Holton v. United States of America

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RUBEN CONJI HOLTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
CIVIL NO. 4:22-CV-00487
(NEARY, J.)
(LATELLA, M.J.)
MEMORANDUM
Before the Court is a discovery dispute. Plaintiff seeks the
disciplinary history and performance reviews for three individuals
involved in his claims; daily logs and medical logs; and documents
related to another relevant individual’s separation from employment.
(Doc. 38). For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff’s request to compel
Defendant to produce these documents will be granted in part and
denied in part.
I. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
Plaintiff filed a Complaint on March 31, 2022 against Defendants
United States of America, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and three
individually named defendants asserting claims of negligence, negligent
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hiring, intentional infliction of emotional distress, medical negligence,
“tortious conduct,” and “emotional harm.” (Doc. 1). On February 17,
2023, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 17). Magistrate
Judge William I. Arbuckle issued a Report and Recommendation on
March 22, 2024, recommending that all claims against the individually
named defendants be dismissed; that Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of
emotional distress, negligent supervision, and negligent hiring claims
be dismissed; and that Plaintiff’s negligence and medical malpractice
claims be permitted to proceed. (Doc. 28 at 24). The United States filed
objections to the portion of the Report and Recommendation allowing
Plaintiff’s ordinary negligence claim to advance. (Doc. 29). On May 9,
2024, United States District Judge Sylvia H. Rambo adopted
Magistrate Judge Arbuckle’s in all regards except as to the reasoning in
denying the United States’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for
ordinary negligence, determining instead that Plaintiff stated a
cognizable claim for ordinary negligence based upon allegations that
medical providers taunted Plaintiff, ignored him, falsified medical
records, and refused to render aid. (Docs. 33; 34 at 32). The United
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States filed an Answer with Affirmative Defenses on June 4, 2024.
(Doc. 36).
On August 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed a letter to the docket
requesting a telephone conference regarding a discovery issue. (Doc.
38).
Magistrate Judge Arbuckle conducted a telephonic discovery
conference on September 26, 2024. (Doc. 40). Following the conference,
Judge Arbuckle issued an Order directing Defendant to provide the
following documents to Chambers for in camera review on or before
October 28, 2024:
(a) In partial response to Plaintiff’s Request for
Production of Documents #4 - All documents
regarding disciplinary history for former
defendants Brosious, Mace-Liebson and Spiese
for the ten-year period from March 31, 2012,
to March 31, 2022;
(b) In partial response to Plaintiff’s Request for
Production of Documents #4 - All performance
evaluations for former Defendants Brosious,
Mace-Liebson and Spiese for the five-year
period from March 31, 2017, to March 31,
2022;
(c) In response to Plaintiff’s Request for
Production of Documents #5 - Copies of the
Daily Logs for the [Special Housing Unit]
SHU where Holton was held for the day shift
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only on the following dates: March 3, 4, 7, 13,
14, & 15;
(d) Any documents pertaining to the cause of
former Defendant Spiese’ separation from
employment at F.C.I. Schuylkill.
(Doc. 41 at 1). Magistrate Judge Arbuckle indicated that “following in
camera review, the Defendant will be given an opportunity to formally
object before any documents deemed relevant by the Court are disclosed
to Plaintiff.” (Id. at 2). He further directed Plaintiff to provide to
counsel for the United States “a detailed signed written response to the
Seven Requests for Production of Documents on or before October 28,
2024.” (Id.).
Defendant filed a letter to the docket on October 17, 2024, in
conjunction with its submission of documents for in camera review,
explaining its efforts to comply and the contents of its production. (Doc.
42). Specifically, Defendant indicated that regarding Plaintiff’s
“Request No. 4,” the BOP conducted a search of Human Resource
records and determined that no disciplinary files exist for Bret
Brosious, Dr. Ellen Mace-Liebson, or for Nurse Spiese. (Doc. 42 at 2).
Additionally, Defendant asserted that the BOP does not have complete
performance evaluation records for the employees for the time-period
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described in the Court’s Order. (Id.). However, Defendant indicated
that it “secured what was still in the agency’s possession and gathered
additional responsive materials from the relevant individuals.” (Id.).
Defendant indicated that it produced for the Court’s inspection
performance evaluations for Brosious from 2016 through 2023; for
Mace-Liebson from 2016 through 2022; and for Spiese from 2020
through 2021. (Id.).
Defendant indicated, with respect to Plaintiff’s “Request No. 5,”
that Holton was housed in a general housing unit from March 26, 2018
through September 22, 2022, not in the SHU. (Id.). Specifically, Holton
was in general population housing on March 3, 4, 7, 13, 14 & 15 of 2021.
(Id.). Defendant asserts that there are “no rounds logs for general
population housing units.” (Id.). With respect to Plaintiff’s “Request
No. 8,” Defendant produced documents relating to Nurse Spiese’s
resignation. (Id.).
