USA v. Vasquez-Amarante

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
[1] ESTEFANI VÁZQUEZ-AMARANTE,
Defendant.
CRIMINAL NO. 22-452 (RAM)
OPINION AND ORDER
This 	matter 	comes 	before 	the 	Court 	on 	the 	United 	States’
Urgent Request for Staying Magistrate Judge’s Order Releasing the
Defendant 	and 	Appeal 	of 	Release 	Order 	(“Urgent 	Motion”) 	and
Defendant 	Estefani 	Vazquez-Amarante’s 	(“Mr. 	Vázquez-Amarante” 	or
“Defendant”) 	Reconsideration 	of 	Stay 	Order 	and 	Opposition 	to
Government’s Motion for De Novo Review. (Docket Nos. 49 and 52).
Having 	heard 	both 	parties 	at 	a 	De 	Novo 	hearing 	held 	on
February 	2, 	2026, 	the 	Court 	DENIES 	the 	United 	States’s 	Urgent
Motion. 	Defendant 	shall 	be 	released 	pursuant 	to 	the 	Magistrate
Judge’s 	Order 	at 	Docket 	No. 	44 	and 	subject 	to 	the 	conditions
therein.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On 	October 	10, 	2022, 	a 	Grand 	Jury 	returned 	an 	Indictment
charging 	Mr. 	Vázquez-Amarante 	with 	two 	counts 	of 	international
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Criminal No. 22-452 (RAM) 	2
distribution of five (5) kilograms or more of cocaine in violation
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 959(a), 960, 963 and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and one count
of 	conspiracy 	to 	commit 	money 	laundering 	derived 	from 	specified
unlawful activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). (Docket No.
3).
On 	September 	7, 	2023, 	a 	Grand 	Jury 	subsequently 	returned 	a
Superseding Indictment charging the same offenses with amendments
that 	are 	not 	relevant 	to 	the 	issue 	before 	the 	court. 	(Docket 	No.
10).
On 	January 	27, 	2026, 	Defendant 	appeared 	before 	Magistrate
Judge Héctor Ramos-Vega for an Arraignment and Detention Hearing.
(Docket No. 43). The Government moved for detention. The Magistrate
heard the parties and took the matter under advisement. Id.
Also 	on 	January 	27, 	2026, 	and 	while 	the 	Pretrial 	Services
Report recommended detention, the Magistrate found that there were
conditions of release that would reasonably assure the appearance
of 	the 	Defendant 	and 	the 	safety 	of 	the 	community. 	In 	addition 	to
the 	standard 	conditions 	of 	release, 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge 	imposed
the 	following 	conditions: 	a 	$10,000 	unsecured 	bond; 	electronic
monitoring 	under 	the 	home 	incarceration 	modality; 	Defendant 	must
reside with his mother; and Defendant must surrender his passport.
(Docket No. 43).
On January 29, 2026, the Government filed its Urgent Motion.
(Docket 	No. 	49). 	The 	Government 	requested 	a 	stay 	of 	the 	order
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Criminal No. 22-452 (RAM) 	3
alleging that the offenses charged triggered a presumption against
finding 	conditions 	of 	release 	and 	that 	Defendant 	is 	a 	danger 	to
the 	community 	and 	a 	risk 	of 	flight. 	Id. 	Specifically, 	the
Government posited that Defendant is a citizen and resident of the
Dominican Republic with extensive ties and property there and with
no 	legal 	status 	in 	the 	United 	States. 	Id. 	at 	3. 	The 	Government
also 	maintained 	that 	Mr. 	Vázquez-Amarante 	lived 	in 	the 	Dominican
Republic 	since 	2020 	until 	his 	extradition 	in 	2026, 	that 	he 	has
siblings, a wife, and a daughter there, and that he owns property
there. Id. The Government further alluded to the evidence against
Defendant 	and 	alleged 	he 	had 	access 	to 	vast 	illicit 	financial
resources. 	Id. 	at 	4. 	The 	Government 	claimed 	that 	the 	nature 	of
Defendant’s 	life 	outside 	of 	the 	United 	States, 	his 	access 	to
financial 	resources, 	and 	his 	exposure 	to 	a 	statutory 	sentence 	of
10 years to life give Mr. Vázquez-Amarante incentive to flee. Id.
