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4:25-cv-00313Pamd12 févr. 2026

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MELISSA ANDERSON, 	: 	Civil No. 4:25-CV-313
:
Plaintiff 	: 	(Judge Munley)
:
v. 	: 	(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
:
FRANK BISIGNANO, 	:
Commissioner of Social Security,1 :
:
Defendant. 	:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction.
In Social Security Appeals adequate articulation of the ALJ’s analysis is
essential for informed decision-making. It follows that an unexplained absence of
analysis is anathema and often compels a remand.
This concept applies with particular force when we consider an ALJ’s
assessment of a claimant’s ability to meet the mental demands of the workplace.
1 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 6, 2025.
Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Frank Bisignano
should be substituted as the defendant in this suit. No further action need be taken to
continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
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Oftentimes experts conclude that claimants are highly restricted in their ability to
maintain concentration and confine them to performing one-to-two step tasks. When
an expert reaches this conclusion, and the expert’s opinion is deemed persuasive by
the ALJ, our colleague, Judge Bloom, has recently explained what the ALJ’s duty
of articulation requires:
[W]hen a medical opinion is found persuasive and contains a limitation
to one- and two-step tasks, the ALJ is obligated to either: (1) include
the limitation in the RFC and limit the claimant to reasoning level one
occupations, or, (2) identify the substantial evidence that the ALJ is
relying on in rejecting the limitation. . . . [A] limitation to “simple,
repetitive tasks” is insufficient to account for a limitation to one- and
two-step tasks.
Cruz v. Bisignano, No. 1:24-CV-1966, 2025 WL 2813882, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30,
2025).
The 	instant 	case 	aptly 	illustrates 	this 	principle. 	The 	plaintiff, 	Melissa
Anderson, 	suffers 	from 	a 	cascading 	array 	of 	severe 	emotional 	impairments,
including 	major 	depressive 	disorder, 	attention 	deficit 	hyperactivity 	disorder
(ADHD), anxiety disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. (Tr. 23). Anderson’s
treating physician stated that these impairments were disabling, (tr. 995-1003); an
examining source found that she suffered marked limitations in her ability to respond
to changes in the workplace, (tr. 806); and a state agency expert opined that she
could perform one-and-two step tasks. (Tr. 114).
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The ALJ found this state agency expert opinion to be persuasive but did not
include the expert’s one-to-two step limitation in Anderson’s residual functional
capacity (RFC) assessment. (Tr. 25-26, 30). Nor did the ALJ provide an evidence-
based reason for refusing to adopt this limitation to one and two step tasks. Instead,
the ALJ stated paradoxically that this mental RFC—which was less exacting that the
state agency expert’s opinion—“provided a somewhat more restrictive residual
functional 	capacity 	than 	is 	indicated 	by 	the 	opinions 	of 	the 	State 	agency
psychological consultants.” (Tr. 30). The ALJ then denied Anderson’s claim,
concluding 	that 	Anderson 	could 	perform 	tasks 	which 	had 	greater 	reasoning
requirements than the one-to-two step task limitation found by the state agency
expert the ALJ deemed persuasive.
This assertion seems factually incorrect, and this enigmatic analysis falls short
of what is needed in this setting to meet the ALJ’s duty of articulation. Accordingly,
we recommend that this case be remanded for further consideration by the
Commissioner.
II. 	Statement of Facts and of the Case
A. Introduction
On April 13, 2021, the plaintiff, Melissa Anderson, filed applications for
disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income pursuant to Titles II
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and XVI for the Social Security Act, alleging an onset of disability beginning May
1, 2014. (Tr. 18). Anderson later amended this date of onset to April 13, 2021. (Id.)
In these applications the plaintiff indicated that she was disabled due to the combined
effects of a host of physical and emotional conditions including osteoarthritis,
fibromyalgia, degenerative disc disease, spina bifida, scoliosis of the lumbar spine,
major depressive disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), anxiety
disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. (Tr. 21). Anderson was born in June of
1983 and was thirty-seven years old on the alleged onset date; thus, she was defined
as a younger individual under the Commissioner’s regulations. (Tr. 33). She had a
high school education and prior employment as a pharmacy technician and wire
harness assembler. (Tr. 32-33).
B. Evidence Relating to Anderson’s Emotional Impairments
With respect to her emotional impairments,2 the ALJ explained that:
[Anderson] has alleged experiencing symptoms of a depressed mood,
hopelessness, helplessness, sadness, a lack of energy, anhedonia guilt,
difficulty 	sleeping, 	decreased 	energy, 	difficulty 	concentrating,
decreased 	appetite, 	suicidal 	ideation, 	dysphoric 	moods, 	guilt,
hopelessness, loss of interest in activities, fatigue, loss of energy,
worthlessness, short-term memory deficits, long-term memory deficits,
organization 	and 	planning 	difficulties, 	diminished 	self-esteem, 	a
2 As discussed below, we conclude that errors in the evaluation of Anderson’s
emotional impairments now call for a remand in this case. Therefore, we are limiting
our factual narrative to a discussion of these emotional impairments.
