing held under Section
1226(a) that (1) a noncitizen poses a danger to the community based
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on clear and convincing evidence, or (2) the noncitizen poses a
flight risk based on a preponderance of the evidence); Brito v.
Garland, 22 F.4th 240, 246 (1st Cir. 2021) (same).
Excepted from the general rule of discretionary detention
under Section 1226(a) are noncitizens involved in specific
enumerated criminal activities. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). Under
Section 1226(c), in accordance with the Laken Riley Act enacted in
January 2025, the Government is required to detain certain
noncitizens who fall within the statute’s criminal categories of
being in the country without inspection and committing specific
crimes. See Pub. L. No. 119-1, § 2, 139 Stat. 3, 3 (2025) (adding
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)).
1. Mr. García is discretionarily detained
According to the Writ of Habeas Corpus, Mr. García believes
he is detained under Section 1226 and is therefore entitled to a
bond hearing. (Docket No. 1 at 3). The Government, as alleged by
Petitioner, believes that Mr. García’s detention falls under
Section 1225’s ambit and therefore Mr. García should be denied a
bond hearing. (Id.).
As pled, Mr. García entered the country without authorization
in 2008, has a pending I-130 application to become a lawful
permanent resident by way of a U.S. citizen relative, and was
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arrested and detained by ICE officials in January 2026. See
generally (Docket No. 1). Given that Section 1226(a) governs
detention for noncitizens who were “arrested and detained” while
residing in the United States, interpreting Section 1225(b)(2) to
apply to this same category would render it and amendments under
the Laken Riley Act superfluous. See Gomes, 2025 WL 1869299, at
*6-7 (outlining statutory interpretation of Section 1226(a) and
Section 1225(b)(2) that demonstrates that an arrest and detention
of noncitizens residing in the United States cannot fall under
Section 1225(b)(2)). Such an interpretation would also conflict
with the INA’s structural distinction between arriving applicants
for admission and noncitizens already present in the United States
and arrested within the country.
Thus, at this juncture, and based solely on the allegations
in the petition, the Court finds that Mr. García has shown a
substantial likelihood that his detention is governed by Section
1226(a)’s discretionary regime. This interpretation aligns with
the statutory distinction between arriving applicants for
admission (governed by Section 1225) and noncitizens who are
already present in the United States and are later arrested and
detained (governed by Section 1226). Again, applying Section
1225(b)(2) to this factual posture would blur that distinction and
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render Section 1226(a) effectively redundant. See Gomes, 2025 WL
1869299, at *6-7. Nor, with the information that this Court has
before it, has Mr. García disclosed any criminal record at all,
which could otherwise subject him to the mandatory detention
exception outlined under Section 1226(c). See (Docket No. 1 at 2);
Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 26-27 (1st Cir. 2021);
Rodriguez-Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1196.
Accordingly, the Court proceeds under the assumption that
Section 1226(a) applies, subject to further factual development.
2. Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits
Where removal and detention of a noncitizen is discretionary,
rather than mandatory, Section 1226(a), entitles a noncitizen to
an initial bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, the
opportunity to be represented by counsel and to present evidence,
the right to appeal, and the right to seek a new hearing when
circumstances materially change. Rodriguez-Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1202;
see also Doe, 11 F.4th at 2.
From the record before this Court, the Government has
allegedly grounded its decision to not grant a bond hearing in a
recent Board of Immigration Appeals decision: Matter of Yajure
Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). In that decision, the Board
concluded that Immigration Judges lack jurisdiction over custody
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redeterminations for certain noncitizens present in the United
States without admission. Id. at 220-28. The Government allegedly
believes that Matter of Yajure Hurtado should tie this Court’s
hands and bind it from acting further.
This Court disagrees. This Court is not bound by BIA
interpretations that conflict with the statutory text or with
controlling judicial precedent. See Loper Bright Enters. v.
Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 400 (2024) (noting “agencies have no
special competence in resolving statutory ambiguities,” but
“(c)ourts do”).
To the contrary, district courts that have considered this
issue have, after conducting persuasive, well-reasoned analyses of
the statutory language and legislative history, rejected Matter of
Yajure Hurtado’s interpretation and routinely upheld the right to
a bond hearing under circumstances akin to those of Petitioner.
See, e.g., Sampiao v. Hyde, 799 F. Supp. 3d 14, 29 n.11 (D. Mass.
2025) (noting the court’s disagreement with the BIA’s analysis in
Yajure Hurtado); Elias Escobar v. Hyde, No. 25-CV-12620, 2025 WL
2823324, at *3 (D. Mass. Oct. 3, 2025); Moreira Aguiar v. Moniz,
No. 25-CV-12706, 2025 WL 2987656, at *3 (D. Mass. Oct. 22, 2025);
Tomas Elias v. Hyde, No. 25-CV-540, 2025 WL 3004437, at *3 (D.R.I.
