CONLEY-REIFER v. MAJOR JEFFREY KENGERSKI et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SKYLAR ANNABELL CONLEY-REIFER, )
)
Plaintiff, 	) 	Civil Action No. 2:23-cv-1804
)
v. 	) 	Judge William S. Stickman
) 	Magistrate Judge Patricia L. Dodge
MAJOR JEFFREY KENGERSKI, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Warden
Beau Sneddon, Major Jeffrey Kengerski, Captain Tyler Wingrove, Captain Jordan Popinski,
Sergeant Michael Waltmire, Corrections Officer Samuel Collins, Corrections Officer Tyler Sager,
and Corrections Officer Kellie Moculski, (“the County Defendants”) (ECF No. 133) be granted.
II. 	Report
A. 	Relevant Procedural History
Plaintiff Skylar Annabell Conley-Reifer, a prisoner in the custody of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons, brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, concerning events that
occurred while she was incarcerated in the Butler County Prison (“BCP”). In addition to the
County Defendants, Plaintiff also asserts claims against former Captain Randy S. Russell1 and
Chaplain Tim Bogden.2
1 Russell has also moved to dismiss, which is pending. (ECF No. 135.)
2 The correct last name of the defendant is Boden. This Court has issued a supplemental service
order directing that the Third Amended Complaint be served on Boden and has not yet been
notified that service has been effectuated.
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After Plaintiff filed her original Complaint, (ECF No. 6), the County Defendants filed a
motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 44.) Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 48),
rendering the motion to dismiss the original Complaint moot. The County Defendants again filed
a motion to dismiss and a motion for a more definite statement. (ECF No. 54.)
In an order issued on January 27, 2025, the Court denied the motion for more definite
statement and the motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. (ECF No. 116.) Among
other claims, Plaintiff’s claims concerning verbal harassment, the grievance system, and an illegal
search by Defendant Sager were dismissed with prejudice. The motion was denied with respect to
the following claims: 	(1) a retaliation claim against Kengerski, Wingrove, and Popinski; (2) a
claim of delayed medical care against Molcuski; (3) a failure-to-protect claim against Sager; and
(4) an excessive force claim against Collins. (Id.) As stated in the order, Plaintiff was permitted to
file an amended complaint as to all other claims and parties not dismissed with prejudice. (Id.)
Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 121) that was stricken (ECF No.
124) because she failed to comply with the directives set forth in the Court’s January 27, 2025,
Order. Plaintiff then filed the operative Third Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 132.)
Presently pending is the County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Third Amended
Complaint. (ECF No. 133.) Their motion has been fully briefed (ECF Nos. 133, 134, 147, 148)
and is ripe for resolution.
B. 	Relevant Factual Allegations
The following factual allegations in the Third Amended Complaint are relevant to the
disposition of the pending motion.
Plaintiff identifies as a transgender female who was a pre-trial detainee during her
imprisonment at BCP. (ECF No. 132 ¶¶ 3, 14.) As it relates to Defendant Corrections Officer Tyler
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Sager, she alleges that he harassed Plaintiff about being transgender. (Id. ¶ 14.) Upon learning
through an internet search that Plaintiff’s criminal charges included a sexual offense, Sager
communicated information about Plaintiff’s criminal charges to other inmates, who used the
information to extort and harass Plaintiff. (Id.) When Plaintiff complained to Sager, he was
verbally abusive to her. (Id.)
On one occasion, Plaintiff asked Defendant Corrections Officer Samuel Collins to change
the channel on the television. (Id. ¶ 15.) In response, Collins “verbally assaulted” Plaintiff and then
hit a tablet out of Plaintiff’s hands, leaving them bruised. (Id.)
Plaintiff lodged multiple complaints about harassment at BCP. (Id. ¶ 16.) She reported her
claims of harassment and discrimination to VOICE, an outside advocacy organization. (Id. ¶ 17)
Upon learning of Plaintiff’s communication with VOICE, Defendants Captain Tyler Wingrove
and Captain Jordan Popinski issued a disciplinary write-up to her and placed her on an
investigative lockdown for filing a false PREA claim. (Id. ¶ 17.) Defendant Major Jeffrey
Kengerski approved of Plaintiff’s detention in the RHU for this misconduct. (Id.) According to
Plaintiff, Kengerski subsequently placed Plaintiff on administrative segregation without due
process. (Id.)
