USA v. Lopez-Diaz

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
JONATHAN LÓPEZ-DÍAZ,
Defendant.
Criminal No. 13-204 (FAB)
MEMORANDUM 	AND 	ORDER
BESOSA, Senior District Judge.
Before the Court is defendant Jonathan López-Díaz (“López”)’s
motion for bail pending appeal. 	(Docket No. 139.) 	For the reasons
set forth below, López’s motion is DENIED.
I. 	Introduction
A 	grand 	jury 	returned 	a 	two-count 	indictment 	on 	April 	11,
2013, charging López with a bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 	2113(a), 	2113(d) 	and 	2 	(count 	one), 	and 	using 	and 	carrying 	a
firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (count two). 	(Docket No. 13.) 	On
July 2, 2014, López pled guilty to both counts of the indictment.
(Docket No. 53.)
On 	November 	3, 	2014, 	López 	was 	sentenced 	to 	33 	months 	of
imprisonment 	as 	to 	count 	one 	and 	60 	months 	of 	imprisonment 	as 	to
count 	two, 	to 	be 	served 	consecutively 	to 	each 	other. 	(Docket
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No. 62.) 	López 	completed 	his 	term 	of 	imprisonment 	and 	began 	his
supervised release term on January 24, 2020. 	(Docket No. 67.) 	On
April 21, 2022, the probation officer informed the Court that López
had violated two of his supervised release conditions by committing
another federal, state or local crime. 	Id. 	López had been charged
with 	domestic 	violence 	under 	state 	law. 	Id. 	On 	March 	16, 	2023,
his 	supervised 	release 	was 	revoked, 	and 	López 	was 	sentenced 	to
thirteen 	months 	of 	imprisonment 	followed 	by 	three 	years 	of
supervised 	release. 	(Docket 	No. 	119.) 	He 	received 	credit 	for
time served. 	Id.
López 	commenced 	his 	second 	supervised 	release 	term 	on
April 13, 	2023, 	which 	was 	scheduled 	to 	expire 	on 	April 	12, 	2026.
(Docket 	No. 	127.) 	On 	October 	3, 	2025, 	the 	probation 	officer
informed the Court that López had violated four of his supervised
release 	conditions 	by 	unlawfully 	using 	and 	possessing 	controlled
substances. 	Id. 	at 	p. 	1. 	According 	to 	the 	motion, 	López 	tested
positive for cocaine on September 4, 10, 18 and November 18, 2024.
Id. 	He also tested positive for marijuana on September 22, 2025.
Id. 	López 	admitted 	to 	relapsing 	and 	enrolled 	in 	outpatient
treatment 	service 	for 	dual 	disorders. 	Id. 	at 	p. 	2. 	Due 	to 	his
continued use, he was referred to Land of Freedom, a rehabilitation
program, on December 3, 2024. 	Id. 	López completed the program on
February 	7, 	2025, 	and 	returned 	to 	outpatient 	treatment 	services.
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Criminal No. 13-204 (FAB) 	3
Id. 	The 	probation 	officer 	requested 	that 	the 	court 	not 	take
adverse action against López at that time. 	Id.
On 	October 	20, 	2025, 	the 	probation 	officer 	filed 	a
supplemental 	motion 	informing 	the 	Court 	that 	López 	violated 	the
condition 	to 	follow 	the 	instructions 	of 	the 	probation 	officer
related 	to 	his 	conditions 	of 	supervision. 	(Docket 	No. 	130.)
Additionally, 	López 	failed 	to 	complete 	a 	questionnaire 	needed 	to
assess 	his 	level 	of 	supervision 	and 	risk 	factors, 	and 	expressed
his 	frustration 	with 	the 	system. 	Id. 	On 	October 	30, 	2025, 	the
probation officer filed a second motion informing the Court of yet
another 	violation. 	(Docket 	No. 	135.) 	López 	had 	again 	tested
positive for cannabinoids on October 16, 2025. 	Id. at p. 2.
