Weisen v. Northumberland County, Department of Adult Probation and Parole

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MEGHAN WEISEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF ADULT
PROBATION AND PAROLE,
Defendant.
No. 4:24-CV-00327
(Chief Judge Brann)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
J ANUARY 16, 2026
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff 	Meghan 	Weisen 	(“Plaintiff”) 	filed 	a 	complaint 	against
Northumberland County, Department of Adult Probation and Parole (“Defendant”)
on February 26, 2024.1 Parties proceeded directly to discovery, which closed on June
3, 2025.2 Soon thereafter, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.3 The motion is now ripe for
disposition. For the reasons set forth below, it is granted in full.
1 	Doc. 1 (Compl).
2 	Doc. 15 (Sch. Ord.).
3 	Doc. 20 (Mot.).
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II. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Standard of Review
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate
where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”4 Material facts are those “that
could alter the outcome” of the litigation, “and disputes are ‘genuine’ if evidence
exists from which a rational person could conclude that the position of the person
with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct.” 5 A defendant “meets this
standard when there is an absence of evidence that rationally supports the plaintiff’s
case.” 6 Conversely, to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must “point to
admissible evidence that would be sufficient to show all elements of a prima facie
case under applicable substantive law.” 7
Party testimony is sufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact on an
issue: “‘a single, non-conclusory affidavit or witness's testimony, when based on
personal knowledge and directed at a material issue, is sufficient to defeat summary
judgment.’” 8 “This is true even where, as here, the information is self-serving.”9
However, courts are not required to credit conclusory testimony, that is, evidence
4 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
5 	EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2010).
6 	Clark v. Mod. Grp. Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993).
7 	Id.
8 	Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 209 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Lupyan v. Corinthian
Colleges, Inc., 761 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 2014)).
9 	Id.
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failing to set forth specific factual assertions and instead regurgitating opinions and
conclusions.10 “[C]onclusory 	testimonial 	evidence 	cannot 	defeat 	summary
judgment.” 11 Moreover, “‘[i]n considering a motion for summary judgment, a
district court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of
the evidence.’” 12 Instead, the Court must believe the non-moving party’s evidence,
drawing all justifiable inferences in his favor. 13
In assessing “whether there is evidence upon which a jury can properly
proceed to find a verdict for the [nonmoving] party,”14 the Court “must view the
facts and evidence presented on the motion in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.”15 “If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails
to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c),” the
Court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.” 16 Finally,
although “the court need consider only the cited materials, . . . it may consider other
materials in the record.” 17
10 	Daimler v. Moehle, No. 23-2611, 2025 WL 1355138, at *5 (3d Cir. May 9, 2025).
11 	Id.; see also Gonzalez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 263 (3d Cir. 2012).
12 	Paladino, 885 F.3d at 209-210 (quoting Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d
Cir. 2004)).
13 	Id. at 210.
14 	Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (quoting Schuylkill & Dauphin Imp.
Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442, 448 (1871)).
15 	Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., 951 F.3d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 2020).
16 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); see also Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613-14 (3d
Cir. 2018).
17 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
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B. 	Statement of Facts
With that standard outlining the Court’s framework for review, I now turn to
the facts. As referenced above, I must view the facts and evidence, and resolve all
doubts, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. With that in mind, the
facts for the purposes of this motion are as follows.
Meghan Weisen was employed by Northumberland County Adult Probation
and Parole Department from 2014 until 2022.18 Plaintiff was terminated on
November 3, 2022 by President Judge Charles Saylor.19 During the time she was
employed by Defendant, Plaintiff experienced a few core, main instances of
disparate treatment in addition to what she posits as a broader sense of inequality in
assignments and office environment. 20
First, Plaintiff was subjected to repeated inappropriate comments by Rich
Frampton (“Frampton”), an employee of Snyder County Prison.21 Frampton was not
an employee of Defendant’s, but Plaintiff interacted with him in her duties as a
probation officer.22 Frampton made calls and sent emails to Plaintiff which made her
uncomfortable, saying things like “it’s so nice to hear your voice,” and asking if her
“knees went weak at the site [sic] of him.” 23 When Plaintiff brought the comments
18 	Doc. 21-7 (Exhibit G); Doc. 26 (Response to Statement of Undisputed Material Facts
“RSUMF”) ¶ 1.