Oct. 27, 2025); Lora-Salazar v. Ripa, No. 26-CV-1014-MAJ (D.P.R.
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Jan. 13, 2026) (Docket Nos. 5, 13). In the same vein, district
courts have similarly rejected the adoption of a broad
interpretation of 1225(b)(2) that would, consequently, generate
overlap with Section 1226(a) as to erroneously deny the
noncitizen’s right to a bond hearing. See generally Jimenez v. FCI
Berlin, Warden, 799 F. Supp. 3d 59 (D.N.H. 2025); Rodriguez v.
Nessinger, No. 25-CV-505, 2025 WL 3306576 (D.R.I. Oct. 17, 2025);
Doe v. Moniz, 800 F. Supp. 3d 203 (D. Mass. 2025); Loa Caballero
v. Baltazar, No. 25-CV-3120, 2025 WL 2977650 (D. Colo. Oct. 22,
2025); dos Santos v. Noem, 2025 WL 2370988 (D. Mass. Aug. 14,
2025); Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz, No. 25-CV-12664-PBS, 2025 WL
2809996 (D. Mass. Oct. 3, 2025) (granting a preliminary injunction
to release a Petitioner unless provided with a bond hearing
compliant with Hernandez-Lara).
This Court joins its sister courts. This Court finds that
Petitioner has demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the
merits of his claim that, because he is being detained pursuant to
Section 1226(a), he is entitled to a bond hearing.
B. Irreparable Harm
The Court turns next to the irreparable harm prong of a TRO
analysis. When evaluating the expedition of equitable relief,
“[an] injunction should issue only where [it is] essential in order
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effectually to protect . . . rights against injuries otherwise
irremediable.” Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312
(1982) (quoting Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 456 (1919)).
Here, the “irremediable” injury would be threefold: detention;
removal from this Court’s jurisdiction pending Mr. García’s habeas
corpus proceedings; and the ensuing, imminent consequences that
such removal would have on his person and his rights.
Without a bond hearing, Mr. García faces a potentially
prolonged period of detention, depriving him of his liberty.
Ferrara v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 2d 351, 360 (D. Mass. 2005)
(“Obviously, the loss of liberty is a . . . severe form of
irreparable injury.”). During this time, Mr. García would also
face a substantial risk of confinement in facilities that courts
have repeatedly found raise serious health, safety, and due process
concerns. See, e.g., Mercado v. Noem, 800 F. Supp. 3d 526, 545
(S.D.N.Y. 2025) (discussing allegations of “significant
overcrowding, pervasive unsanitary conditions, lack of basic
hygiene resources, insufficient food and water, inadequate
sleeping conditions, substandard medical care, and extremely
significant restrictions on attorney-client communications” in a
New York immigration detention center).
Moreover, without the issuance of a TRO, Mr. García would be
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likely transferred to an immigration detention facility in
mainland United States and separated from his counsel – which would
materially interfere with his ability to access counsel and to
litigate his habeas petition. See, e.g., Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 6
(detailing the transferring of noncitizen detainees out of their
original jurisdiction, which impeded access to legal and
administrative support).
As such, the Court finds this factor also weighs in Mr.
García’s favor.
C. Balance of Equities and Public Interest
When the Government is the opposing party, the balance of
equities and the public interest merge. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S.
418, 435 (2009). Where a petitioner has demonstrated a likelihood
that the Government’s conduct is inconsistent with governing law,
these factors weigh in favor of injunctive relief. See Hernandez-
Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19 at 41. Moreover, there is no public
interest in the enforcement of unlawful agency action. Nken, 556
U.S. at 436.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the Writ of Habeas Corpus and accompanying motions,
(Docket Nos. 1-3, 6-7), this Court finds at this juncture that
irreparable harm is likely to befall Mr. García if he is not
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afforded a bond hearing.
As such, this Court GRANTS the Emergency Motion as to
Petitioner’s request for a TRO; GRANTS the Show Cause Order; and
HOLDS IN ABEYANCE the Writ of Habeas Corpus as to the remaining
prayers for relief. This Court ORDERS that the Government shall
not transfer Petitioner outside of Puerto Rico and that he be
granted a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge, no later than
February 3, 2026 at 5:00 P.M. The Government shall inform by
February 4, 2026 whether such bond hearing has been held and its
outcome. The Court also ORDERS the Government show cause as to why
the Petitioner’s Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be granted by
February 4, 2026 at 5:00 P.M.
This Order grants only temporary injunctive relief and does
not adjudicate the merits of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, on January 23, 2026.
/s/ Gina R. Méndez-Miró
GINA R. MÉNDEZ-MIRÓ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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