WE, LLC v. M.R.J. Distributors, Inc. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
WE, LLC d/b/a WILD ENCANTOS,
Plaintiff,
v.
MRJ DISTRIBUTORS, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants.
Civil No. 24-1584 (ADC)
OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is United States Magistrate Judge Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte’s
Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) issued on October 23, 2025, recommending the denial of
plaintiff WE, LLC’s (“plaintiff”) motion for a preliminary injunction. ECF No. 69. On November
6, 2025, plaintiff filed objections to the Magistrate Judge’s R&R. ECF No. 72. Defendant
responded to the objections on November 18, 2025. ECF No. 76.
For the reasons set forth below, after careful consideration, plaintiff’s objections are
OVERRULED, and the R&R is ADOPTED.
I. 	Factual and Procedural Background
The R&R aptly summarizes plaintiff’s extensive history of copyright infringement
litigation in federal court, as well as the factual and procedural history of the current case. ECF
No. 69, at 2-8. Thus, neither needs to be repeated at length here. By means of a brief review,
however, 	plaintiff 	alleges 	copyright 	infringement 	by 	MRJ 	Distributors, 	Inc. 	(“MRJ” 	or
“defendant”) of a musical plush toy coquí frog, a musical plush toy parrot, and the toys’
Case 3:24-cv-01584-ADC Document 98 Filed 01/30/26 Page 1 of 8

Civil No. 24-1584 (ADC) 	Page 2
accompanying hang tags. ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 23, 28-29. Plaintiff seeks preliminary and permanent
injunctive relief, damages, and reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. and
15 U.S.C. § 1125. Id., at 14-15. Plaintiff’s complaint only perfunctorily requested a preliminary
injunction, which did not properly comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. Id. Accordingly, on December
30, 2024, the Court issued an order stating that it would not consider “any request for
preliminary injunctive relief unless and until a separate motion to that effect is filed, notice is
given to the defendants, and the provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 and L. Civ. R. 65 are otherwise
complied with.” ECF No. 5. On May 12, 2025, plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction. ECF
No. 37. MRJ filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which
plaintiff opposed and to which MRJ replied. ECF Nos. 16, 25, 30, 39. The Court denied MRJ’s
motion, and referred its request for preliminary injunctive relief to the Magistrate Judge for a
hearing and an R&R. ECF Nos. 54-56.
On October 1, 2025, the Magistrate Judge held a hearing on the preliminary injunction
and received testimony from plaintiff and defendant MRJ.1 On October 23, 2025, the Magistrate
Judge issued an R&R, recommending the denial of plaintiff’s preliminary injunction motion.
ECF No. 69, at 1. The R&R discusses the hearing testimony, detailing how much of plaintiff’s
testimony centered on the similarities and dissimilarities between Wild Encantos’ and MRJ’s
1 At the hearing, plaintiff withdrew its preliminary injunction request as to defendant Wal-Mart of Puerto Rico
(“Walmart”), and thus the Magistrate Judge did not receive testimony regarding the preliminary injunction from
Walmart. ECF Nos. 59, 64.
Case 3:24-cv-01584-ADC Document 98 Filed 01/30/26 Page 2 of 8

Civil No. 24-1584 (ADC) 	Page 3
plush toys. Id., at 7-8. Additionally, the R&R describes how, when the Magistrate Judge asked
Wild Encantos’ about its evidence regarding irreparable harm resulting from the alleged
copyright infringement, Wild Encantos stated only that the presence of the lookalike plush toys
in the market was sufficient by itself to prove irreparable harm. Id., at 8. On the basis that Wild
Encantos’ argument regarding irreparable harm “appear[ed] to be premised entirely on the now
defunct presumption of irreparable harm,” the Magistrate Judge recommended denying the
request for a preliminary injunction. Id., at 11-13.
On 	November 	6, 	2025, 	plaintiff 	filed 	objections 	to 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge’s 	R&R.
ECF No. 72. Plaintiff makes two objections to the R&R. First, plaintiff argues that the Magistrate
Judge erred in not considering all four factors a party must satisfy for the issuance of an
injunction, particularly the first factor, whether plaintiff would be likely to succeed on the
merits. ECF No. 72, at 4. Secondly, Wild Encantos objects to the R&R ‘s conclusion that it would
not suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction because, in conducting the irreparable
harm analysis, the Magistrate Judge incorporated the likelihood of confusion standard, which
is applicable to trademark, not copyright, cases. Id., at 4-6.
Defendant countered both objections, arguing that, as to the first objection, the R&R need
not have addressed the likelihood of success on the merits if there was ultimately no finding of
irreparable harm. ECF No. 76, at 6-8. As to Wild Encantos’ second objection, defendant argued
that, because no dispositive presumption of irreparable harm exists in copyright cases, and
Case 3:24-cv-01584-ADC Document 98 Filed 01/30/26 Page 3 of 8