19 	Doc. 26 ¶ 34, 43.
20 	Doc. 26
21 	Doc. 26 ¶ 5.
22 	Id. ¶ 4, 6.
23 	Id. ¶ 5.
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to the attention of her then supervisor, Jimmy Cortelyou, he said something to the
effect of “maybe you should just lay on your back and take one for the team.” 24
Cortelyou also told Plaintiff to print off the emails from Frampton and provide them
to Cortelyou, to delete the electronic versions, and to cease communications with
Frampton.25 Plaintiff did so, and besides having to occasionally see Frampton in her
role, she did not engage in any further conversations or communications with him. 26
Afterwards, Cortelyou and other male coworkers of Plaintiff’s made comments to
her minimizing the incident and making fun of the situation.27 Plaintiff does not
remember specifically which coworkers were making the comments, but rather
perceived a general feeling regarding this interaction within the office. 28
Next, there was an incident with the fit of Plaintiff’s bulletproof vest. In
September 2021, Defendant had been having issues with their bulletproof vest
supplier; specifically, several officers’ vests did not fit correctly.29 The fitting issue
was particularly prevalent with female officers.30 Plaintiff was one such affected
officer; her vest was far too large for her frame.31 Plaintiff complained of the
improper fit of her vest to Deputy Brian Updegrove (“Updegrove”), and, in response,
24 	Id. ¶ 7.
25 	Id. ¶ 9.
26 	Id. ¶ 10.
27 	Id. ¶ 11.
28 	Id.
29 	Id. ¶ 15.
30 	Id.
31 	Id.
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he said “maybe you should do something about your tits” and commented that her
body, including her breasts, were smaller after her recent weight loss.32 Updegrove
had Plaintiff run down the hallway to demonstrate how the vest bounced. 33 When
she did so, he laughed and directed her to show show Heitzman, her supervisor, that
the vest fit poorly as well. 34 Plaintiff did not, at that time, report the comments to her
supervisor.35 Another female employee, Brianne Herring (“Herring”), had similar
problems with her vest; Plaintiff witnessed a conversation between Herring and
Updegrove about the fit of Herring’s vest where Updegrove said “you girls and all
your issues with your boobs.” 36
Finally, Plaintiff perceived an overall discriminatory environment.37 Plaintiff
made complaints to Heitzman and Updegrove of the “general nature of the
environment in the office,” being the “attitude in the office that . . . if you are a
female you would be treated less favorably than males.” 38 Plaintiff believed that
“females were held to . . . more scrutiny and weren’t allowed to do as many things
32 	Id. ¶ 16.
33 	Id.
34 	Id.
35 	Id. ¶ 24.
36 	Id. ¶ 20.
37 	The Court is not required to credit conclusory allegations, and will largely disregard most of
Plaintiff’s allegations about the environment as too generalized, conclusory, and devoid of
specific factual allegations to survive a motion for summary judgment. The Court lays these
facts out to accurately summarize Plaintiff’s testimony, and will address their significance
below.
38 	Doc. 21-2 (Exhibit A) 52:13-24.
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because they were female.” 39 Plaintiff testified that she was “required to do a lot
more in a bigger variety of things than other officers and that female officers were
frequently required to and expected to do more administrative tasks than male
officers who were expected to be out in the field the majority of the time.” 40
Few discrete instances of Plaintiff’s generalized environmental claims can be
discerned from the record. 41 Three female officers were assigned to handle the “PSI
reports” and field officers did not have to do them. 42 Plaintiff complained about
management of assignments and was “offered to switch to a field position if I didn’t
like my office job,” among other suggestions.43 Plaintiff also testified that she
“signed up for a lot of shifts” while the office was short-staffed, and was being
“blocked” 	from 	picking 	up 	shifts 	because 	the 	“amount 	of 	hours 	that 	[she]
worked . . . made other people look bad.” 44 Other staff, including male staff, were
not being blocked.45 Plaintiff complained to her supervisor as well as other
employees that she believed she was being restricted from going out in the field. 46
39 	Doc. 21-1 at 56:3-5.
40 	Doc. 26 ¶ 25; Doc. 21-1 at 53:19-54:8.
41 	Plaintiff’s answer to the statement of material facts largely cites to Plaintiff’s deposition
testimony, Doc. 21-1 (Exhibit A) and the emails Plaintiff sent to an officer “Ron McClay,”
Doc. 21-5 (Exhibit E).