On 	November 	11, 	2025, 	the 	probation 	officer 	filed 	a 	third
supplemental motion informing that López had failed to notify him
about 	his 	contact 	with 	law 	enforcement 	officers 	due 	to 	seven
traffic violations. 	(Docket No. 137 at p. 2.) 	López also failed
attend 	his 	scheduled 	appointment 	with 	the 	outpatient 	treatment
program and failed to ask for another appointment. 	Id.
On 	December 	3, 	2025, 	the 	Court 	held 	a 	final 	revocation
hearing. 	(Docket No. 140.) 	At the hearing, the Court determined
that 	López 	committed 	a 	Grade 	B 	violation 	by 	using 	and 	possessing
a 	controlled 	substance 	and 	sentenced 	him 	to 	twelve 	months 	of
imprisonment 	with 	no 	term 	of 	supervision 	to 	follow. 	(Docket
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Criminal No. 13-204 (FAB) 	4
No. 140; Docket No. 142.) 	López’s attorney objected to the Court’s
finding of a Grade B violation. 	(Docket No. 64 at p. 9.)
On December 8, 2025, López filed an appeal. 	López also filed
the current motion for release pending appeal. 	(Docket No. 139.)
He 	alleges 	the 	Court 	improperly 	classified 	use 	of 	a 	controlled
substance 	as 	a 	Grade 	B 	violation 	by 	equating 	use 	with 	possession
of 	a 	controlled 	substance. 	Id. 	The 	government 	responded 	on
December 22, 2025. 	(Docket No. 151.)
II. 	Section 3143 of the Bail Reform Act
“The 	provisions 	of 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 	3143 	govern 	release 	pending
sentencing 	or 	appeal.” 	F ED. R. C RIM. P. 	46(c). 	Congress 	enacted
this 	provision 	to 	“reverse 	the 	presumption 	in 	favor 	of 	bail 	that
had 	been 	established 	under 	the 	prior 	statute.” 	United 	States 	v.
Miller, 753 F.2d 19, 22 (3d Cir. 1985). 	Pursuant to section 3143,
“it 	is 	presumed 	that 	an 	individual 	convicted 	of 	an 	offense 	and
sentenced to a term of imprisonment . . . will be detained pending
appeal.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Vázquez-Botet, 	No. 	04-160, 	2007 	WL
316438, 	at 	*1 	(D.P.R. 	Jan. 	31, 	2007) 	(Fusté, 	J.) 	(citing 	United
States 	v. 	Colón-Muñoz, 	292 	F.3d 	18, 	20 	(1st 	Cir. 	2002)). 	To
prevail, 	López 	must 	establish 	by 	clear 	and 	convincing 	evidence
that: 	(1) he is “not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety
of 	any 	other 	person 	or 	the 	community 	if 	released,” 	(2) 	that 	his
“appeal is not for the purpose of delay,” and (3) that the appeal
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Criminal No. 13-204 (FAB) 	5
“raises 	a 	substantial 	question 	of 	law 	or 	fact.” 	18 	U.S.C.
§ 3143(b)(1); 	see 	United 	States 	v. 	Colón-Berríos, 	791 	F.2d 	211,
214 n.4 (1st Cir. 1986) (“In enacting § 3143, Congress placed the
burden as to all elements bearing on whether to grant bail pending
appeal 	on 	defendants.”). 	The 	Court 	will 	focus 	only 	on 	whether
López’s appeal raises a substantial question of law or fact because
that 	issue 	is 	dispositive 	to 	decide 	whether 	or 	not 	to 	grant 	bail
pending 	appeal. 	United 	States 	v. 	Ortiz-Carrasco, 	863 	F.3d 	1, 	4
(1st Cir. 2017)
Courts engage in a two-pronged analysis to determine whether
an 	appeal 	presents 	a 	substantial 	question 	of 	law. 	United 	States
v. Zimny, 857 F.3d 97, 99 (1st Cir. 2017). 	First, the appeal must
present 	“a 	close 	question 	or 	one 	that 	very 	well 	could 	be 	decided
the 	other 	way.” 	Id. 	at 	100 	(citing 	United 	States 	v. 	Bayko, 	774
F.2d 	516, 	523 	(1st 	Cir. 	1985)); 	see 	Colón-Muñoz, 	292 	F.3d 	at 	20
(“The ‘likely to result’ standard is applied flexibly – a question
that 	can 	be 	regarded 	as 	‘close’ 	will 	suffice.”). 	Second, 	courts
consider the “likelihood prong,” by inquiring whether a favorable
disposition 	will 	“result 	in 	reversal 	or 	an 	order 	for 	a 	new 	trial
of 	all 	counts 	on 	which 	imprisonment 	has 	been 	imposed.” 	Id.