Civil No. 24-1584 (ADC) 	Page 4
because plaintiff presented no evidence to support any such finding, the R&R did not err in its
finding of no irreparable harm. Id., at 2-5.
II. 	Standard of Review
United States Magistrate Judges are granted authority to make proposed findings and
recommendations on a motion to dismiss, while the ultimate resolution of the motion remains
at the discretion of the presiding judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); accord
L. Civ. R. 72(a)(1). Any party adversely affected by the recommendation issued may file written
objections within fourteen (14) days of being served with the report and recommendation. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b). A party that files a timely objection is entitled to a de novo determination of
“those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
specific objection is made.” Sylva v. Culebra Dive Shop, 389 F. Supp. 2d 189, 191–92 (D.P.R. 2005)
(citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673 (1980)). “The district court need not consider
frivolous, conclusive, or general objections.” Rivera–García v. United States, Civ. No. 06–1004
(PG), 2008 WL 3287236, at *1 (D.P.R. Aug. 7, 2008) (citing Battle v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 834 F.2d
419 (5th Cir. 1987)).
To the extent a party’s objections are little more than general or conclusory, without
specifying to which issues the party is objecting, or where the objections are repetitive of the
arguments already made to the magistrate judge, a de novo review may be unwarranted. Id.
“Instead, the report and recommendation is reviewed by the district judge for clear error.” Id.
Case 3:24-cv-01584-ADC Document 98 Filed 01/30/26 Page 4 of 8

Civil No. 24-1584 (ADC) 	Page 5
(citing Camardo v. Gen. Motors Hourly–Rate Emps. Pension Plan, 806 F. Supp. 380, 382 (W.D.N.Y.
1992) (“It is improper for an objecting party to ... submit[ ] papers to a district court which are
nothing more than a rehashing of the same arguments and positions taken in the original papers
submitted to the Magistrate Judge. Clearly, parties are not to be afforded a ‘second bite at the
apple’ when they file objections to a R & R.”)).
In conducting its review, the Court is free to “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate-judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see
also, Templeman v. Chris Craft Corp., 770 F.2d 245, 247 (1st Cir. 1985); Alamo Rodríguez v. Pfizer
Pharma., Inc., 286 F. Supp. 2d 144, 146 (D.P.R. 2003). Hence, the court may accept those parts of
the report and recommendation to which the party does not object. See Hernández–Mejías v. Gen.
Elec., 428 F. Supp. 2d 4, 6 (D.P.R. 2005) (citing Lacedra v. Donald W. Wyatt Detention Facility, 334
F. Supp. 2d 114, 125–26 (D.R.I. 2004)). The Court, however, “is not required to make separate
findings of fact or issue an opinion setting forth its own reasoning.” United States v. Bach, 388 F.
App’x 2 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Jonco, LLC v. ALI, Inc., 157 F.3d 33, 35 (1st Cir. 1998)).
III. 	Discussion
Plaintiff’s first objection to the R&R, that the Magistrate Judge erred in not considering
all four factors required to issue an injunction, is entitled to de novo review. Sylva, 389 F. Supp.
2d at 191–92. The four factors that a movant must satisfy for a Court to issue a preliminary
injunction are: “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a significant risk of
Case 3:24-cv-01584-ADC Document 98 Filed 01/30/26 Page 5 of 8