42 	Doc. 26 ¶ 27.
43 	Id. ¶ 27.
44 	Id. ¶ 30.
45 	Id.
46 	Doc. 21-1 at 68:6-23.
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Over Labor Day Weekend in September 2022, Plaintiff slept at the office
without prior authorization.47 Plaintiff did so because she was going through a
divorce at the time, and had previously worked late at the office without issue. 48
Plaintiff was aware of another employee who had a cot at the office, and was not
aware that staying overnight at the office was prohibited and terminable.49 Plaintiff’s
stay at the office was discovered because Plaintiff placed her co-workers’ timesheets
on their desks when she found them elsewhere. 50 Plaintiff had once been previously
disciplined for disturbing other employees’ possessions.51
Chief Heitzman recommended to President Judge Saylor that Plaintiff be
terminated. Judge Saylor authorized her termination, and, in his declaration, stated
that he did so because of Plaintiff’s unauthorized use of overnight facilities and her
previous disciplinary history.52 There is no evidence in the record that indicates that
Judge 	Saylor 	knew 	that 	Plaintiff 	had 	complained 	of 	sexual 	harassment 	or
discrimination.53
47 	Doc. 26 ¶ 37.
48 	Doc. 26 ¶¶ 38, 40.
49 	Doc. 26 ¶ 38.
50 	Doc. 26 ¶ 35.
51 	Doc. 21-12 (Exhibit L).
52 	Doc. 21-8 (Exhibit H – Saylor Declaration).
53 	Doc. 21-8 (Exhibit H – Saylor Declaration). In Plaintiff’s response to the statement of material
facts, Doc. 26, Plaintiff disputes these facts only by arguing that the “veracity and credibility
of the witnesses’ is for the factfinder to determine at trial.” Doc. 26 at ¶ 45. However, the Court
need not shut its eyes to uncontroverted witness testimony supporting Defendant merely
because the Court ought not weigh credibility. See Elliott v. Delaware State Univ., 879 F. Supp.
2d 438, 441 n.1 (D. Del. 2012) (“[T]he Court accepts the Plaintiff's gloss on the facts when
there is a dispute, but also accepts [witness] testimony to the extent it is undisputed.”).
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Plaintiff filed her complaint with this Court on February 26, 2024.54 She raised
three types of claims, each under both the PHRA and Title VII: sexual harassment
hostile work environment claims, gender discrimination, and retaliation.55
C. 	Analysis
1. 	Immunity from the PHRA
“The Third Circuit has repeatedly held that “‘Pennsylvania's judicial districts,
including 	their 	probation 	and 	parole 	departments, 	are 	entitled 	to 	Eleventh
Amendment immunity.’”56 Pennsylvania has not waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity, and “federal courts throughout the Commonwealth have consistently held
that the applicable language of the PHRA does not operate as a waiver of
Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity” for suits brought in federal court. 57
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also held that separation of powers principles
bar PHRA claims against the state judiciary. 58
As other district courts in the Third Circuit have noted, probation departments
are typically part of the state judiciary.59 Here, Defendant has established that
54 	Doc. 1 (Compl.).
55 	Id.
56 	Wenhold v. Lehigh County Adult Probation and Parole, No. 20-CV-3681, 2021 WL 680106,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2021) (quoting Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob & Parole,
551 F.3d 193, 197 (3d Cir. 2008)).
57 	Mitchell v. Miller, 884 F. Supp. 2d 334, 380 (W.D. Pa. 2012).
58 	Renner v. Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, 660 Pa. 225, 280 (2020); see also
Giordano v. Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania, No. 20-277, 2021 WL 1193112, at *4
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2021).
59 	See, e.g., Haybarger, 551 F.3d 193, 198 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We have held that Pennsylvania's
judicial districts, including their probation and parole departments, are entitled to Eleventh
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Plaintiff worked for the judiciary as a probation officer and, therefore, is immune
from suits under the PHRA. Defendant has submitted evidence that Plaintiff’s
termination was by President Judge Saylor, 60 and provided multiple cases of courts
noting that probation is an arm of the judiciary. 61 Plaintiff was also hired by another
judge, the Honorable William Wiest. 62 There has been no evidence submitted for
this Court to conclude that the probation department here, unlike every other
probation department known to this Court, was not a branch of the judiciary.
Furthermore, Plaintiff provides no cases where a probation officer was found
to not be an agent of the judiciary or where the PHRA applied to a probation
officer.63 Nor does Plaintiff provide evidence that this specific probation office was
outside of the purview of the judiciary, pointing out only that her W-2 forms had
“Northumberland County” printed on them.64 She also points to a written reprimand
as purported evidence that county employees were disciplining Plaintiff. 65 As to the
latter, the listed employee there is only described as “Chief Probation Officer,” and
Amendment immunity.”); Slaughter v. Dauphin County Adult Probation, No. 1:24-CV-1170,
2024 WL 5697099, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2024) (“County probation officers are an arm of
the state, as part of the judiciary, and are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity against
intentional tort claims.”) R&R adopted at No. 1:24-CV-01170, 2024 WL 5695924 (M.D. Pa.
Dec. 19, 2024).