Also 	on 	January 	29, 	2026, 	the 	Court 	issued 	an 	order 	staying
the 	Order 	of 	Release 	because 	it 	found 	that 	“[t]he 	Government 	has
made a showing of likelihood of success on the merits and of risk
of flight if the order of release is not stayed.” (Docket No. 50).
Moreover, 	the 	Court 	also 	found 	that 	“the 	public 	interest 	also
favors a brief stay.” Id.; See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009).
The 	Court 	set 	the 	De 	Novo 	hearing 	on 	detention 	or 	release 	for
February 4, 2026. Id.
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Criminal No. 22-452 (RAM) 	4
On 	that 	same 	day, 	Defendant 	filed 	a 	trifecta 	of 	motions
comprised 	of 	a 	motion 	requesting 	a 	copy 	of 	the 	audio 	of 	the
detention hearing, the Motion for Reconsideration, and a motion to
advance 	the 	De 	Novo 	hearing. 	(Docket 	Nos. 	52-55). 	In 	his 	Motion
for 	Reconsideration, 	Mr. 	Vázquez-Amarante 	maintained 	that 	any
potential 	risk 	of 	flight 	is 	mitigated 	by 	the 	fact 	that 	he
voluntarily 	surrendered 	to 	Dominican 	Republic 	authorities 	for
extradition to the United States. (Docket No. 52 at 3). Moreover,
Defendant alleged strong family ties to the community because his
mother 	has 	resided 	in 	Puerto 	Rico 	for 	many 	years. 	Id. 	at 	11. 	Mr.
Vázquez-Amarante 	also 	maintained 	that 	he 	has 	no 	criminal 	record
and 	that 	the 	Government 	has 	made 	no 	showing 	that 	he 	is 	a 	risk 	to
the community. Id. Finally, Defendant posited that the conditions
set 	by 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge 	reasonably 	assure 	the 	safety 	of 	the
community and his appearance. Id. at 12-13.
The 	Court 	advanced 	the 	De 	Novo 	hearing 	to 	February 	2, 	2026.
(Docket No. 55). At the De Novo hearing, the Government proceeded
by 	proffer 	and 	moved 	for 	detention 	on 	risk 	of 	flight 	and
dangerousness 	grounds. 	But 	its 	proffer 	focused 	on 	the 	former 	and
shed no light on the latter.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. Standard of review for a detention or release order.
District 	courts 	review 	a 	magistrate 	judge’s 	order 	of
detention or release under a de novo standard and “need not defer
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Criminal No. 22-452 (RAM) 	5
to 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s 	findings 	or 	give 	specific 	reasons 	for
rejecting them.” United States v. Cidraz-Santiago, 18 F. Supp. 3d
124, 	126 	(D.P.R. 	2014) 	(citations 	omitted). 	A 	district 	court 	may
also 	“take 	additional 	evidence 	or 	conduct 	a 	new 	evidentiary
hearing” when “the defendant has placed relevant facts at issue.”
Id.
B. The Bail Reform Act
Pursuant 	to 	the 	Bail 	Reform 	Act 	of 	1984, 	a 	judicial 	officer
must 	determine 	whether 	a 	person 	charged 	with 	an 	offense 	shall 	be
detained 	or 	released 	pending 	trial. 	See 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 	3142(a).
Section 	3142(e) 	of 	the 	Bail 	Reform 	Act 	provides 	that 	if, 	after
conducting a hearing, “the judicial officer finds that no condition
or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance
of 	the 	person 	as 	required 	and 	the 	safety 	of 	any 	other 	person 	and
the community, such judicial officer shall order the detention of
the person before trial.” Id. § 3142(e).
i. 	Standard of proof
The 	standard 	of 	proof 	for 	detention 	on 	the 	grounds 	of
dangerousness 	is 	clear 	and 	convincing 	evidence. 	Id. 	§ 	3142(f).