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diminished 	sense 	of 	pleasure, 	social 	withdrawal, 	excessive
apprehension and worry, being easily fatigued, irritability, restlessness,
racing/ruminating 	thoughts, 	muscle 	tension, 	avoidance 	of 	social
settings, 	hyper 	startle 	responses, 	nightmares, 	hypervigilance,
avoidance, intrusive thoughts, detachment from others, and panic
attacks with associated heart palpitations, sweating, trembling, chest
pain, nausea, dizziness, and "a sense of dread” (Exhibits 11F and 13F).
Additionally, [Anderson]’s medical records indicate [she] was assessed
with clinical examination findings of a frustrated mood, a depressed
mood, 	mildly 	impaired 	attention 	and 	concentration, 	and 	mildly
impaired recent and remote memory skills and the claimant was noted
to be tearful during a medical appointment (Exhibits 6F, 11F, and 13F).
(Tr. 28).
Further, the ALJ reported that during the hearing conducted in her case
Anderson:
[T]estified that she has no motivation to do anything, she feels sad and
worthless, she wants to sleep all the time, and she cries while waiting
for the day to be over. She feels anxious most of the day which makes
it hard for her to function normally and she experiences panic attacks
once or twice a month. She has a lot of difficulty concentrating and she
forgets what she is saying in the middle of a sentence. She cannot
remember things that just happened and she will rewind television
shows because she does not remember what happened. She needs to set
reminders or make lists regarding paperwork that she needs to do for
her child and her father helps her with it. She also needs to set reminders
on her phone to help her remember to take medication.
(Tr. 27).3
3 We note that the ALJ’s decision attempts to minimize these symptoms based upon
isolated excerpts from three treatment notes. (Tr. 28). Because we recommend
remand on other grounds, we have not addressed the legal sufficiency of the ALJ’s
reliance on these limited excerpts to partially discount the plaintiff’s symptoms
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Given this clinical history, and Anderson’s self-reported limitations due to her
psychological conditions, three experts provided opinions which fully assessed her
mental residual functional capacity.4 One of these experts, Dr. Louise Butler, had
been treating Anderson on a monthly basis for more than two years. (Tr. 996). From
this extended treatment perspective, Dr. Butler stated in September of 2022, that
Anderson 	experienced 	sleep 	disturbances, 	decreased 	energy, 	feelings 	of
hopelessness, 	distractibility, 	panic 	attacks, 	muscle 	tension, 	and 	feelings 	of
inadequacy. (Tr. 999-1000). According to the doctor, Anderson was markedly
impaired when it came to maintaining attention and attendance at work, working
beyond observing that: “It is well-established that an ALJ may not ‘“cherry-pick”
results that support his conclusion and ignore those that do not.’” Edinger v. Saul,
432 F. Supp. 3d 516, 529 (E.D. Pa. 2020).
4 Two other experts addressed Anderson’s emotional impairments, albeit in a fashion
which does not materially advance our understanding of her mental RFC. For
example, in July of 2022, a state agency expert, Dr. John Gavazzi, declined to opine
regarding her ability to meet the mental demands of the workplace. (Tr. 164). In
March of 2024, Dr. Suzanna Martin, another non-treating, non-examining source,
found that Anderson suffered from depressed mood, diminished interest in activity,
appetite 	disturbance, 	sleep 	disturbance, 	psychotomotor 	retardation, 	decreased
energy, feelings of guilt, difficulty concentrating and thoughts of suicide, irritability,
fatigue, 	difficulty 	concentrating, 	sleep 	disturbance, 	re-experiencing 	symptoms
(nightmares, flashbacks) due to exposure to violence, avoidance behavior, mood
disturbance and hyperarousal. (Tr. 1153-1156). Dr. Martin concluded that these
symptoms moderately affected her ability to understand, remember and apply
information and concentrate, persist and maintain pace. (Id.) However, Dr. Martin
provided no further evaluation of Anderson’s mental RFC.
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with others, completing a work-day without interruptions, performing at a consistent
pace, and dealing with normal work stress. (Tr. 1001). She was moderately impaired
in terms of remembering and carrying out work procedures and very short and simple
instructions, sustaining a routine without special supervision, making simple work
decisions, asking simple questions, accepting criticism and instructions, working
with others, identifying workplace hazards, and responding to changes in a routine
work setting. (Id.) Overall Dr. Butler found that Anderson had marked limitations in
concentration, persistence and pace, would be off-task more than 20% of the work-
day, and would miss four or more days each month due to her impairments. (Tr.
1002).
A second medical opinion was provided in November of 2021 by a consulting
examining source, Dr. Leah Bielski. (Tr. 799-812). Dr. Bielski reported that
Anderson:
[H]as difficulties with staying asleep waking two to three times a night.