Defendant Sergeant Michael Waltmire presided over Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing
regarding her report to VOICE. (Id. ¶ 21.) When she attempted to defend herself, Waltmire told
her that the hearing was simply a formality and he had been directed to find her guilty by
Kengerski, Popinski, and Wingrove. (Id.) Further, when Plaintiff stated the facts of her case,
Waltmire verbally harassed her and “attacked” her for being transgender. (Id.)
Plaintiff informed Defendant Corrections Officer Kellie Moculski that she was having a
mental health crisis. Rather than calling a professional, Moculski emailed the mental health staff,
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resulting in a delay. (Id. ¶ 19.) Moculski also became argumentative with Plaintiff, which increased
Plaintiff’s stress. (Id.)
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Warden Beau Sneddon failed to supervise the
employees directly beneath him or to train his staff about how to treat transgender individuals. (Id.
¶ 20.) Instead, his policies encouraged staff misconduct while thwarting Plaintiff from seeking
redress from misconduct. (Id.) Nor did he afford inmates such as Plaintiff “special consideration”
and permitted staff to engage in verbal and sexual harassment as a means of “control.” (Id.)
C. 	Standard of Review
A complaint requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed, in whole or in part, for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the
court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff
may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). When “accept[ing] all of the
complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true,” the court “may disregard any legal conclusions.” Id. at
210-11.
Further, “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint,
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted); see also Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The obligation to
liberally construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings is well-established.”). Additionally, the Court must
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“apply the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name it.” Mala v. Crown
Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013). At the same time, “pro se litigants still must
allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim[,]” and “they cannot flout procedural
rules—they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Id. at 245.
D. 	Discussion
Plaintiff’s claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983,
a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color
of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Section 1983 does not itself create any
substantive rights; it simply provides a cause of action that allows the plaintiff to vindicate rights
that have already been secured. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002).
In a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must plead a defendant’s personal
involvement in the alleged deprivation of the constitutional right. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete,
845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). That is because, as stated in the text of § 1983 itself, only a
person who “subjects, or causes to be subjected” another person to a civil rights violation can be
held liable under § 1983. Thus, each defendant is liable only for his or her own conduct. See, e.g.,
id.; see also Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016); Barkes v. First Correctional
Medical, 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014) (rev’d sub. nom. on other grounds 575 U.S. 822 (2015));
C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 173 (3d Cir. 2005) (“To impose liability on the
individual defendants, Plaintiffs must show that each one individually participated in the alleged
constitutional violation or approved of it.”) (citing C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 201-02 (3d Cir.
2000) (en banc)).
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1. 	Previously Dismissed Claims
The County Defendants argue that Plaintiff has attempted to reassert claims that were
previously dismissed with prejudice. (ECF No. 134 at 10-11.) They are correct.
Plaintiff again attempts to assert a claim against Sager based on his Internet search
concerning Plaintiff. (ECF No. 132 ¶ 27.) In the Third Amended Complaint, she characterizes the
claim as a violation of privacy, while in the Amended Complaint, she had characterized it as an
illegal search. The result is the same. Any claim about Sager’s search on the internet has been
dismissed with prejudice. To be clear, the only pending claim against Sager is a failure to protect
claim.3 (ECF No. 116 at 5.)
The County Defendants also correctly point out that the Third Amended Complaint
includes allegations of verbal harassment by various defendants despite the fact that all claims
concerning verbal harassment were dismissed with prejudice. (ECF No. 134 at 11 (citing ECF No.
116 at 4).) Thus, all claims based on verbal harassment, including Plaintiff’s allegations that
Collins “verbally assaulted” her, Waltmire verbally harassed her and “attacked” her for being
transgender, and Sager engaged in name-calling, should again be dismissed.