60 	Doc. 21-8 (Exhibit H – Saylor Declaration).
61 	Doc. 21 at 3-4.
62 	Doc. 21-7 (Exhibit G).
63 	Doc. 25 (Br. in Opp.) at 5-6.
64 	Id.; Doc. 25-1 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1).
65 	Doc. 25 at 6, Doc. 21-12 (Defendant’s Exhibit L).
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the document does not indicate that this position is a county one.66 That leaves only
the W-2 forms with “Northumberland County” on them. Without more, there is
insufficient evidence from which a rational person could conclude that the judiciary
did not employ Plaintiff. Indeed, Plaintiff seems to rest on the hope that, somehow,
the lack of evidence would raise a dispute of material fact; 67 however, at this stage
in the litigation, Plaintiff cannot rest on allegations but must affirmatively supply
such evidence. 68 Therefore, Plaintiff cannot sue Defendant under the PHRA.
Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate for Counts II, IV, and VI, all
of which raise claims under the PHRA. Those counts are consequently dismissed.
2. 	Hostile Work Environment
With the PHRA claims dismissed, I turn now to Plaintiff’s Title VII claims,
beginning first with her hostile work environment sexual harassment claims. To
establish a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “1) the
employee 	suffered 	intentional 	discrimination 	because 	of 	his/her 	sex, 	2) 	the
discrimination was severe or pervasive, 3) the discrimination detrimentally affected
the plaintiff, 4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in
like circumstances, and 5) the existence of respondeat superior liability.” 69 For this
claim, Plaintiff would need to prove that the inappropriate workplace conduct was
66 	Id.
67 	Doc. 25 at 6.
68 	See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
69 	Mandel v. M&Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2013).
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so “severe or pervasive” that it created a “hostile, intimidating, or offensive work
environment.”70
However, prior to bringing a hostile work environment claim under Title VII,
an employee must first file “a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) either 180 or 300 days ‘after the alleged unlawful employment
practice occurred.’”71 “A plaintiffs attempt to obtain relief under federal law from a
defendant's alleged employment discrimination under Title VII ‘may proceed only
if he filed his administrative charge of discrimination within 300 days of the
unlawful employment actions he challenges.’”72 Defendant points out that, where a
state agency has no jurisdiction to grant relief, as here, plaintiffs are entitled to the
shorter 180 day deadline.73 Plaintiff filed a complaint/charge of discrimination with
the PHRC and the EEOC on December 2, 2022. Plaintiff has not shown a
discriminatory act that occurred within either deadline and, therefore, the hostile
work environment claim must be dismissed as untimely.
Plaintiff argues that her claim should not be barred as untimely under the
“continuing 	violation” 	doctrine. 74 “The 	continuing 	violation 	theory 	allows 	a
‘plaintiff [to] pursue a Title VII claim for discriminatory conduct that began prior to
70 	Pittman v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 434, 440 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
71 	Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105 (2002).
72 	Nahouraii v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., No. 2:11-CV-00973, 2015 WL 401422, at * 13 (W.D. Pa.
Jan. 28, 2015) (quoting Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851, 854 (3d Cir. 2000).
73 	Doc. 21 (Br. in Supp.) at 6 n.1; Benn v. First Jud. Dist. Of Pa., No. 98-5730, 2000 WL
1236201, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2000) aff’d 426 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2005).
74 	Doc. 25 (Br. in Opp.) at 7.
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the filing period if he can demonstrate that the act is part of an ongoing practice or
pattern of discrimination of the defendant.’” 75 Such acts “‘can occur at any time so
long as they are linked in a pattern of actions which continues into the applicable
limitations period.’”76 “To allege a continuing violation, the plaintiff must show that
all acts which constitute the claim are part of the same unlawful employment
practice and that at least one act falls within the applicable limitations period.” 77
Plaintiff has failed to show that any acts extended into the applicable
limitations period. The two instances of discrimination Plaintiff points to are the
Rich Frampton and vest incidents, with the former ending in 201778 and the latter
occurring in August 2021.79 Other than these instances, Plaintiff falls back on her
generalized complaints of the environment and atmosphere in the probation office.80
However, at the summary judgment stage, vague statements that harassment
occurred frequently are insufficient. 81
75 	Rush v. Scott Specialty Gases, 113 F.3d 476, 481 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting West v. Phila. Elec.
Co., 45 F.3d 744, 754 (3d Cir. 1995)).
76 	Mandel v. M&Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting O’Connor v.
City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 127 (3d Cir. 2006)).
77 	Id. at 165-66.
78 	Doc. 26 ¶ 14.
79 	Id. at ¶ 19.
80 	Doc. 25 (Br. in Opp.) at 8-11 (Pointing to no specific instances besides those with Frampton
and the vest, and instead arguing that “Plaintiff averred that she experienced continuous
harassment during her employment. . . . Plaintiff detailed and outlined a constant environment
of harassment in her complaint to the Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania. . . . the five
years of harassment in conjunction with Plaintiff’s asserted specific instances . . . .” without
any citation of specific examples or to the record).
