TOMPKINS v. RODGERS et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TRENTON JOHN TOMPKINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
KENNETH RODGERS;
WILLIAM SHERMAN;
MICHAEL PETERS; and
ANTHONY GIOAN,
Defendants.
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2:19-CV-1089
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Trenton Tompkins missed a number of pretrial deadlines and
failed to appear for the final pretrial conference, causing the Court to postpone the
long-scheduled trial in this case. 	In response to Mr. Tompkins’s non-compliance,
Defendants have moved to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute. After considering
the parties’ briefs (ECF 276, 280, 282), the Court denies the motion. 	Although Mr.
Tompkins’s failures to comply with this Court’s orders are substantial, they do not
rise to the “extreme” level required to grant a motion to dismiss under the Poulis
factors. Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir.1992).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) permits “a defendant [to] move to dismiss
the action or any claim against it” “if the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with
these rules or a court order.” But “dismissal is a harsh remedy and should be resorted
to only in extreme cases.” Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373 (cleaned up).
The Third Circuit has outlined six factors to be weighed in considering whether
dismissal 	is 	proper 	under 	Rule 	41(b): 	“(1) 	the 	extent 	of 	the 	party’s 	personal
responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet
scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether
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the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the
effectiveness 	of 	sanctions 	other 	than 	dismissal, 	which 	entails 	an 	analysis 	of
alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.” Poulis v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984). 	“[N]o single Poulis
factor is dispositive[;]” at the same time, “not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied
in order to dismiss a complaint.” Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 2008).
The Court considers these factors, as follows.
Extent of party’s personal responsibility. The first Poulis factor supports
dismissal because, as a pro se litigant, Mr. Tompkins is personally responsible for his
actions. 	See In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., 687 F. App’x
210, 214 (3d Cir. 2017); Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002).
Prejudice 	to 	Defendants. 	Mr. 	Tompkins’s 	failures 	have 	prejudiced
Defendants, so this factor also weighs against him. Defendants’ ability to prepare for
trial was prejudiced by Mr. Tompkins’s inconsistent responses to Court orders. 	See
Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003) (under Poulis, “the burden
imposed by impeding a party’s ability to prepare effectively a full and complete trial
strategy is sufficiently prejudicial”). For example, Mr. Tompkins did not file multiple
documents required by the Court’s Pretrial Order (ECF 235), including an exhibit
list, responses to Defendants’ motions in limine, and objections to the Court’s
proposed voir dire, jury instructions, and verdict slip. Without these documents, the
final pretrial conference was poised to serve a particularly important purpose—filling
in the gaps left by Mr. Tompkins’s missing filings. Yet Mr. Tompkins failed to appear
for the final pretrial conference, scheduled with over a month of advance notice. See
ECF 242, 271. Even after the Court attempted to contact Mr. Tompkins repeatedly
by phone and email and rescheduled the in-person conference to a telephone
conference five hours later to attempt to accommodate Mr. Tompkins, he again failed
to appear. 	See ECF 272, 273. 	Mr. Tompkins’s excuses for his failures—that
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Defendants filed “an extraordinary volume of coordinated pretrial material,” that he
filed his own motions in limine and a motion for an extension, and that he missed the
Court’s emails—lack merit. 	ECF 280 at 3-4; see ECF 282 (Defendants explaining
that, in accordance with the pretrial order, they only filed approximately 35 pages of
substantive material); ECF 265 (order denying Mr. Tompkins’s motion to extend one
day after his motion and six days before the scheduled final pretrial conference).
These combined failures have imposed a significant burden on Defendants’ ability to
prepare effectively for trial.
History of dilatoriness. 	Mr. Tompkins’s history of dilatoriness supports
dismissal. 	“[R]epeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of dilatoriness,”
though eventual responsiveness may reduce the influence of this factor on the overall
determination. 	Adams v. Trs. of New Jersey Brewery Employees’ Pension Tr. Fund,
29 F.3d 863, 874-75 (3d Cir. 1994). 	In addition to the missed deadlines and
conferences mentioned above, Mr. Tompkins failed to appear at his deposition, forcing
Defendants to reschedule. 	See ECF 185, 189. 	He also arrived over an hour late for
the parties’ settlement conference. 	See ECF 234, 236. 	That Mr. Tompkins met
certain other court-ordered requirements throughout litigation does not change the
fact that he missed these deadlines and events. However, the weight of this factor is
mitigated by Mr. Tompkins’s eventual responses, including his response to the show-
cause order (filed the day after the Court required justification for his missing the
two final pretrial conferences). See ECF 277.
Bad faith. The fourth Poulis factor arguably weighs in Mr. Tompkins’s favor.
A showing of “flagrant bad faith” supports dismissal. 	National Hockey League v.
Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976). That said, filing delays and
deficiencies, without more, are unlikely to qualify as “willful or contumacious
behavior.” 	Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871, 875 (3d Cir. 1984). 	Here, Mr.
Tompkins’s excuses have been insufficient, and his failure to attend the final pretrial
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conferences (conveniently) forced the Court to delay the trial, as Mr. Tompkins
previously requested and the Court denied. 	ECF 264, 265. 	Still, the Court is not
confident that Mr. Tompkins’s behavior was “intentional or self-serving,” and, in light
of his pro se status, provides Mr. Tompkins with some leeway. 	Adams, 29 F.3d at
875.
Alternative sanctions. The effectiveness of alternative sanctions is neutral,
at least at this point. 	On the one hand, “where a plaintiff is proceeding pro se and
IFP, [the Third Circuit has] upheld the conclusion that no alternative sanctions
existed because monetary sanctions ‘would not be an effective alternative.’” Nieves v.
Thorne, 790 F. App’x 355, 358 (3d Cir. 2019) (paraphrasing Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262–
63). 	Mr. Tompkins is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, so there are no
meaningful alternative sanctions available. See ECF 227. On the other hand, there
is one final alternative here—specifically, what the Court intends to do: sanction Mr.
Tompkins by warning him that any other missed court appearances or deadlines will
result in dismissal. This will be his last chance.
Merits. 	The 	meritoriousness 	of 	Mr. 	Tompkins’s 	claims 	weighs 	against
dismissal. 	A 	claim 	is 	meritorious 	“when 	the 	allegations 	of 	the 	pleadings, 	if
established at trial, would support recovery by plaintiff.” 	Poulis, 747 F.2d at 870.
The Court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to Mr.
Tompkins’s excessive force, assault, and battery claims based on the arguable merits
of those claims. ECF 218. Given that Mr. Tomkins has some triable claims, the Court
finds that they are not so lacking in merit to warrant dismissal.
Considering these factors as a whole, the Court finds that the “extreme”
sanction of dismissal is not warranted, though notes that any further failures by Mr.
Tompkins will very likely tip the balance the other way. 	Accordingly, after careful
consideration, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF 276)
is DENIED without prejudice.
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DATED this 15th day of December, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ J. Nicholas Ranjan
United States District Judge
cc:
Trenton John Tompkins
510 Main St.
Prospect, PA 16052
trenttompkins@gmail.com
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