She also experiences a loss of appetite. Depressive symptomatology
includes dysphoric moods, guilt, hopelessness, loss of interest in
activities, irritability, fatigue, loss of energy, worthlessness, diminished
self-esteem, concentration difficulties, diminished sense of pleasure,
and social withdrawal. Suicidal/homicidal ideation, intent, and plan
were 	denied. 	Anxiety-related 	symptomatology 	includes 	excessive
apprehension 	and 	worry, 	easily 	fatigued, 	irritability, 	restlessness,
racing/ruminating thoughts, difficulties concentrating, muscle tension,
and avoidance of social settings. Phobic responses were denied. There
is a history of exposure to trauma, including physical, sexual, and
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emotional abuse in adulthood, and physical and emotional abuse in
childhood by her twin sister. She reported flashbacks, hyperstartle
responses, nightmares, hypervigilance, avoidance, intrusive thoughts,
detachment from others, and sleep disturbances. Panic attacks occur
two times a month. Specific situations were not noted. They include
heart palpitations, sweating, trembling, chest pain, nausea, dizziness,
and “a sense of dread.” Manic symptomatology and thought disorder
denied. 	Cognitive 	symptomatology 	includes 	short-term 	memory
deficits, 	long-term 	memory 	deficits, 	concentration 	difficulties,
organization and planning difficulties.
(Tr. 800-801).
Dr. Bielski further opined that Anderson was moderately impaired in terms of
all spheres of simple or complex workplace decision making, (tr. 805), and
concluded that she suffered from marked limitations responding appropriately to
usual work situations and changes in work routine. (Tr. 806).
Thus, the treating and examining source opinions indicated that Anderson
suffered from a cascading array of severe emotional impairments. These experts,
who actually treated or examined the plaintiff, concluded that she experienced
multiple marked and moderate impairments. Moreover, Anderson’s treating doctor
opined based upon a two year treatment history that these impairments were
disabling.
There was one further opinion from a non-treating, non-examining state
agency expert which also indicated that Anderson was significantly limited in
meeting the mental demands of the workplace. On December 15, 2021, Dr. Molly
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Haas Cowan evaluated the severity of Anderson’s psychological conditions, and
found that:
The claimant can make simple decisions. The claimant would be able
to maintain regular attendance and be punctual. The claimant is able to
carry out very short and simple instructions. The claimant can perform
one- and two-step tasks.
(Tr. 113) (emphasis added).
Dr. Cowan’s opinion that Anderson could perform one-and-two steps tasks is
significant. The reference to one-to-two steps tasks is a term of art in Social Security
practice which connotes jobs limited to reasoning level 1 since the definition of this
reasoning 	level 	is 	confined 	to 	jobs 	which 	entail: 	“Apply[ing] 	commonsense
understanding to carry out simple one- or two-step instructions.” Dictionary of
Occupational Titles, Appendix C - Components of the Definition Trailer, 1991 WL
688702. Thus, the state agency expert’s opinion that Anderson could perform one-
and-two step tasks was tantamount to a finding that she was limited to reasoning
level 1 jobs.
C. The ALJ Hearing and Decision.
It was against this medical backdrop that Anderson’s disability claim came to
be heard by the ALJ on June 2, 2023. Anderson and a Vocational Expert (VE) both
testified at this hearing. (Tr. 45-72). The ALJ’s hypothetical questions posed to the
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VE did include a limitation to simple and routine tasks, but the ALJ did not question
the VE about whether a limitation to one and two step tasks would preclude the
plaintiff from working the occupations he identified. (Tr. 68-70). In response to these
hypotheticals the ALJ identified a number of jobs Anderson might be able to
perform, but many of the positions named by the VE required level 2 reasoning, a
greater level of reasoning than the level 1 reasoning level that the state agency expert
identified when she opined that Anderson could perform one-and-two step tasks.
Following this hearing, on May 23, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision denying
Anderson’s application for benefits. (Tr. 18-34). In that decision, the ALJ first
concluded that the plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April
13, 2021, the amended alleged onset date and application date for supplemental
security income benefits. (Tr. 21). At Step 2 of the sequential analysis that governs
Social Security cases, the ALJ found that Anderson had the following severe
impairments: osteoarthritis, fibromyalgia, degenerative disc disease, spina bifida,
scoliosis 	of 	the 	lumbar 	spine, 	major 	depressive 	disorder, 	attention 	deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), anxiety disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD). (Id.) At Step 3, the ALJ determined that these impairments did not meet or
medically equal the severity of any listed impairments. (Tr. 22-25).
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Between Steps 3 and 4 the ALJ fashioned the following residual functional
capacity (RFC), for Anderson:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds
that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform less
than the full range of light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except
the claimant can occasionally climb ramps or stairs, but never climb
ladders, ropes or scaffolds. She can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel,
crouch or crawl. She can understand, remember or carry out simple,
routine, repetitive tasks. These are tasks that can be easily understood,
easily performed, basic, not complicated, clear and straightforward.
These tasks require little to no demonstration, and they can be learned
within 30 days or less from the beginning of the job. The claimant can
make 	judgments 	on 	simple, 	work-related 	decisions. 	She 	can
occasionally interact with the public, coworkers and supervisors in a
routine work setting.
(T. 25-26). Notably, this RFC made no provision limiting Anderson to one-to-step
tasks despite Dr. Cowan’s opinion stating that she “can perform one- and two-step
tasks.” (Tr. 113).