2. 	Impermissible New Claims
The County Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has impermissibly added new claims in
the Third Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 134 at 9-10.) Specifically, Plaintiff adds claims of
discrimination in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments against Kengerski, Popinski,
and Wingrove. (ECF No. 132 ¶¶ 23-25.) In addition, the Third Amended Complaint includes
3 Plaintiff concedes this point in her response. (ECF No. 147 at 4.)
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claims of discrimination and retaliation in violation of the First and Eighth Amendments against
Waltmire. (Id. ¶ 26.)
The Court limited the scope of amendment to “the claims and parties not dismissed with
prejudice.” (ECF No. 116 at 5.) The claim previously asserted against Kengerski, Popinski, and
Wingrove was retaliation. (Id.) As to Waltmire, the sole claim against him was a violation of
Plaintiff’s due process rights. (ECF No. 106 at 19.) These claims were not dismissed in the Court’s
January 27, 2025, Order and remain as claims going forward.
Thus, Plaintiff’s newly raised claims that are outside the scope of the permitted
amendments should be dismissed. Specifically, that includes the claim of discrimination in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments against Kengerski, Popinski, and Wingrove
and claims of discrimination and retaliation in violation of the First and Eighth Amendments
against Waltmire.4
3. 	Claim against Sneddon
The County Defendants also contend that Plaintiff failed to cure the defects that the Court’s
previous ruling identified regarding her claims against Warden Sneddon. (ECF No. 134 at 11-14.)
In that decision, the Court found that Plaintiff’s failure to adequately allege Sneddon’s personal
involvement in any wrongdoing and her conclusory allegations about Warden Sneddon’s failure
to supervise his employees did not state claim against him. (ECF No. 106 at 19.) While Plaintiff
was given leave to amend her claims against Warden Sneddon, the County Defendants assert that
they are still deficient and must be dismissed with prejudice.
4 In her response, Plaintiff confirms that her sole claim against Kengerski, Popinski, and Wingrove
is retaliation. (ECF No. 147 at 2-3.)
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As noted by the County Defendants, the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint and Amended
Complaint were insufficient to state a claim against Warden Sneddon. They contend that the
allegations in the Third Amended Complaint fare no better.
In the Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s allegations against Warden Sneddon are
limited to the following:
Defendant Warden Beau Sneddon failed to supervise the BCP employees
beneath him or to train his staff with respect to how to treat and care for
transgender individual in their custody, and instead instituted policies that
directly harmed Plaintiff and placed her in harms way. Defendant Sneddon
in 	fact 	encourages, 	through 	policies 	and 	customs, 	BCP 	employees’
misconduct while directly thwarting Plaintiff’s attempts to complain and
seek redress with respect to said misconduct. Defendant Sneddon allowed
for inmates such as Plaintiff to be afforded any “special consideration” with
respect to their safety and permitted BCP employees to use verbal and
sexual harassment as a method of “control.”
(ECF No. 132 ¶ 20.)
These allegations do not plausibly state a claim against Warden Sneddon. First, the
operative complaint includes no factual allegations about his personal involvement in any
wrongdoing. With no such factual basis, Plaintiff has not pleaded a claim against Warden Sneddon
based on his personal involvement in a violation of her civil rights.
To the extent that Plaintiff’s claims are based upon Warden Sneddon’s supervisory
liability, they also fail. The Court of Appeals has identified two general ways in which a
supervisor-defendant may be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates. First,
liability may attach if the supervisor, “with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established
and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.” A.M.
ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (alteration in
original) (quoting Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989)).
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Second, “a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating
the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of
and acquiesced” in the subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct. Id. (citing Baker v. Monroe Twp.,
50 F.3d 1186, 1190 (3d Cir. 1995)). “Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and
acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity.” Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208.