Clear 	and 	convincing 	evidence 	is 	“more 	than 	preponderance 	of 	the
evidence 	but 	less 	than 	beyond 	a 	reasonable 	doubt.” 	United 	States
v. 	Acevedo-Ramos, 	600 	F. 	Supp. 	501, 	509 	(D.P.R. 	1984) 	(citations
omitted), aff’d, United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d 203 (1st
Cir. 	1985). 	This 	standard 	requires 	“a 	high 	degree 	of 	certainty
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Criminal No. 22-452 (RAM) 	6
that 	the 	information 	presented 	supports 	the 	conclusion 	of
dangerousness 	or 	risk 	to 	the 	obstruction 	of 	justice.” 	Id. 	On 	the
other hand, the standard of proof for detention on the grounds of
risk of flight is preponderance of the evidence. United States v.
Patriarca, 948 F.2d 789, 793 (1st Cir. 1991).
ii. 	Factors the Court must consider
To 	determine 	whether 	there 	are 	conditions 	of 	release 	that
assure 	a 	defendant’s 	appearance 	and 	the 	safety 	of 	the 	community,
judicial 	officers 	must 	consider 	the 	following 	factors: 	(1) 	the
nature and circumstances of the offense charged; (2) the weight of
the 	evidence 	against 	the 	defendant; 	(3) 	the 	defendant’s 	personal
history and characteristics; and (4) the nature and seriousness of
the 	danger 	to 	any 	person 	or 	the 	community 	that 	would 	be 	posed 	by
the defendant’s release. 18 U.S.C. § 4152(g).
iii. 	The 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) presumption
18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) creates a rebuttable presumption that no
conditions 	can 	reasonably 	assure 	the 	appearance 	of 	the 	defendant
and the safety of the community where there is probable cause that
a defendant has committed one of the crimes listed in the statute
or in the other circumstances set forth therein. United States v.
Vargas-Reyes, 	220 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	221, 	225 	(D.P.R. 	2016) 	(citing 	18
U.S.C. 	§ 	3142(e)(3)). 	A 	grand 	jury 	indictment 	alone 	suffices 	to
trigger the presumption. Id. (citing, inter alia, United States v.
Vargas, 804 F.2d 157, 163 (1st Cir. 1986)).
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Criminal No. 22-452 (RAM) 	7
In 	cases 	involving 	drug 	trafficking 	crimes, 	the 	presumption
comes 	from 	“Congress’s 	finding 	that 	drug 	traffickers 	often 	have
the 	resources 	and 	foreign 	contacts 	to 	escape 	to 	other 	countries”
and that “[f]orfeiture of even a large bond may be just a cost of
doing 	business, 	. 	. 	. 	hence 	drug 	traffickers 	pose 	special 	flight
risks.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Palmer-Contreras, 	835 	F.2d 	15, 	17 	(1st
Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Dillon, 938 F.2d 1412, 1416-
17 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting appellant-defendant remained a risk of
flight where the drug organization “probably could absorb the loss
of 	$200,000 	worth 	of 	security”); 	United 	States 	v. 	Perez-Franco,
839 	F.2d 	867, 	870 	(1st 	Cir. 	1988) 	(gravity 	of 	charges 	and 	non-
citizen status makes the risk of flight pronounced); United States
v. 	Jessup, 	757 	F.2d 	378, 	385 	(1st 	Cir. 	1985) 	(reviewing 	the
evidence 	before 	Congress 	that 	drug 	offenders 	pose 	particular
flight risk), partially abrogated on other grounds by United States
v. O’Brien, 895 F.2d 810 (1st Cir. 1990).
Once 	triggered, 	the 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 	3142(e)(3) 	presumption
imposes on the defendant a burden of production. See Vargas-Reyes,
220 	F. 	Supp. 	at 	225. 	The 	defendant 	may 	satisfy 	the 	burden 	of
production 	by 	introducing 	at 	least 	some 	evidence 	contrary 	to 	the
facts presumed. Id. For that reason, “[t]he burden is not heavy.”