The ALJ’s analysis of the medical opinion evidence further heightened the
ambiguity in this RFC. At the outset, the ALJ largely discounted the opinion of every
medical source who actually treated or examined Anderson, finding Dr. Butler’s
opinion unpersuasive, (Tr. 31), and concluding that “the aspect of Dr. Bielski’s
opinion 	pertaining 	to 	understanding, 	remembering, 	or 	carrying 	out 	simple
instructions and the ability to make judgments on simple work related decisions”
was unpersuasive. (Tr. 30).
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Instead, the ALJ deemed the opinion of the state agency expert, Dr. Cowan,
to be persuasive, stating that:
State agency psychological consultants completed mental residual
functional capacity assessments on December 15, 2021 and April 13,
2022 	that 	indicate 	the 	claimant 	has 	some 	moderate 	limitations
pertaining to sustained concentration and persistence and adaptation.
The State agency psychological consultants also completed psychiatric
review techniques that indicate the claimant has an overall mild degree
of limitation pertaining to understanding, remembering, or applying
information and social interaction and an overall moderate degree of
limitation pertaining to concentration, persistence, or maintaining pace,
and adapting or managing oneself (Exhibits 3A, 4A, and 10A). In
support of the opinions, the State agency psychological consultants
provided explanatory comments that include references to symptoms
related 	to 	the 	claimant’s 	mental 	impairments. 	Additionally, 	the
opinions of the State agency psychological consultants are generally
consistent with the claimant’s medical records on a longitudinal basis,
including clinical examination findings of an appropriate mood, an
appropriate affect, appropriate eye contact, clear sensorium, normal
motor behavior, a full range of affect, fluent speech, good insight, and
good judgment. Thus, the undersigned generally finds the opinions of
the State agency psychological consultants persuasive. However, to
fully accommodate the claimant’s symptoms related to the claimant’s
mental impairments the undersigned has provided a somewhat more
restrictive residual functional capacity than is indicated by the opinions
of the State agency psychological consultants.
(Tr. 30).
This aspect to the ALJ’s decision is curious in several respects. First, the ALJ
referred to the opinions of state consultants. The use of the plural term “consultants”,
implied that there was a medical consensus among these sources. This is incorrect,
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only one state agency expert, Dr. Cowan, described Anderson’s mental abilities. The
second state agency expert, Dr. Gavazzi, declined to opine on this question.
Second, Dr. Cowan’s opinion stated that Anderson could perform one-and-
two step tasks but, without explanation, this material limitation imposed by a source
deemed persuasive by the ALJ never found its way into Anderson’s mental RFC.
Nor was the omission explained in any way by the ALJ. Instead, the ALJ’s analysis
of this opinion closed with a paradoxical proposition. The ALJ stated that he “has
provided a somewhat more restrictive residual functional capacity than is indicated
by the opinions of the State agency psychological consultants.” (Id.) However, by
excluding Dr. Cowan’s limitation to one-to-two step tasks from this RFC, the ALJ
had done just the opposite—he formulated a mental RFC which was less restrictive
than Dr. Cowan’s opinion. It appears that the ALJ did not recognize this internal
inconsistency.
The ALJ’s decision then went on to further highlight these inconsistencies.
The ALJ determined that Anderson could not perform her past relevant work, (tr.
32-33), but identified the following tasks that he believed Anderson could undertake:
photocopy machine operator, DOT#207.685-014, light exertional level,
unskilled, 	SVP2 	(21,000 	jobs 	nationally); 	housekeeper, 	cleaner,
DOT#323.687-014, light exertional level, unskilled, SVP 2 (391,000
jobs nationally); and office helper, DOT#239.567-010, light exertional
level, unskilled, SVP2 (43,000 jobs nationally).
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(Id.) Two of these jobs were performed at reasoning level 2,5 a reasoning level which
under the Commissioner’s regulations required more than the reasoning capabilities
defined by Dr. Cowan, the ability to perform one-to-two step tasks. The ALJ’s
decision did not reconcile this apparent contradiction. Instead, having reached these
conclusions, the ALJ found at Step 5 that Anderson had not met the exacting
standards for disability prescribed by law and denied her claim. (Tr. 34).
This appeal followed. On appeal, Anderson argues inter alia that the ALJ’s
mental RFC analysis was fundamentally flawed. As discussed below, we agree and
recommend 	that 	this 	case 	be 	remanded 	for 	further 	consideration 	by 	the
Commissioner.
III. 	Discussion
A. Substantial Evidence Review – the Role of this Court
When reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision denying a claimant’s
application for benefits, this Court’s review is limited to the question of whether the
findings of the final decision-maker are supported by substantial evidence in the
record. See 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200
5 Photocopy machine operator, DOT#207.685-014, reasoning level 2, 1991 WL
671745; Office helper, DOT#239.567-010, reasoning level 2, 1991 WL 672232.
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(3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp.2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012).
Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but
rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). Substantial
evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla.
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A single piece of evidence is not
substantial evidence if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a
conflict created by the evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir.
1993). But in an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be
“something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ’s decision]
from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n,
383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “In determining if the Commissioner’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.”
Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F. Supp.2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
The Supreme Court has underscored for us the limited scope of our review in
this field, noting that:
The phrase “substantial evidence” is a “term of art” used throughout
administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency
factfinding. T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 574 U.S. ––––, ––––,
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135 S.Ct. 808, 815, 190 L.Ed.2d 679 (2015). Under the substantial-
evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record
and asks whether it contains “sufficien[t] evidence” to support the
agency's factual determinations. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) (emphasis
deleted). And whatever the meaning of “substantial” in other contexts,
the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial
evidence, this Court has said, is “more than a mere scintilla.” Ibid.; see,
e.g., Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420 (internal quotation marks
omitted). It means—and means only—“such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. at 229, 59 S.Ct. 206. See Dickinson v.
Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153, 119 S.Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143 (1999)
(comparing the substantial-evidence standard to the deferential clearly-
erroneous standard).
Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154.
The question before this Court, therefore, is not whether the claimant is
disabled, but rather whether the Commissioner’s finding that she is not disabled is
supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application
of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205,
at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been held that an ALJ’s errors of law denote
a lack of substantial evidence”) (alterations omitted); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F.
Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“The Secretary’s determination as to the status of
a claim requires the correct application of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright v.
Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal
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matters is plenary); Ficca, 901 F. Supp.2d at 536 (“[T]he court has plenary review
of all legal issues . . . .”).
Several fundamental legal propositions which flow from this deferential
standard of review. First, when conducting this review “we are mindful that we must
not substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder.” Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777
F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d
Cir. 2005)). Thus, we are enjoined to refrain from trying to re-weigh the evidence.
Rather our task is to simply determine whether substantial evidence supported the
ALJ’s findings. However, we must also ascertain whether the ALJ’s decision meets
the burden of articulation demanded by the courts to enable informed judicial
review. Simply put, “this Court requires the ALJ to set forth the reasons for his
decision.” Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000).
As the Court of Appeals has noted on this score:
In Burnett, we held that an ALJ must clearly set forth the reasons for
his 	decision. 	220 	F.3d 	at 	119. 	Conclusory 	statements 	. 	. 	. 	are
insufficient. The ALJ must provide a “discussion of the evidence” and
an “explanation of reasoning” for his conclusion sufficient to enable
meaningful judicial review. Id. at 120; see Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d
501, 505 & n. 3 (3d Cir.2004). The ALJ, of course, need not employ
particular “magic” words: “Burnett does not require the ALJ to use
particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting his
analysis.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505.
Diaz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2009).
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Thus, in practice ours is a twofold task. We must evaluate the substance of the
ALJ’s decision under a deferential standard of review, but we must also give that
decision careful scrutiny to ensure that the rationale for the ALJ’s actions is
sufficiently articulated to permit meaningful judicial review.
This principle applies with particular force to legal challenges, like the claim
made here, based upon alleged inadequacies in the articulation of a claimant’s
mental RFC. In Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 212 (3d Cir. 2019), the
United States Court of Appeals recently addressed the standards of articulation that
apply in this setting. In Hess the court of appeals considered the question of whether
an RFC which limited a claimant to simple tasks adequately addressed moderate
limitations on concentration, persistence, and pace. In addressing the plaintiff’s
argument that the language used by the ALJ to describe the claimant’s mental
limitations was legally insufficient, the court of appeals rejected a per se rule which
would require the ALJ to adhere to a particular format in conducting this analysis.
Instead, framing this issue as a question of adequate articulation of the ALJ’s
rationale, the court held that: “as long as the ALJ offers a ‘valid explanation,’ a
‘simple tasks’ limitation is permitted after a finding that a claimant has ‘moderate’
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difficulties in ‘concentration, persistence, or pace.’ ” Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931
F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2019).
There is a corollary to this pragmatic analysis which applies when an ALJ
deems a medical opinion which contains a one-to-two step limitation to be
persuasive. In this setting the ALJ’s duty of articulation is clear: “when a medical
opinion is found persuasive and contains a limitation to one- and two-step tasks, the
ALJ is obligated to either: (1) include the limitation in the RFC and limit the claimant
to reasoning level one occupations, or, (2) identify the substantial evidence that the
ALJ is relying on in rejecting the limitation.” Cruz, 2025 WL 2813882, at *8. See
also Rita R. v. Kijakazi, No. 21 C 5631, 2023 WL 2403139, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
8, 2023) (“Indeed, an ALJ is required to provide a thorough and appropriate
explanation for rejecting a state agency psychologist's opinion that a claimant is
limited to one-to-two step tasks.”)
B. Initial Burdens of Proof, Persuasion, and Articulation for the ALJ
To receive benefits under the Social Security Act by reason of disability, a
claimant must demonstrate an inability to “engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); see also 20
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C.F.R. §404.1505(a). 	To satisfy this requirement, a claimant must have a severe
physical or mental impairment that makes it impossible to do his or her previous
work or any other substantial gainful activity that exists in the national economy. 42
U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. §404.1505(a). To receive benefits under Title II of
the Social Security Act, a claimant must show that he or she contributed to the
insurance program, is under retirement age, and became disabled prior to the date on
which he or she was last insured. 42 U.S.C. §423(a); 20 C.F.R. §404.131(a).
In making this determination at the administrative level, the ALJ follows a
five-step sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a). Under this process,
the ALJ must sequentially determine: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in
substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3)
whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) whether
the claimant is able to do his or her past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant
is able to do any other work, considering his or her age, education, work experience
and residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4).
Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ must also assess a claimant’s residual
functional capacity (RFC). RFC is defined as “that which an individual is still able
to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).” Burnett v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R.
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§§404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(1). In making this assessment, the ALJ considers all of
the claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including any non-severe
impairments identified by the ALJ at step two of his or her analysis. 	20 C.F.R.
§404.1545(a)(2).
There is an undeniable medical aspect to an RFC determination, since that
determination entails an assessment of what work the claimant can do given the
physical limitations that the claimant experiences. Yet, when considering the role
and necessity of medical opinion evidence in making this determination, courts have
followed several different paths. Some courts emphasize the importance of medical
opinion support for an RFC determination and have suggested that “[r]arely can a
decision be made regarding a claimant's residual functional capacity without an
assessment from a physician regarding the functional abilities of the claimant.”
Biller v. Acting Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 962 F. Supp. 2d 761, 778–79 (W.D. Pa. 2013)
(quoting Gormont v. Astrue, Civ. No. 11–2145, 2013 WL 791455 at *7 (M.D. Pa.
Mar. 4, 2013)). In other instances, it has been held that: “There is no legal
requirement that a physician have made the particular findings that an ALJ adopts
in the course of determining an RFC.” Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 F. App’x 6, 11
(3d Cir. 2006). Further, courts have held in cases where there is no evidence of any
credible medical opinion supporting a claimant’s allegations of disability that “the
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22
proposition that an ALJ must always base his RFC on a medical opinion from a
physician is misguided.” Cummings v. Colvin, 129 F. Supp. 3d 209, 214–15 (W.D.
Pa. 2015).
These 	seemingly 	discordant 	legal 	propositions 	can 	be 	reconciled 	by
evaluation of the factual context of these decisions. Those cases which emphasize
the importance of medical opinion support for an RFC assessment typically arise in
the factual setting where a well-supported medical source has identified limitations
that would support a disability claim, but an ALJ has rejected the medical opinion
which supported a disability determination based upon a lay assessment of other
evidence. Biller, 962 F.Supp.2d at 778–79. In this setting, these cases simply restate
the commonplace idea that medical opinions are entitled to careful consideration
when making a disability determination, particularly when those opinions support a
finding of disability. In contrast, when an ALJ is relying upon other evidence, such
as contrasting clinical or opinion evidence or testimony regarding the claimant’s
activities of daily living, to fashion an RFC courts have adopted a more pragmatic
view and have sustained the ALJ’s exercise of independent judgment based upon all
of the facts and evidence. See Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 F. App'x 6, 11 (3d Cir.
2006); Cummings v. Colvin, 129 F. Supp. 3d 209, 214–15 (W.D. Pa. 2015). In either
event, once the ALJ has made this determination, our review of the ALJ's assessment
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of the plaintiff's RFC is deferential, and that RFC assessment will not be set aside if
it is supported by substantial evidence. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 129 (3d
Cir. 2002); see also Metzger v. Berryhill, No. 3:16-CV-1929, 2017 WL 1483328, at
*5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2017), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Metzgar
v. Colvin, No. 3:16-CV-1929, 2017 WL 1479426 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2017); Rathbun
v. Berryhill, No. 3:17-CV-00301, 2018 WL 1514383, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 12,
2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-301, 2018 WL 1479366
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2018).
At Steps 1 through 4, the claimant bears the initial burden of demonstrating
the existence of a medically determinable impairment that prevents him or her in
engaging in any of his or her past relevant work. Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064. Once this
burden has been met by the claimant, it shifts to the Commissioner at Step 5 to show
that jobs exist in significant number in the national economy that the claimant could
perform that are consistent with the claimant’s age, education, work experience and
RFC. 20 C.F.R. §404.1512(f); Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064.
The ALJ’s disability determination must also meet certain basic substantive
requisites. Most significant among these legal benchmarks is a requirement that the
ALJ adequately explain the legal and factual basis for this disability determination.
Thus, in order to facilitate review of the decision under the substantial evidence
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standard, the ALJ's decision must be accompanied by “a clear and satisfactory
explication of the basis on which it rests.” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d
Cir. 1981). Conflicts in the evidence must be resolved and the ALJ must indicate
which evidence was accepted, which evidence was rejected, and the reasons for
rejecting certain evidence. Id. at 706-07. In addition, “[t]he ALJ must indicate in his
decision which evidence he has rejected and which he is relying on as the basis for
his finding.” Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999).
C. Legal Benchmarks for the ALJ’s Assessment of Medical Opinions
The plaintiff filed this disability application following a paradigm shift in the
manner in which medical opinions were evaluated when assessing Social Security
claims. Prior to March 2017, ALJs were required to follow regulations which defined
medical opinions narrowly and created a hierarchy of medical source opinions with
treating sources at the apex of this hierarchy. However, in March of 2017, the
Commissioner’s regulations governing medical opinions changed in a number of
fundamental ways. The range of opinions that ALJs were enjoined to consider were
broadened substantially, and the approach to evaluating opinions was changed from
a hierarchical form of review to a more holistic analysis. As one court as aptly
observed:
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The regulations regarding the evaluation of medical evidence have been
amended for claims filed after March 27, 2017, and several of the prior
Social Security Rulings, including SSR 96-2p, have been rescinded.