81 	Parties agree that a plaintiff may not rely “merely on ‘vague statements’ to defeat summary
judgment” and that unsubstantiated, general allegations that inappropriate conduct occurred
“all the time” may be excluded. Nitkin v. Main Line Health, 67 F.4th 565, 569, 571 (3d Cir.
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Combing the record, the only two possible other examples of discrimination
Plaintiff references are that 1) three female clerks had to do the PSI reports, and 2)
Plaintiff was being “blocked” from picking up additional shifts. Plaintiff does not tie
either of these instances to a time period within the applicable deadline to file, but
the Court will construe the doubt in Plaintiff’s favor and analyze these instances as
if they had occurred within the relevant time period.
First, Plaintiff complained to her union rep that only three employees
completed PSI reports; those employees were all female. 82 In this complaint to the
union rep, Plaintiff makes no reference to gender discrimination being the cause of
report assignments, rather taking issue with the office’s organization overall and
management of tasks from a logistical lens. 83 Moreover, there is no evidence in the
2023) (“[Plaintiff] admitted during her deposition that she could not describe other instances
from the group meetings where anything untoward was said. . . . Thus, the District Court
properly excluded [Plaintiff’s] general, unsubstantiated allegations that the alleged conduct
occurred ‘regularly’ or ‘all the time.’” (internal quotation omitted).
Plaintiff requests that the Court consider the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit’s reasoning in Knox v. CRC Mgmt. Co., LLC, which held that a plaintiff need not
provide specific descriptions of every instance of harassment to survive summary judgment.
134 F.4th 39, 52-54 n.5 (2d Cir. 2025). However, Knox does not provide the support that
Plaintiff alludes to; in Knox, the plaintiff was still able to provide a litany of specific examples
of the daily harassment. Id. (“We cannot say that the daily comments that Knox alleges are
insufficient as a matter of law.”). The difference here is that Plaintiff has not alleged daily
comments; instead, she has alleged a more generalized atmosphere of discrimination and points
only to the two specific instances discussed for support. See Doc. 26 ¶¶ 25, 26; Doc. 21-1
(Exhibit A) at 52:18-53:3 (“…it’s hard to remember specifics; however, there was the attitude
in the office that, uhm, if you are a female you were treated less favorably than males”).
Without evidence or specifics, statements that discrimination occurred daily are merely
conclusory and need not be credited.
82 	Doc. 21-5 (Exhibit E).
83 	Id.
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record to conclude that report assignments were being doled out in a discriminatory
way. Indeed, the same email explains that Plaintiff worked as an “office probation
officer”84 and that field officers did not complete reports.85 In Plaintiff’s complaint
making reference to this assignment structure, her issue is with the administrative
staffing, i.e. that there used to be more officers completing reports and now there are
insufficient officers for the workload. 86
At this stage, Plaintiff cannot survive by mere allegations of discrimination
and must affirmatively point to actual evidence of it, or at least testify as to specific
examples and methods. She has not, and, therefore, the Court does not see this as an
instance of discrimination falling within the applicable time period.
Next, Plaintiff said she was being blocked from picking up shifts. This is again
too generalized to be cognizable; it is yet another version of the same, conclusory
statements that discrimination occurred “all the time.” Plaintiff gives no reference to
when she was blocked from picking up shifts or who was blocking her. Moreover,
the reason that Plaintiff herself gives for the blocking is entirely unrelated to
discrimination. Plaintiff said she was being blocked because she “signed up for a lot
of shifts, as often as [she] could” and because she “made a lot of people angry with
the amount of hours that [she] worked.” 87 The offhand reference that “[o]ther staff,
84 	Id. at 2.
85 	Id. at 3.
86 	Id.
87 	Doc. 26 ¶ 30.
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males, were being allowed to go out”88 is insufficient to transform this generalized
grievance into a discrete example of discrimination.
In short, there is no evidence, by way of testimony or otherwise, from which
this Court can conclude that Plaintiff was being assigned administrative tasks that
other officers were not because she was a woman. Similarly, there is also no
evidence from which this Court can conclude that Plaintiff was being blocked from
picking up shifts because she was a woman. The only instances of intentional
discrimination that Plaintiff points to are those related to Frampton comments and
the fitting of the vest, both of which concluded well prior to the applicable filing
deadline.
Therefore, Plaintiff has not shown that any act of intentional discrimination
occurred within the necessary time period and, accordingly, her hostile work
environment claim fails as untimely.
