Sorokaput v. Schuylkill County Prison et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PETER SOROKAPUT,
Plaintiff,
v.
SCHUYLKILL COUNTY PRISON, et
al.,
Defendants.
No. 4:26-CV-01039
(Chief Judge Brann)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
OCTOBER 16, 2026
Plaintiff Peter Sorokaput is a serial prisoner litigant who is well known to
this Court. He lodged the instant pro se Section 1983 1 lawsuit in April 2026, his
fifth such civil rights action, alleging constitutional violations by officials at
Schuylkill County Prison in 2019. Because Sorokaput’s Section 1983 complaint is
facially barred by the statute of limitations and he has provided no basis for tolling,
the Court will dismiss this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Sorokaput’s handwritten complaint is brief but clear. He alleges that from
February 19, 2019, to December 27, 2019, he was subjected to unlawful conditions
1 	42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional
wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves
as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ.
v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002).
Case 4:26-cv-01039-MWB-MP Document 20 Filed 10/16/26 Page 1 of 7

2
of confinement at Schuylkill County Prison. 2 Sorokaput asserts a plethora of
constitutional tort claims, alleging that unidentified “guards” sexually harassed
him; his living conditions were overcrowded, unsanitary, and cold; he was
assaulted by another inmate and guards failed to protect him; he was physically
assaulted by a guard; and he was denied proper medical care. 3
Sorokaput sues the following defendants: Schuylkill County, “all guards and
supervisors” at Schuylkill County Prison, and prison guard “Rodiequez.” 4 He
seeks a declaration that his rights were violated, a “preliminary and permanent
injunction ordering Defendants to stop,” and compensatory and punitive damages. 5
The Court screened Sorokaput’s pro se complaint as mandated by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a).6 During that screening, the Court identified multiple pleading
deficiencies, including failure to plead personal involvement and attempting to sue
a municipality without alleging a constitutionally infirm policy or custom. 7 Most
notably, however, was that Sorokaput’s claims involved conduct that had occurred
in 2019, likely rendering his Section 1983 claims barred by the two-year statute of
limitations.8 Moreover, nothing in his complaint indicated that the two-year statute
of limitations would be tolled pursuant to equitable tolling, the discovery rule, or
2 	See generally Doc. 1.
3 	See id. at 2.
4 	See id. at 1.
5 	See id. at 3.
6 	See generally Docs. 17, 18.
7 	See Doc. 17 at 4-7.
8 	See id. at 7-9.
Case 4:26-cv-01039-MWB-MP Document 20 Filed 10/16/26 Page 2 of 7

3
any other basis to extend the limitations period.
Out of an abundance of caution, the Court provided Sorokaput with “notice
and an opportunity to be heard” on the statute-of-limitations issue and whether any
basis for tolling exists.9 Sorokaput timely filed his response,10 but that one-page
document does not establish any basis for tolling the statute of limitations.
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss this case with prejudice pursuant to Section
1915A(b)(1).
II. 	STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Courts are statutorily obligated to review, “as soon as practicable,” pro se
prisoner complaints targeting governmental entities, officers, or employees. 11 One
basis for dismissal at the screening stage is if the complaint “fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted[.]” 12 This language closely tracks Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, courts apply the same standard to
screening a pro se prisoner complaint for sufficiency under Section 1915A(b)(1) as
they utilize when resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).13
9 	See id. at 9; Doc. 18 ¶ 1; Soumphonphakdy v. Walilko, 808 F. App’x 59, 60 (3d Cir. 2020)
(nonprecedential) (quoting Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009)).
10 	See generally Doc. 19.
11 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
12 	Id. § 1915A(b)(1).
13 	See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 & n.11 (3d Cir. 2002); O’Brien
v. U.S. Fed. Gov’t, 763 F. App’x 157, 159 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (nonprecedential);
cf. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
Case 4:26-cv-01039-MWB-MP Document 20 Filed 10/16/26 Page 3 of 7

4
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire
“whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to
offer evidence to support the claims.” 14 The court must accept as true the factual
allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.15 In addition to the facts alleged on the face of
the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint,
matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents” attached to
a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based upon these
documents.16
When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a
three-step inquiry.17 At step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the]
plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” 18 Second, the court should distinguish well-
pleaded factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal
conclusions, which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be
disregarded.19 Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations
14 	Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir.
1996).
15 	Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).
16 	Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.
v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).
17 	Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).
18 	Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in original)).
19 	Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
Case 4:26-cv-01039-MWB-MP Document 20 Filed 10/16/26 Page 4 of 7