Moreover, 	the 	purported 	error 	“must 	not 	be 	harmless 	or
unprejudicial.” 	Bayko, 774 F.2d at 523; see, e.g., United States
v. 	Gurry, 	Case 	No. 	16-10343, 	2020 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	38273, 	at 	*31
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Criminal No. 13-204 (FAB) 	6
(D. Mass. Mar, 5, 2020) (“Even if the appellate court were to find
that some witness testimony was admitted in error or were to agree
with 	the 	Court 	that 	the 	Government’s 	statements 	in 	its 	closing
rebuttal were improper, it is unlikely that those decisions would
result in an acquittal, new trial, or a reduced sentence given the
weight of the evidence involved in this case.”).
III. Discussion
López argues that there is a substantial question of law that
will 	likely 	result 	in 	a 	reversal 	on 	appeal. 	(Docket 	No. 	139 	at
pp. 2-4.) 	He 	states 	that 	“[t]he 	core 	of 	[his] 	appeal 	is 	whether
a 	drug 	positive 	is 	tantamount 	to 	possession 	of 	controlled
substances 	under 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 	3533 	and 	therefore 	whether 	it
constitutes 	a 	Grade 	C 	or 	Grade 	B 	violation 	of 	supervised 	release
under the Guidelines.” 	Id. at p. 2. 	As discussed below, López’s
argument 	does 	not 	constitute 	a 	substantial 	question 	of 	law 	and
does not merit granting him bail on appeal.
López 	alleges 	that 	the 	Guidelines 	and 	section 	3583 	treat 	a
drug 	positive 	test 	and 	possession 	of 	a 	controlled 	substance 	as
distinct 	and 	should 	be 	treated 	as 	such. 	Id. 	First, 	assuming
López’s argument is correct that use and possession are treated as
different 	types 	of 	violations, 	the 	possession 	of 	controlled
substances or more than three drug positive results in the course
of 	a 	year 	are 	both 	subject 	to 	a 	mandatory 	revocation. 	18 	U.S.C.
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Criminal No. 13-204 (FAB) 	7
§ 	3583(g). 	López 	states 	that 	he 	only 	tested 	positive 	once 	over
the 	year, 	but 	in 	fact, 	he 	tested 	positive 	on 	November 	18, 	2024,
September 	22, 	2025, 	and 	October 	16, 	2025, 	three 	times 	over 	the
course 	of 	a 	year. 	This 	requires 	a 	mandatory 	revocation 	on 	its
own. 	Second, 	it 	is 	well 	settled 	that 	“[i]n 	federal 	courts, 	a
positive drug test is sufficient to show that a defendant possessed
the 	drugs.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Brennick, 	337 	F.3d 	107, 	111 	(1st
Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Dow, 990 F.2d 22, 24 (1st Cir.
1993)). 	And possession is considered a Grade B violation because
it is a felony under Puerto Rico law. 	See Docket No. 139 at p. 2.