According to the new regulations, the Commissioner “will no longer
give any specific evidentiary weight to medical opinions; this includes
giving controlling weight to any medical opinion.” Revisions to Rules
Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence (“Revisions to Rules”),
2017 WL 168819, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, at 5867–68 (Jan. 18, 2017), see
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). Instead, the Commissioner
must consider all medical opinions and “evaluate their persuasiveness”
based 	on 	the 	following 	five 	factors: 	supportability; 	consistency;
relationship with the claimant; specialization; and “other factors.” 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a)-(c), 416.920c(a)-(c).
Although the new regulations eliminate the perceived hierarchy of
medical sources, deference to specific medical opinions, and assigning
“weight” to a medical opinion, the ALJ must still “articulate how [he
or she] considered the medical opinions” and “how persuasive [he or
she] find[s] all of the medical opinions.” Id. at §§ 404.1520c(a) and
(b)(1), 416.920c(a) and (b)(1). The two “most important factors for
determining the persuasiveness of medical opinions are consistency and
supportability,” 	which 	are 	the 	“same 	factors” 	that 	formed 	the
foundation of the treating source rule. Revisions to Rules, 82 Fed. Reg.
5844-01 at 5853.
An ALJ is specifically required to “explain how [he or she] considered
the supportability and consistency factors” for a medical opinion. 20
C.F.R. 	§§ 	404.1520c 	(b)(2), 	416.920c(b)(2). 	With 	respect 	to
“supportability,” the new regulations provide that “[t]he more relevant
the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented
by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical
opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” Id. at §§
404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1). The regulations provide that with
respect to “consistency,” “[t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) or
prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other
medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more
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persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s) will be.” Id. at §§ 404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2).
Under the new regulations an ALJ must consider, but need not
explicitly discuss, the three remaining factors in determining the
persuasiveness of a medical source's opinion. Id. at §§ 404.1520c(b)(2),
416.920c(b)(2). However, where the ALJ has found two or more
medical opinions to be equally well supported and consistent with the
record, but not exactly the same, the ALJ must articulate how he or she
considered those factors contained in paragraphs (c)(3) through (c)(5).
Id. at §§ 404.1520c(b)(3), 416.920c(b)(3).
Andrew G. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:19-CV-0942 (ML), 2020 WL 5848776, at
*5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2020).
Oftentimes, as in this case, an ALJ must evaluate various medical opinions.
Judicial review of this aspect of ALJ decision-making is still guided by several
settled legal tenets. First, when presented with a disputed factual record, it is well-
established that “[t]he ALJ – not treating or examining physicians or State agency
consultants – must make the ultimate disability and RFC determinations.” Chandler
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011). Thus, when evaluating
medical opinions “the ALJ may choose whom to credit but ‘cannot reject evidence
for no reason or for the wrong reason.’” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d
Cir. 2000) (quoting Mason, 994 F.2d at 1066). Therefore, provided that the decision
is accompanied by an adequate, articulated rationale, it is the province and the duty
of the ALJ to choose which medical opinions and evidence deserve greater weight.
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However, the ALJ’s duty of articulation remains unchanged and immutable.
Therefore, inconsistencies or ambiguities in medical opinion analysis may compel
remand.
D. This Case Should Be Remanded.
Judged against these legal guideposts, we conclude that the ALJ’s mental RFC
analysis and evaluation of the medical opinion evidence is flawed in several ways
which collectively compel a remand.
At the outset, we note that the ALJ’s decision to reject the opinion of every
medical source who treated or examined Anderson in favor of a non-examining, non-
treating source is potentially problematic. At a minimum, this choice by an ALJ must
be supported by a well-articulated explanation.
But beyond this threshold concern, we find that the ALJ’s characterization of
the opinion of the non-examining state agency expert, Dr. Cowan, that the ALJ found
persuasive, and the RFC the ALJ fashioned based upon this opinion are riddled with
internal inconsistences, factual errors, and inherent ambiguities. At the outset, the
ALJ’s decision refers to the opinions of “state consultants,” implying that there was
a medical consensus among more than one state agency expert. This appears to be
incorrect, since only one state agency expert, Dr. Cowan, described Anderson’s
Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 27 of 32
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mental abilities. The second state agency expert, Dr. Gavazzi, declined to opine on
this question.
Further, the ALJ’s decision deemed Dr. Cowan’s opinion to be persuasive but
then, without explanation, failed to incorporate an apparently significant finding
made by the doctor into Anderson’s RFC. Dr. Cowan’s opinion clearly stated that
Anderson could perform one-and-two step tasks. However, without explanation, this
material limitation imposed by a source deemed persuasive by the ALJ never found
its way into Anderson’s mental RFC.
This was error since it is well-settled that an ALJ's decision must be
accompanied by “a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests.”