5
“and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 20
Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” 21
Because Sorokaput proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally
construed and his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” 22 This is
particularly true when the pro se litigant, like Sorokaput, is incarcerated. 23
III. 	DISCUSSION
The statute of limitations applicable to Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania
is two years.24 That two-year period accrues (or begins to run) when the plaintiff
“knew or should have known of the injury upon which his action is based”25 and
“the last act needed to complete the tort occurs.” 26 Furthermore, a District Court
can raise the timeliness issue sua sponte at the screening stage if—on the face of
the complaint—the allegations “show that relief is barred by the applicable statute
of limitations.”27
20 	Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
21 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.
22 	Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
23 	Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
24 	See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009); 42 PA. CONS . STAT . ANN. § 5524(7).
25 	Sameric Corp. of Del. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation
omitted).
26 	Nguyen v. Pennsylvania, 906 F.3d 271, 273 (3d Cir. 2018).
27 	See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007); Whitenight v. Pa. State Police, 674 F. App’x 142,
144 (3d Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential) (collecting cases); Paluch v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr.,
442 F. App’x 690, 693 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011) (nonprecedential) (“Although the statute of
Case 4:26-cv-01039-MWB-MP Document 20 Filed 10/16/26 Page 5 of 7

6
Sorokaput expressly avers that the alleged unconstitutional conduct occurred
from February 2019 to December 2019. Moreover, the facts as alleged
demonstrate that Sorokaput knew or should have known of the injury upon which
his action is based at that time. He thus had two years, or until December 2021, to
file a Section 1983 lawsuit raising such claims. However, he did not file the
instant case until 2026, many years out of time.
Nothing in Sorokaput’s complaint indicates that the two-year statute of
limitations would be tolled pursuant to equitable tolling, the discovery rule,
exhaustion of administrative remedies, or any other basis to extend the limitations
period.28 Sorokaput’s claims involve allegations of discrete, obvious civil rights
violations such as being assaulted by a corrections officer, being sexually harassed,
being denied appropriate medical care, and being assaulted by another inmate
without proper protection from guards. Such serious and conspicuous civil rights
violations would have put Sorokaput on notice that his claims had accrued and his
two-year clock in which to file a lawsuit had begun to run.
In his response to this Court’s show-cause Order, Sorokaput does not
provide any basis for tolling the statute of limitations. He simply claims that the
limitations applicable to [civil rights] actions is an affirmative defense, which may be waived
by the defendant, it is appropriate to dismiss sua sponte under § 1915(e)(2) a complaint whose
untimeliness is apparent from the face of the record.”) (citing Jones, 549 U.S. at 215).
28 	See Soumphonphakdy, 808 F. App’x at 60 (explaining that district courts should not sua sponte
dismiss civil rights actions on statute-of-limitations grounds unless it is apparent from the face
of the complaint that there is no valid basis for tolling).
Case 4:26-cv-01039-MWB-MP Document 20 Filed 10/16/26 Page 6 of 7

7
Eighth Amendment protects against cruel and unusual punishments and provides
the right to safe and humane conditions in prison. 29 While that may be true, if an
inmate intends to file a lawsuit under Section 1983 for a violation of their
constitutional rights, they generally must do so within two years of when their
rights were violated. Sorokaput also vaguely alleges that he missed the filing
deadline “through the fault of another,”30 but he does not provide any facts to
support this allegation.31
Sorokaput filed his Section 1983 lawsuit many years out of time, and he has
provided no basis to toll the limitations period. His complaint, therefore, must be
dismissed.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court will dismiss with prejudice Sorokaput’s
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) as barred by the statute of
limitations. An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge
29 	Doc. 19 at 1.
30 	See id.
31 	Sorokaput cursorily mentions that a corrections officer at Schuylkill County Prison “harassed
[him] about [his] case.” 	See id. 	Yet he does not provide any reason why he did not file a
Section 1983 lawsuit after he was transferred to a different prison in December 2019.
Case 4:26-cv-01039-MWB-MP Document 20 Filed 10/16/26 Page 7 of 7