The bald and conclusory allegations in the Third Amended Complaint do not plead any
factual basis for a civil rights claim against Warden Sneddon. Plaintiff only generally references
“policies and customs” that Warden Sneddon allegedly instituted that harmed her without
specifically identifying what the policies are or how they harmed her. Moreover, as Defendants
point out, there are no facts to support a conclusion that any alleged failure to train employees
amounted to deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s rights. See Estate of Roman v. City of Newark,
914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019). Similarly, Warden Sneddon’s alleged “encouragement” of
misconduct through the implementation of unidentified policies insufficiently forms a basis for
any claim, and Plaintiff does not claim that Warden Sneddon had actual knowledge of any
misconduct, participated in misconduct or directed others to violate Plaintiff’s rights.
Finally, if Plaintiff alleges that Warden Sneddon is automatically liable for the actions of
others, any such claim also fails. The doctrine of respondeat superior, which makes an employer
or supervisor automatically responsible for the wrongdoing of its employees, does not apply under
§ 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a
plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual
actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. For that reason, supervisor-
defendants cannot be held liable for every illegal act that takes in a correctional facility. They are
only liable for their own conduct.
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Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Warden Sneddon. Thus, the claims against him
should be dismissed.
4. 	Claim against Waltmire
Finally , the County Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to cure the identified defects
in her due process claim against Waltmire. (ECF No. 134 at 14-15.) In previously evaluating this
claim as raised in the Amended Complaint, the Court found that Plaintiff made only generic
allegations about the manner in which all misconduct hearings are conducted, as opposed to
specific allegations about any hearing in which she participated. (ECF No. 106 at 19.) The Court
also found that Plaintiff failed allege how she was harmed by the alleged deficiencies in the
process. (Id.)
In the Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff identifies the hearing on which her claim is
based as the one regarding her PREA complaint to VOICE. (ECF No. 132 ¶ 21.) It can be inferred
from other allegations in the complaint that because of Waltmire’s adjudication of her guilt at that
hearing, she was placed in the RHU. (Id. ¶ 17; see also ECF No. 147 at 4.)
Plaintiff’s claim is one for procedural due process. But as the County Defendants correctly
argue, Plaintiff has failed to allege a protected liberty interest. The Due Process Clause, guaranteed
through the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, provides that no state shall
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const.. Amend.
XIV. The Due Process Clause was promulgated to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise
of the powers of government. The “procedural” aspect of the Due Process Clause requires the
government to follow appropriate procedures to promote fairness in governmental decisions, while
the “substantive” aspect of the Clause bars certain government actions regardless of the fairness
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of the procedures used to implement them so as to prevent governmental power from being used
for purposes of oppression. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-33 (1986).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained that “inmates are
generally not entitled to procedural due process in prison disciplinary hearings because the
sanctions resulting from those hearings do not usually affect a protected liberty interest.” Burns v.
Pa. Dep't of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 171 (3d Cir. 2011). The Supreme Court has recognized that
states, “may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due
Process Clause. But these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which. . .
imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Mere placement in the RHU is not such
a hardshipSee Laake v. Mooney, 2022 WL 17976326, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2022).
Because Plaintiff does not allege a protected liberty interest, she cannot raise a procedural
due process claim based on the loss of such an interest. Accordingly, this claim should be
dismissed.
E. 	Amendment
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a civil rights complaint is vulnerable to dismissal
for failure to state a claim, the Court should permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment
would be inequitable or futile. Mullin v. Balicki, 875 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2017); Grayson, 293
F.3d at 108.
Plaintiff has had an adequate opportunity to remedy the deficiencies in her claims through
multiple amendments. It would be both futile and inequitable to permit Plaintiff to further amend
her complaint.
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III. 	Conclusion
For these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the County Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss should be granted. With regard to the County Defendants, this action should proceed only
to the claims of retaliation against Kengerski, Wingrove, and Popinski, the delay of medical care
claim against Moculski, the failure to protect claim against Sager, and the claim of excessive force
against Collins.
Pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2
of the Local Civil Rules, litigants who seek to challenge this Report and Recommendation must
seek review by the district judge by filing objections by December 9, 2025. Any party opposing
the objections shall file a response by December 23, 2025. Failure to file timely objections will
waive the right of appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).
Dated: November 25, 2025 	/s/ Patricia L. Dodge
PATRICIA L. DODGE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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