The 	Guidelines, 	however, 	state 	that 	when 	a 	mandatory
revocation 	occurs 	due 	to 	the 	use 	of 	controlled 	substances, 	“the
court 	shall 	consider 	whether 	the 	availability 	of 	appropriate
substance 	abuse 	programs, 	or 	a 	defendant’s 	current 	or 	past
participation 	in 	such 	programs, 	warrants 	an 	exception 	from 	the
requirement 	of 	mandatory 	revocation 	and 	imprisonment.” 	U.S.
Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4, application note 3 (U.S. Sent’g
Comm’n 2025). 	During López’s sentencing on revocation, the Court
considered that López had completed a substance abuse program and
was 	referred 	to 	an 	outpatient 	treatment, 	but 	that 	he 	continued
using 	controlled 	substances. 	The 	Court 	therefore 	did 	consider
whether substance abuse treatment was an option, but opted not to
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Criminal No. 13-204 (FAB) 	8
make an exception, and sentenced him to twelve months for a Grade
B violation.
López 	also 	alleges 	the 	Court 	violated 	the 	rule 	set 	forth 	in
the 	Supreme 	Court’s 	recent 	decision 	in 	Esterás 	v. 	United 	States,
606 	U.S. 	185 	(2025), 	by 	implicitly 	relying 	on 	the 	retributive
factor under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) in revoking his supervised
release.1 	See 	Docket 	No. 	139 	at 	p. 	3. 	The 	Court, 	however, 	did
not 	base 	its 	decision 	to 	revoke 	his 	supervised 	release 	on 	its
consideration 	of 	the 	section 	3553(a)(2)(A) 	factor, 	which 	covers
retribution 	for 	a 	defendant’s 	underlying 	criminal 	offense, 	bank
robbery and use of a firearm during a crime of violence. 	See id.
The 	Court 	solely 	focused 	on 	López’s 	violations 	of 	his 	release
conditions, and the fact that this was his second revocation. 	The
Court only referred to the underlying criminal offense when stating
that 	it 	could 	not 	sentence 	López 	to 	more 	than 	five 	years 	on
revocation. 	Accordingly, López has failed to show that his appeal
presents a substantial question of law.
Failure 	to 	satisfy 	the 	third 	prong 	of 	the 	section 	3143(b)
analysis 	negates 	the 	need 	to 	address 	risk 	of 	flight 	or 	alleged
attempts 	to 	delay. 	Judicial 	restraint 	compels 	this 	Court 	to
1 Section 3553(a)(2)(A) instructs courts at sentencing to consider “the need
for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.” 	18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(A).
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Criminal No. 13-204 (FAB) 	9
resolve only those issues that are dispositive to a dispute. 	See
Ortiz-Carrasco, 	863 	F.3d 	at 	4 	(“[J]udges 	– 	unlike 	academicians 	–
are 	not 	at 	liberty 	to 	scratch 	every 	intellectual 	itch.”); 	Valley
Forge 	Ins. 	Co. 	v. 	Health 	Care 	Mgmt. 	Ptnrs, 	LTD., 	616 	F.3d 	1086,
1094 	(10th 	Cir. 	2010) 	(“Judicial 	restraint, 	after 	all, 	usually
means 	answering 	only 	the 	questions 	we 	must, 	not 	those 	we 	can.”)
(citing PDK Labs., Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(Roberts, 	J., 	concurring 	in 	part 	and 	concurring 	in 	the 	judgment)
(“If 	it 	is 	not 	necessary 	to 	decide 	more, 	it 	is 	necessary 	not 	to
decide more.”)); see, e.g., Magee v. Harshbarger, 16 F.3d 469, 472
(1st 	Cir. 	1994) 	(“Because 	the 	cause 	and 	prejudice 	requirement 	is
conjunctive, 	we 	need 	not 	consider 	the 	latter 	element 	where 	the
former has not been satisfied.”). 	Accordingly, the Court need not
determine whether López poses a danger to the safety of others or
is likely to flee.
IV. 	Conclusion
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	above, 	López’s 	motion 	for 	bail
pending appeal is DENIED. 	(Docket No. 139.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, January 7, 2026.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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