Id. 	Notably, 	the 	burden 	of 	persuasion 	always 	rests 	with 	the
Government in both presumption and non-presumption cases. Id.
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Criminal No. 22-452 (RAM) 	8
However, 	the 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 	3142(e)(3) 	presumption 	does 	not
simply 	vanish 	once 	a 	defendant 	has 	produced 	some 	evidence. 	See
Palmer-Contreras, 835 F.2d at 18; Jessup, 757 F.2d at 383-84, 387.
Instead, judges must keep the presumption in mind as an additional
factor to the four listed in Section 3142(g). See Palmer-Contreras,
835 F.2d at 18; Jessup, 757 F.2d 383-84, 387. In drug trafficking
cases, 	the 	weight 	afforded 	to 	the 	presumption 	depends 	on 	how
closely 	the 	defendant 	resembles 	the 	paradigmatic 	drug 	trafficker
for 	whom 	the 	risk 	is 	particularly 	high; 	“the 	less 	those 	features
resemble 	the 	congressional 	paradigm, 	the 	less 	weight 	the 	[court]
will 	likely 	give 	to 	Congress’s 	concern 	for 	flight.” 	Jessup, 	757
F.2d 	at 	387; 	see 	also 	Palmer-Contreras, 	835 	F.2d 	at 	18; 	Perez-
Franco, 839 F.2d at 870.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The nature and circumstances of the offense charged.
Mr. 	Vázquez 	was 	indicted 	on 	two 	counts 	of 	drug 	trafficking
offenses. 	(Docket 	No. 	10). 	Here, 	the 	presumption 	comes 	from 	18
U.S.C. 	§ 	3142(e)(3)(A), 	i.e., 	probable 	cause 	to 	believe 	that
Defendant 	committed 	“an 	offense 	for 	which 	a 	maximum 	term 	of
imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled
Substances 	Act[.]” 	Given 	the 	severity 	of 	the 	punishment 	provided
by 	the 	relevant 	statutes, 	this 	factor 	favors 	detention. 	However,
as the Court will discuss, the remaining factors favor release.
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Criminal No. 22-452 (RAM) 	9
B. The weight of the evidence against Defendant.
The 	weight 	of 	the 	evidence 	against 	Defendant 	appears 	to 	be
strong. 	To 	support 	the 	international 	distribution 	of 	cocaine
charges, 	the 	Government 	has 	proffered 	evidence 	of 	a 	controlled
delivery of cocaine to Mr. Vázquez-Amarante. 	To support the money
laundering 	charges, 	the 	Government 	has 	proffered 	evidence 	of
multimillion 	dollar 	amounts 	of 	cash 	purportedly 	delivered 	to 	an
undercover informant at Defendant’s direction.
Regardless of the import or weight of the evidence proffered
by 	the 	Government, 	the 	Court 	is 	not 	concerned 	with 	Mr. 	Vázquez-
Amarante’s 	guilt 	or 	innocence 	at 	this 	stage. 	See 	18 	U.S.C. 	§
3142(j) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed as modifying
or 	limiting 	the 	presumption 	of 	innocence.”). 	The 	Court’s 	task 	is
to 	assess 	whether 	there 	is 	a 	set 	of 	conditions 	that 	“will
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the
safety 	of 	any 	other 	person 	and 	the 	community.” 	18 	U.S.C. 	§
3142(c)(B). 	Thus, 	this factor does 	not 	preclude 	a 	finding 	that 	a
set of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of individuals
and the community.
C. Defendant’s history and characteristics.
Defendant’s 	history 	and 	characteristics 	favor 	release. 	Mr.
Vázquez-Amarante is 48 years old and a citizen and resident of the
Dominican 	Republic. 	Mr. 	Vázquez-Amarante 	lacks 	a 	history 	of
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Criminal No. 22-452 (RAM) 	10
substance 	abuse 	and 	voluntarily 	submitted 	to 	urinalysis 	which
yielded negative results to all drugs tested.