Because the undersigned magistrate judge did not have the
benefit of hearing the parties’ respective arguments as to why each
category of documents should or should not be produced, we ordered the
parties to submit letter briefs on or before September 4, 2025. Each
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party submitted letters outlining their respective positions on the issue
in compliance with that order. (Docs. 58 and 59). The matter is ripe for
review.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Federal courts have broad discretion to determine the scope of
discovery and to manage the discovery process. 	See Wisniewski v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987) (“The conduct of
discovery is a matter for the discretion of the district court and its
decisions will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse of this
discretion.”). Decisions regarding the proper scope of discovery are
considered non-dispositive. 	Riley v. Clark, No. 4:20-cv-325, 2023 WL
6129507, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2023). In the Third Circuit, “it is
well recognized that the federal rules allow broad and liberal discovery.”
Pacitti v. Macy's, 193 F.3d 766, 777-78 (3d Cir. 1999).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 governs motions to compel
discovery, and “[t]he scope of what type of discovery may be compelled
under Rule 37 is defined, in turn, by Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure.” 	Brewer v. Berks Cty. Sheriff, No. 13-5763, 2015 WL
13620425, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2015) (quoting Breslin v. Dickinson
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Twp., No. 09-1396, 2011 WL 1577840 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2011)). Under
Rule 26, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional
to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Rule 26(b)(2)(C)
provides:
On motion or on its own, the court must limit the
frequency or extent of discovery otherwise
allowed by these rules or by local rule if it
determines that:
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably
cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained
from some other source that is more
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample
opportunity to obtain the information by
discovery in the action; or
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit,
considering the needs of the case, the amount
in controversy, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the issues at stake in the action,
and the importance of the discovery in
resolving the issues.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)(C); see Mayo v. City of Scranton, No. 3:10-CV-
935, 2012 WL 6050551, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 2012).
When deciding a motion to compel, “[t]he moving party bears the
initial burden to prove that the requested discovery falls within the
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scope of discovery as defined by Rule 26(b)(1).” 	Atkinson v. Luitpold
Pharms., Inc., 414 F. Supp. 3d 742, 744 (E.D. Pa. 2019). “If the moving
party meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing
party to demonstrate that the requested discovery (i) does not fall
within the scope of discovery contemplated by Rule 26(b)(1), or (ii) is not
sufficiently relevant to justify the burden of producing the information.”
Atkinson, 414 F. Supp. 3d at 744 (citation omitted). Discovery is
governed by Rule 26, which provides:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any
party's claim or defense and proportional to the
needs of the case, considering the importance of
the issues at stake in the action, the amount in
controversy, the parties’ relative access to
relevant information, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the discovery in resolving the
issues, and whether the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
“Relevance in this context has been ‘construed broadly to
encompass any matter that could bear on, or that could reasonably lead
to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the
case.’” 	United States ex rel. Bergman v. Abbott Labs., No. 09-4264, 2016
WL 4247429, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2016) (quoting Oppenheimer
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Funds v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978)). The scope of discovery is broad,
but it is not unlimited. 	See Bayer AG v. Betachem, Inc., 173 F.3d 188,
191 (3d Cir. 1999). Discovery should not serve as a fishing expedition.
See Upshaw v. Janssen Research & Development, LLC, No. 11-7574,
2014 WL 1244047, at * 3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2014); Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1).
Finally, “[i]t is an obvious truism that a court should not enter an
order compelling a party to produce documents where the documents do
not exist.” 	Wells v. JPC Equestrian, Inc., No. 3:13-CV-2575, 2014 WL
5641305, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2014). It is clear, therefore, that the
court cannot compel the production of things that do not exist. Nor can
the court compel the creation of evidence by parties who attest that they
do not possess the materials sought by an adversary in litigation. 	See,
e.g., AFSCME District Council 47 Health and Welfare Fund v. Ortho-
McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 08-5904, 2010 WL 5186088
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2010); Knauss v. Shannon, No. 08-1698, 2009 WL
975251 (M.D. Pa. April 9, 2009); Lawson v. Love's Travel Stops &
Country Stores, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-1266, 2019 WL 5622453, at *4 (M.D.
Pa. Oct. 31, 2019).
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III. 	DISCUSSION
A. Categories (a) and (b) – Disciplinary Histories and
Performance Evaluations
With respect to the disciplinary records sought, Plaintiff argues
that he “needs these documents to show and prove misdeeds and or
negligence similar or that coincides with his complaints so that he can
make and argue the facts at trial.” (Doc. 59 at 1). As to the
performance evaluations, Plaintiff argues that he “need[s] the
evaluations to show that their performances were below medical
accepted standards.” (Id.).
Defendant argues that performance evaluations and disciplinary
histories are “private, sensitive materials of non-parties that have no
bearing on the issues in this case.” (Doc. 58 at 1). Defendant further
adds that, as set forth in its October 17, 2024 letter, the BOP’s search
for Human Resources records revealed no disciplinary history for the
relevant individuals. (Id.).
Given that Defendant has represented that no disciplinary records
exist for the identified individuals, we cannot compel Defendant to
produce records that do not exist. 	See Wells, No. 2014 WL 5641305, at
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*4. Thus, we consider only whether Plaintiff is entitled to the requested
performance reviews.