3. 	Gender Discrimination
“To prevail in a sex discrimination claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must first
establish by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination.”89
The plaintiff must show that “1) s/he is a member of a protected class, 2) s/he was
qualified for the position s/he sought to attain or retain, 3) s/he suffered an adverse
employment action, and 4) the action occurred under circumstances that could give
88 	Id.
89 	Mandel, 706 F.3d at 169.
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rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.”90 If Plaintiff succeeds in proving
the prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the defendant “to articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.”91 Then, “should
the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the
defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.”92
The parties are, of course, in agreement that Plaintiff was a woman, and, thus,
a member of a protected class. Parties also do not dispute that Plaintiff was
terminated by Defendant, which is an adverse employment action, and is seemingly
where Plaintiff believes the discrimination occurred.93 The heart of the dispute lies
with the fourth element: whether the termination occurred under circumstances that
could give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.
There are several routes that a plaintiff can take to raise an inference of
intentional discrimination. The road most trod is comparator evidence, or evidence
that an employer treated similarly situated individuals not in a plaintiff’s protected
class more favorably than the plaintiff.94 However, an inference of discrimination
can also be supported by “evidence of similar . . . discrimination of other employees,
90 	Id.
91 	Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (citing to McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
92 	Id.
93 	Abramson v. William Paterson College of New Jersey, 260 F.3d 265, 288 (3d Cir. 2001).
94 	See Mammen v. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 523 F. Supp. 3d 702, 721 (E.D. Pa. 2021).
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or direct evidence of discrimination from statements or actions by her supervisors
suggesting . . . animus.” 95
Here, Plaintiff relies on comparator evidence to raise an inference of
discrimination. Specifically, she relies on other individuals who she claims violated
policy but were not discharged as she was. The Third Circuit recently clarified who
plaintiffs may use as a comparator: employees “need not be identical” but must be
similarly situated in “all material respects.”96 Relevant factors in this analysis
include “whether the employees dealt with the same supervisor, were subject to the
same standards, and shared similar job responsibilities.” 97 The Third Circuit also
stated that employees cannot be similarly situated if they hold a different job title or
work in a different department. 98 Moreover, when the issue is misconduct, purported
comparators “must have committed offenses of ‘comparable seriousness.’” 99 Stated
differently, both Plaintiff and the comparator must have “‘engaged in similar
conduct 	without 	such 	differentiating 	or 	mitigating 	circumstances 	as 	would
distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them.’”100 Courts may
95 	Golod v. Bank of America Corp., 403 F. App’x 699, 702 (3d Cir. 2010) (emphasis added); see
also Mammen, 523 F. Supp. at 721 (E.D. Pa. 2021) (quoting Golod).
96 	See Qin v. Vertex, Inc., 100 F.4th 458, 474 (3d Cir. 2024).
97 	Id.
98 	Id.
99 	Opsatnik v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 335 F. App’x 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Wright v.
Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 710 (6th Cir. 2006)).
100 Hobson v. St. Luke’s Hosp. and Health Network, 735 F. Supp. 2d 206, 214 (E.D. Pa. 2010)
(quoting Houston v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 355 F. App’x 651, 654 (3d Cir. 2009)).
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properly grant summary judgment when it is clear that “no reasonable jury could
find that the similarly situated requirement has been met.” 101
As comparators, Plaintiff points to a variety of other employees who violated
policy and were not fired.102 However, Plaintiff has not shown that these employees
committed similar conduct without differentiating or mitigating circumstances.
First, Plaintiff points to Deputy Director Updegrove as a comparator; with a different
title and position, Updegrove is not similarly situated to Plaintiff.103 Moreover,
Updegrove had authorization to utilize Defendant’s property before he did so, which
means his conduct was unlike Plaintiff’s.104 Next, Plaintiff points to Ron McClay
and 	Dan 	Shoop, 	probation 	officers 	who 	used 	Defendant’s 	vans 	without
authorization.105 While the most similar violation to Plaintiff’s, using company
property without authorization, taking a van that the employee is authorized to use
to an unauthorized location is not “of comparable seriousness”106 to sleeping all
weekend in the office. Moreover, only Plaintiff, not the identified comparators, had
a past disciplinary incident.107 Additionally, the difference between treatment in