Mr. 	Vázquez-Amarante 	has 	no 	criminal 	history 	in 	Puerto 	Rico
or 	elsewhere 	in 	the 	United 	States. 	He 	was 	previously 	a 	legal
permanent 	resident 	of 	the 	United 	States 	residing 	in 	Puerto 	Rico.
According 	to 	the 	Pretrial 	Services 	Report, 	Mr. 	Vázquez-Amarante
asserted he has been residing in the Dominican Republic since 2020.
The 	attorney 	for 	the 	Government 	corroborated 	that 	assertion 	by
proffering that Mr. Vázquez-Amarante left Puerto Rico in 2020 and
never re-entered the United States until he was extradited to face
prosecution.
Mr. 	Vázquez-Amarante’s 	alienage, 	on 	its 	own, 	is 	not
inherently probative of a serious risk of flight nor is it a factor
that “tip[s] the balance either for or against detention.” United
States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir. 1985). Instead,
the 	fundamental 	question 	is 	what 	ties 	Mr. 	Vázquez-Amarante 	has
with 	the 	United 	States 	in 	general 	and 	with 	Puerto 	Rico 	in
particular. 	When 	tasked 	with 	assessing 	an 	alien 	defendant’s 	ties
to the United States, courts should consider the following factors:
“how 	long 	the 	defendant 	has 	resided 	in 	this 	country, 	whether
defendant has been employed in the United States, whether defendant
owns 	any 	property 	in 	this 	country, 	and 	whether 	defendant 	has 	any
relatives 	who 	are 	United 	States 	residents 	or 	citizens.” 	U.S. 	v.
Townsend, 897 F.2d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 1990).
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Criminal No. 22-452 (RAM) 	11
Mr. 	Vázquez-Amarante 	has 	the 	following 	ties 	to 	Puerto 	Rico:
his 	mother 	and 	daughter 	are 	residents 	of 	Puerto 	Rico. 	While 	he
appears to have relinquished his legal permanent resident status,
no 	evidence 	was 	proffered 	that 	he 	fled 	to 	the 	Dominican 	Republic
to evade prosecution. Moreover, he voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities 	to 	face 	prosecution 	when 	his 	extradition 	was
authorized.
While 	the 	Government’s 	motion 	and 	proffer 	highlighted 	that
Mr. 	Vázquez-Amarante 	allegedly 	attempted 	to 	launder 	multimillion
dollar amounts of proceeds from drug trafficking in 2021, there is
no 	evidence 	that 	Defendant 	possesses 	access 	to 	such 	significant
financial 	resources 	at 	present. 	If 	he 	did, 	he 	could 	have 	easily
fled from the Dominican Republic. Instead, he surrendered to face
prosecution in the United States when called in by the authorities.
Defendant’s 	community 	ties 	to 	Puerto 	Rico, 	lack 	of 	criminal
history, 	and 	voluntary 	surrender 	rebut 	the 	presumption 	under 	18
U.S.C. § 3142(e). See United States v. Newton, 215 F.3d 1313 (1st
Cir. 	2000) 	(defendant’s 	evidence 	of 	family 	and 	business 	ties 	to
Puerto 	Rico, 	no 	prior 	criminal 	convictions, 	and 	compliance 	with
pretrial release conditions were sufficient to rebut presumption).
D. The 	nature 	and 	seriousness 	of 	the 	danger 	to 	any 	person
or 	the 	community 	that 	would 	be 	posed 	by 	Defendant’s
release.
The 	Government 	did 	not 	proffer, 	much 	less 	present, 	any
evidence 	of 	dangerousness. 	Thus, 	the 	Government 	did 	not 	meet 	its
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Criminal No. 22-452 (RAM) 	12
burden to support “by clear and convincing evidence that there is
no condition or set of conditions that will reasonably assure the
safety 	of 	any 	other 	person 	or 	the 	community.” 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 	3142
(f).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	Defendant 	Estefani 	Vázquez-
Amarante shall be released pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Order
at Docket No. 44 and subject to the conditions therein.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 6 th day of February 2026.
s/Raúl M. Arias-Marxuach_________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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