Courts recognize that “[p]ersonnel files are confidential and
discovery should be limited.” 	Miles v. Boeing Co., 154 F.R.D. 112, 115
(E.D. Pa. 1994); see also Bracey v. Price, No. 09-1662, 2012 WL 849865,
*2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2012) (“[p]ersonnel files often contain sensitive
personal information . . . and it is not unreasonable to be cautious
about ordering their entire contents disclosed willy-nilly”) (quoting
Regan-Touhy v. Walgreen Co., 526 F.3d 641, 648 (10 th Cir. 2008). While
personnel files are not “categorically out-of-bounds,” courts must weigh
the right to the relevant discovery against the privacy interest of non-
parties. 	Harris v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co. Operations, Inc., No.
1:09-cv-1449, 2010 WL 4683776, *5 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2010) (citing
Reagan-Touhy, 526 F.3d at 648).
In Shorter v. Samuels, No. 3:16-cv-1973, 2021 WL 1017375, *34
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2021), the Court held that employees’ performance
evaluations were relevant and discoverable. The Court noted, “if an
evaluation pertains to an employee’s failure to carry out one of his or
her duties, this would bear directly on the breach of duty element for
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the negligence claim.” 	Id. at *35. Likewise, here a claim of ordinary
negligence remains and the performance reviews of the identified
individuals “could bear on, or [] could reasonably lead to other matter
that could bear on,” an issue that may be in the case.1 	See United
States ex rel. Bergman v. Abbott Labs., No. 09-4264, 2016 WL 4247429,
at *2. Defendant has not demonstrated that the performance reviews
do not fall within the scope of discovery contemplated by Rule 26(b)(1)
or that they are not sufficiently relevant to justify the burden of
production. 	See Atkinson, 414 F. Supp. 3d at 744. Accordingly,
Defendant will be required to produce the performance reviews.
However, after reviewing the performance reviews in camera, we are
mindful of the fact that they contain significant additional information
1 We note that Plaintiff has indicated that the performance reviews are
necessary to show that the individuals’ “performance were below medical
accepted standard.” 	(Doc. 59 at 1). 	In a medical malpractice claim, a
plaintiff is “required to present an expert witness who will testify, to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the acts of the physician
deviated form good and acceptable medical standards, and that such
deviation was the proximate cause of the harm suffered.” 	Laskowski v.
U.S. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 918 F. Supp. 2d 301, 313 (M.D. Pa. 2013)
(citing Estate of Keating ex rel. Keating v. Coatesville VA Med. Ctr., 498
F. 	App’x 	184 	(3d 	Cir. 	2012)). 	Thus, 	Plaintiff 	may 	not 	rely 	upon
performance reviews to demonstrate that any of the individuals’ care
deviated from the acceptable medical standard.
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that goes beyond whether each individual satisfactorily performed his
or her job, including information that is not relevant to the issues in the
instant matter. Therefore, Defendant will be given an opportunity to
redact any and all sensitive, personal, and non-relevant information
from the performance reviews prior to production. To be clear, Plaintiff
is entitled only to the information in the respective performance reviews
that discloses whether each individual satisfactorily performed his or
her duties.
B. Category (c) – Logs
Regarding category (c), the logs, BOP counsel noted that, as set
forth in its October 17, 2024 letter, Plaintiff was in general population
housing during the identified dates. (Doc. 58 at 2). No rounds logs exist
for general population housing, and so, no responsive documents exist.
(Id.). We cannot compel Defendant to produce records that do not exist
and so, Plaintiff’s request as to Category C is denied. 	See Wells, No.
2014 WL 5641305, at *4.
C. Category (d) – Documents Related to Nurse Spiese’s
Separation
Finally, Plaintiff argues that he “need[s] these documents to show
that Defendant Spiese’s separation from employment from F.C.I.
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Schuylkill was due to numerous complaints from prisoners [and] her
continuous negligence.” (Doc. 59 at 2).
Defendant objects to production of documents regarding Nurse
Spiese’s separation as overly broad, unduly burdensome, irrelevant to
resolving the disputed issues in the case, and a “vexatious invasion of
personal privacy.” (Doc. 58 at 3). Defendant added that Nurse Spiese
was not “removed” or terminated. (Id.). Rather, she resigned. (Id.).
Based upon our in camera review, there are no documents relating
to Nurse Spiese’s separation that “show that Defendant Spiese’s
separation form employment from F.C.I. Schuylkill was due to
numerous complaints from prisoners [and] her continuous negligence.”
(Doc. 59 at 2). Rather, the documents submitted for in camera review
confirm Defendant’s representation that Nurse Spiese resigned and
therefore are not relevant for the purpose articulated by Plaintiff.
Further, the human relations forms submitted for review contain
significant personal information regarding Nurse Spiese, including
salary information and personal identifiers. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
request as to this category of information will also be denied.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff’s request to compel
documents will be granted in part and denied in part. The request is
granted only with respect to the performance reviews and denied in all
other respects. Defendant will be afforded time, however, as set forth in
our accompanying order, to redact information other than whether the
individuals were assessed to have satisfactorily performed their
respective duties from the performance reviews.
Date: November 14, 2025 	/s/ Leo A. Latella
Leo A. Latella
United States Magistrate Judge
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