Cotter, 642 F.2d at 704. Furthermore, the ALJ must also “indicate in his decision
which evidence he has rejected and which he is relying on as the basis for his
finding.” Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 433. These mandates apply here in the context of
the ALJ’s assessment of medical opinion evidence which appeared to limit a
claimant to one-to-two step tasks. Indeed, this court, and others, have applied these
paradigms in in this setting, specifically concluding that “when a medical opinion is
found persuasive and contains a limitation to one- and two-step tasks, the ALJ is
obligated to either: (1) include the limitation in the RFC and limit the claimant to
reasoning level one occupations, or, (2) identify the substantial evidence that the
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ALJ is relying on in rejecting the limitation.” Cruz, 2025 WL 2813882, at *8. See
also Rita R. v. Kijakazi, No. 21 C 5631, 2023 WL 2403139, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
8, 2023) (“Indeed, an ALJ is required to provide a thorough and appropriate
explanation for rejecting a state agency psychologist's opinion that a claimant is
limited to one-to-two step tasks.”)
Moreover, this error is not harmless here since the ALJ’s conclusion that
Anderson was not disabled was based in part upon her ability to perform work in
occupations requiring a reasoning level of 2 which is inconsistent with a limitation
to one-to-two step tasks. As this court explained:
The 	DOT 	defines 	occupations 	by 	reasoning 	level 	and 	defines
“reasoning 	level 	one” 	as 	the 	ability 	to 	“apply 	commonsense
understanding to carry out simple one-or two-step instructions.” The
similarity of that language to “one- and two-step tasks,” leads us to
conclude that an individual limited to “one-and two-step tasks” is
likewise limited to “reasoning level one” occupations. Importantly, this
limitation is dischargeable: an ALJ may find otherwise, so long as they
rely on and cite to substantial evidence that adequately explains why
they are omitting the limitation in the claimant's RFC despite having
found the relevant medical opinion to be persuasive.
Additionally, courts in eight of the eleven circuits where a District court
has considered this issue have held that “simple repetitive tasks” and
“one- and two-step tasks” are legally distinct limitations. And all but
one of these cases also found that a limitation to “one- and two-step
tasks” 	necessarily 	limits 	the 	claimant 	to 	reasoning 	level 	one
occupations.
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Cruz, 2025 WL 2813882, at *7. See also Rita R., 2023 WL 2403139, at *3–4 (“The
ALJ's error is of crucial importance because a limitation to ‘simple tasks’ (the RFC
limitation the ALJ found here) encompasses jobs that may involve complexity
beyond one-to-two step tasks”); Daniel M. v. Kijakazi, No. 2:21-CV-243, 2023 WL
154909, at *3 (D. Vt. Jan. 11, 2023) (collecting cases) (concluding reasoning Levels
2 and 3 are not consistent with “simple, one-to-two step tasks”). Therefore, further
clarity is needed here.
Finally, the ALJ’s analysis of Dr. Cowan’s medical opinion closed with a
paradoxical proposition. The ALJ stated that he “has provided a somewhat more
restrictive residual functional capacity than is indicated by the opinions of the State
agency psychological consultants.” (Id.) However, by excluding Dr. Cowan’s
limitation to one-to-two step tasks from this RFC, the ALJ had done just the
opposite—he formulated a mental RFC which was less restrictive than Dr. Cowan’s
opinion. In the past we have held that similar, paradoxical reasoning by ALJs
compels a remand. See Matos v. Bisignano, No. 4:24-CV-675, 2025 WL 2918975,
at *11 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2025) (ALJ’s assertion that a two-to three-step task RFC
is more restrictive than medical opinions limiting the plaintiff to one-to-two step
tasks required remand).
Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 30 of 32
31
So it is here. The ALJ’s suggestion that this less restrictive RFC is actually
more confining than Dr. Cowan’s opinion, which limited Anderson to one-to-two
steps tasks, appears to be in error. This error is potentially prejudicial and warrants
a remand of this case for further consideration by the Commissioner.
Simply put, more was needed here by way of explanation on the part of the
ALJ. Indeed, a rising tide of caselaw supports our recommendation that the ALJ
erred in failing to address the one and two step task limitation opined by the expert
whose opinion he found persuasive. Since the ALJ’s burden of articulation is not
met in the instant case, we recommend this matter must be remanded for further
consideration by the Commissioner.
Yet, while we recommend that these errors compel a remand in this case,
nothing in this Report and Recommendation should be deemed as expressing a
judgment on what the ultimate outcome of any reassessment of this evidence should
be. Instead, that judgment should remain to province of the ALJ.
IV. 	Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff’s request
for 	a 	new 	administrative 	hearing 	be 	GRANTED, 	the 	final 	decision 	of 	the
Commissioner denying these claims be vacated, and this case be remanded to the
Commissioner to conduct a new administrative hearing.
Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 31 of 32
32
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings,
recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in
28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the
disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party
shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and
all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which
objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing
requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall
make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings
or 	recommendations 	made 	by 	the 	magistrate 	judge. 	The 	judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or
where required by law, and may consider the record developed before
the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis
of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall
witnesses, 	or 	recommit 	the 	matter 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	with
instructions.
Submitted this 12 th day of February 2026.
S/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 4:25-cv-00313-JKM Document 18 Filed 02/12/26 Page 32 of 32

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