Civil No. 24-1584 (ADC) 	Page 6
irreparable harm if the injunction is withheld, (3) a favorable balance of hardships, and (4) a fit
(or lack of friction) between the injunction and the public interest.” Nieves-Márquez v. Puerto Rico,
353 F.3d 108, 120 (1st Cir. 2003).
In its objections to the R&R, Wild Encantos cites to Grant v. Trial Court of Commonwealth,
137 F 4th 1,4 (1st Cir. 2025), to support its argument that that the Magistrate Judge should have
analyzed each and every one of the four factors. ECF No. 72, at 4. Yet the case stands for the
same standard already articulated above – for a preliminary injunction to issue, the movant
must satisfy all four factors in his or her favor, not that the court must analyze every one of the
four factors before declining to issue a preliminary injunction. See Russomano v. Novo Nordisk
Inc., 960 F.3d 48, 55 (1st Cir. 2020) (finding no error in the district court’s “decision not to analyze
the remaining factors in the test for a preliminary injunction before denying the motion.”).
Indeed, the First Circuit is clear that, while “[t]he first two factors are the most important” in
analyzing a request for a preliminary injunction, such a request can be denied solely with no
showing of irreparable harm. Together Emps. v. Mass Gen. Brigham Inc., 32 F.4th (1st Cir. 2022)
(affirming the denial of a preliminary injunction where “appellants made virtually no effort to
show irreparable harm.”). The Magistrate Judge, therefore, did not err in determining that,
because there was no significant risk of irreparable harm, no preliminary injunction would
issue. ECF No. 69, at 13. Plaintiff’s first objection holds no water.
Case 3:24-cv-01584-ADC Document 98 Filed 01/30/26 Page 6 of 8

Civil No. 24-1584 (ADC) 	Page 7
As to plaintiff’s second objection, that it is suffering the threat of irreparable harm,
plaintiff does little more than raise the same arguments presented to – and rejected by – the
Magistrate Judge.2 At the hearing, plaintiff argued that it would suffer irreparable harm both
because the allegedly infringing plush toys were being sold at a cheaper price and because their
presence in the market confused some consumers. ECF No. 69, at 8. However, when the
Magistrate Judge specifically inquired whether plaintiff’s “argument [was] that sort of the mere
existence of what you’re calling an infringing product causes irreparable injury to your client,”
plaintiff’s counsel answered “exactly.” Id. As the R&R points out, and as plaintiff’s counsel
acknowledged both at the hearing and in its objections to the R&R, there is no longer a
presumption of irreparable harm in copyright cases. Id.; ECF No. 72, at 4. Although plaintiff
offered vague allegations that it was concerned about lower-priced knockoffs and competition
from these products at Walmart and Supermax, it offered no evidence as to whether the sales of
the allegedly infringing toys actually caused an injury. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge was
correct in finding that, absent any concrete evidence as to irreparable harm, plaintiffs had failed
to present a showing of the same.
2 While plaintiff also raises the argument that the Magistrate Judge, in conducting the irreparable harm analysis,
incorporated the likelihood of confusion standard, which is applicable to trademark, not copyright, cases, plaintiff
itself was the party who raised the likelihood of confusion argument at the preliminary injunction hearing. See Tr.
of Prelim. Inj. Hearing at 151:22-153:14; 159:4-160:4.
Case 3:24-cv-01584-ADC Document 98 Filed 01/30/26 Page 7 of 8

Civil No. 24-1584 (ADC) 	Page 8
IV. 	Conclusion
For all of the above reasons, the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s R&R at ECF No.
69. Consequently, plaintiff’s objections to the R&R at ECF No. 72 are OVERRULED and the
request for a preliminary injunction at ECF No. 37 and accompanying supplemental motion at
ECF No. 41 are DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
At San Juan, Puerto Rico, on this 30th day of January, 2026.
S/AIDA M. DELGADO-COLÓN
United States District Judge
Case 3:24-cv-01584-ADC Document 98 Filed 01/30/26 Page 8 of 8