101 Hampshire v. Bard, 793 F. App’x 75, 80 (3d Cir. 2019).
102 Doc. 1 ¶¶ 40-43.
103 Qin, 100 F.4th at 474.
104 Doc. 21-13 (Exhibit M).
105 Doc. 1 ¶¶ 41, 43.
106 Opsatnik, 335 F. App’x at 223.
107 Doc. 26 ¶¶ 41, 53, 57.
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Plaintiff and these officers are not so different; both unauthorized vehicle users
received 10 day suspensions.108
Finally, Plaintiff argues that she is similarly situated to Skylar Ebner, a
probation officer who left his firearm out on a desk, and probation officer Henrich,
who was reprimanded for effectuating an arrest while working alone in the field.109
These violations are also too dissimilar from Plaintiff’s to compare, as the purported
comparators’ 	violations 	involved 	breaches 	of 	safety 	protocol 	rather 	than
unauthorized use of company property. Not every violation of policy situates
violative employees similarly.110
Plaintiff presents no other evidence that raises an inference of discrimination
in her firing and, therefore, has not met her prima facie case. However, even if the
comparators were similarly situated to Plaintiff, she has not met her burden to prove
that Defendant’s proffered reason for her termination, namely the weekend stay in
the office and prior disciplinary history, were a pretext for discrimination.111 To
show pretext on summary judgment, a plaintiff can “‘discredit the proffered reasons,
either 	circumstantially 	or 	directly.’” 112 Plaintiffs 	do 	so 	by 	showing 	“such
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the
108 Doc. 26 ¶¶ 52, 56; Doc. 21-14 (Exhibit N); Doc. 21-16 (Exhibit P).
109 Doc. 1 at ¶ 42; Doc. 26 ¶ 58-60.
110 Opsatnik, 335 F. App’x at 223.
111 Texas Dept. of Community Affairs, 450 U.S. at 253.
112 Kogan v. T-M Automotive, Inc., No. 22-0519, 2023 WL 2588550 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2023)
(quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1994)) (cleaned up).
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employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder
could rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence,’ and hence infer ‘that the
employer did not act for [the asserted] nondiscriminatory reasons.’”113 The factual
dispute is whether “discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the
employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.” 114
Plaintiff has provided no evidence that Defendant’s proffered reason for
terminating Plaintiff is pretext. Defendant has submitted the declaration from
President Judge Saylor, who authorized her termination, stating that he did so based
on the weekend unauthorized stay in the office as well as her prior history of
discipline. 115 Plaintiff has admitted to the conduct at issue, staying overnight all
weekend in the office, which “lends credibility” to Defendant’s stated rationale.116
Besides arguing that other employees broke policy and were not fired, the only
evidence of discrimination that Plaintiff points to is the Frampton and vest incidents,
which occurred well prior to her termination.117 Plaintiff has not shown that these
incidents were connected to her firing; the firing was authorized by President Judge
Saylor who, from the record, played no part in the day-to-day operations of the
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Doc. 21-8 (Exhibit H).
116 In re Tribune Media Company, 902 F.3d 384, 403 (3d Cir. 2018).
117 Indeed, in brief, Plaintiff only points to comparator evidence as evidence raising an inference
of discrimination in her gender discrimination section. Doc. 25 at 13-15. Plaintiff does not
address pretext at all. Id.
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probation office.118 Plaintiff has not testified or alleged that President Judge Saylor
fired her because of her gender, nor that his decision was in any way motivated by
discriminatory animus. As it stands, “the record does not give us sufficient basis to
discredit [Defendant’s] explanation for its employment decision.”119 Plaintiff rests
on the hope that summary judgment should be viewed strictly when addressing
issues of intent and credibility;120 however, Plaintiff must provide some evidence to
raise a dispute around the Defendant’s intent in the first instance. 121
Therefore, I find that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to
Plaintiff’s gender discrimination claims, and Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment is granted. 122
4. 	Retaliation
“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must
tender evidence that: ‘(1) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) the
employer took an adverse employment action against her; and (3) there was a causal
118 Doc. 21-8.
119 In re Tribune, 902 F.3d at 403.
120 Plaintiff states in brief that “pointing to evidence which calls into question the defendant’s
intent raises an issue of material fact,” but has not herself pointed to that evidence. Doc. 25 at
5.
121 At this stage, Plaintiff cannot rest on pleadings and allegations, but must instead provide
evidence to raise a genuinely disputed fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986).
122 Cf Sowell v. Kelly Services, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 3d 684, 696-97 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (finding
summary judgment inappropriate where the plaintiff testified that the “performance and
attitude 	issues” 	raised 	to 	support 	her 	firing 	were 	entirely 	fabricated 	and 	provided
contemporaneous notes and emails to support her assertion).
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connection between her participation in the protected activity and the adverse
employment action.’”123 Parties are agreed that Defendant fired Plaintiff, so the
elements in dispute here are the first and third.
The Court need not analyze the first element because Plaintiff’s claim fails so
clearly on the third. To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff must
“produce evidence ‘sufficient to raise the inference that her protected activity was
the likely reason for the adverse [employment] action.’”124 Plaintiff can raise that
inference in a variety of ways, including, but not limited to, evidence of “an
employer’s inconsistent explanation for taking an adverse employment action,” a
“pattern of antagonism,” or “temporal proximity ‘unusually suggestive of retaliatory
motive.’” 125
Plaintiff asserts that her protected activity was a variety of complaints to
employees about “disparate treatment and harassment.”126 Even assuming that
Plaintiff engaged in a protected activity,127 Plaintiff has adduced no evidence to
123 Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Nelson v. Upsala Coll.,
51 F.3d 383, 386 (3d Cir. 1995)).
124 Carvalho-Grevious v. Delaware State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 259 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting
Kachmar v. SunGard Data Systems, Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997)) (emphasis in
original).
125 Id. at 260.
126 Doc. 25 at 17-18.
127 The Court assumes this for purposes of highlighting the dearth of evidence on the third element,
and does not analyze in depth whether Plaintiff took a protected activity, but finds Plaintiffs’
claim of a protected activity dubious at best. Plaintiff points to three sources for her protected
activity: her answers to interrogatories, Doc. 25-2, her emails in Exhibit E, Doc. 21-5, and the
notes of her complaints in Exhibit F, Doc. 21-6. See Doc. 25 at 17-18. As to Plaintiff’s citation
to Exhibits E and F as evidence of her complaints, Doc. 25 at 17-18, neither document raises
a complaint of gender discrimination, instead highlighting Plaintiff’s grievances about staffing
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suggest that the protected activity was likely the reason for her termination. Besides
Plaintiff’s general assertions that she “complained about harassment . . . on multiple
occasions,” 128 the latest concrete example of a complaint that Plaintiff provided
occurred on May 20, 2022,129 when she had a call with her supervisor Megan
Kriner.130 This is not so close in time as to be temporally suggestive of retaliation.131
Additionally, Plaintiff has not presented that Defendant gave “inconsistent
explanations” for her termination nor has she shown a “pattern of antagonism.” 132
Plaintiff alleges a “pattern of continued harassment,” but, as discussed above, rests
on the Frampton and vest fitting incidents from 2017 and 2021, respectively.133
These incidents do not show a “pattern of antagonism” following “protected
conduct” that gives rise to an inference of retaliation.134 A pattern of antagonism,
different than mere harassment, would involve showing that some actions were taken
against Plaintiff that correlated with each instance of reporting.135 At most, Plaintiff
generally and administrative management. The responses to interrogatories, Doc. 25-2, are
more of the same generalized, conclusory language without reference to additional specific
examples.
128 Doc. 25-2 (Exhibit 2, Answers to Interrogatories).
129 See Doc. 21-6 (Exhibit F).
130 Id.
131 See, e.g., Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 2007) (where a five-month period
before complaint and adverse action was insufficient to be temporally suggestive of causation).
132 Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 259.
133 Doc. 25-2 (Exhibit 2).
134 Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys. Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997).
135 See Kriss v. Fayette County, 827 F. Supp. 2d 477, 495 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (“[A] ‘pattern of
antagonism’ to support causation refers to intervening antagonism between the time of the
protected activity and the time of the alleged retaliatory conduct.”) (quoting Marra v. Phila.
Housing Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 302 (3d Cir. 2007)).
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has shown one incident of antagonism; that being her supervisor’s 2017 comment to
her in response to her complaints about Frampton’s harassment. 136 It does not appear
that Plaintiff reported the vest fitting incident anywhere, 137 nor that her otherwise
generalized comments, if any,138 had an effect on the way that her supervisors and
coworkers treated her.
Moreover, the evidence presented by Defendant demonstrates the lack of a
causal chain between any adverse action and Plaintiff’s firing. President Judge
Saylor terminated Plaintiff, and, in his uncontroverted declaration, stated that he had
no knowledge of any complaints made by Plaintiff about discrimination.139 While
the Court cannot weigh credibility of witnesses, Plaintiff has not presented any
evidence to contest Judge Saylor’s declaration or demonstrate the connection
between Plaintiff’s complaints and her termination.
Accordingly, I find that there is no genuine dispute of material fact on the
record, as there is no evidence for any rational person to conclude a causal link
existed between protected activity and adverse action. Therefore, Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment is granted as to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
136 Doc. 21-1 (Exhibit A) at 16:23-17:13.
137 Doc. 26 ¶ 24. While Plaintiff disputes this and points out that the deposition only states that
she did not immediately tell her supervisor of the comments, Plaintiff points to no other
concrete occasion where she did so. Id.
138 Without evidence or specific examples, the Court does not credit Plaintiff’s repeated assertions
that she complained all the time to her supervisors.
139 Doc. 21-8 (Exhibit H) at ¶ 11-12.
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III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons enumerated above, I find it appropriate to grant Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment on each of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff’s claims are
dismissed, and the Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge
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