Vasapolli v. The President of the United States et al

3:26-cv-00613Pamd18 mars 2026

Texte intégral

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOSEPH VASAPOLLI, : CIVIL NO. 3:26-CV-00613
:
Plaintiff, : (Magistrate Judge Schwab)
:
v. :
:
THE PRESIDENT OF THE :
UNITED STATES, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction.
Currently pending are the plaintiff’s, Joseph Vasapolli’s (“Vasapolli”),
“Motion for Emergency Temporary Restraining Order,” and “Emergency Master
Motion for Injunctive Relief” (collectively “the pending emergency motions”)
Docs. 22, 23; see also docs. 3, 7. Herein, we discuss the pending emergency
motions, and we conduct a preliminary review of the amended complaint. After
our review of the amended complaint, we recommend that the court dismiss the
complaint, because we conclude that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. We further recommend that the court deny the pending emergency
motions. We finally recommend that the court grant Vasapolli leave to amend his
complaint
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II. Background and Procedural History.
Vasapolli commenced this action pro se on February 13, 2026, by filing a
complaint and an application to proceed in forma pauperis in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Docs. 1, 2. On that same
date, Vasapolli also filed the pending motion for temporary restraining order. Doc.
3. On February 18, 2026, the Eastern District issued an order (1) directing
Vasapolli to file a declaration to cure the fact that Vasapolli failed to sign his
complaint or emergency motion for temporary restraining order; and (2) denying
Vasapolli’s application to proceed in forma pauperis without prejudice to
Vasapolli filing a new application with sufficient financial information. Doc. 6.
On March 3, 2026, Vasapolli filed his “emergency master motion for
injunctive relief” and his second application to proceed in forma pauperis. Docs. 7,
8. And on March 4, 2026, Vasapolli filed the declaration described in the Eastern
District’s February 18, 2026 Order. Doc. 9. Between March 4, 2026, and March
11, 2026, Vasapolli filed nine documents: one requesting relief (but is unsigned
and not titled a motion, and requests the same relief as the “emergency master
motion for injunctive relief”), seven that purport to be evidence of his claims, and
one titled “Plaintiff’s Narrative Statement in Support of Amended Complaint[.]”
Docs. 10–18.
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On March 11, 2026, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania transferred the case
to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania because
“it is apparent the majority of the events, which appear to be largely based on
incidents taking place at or related to medical facilities, occurred in Wayne
County, which is located in the Middle District of Pennsylvania” “and [Vasapolli]
appears to allege other incidents occurring in Lackawanna County which is also
located in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.” Doc. 19 at 1, n.1 (internal citations
omitted). On March 12, 2026, Vasapolli filed an amended complaint. Doc. 21.
The following allegations are taken from the amended complaint. Id.
The amended complaint purports to “add[] Joseph Lavin as Defendant” in
addition to the defendants named in the initial complaint, who are named only in
the amended complaint’s caption. Id. at 1. Vasapolli alleges that Joseph Lavin
(“Lavin”), a “court employee of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania[,]” engaged in
a “pattern of conduct[.]” Id. But the amended complaint contains sparse factual
allegations. See generally id. Vasapolli alleges that Lavin contacted Vasapolli via
“pretextual phone call” in order to transfer the instant case from the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania to the present venue, the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
Id. at 2; see also id. generally. It is unclear how this singular phone call constitutes
a “pattern of conduct.” See generally id. Vasapolli summarily alleges that this
phone call “directly resulted in the sua sponte transfer of this case to the Middle
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District of Pennsylvania; and [] furthered the coordinated pattern of retaliation
against Plaintiff’s presidential candidacy and whistleblower disclosures
documented throughout this complaint.” Id. at 1. Vasapolli also alleges that Lavin
is a part of a “RICO enterprise” which “consists of: (1) Multiple licensed
Pennsylvania casinos coordinating account freezes post-jackpot; (2) Pennsylvania
Gaming Control Board—stalling investigation HY-I-0987441-24, allowing fraud
to continue; (3) Pennsylvania Department of Revenue—applying false liens and
offsets; (4) Pennsylvania Attorney General—bouncing [sic] whistleblower
disclosures; (5) IRS—rejecting returns based on corrupted casino data; (6) SSA—
delaying disability benefits until congressional intervention; (7) Judgment Fund—
rejecting $25M claims as ‘unauthorized’; (8) Joseph Lavin—court employee who
transferred case into defendants’ jurisdiction via pretextual phone call.” Id. at 2.
Vasapolli concludes that “[t]his is not coincidence[;] [t]his is a RICO enterprise.”
Id.
Vasapolli brings the following claims against Lavin: (1) a Bivens claim for
violation of unspecified constitutional rights; (2) civil RICO claims under 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d); (3) criminal charges for obstruction of justice under 18
U.S.C. § 1503; and (4) claims for “whistleblower retaliation” pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(8). For relief, Vasapolli seeks millions of dollars, criminal referrals of
Lavin and an individual who is unnamed in the factual allegations of the amended
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complaint, debt forgiveness and “clean slates” for four individuals who are
otherwise unnamed in the amended complaint, “[b]usiness recovery and debt
relief” for a fifth individual who is otherwise unnamed in the amended complaint,
and injunctive relief—specifically, “medevac/transfer, federal investigations, [and]
whistleblower protections[.]” Doc. 21 at 2–3.
After an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint has no role in
the future litigation of the case. See Young v. Keohane, 809 F. Supp. 1185, 1198
(M.D. Pa. 1992); Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 82 (3d Cir. 2019).
Accordingly, we will not consider Vasapolli’s initial complaint. Nevertheless,
because Vasapolli purports to “add” his claims against Lavin in addition to the
claims in his initial complaint, we note that in his initial complaint Lavin alleged
the President of the United States, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal
Communications Commission, and the Federal Election Commission (hereafter
collectively the “initial defendants”) violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth
Amendment rights and committed battery and kidnapping. Doc. 2. Vasapolli bases
these claims on his “unlawful[] seiz[ure] and place[ment] in a mental institution
against his will” and his “inject[ion] with GHB without consent” which “directly
caused [Vasapolli’s] initial heart attack and the subsequent sequence of 11 heart
surgeries/events[.]” Id.
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III. Standard of Review.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court shall dismiss a complaint brought in
forma pauperis if it determines that the complaint “fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). This statutory text mirrors
the language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which provides that a complaint should be
dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
When determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can
be granted, “[w]e must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true,
construe the complaint in the light favorable to the plaintiff, and ultimately
determine whether [the] plaintiff may be entitled to relief under any reasonable
reading of the complaint.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F. 3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010).
In making that determination, we “consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to
the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic
documents if the [plaintiff’s] claims are based upon these documents.” Id. at 230.
“Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a
‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2)). The statement required by Rule 8(a)(2) must give the defendant fair
notice of the nature of the plaintiff’s claim and of the grounds upon which the
claim rests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Detailed factual
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allegations are not required, but more is required than “labels,” “conclusions,” or
“a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “In other words, a complaint must do more
than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578
F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). “A complaint has to ‘show’ such an entitlement with
its facts.” Id.
In considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be
granted, the court “‘must accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true and
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.’”
Krieger v. Bank of Am., N.A., 890 F.3d 429, 437 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Flora v.
Cty. of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2015)). But a court “need not credit a
complaint’s bald assertions or legal conclusions.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch.
Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). A court also need not “assume that a
. . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen.
Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526
(1983).
Following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more
than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, it must recite factual allegations
sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere
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speculation. In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint
entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a
plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should
identify allegations that, “because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”
Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a
court should assume their veracity and then determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”
Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (footnote and
citations omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679).
A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and
“‘however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege
sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina,
Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
III. Discussion.
Vasapolli’s amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. “Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e).
“This already liberal standard is ‘even more pronounced’ where a plaintiff files the
complaint without the assistance of counsel.” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d
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69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Erickson, 5 51 U.S. at 94). “[A] court must make
reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants from the inadvertent forfeiture of
important rights due merely to their lack of legal training.” Id. Thus, “[c]ourts are
more forgiving of pro se litigants for filing relatively unorganized or somewhat
lengthy complaints.” Id.
Liberally construing Vasapolli’s amended complaint, however, we
nevertheless conclude that it fails to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, which requires,
among other things, that a claim for relief must contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and
allegations that are “simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), 8 (d)(1).
Moreover, “[f]undamentally, Rule 8 requires that a complaint provide fair notice of
‘what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Garrett, 938 F.3d at
92 (quoting Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93). Here, the amended complaint does not
provide fair notice of what Vasapolli’s claims against the initial defendants are.
Vasapolli includes no factual allegations against the initial defendants, nor does he
state what claims he brings against them in the amended complaint.
As to the claims Vasapolli brings against Lavin in the amended complaint,
these claims also fail. Despite bringing Bivens claims against Lavin, Vasapolli
does not identify what constitutional rights Lapin allegedly violated. Moreover, it
is entirely unclear from the complaint how Lavin’s phone call to Vasapolli, and the
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later transfer of this case to the Middle District of Pennsylvania, violated
Vasapolli’s rights. Similarly, it is unclear what Vasapolli disclosed such that he is
entitled to whistleblower protections or how that was connected to Lavin’s phone
call and the later transfer of this case to the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Thus,
Vasapolli’s “whistleblower retaliation” claim fails as well.
Vasapolli also brings claims against Lavin pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)
and (d), subsections of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(“RICO”). Doc. 21 at 2. “Section 1962(c) makes it unlawful for a person
employed by or associated with an enterprise to conduct the enterprise’s affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity.” RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eur. Cmty., 579
U.S. 325, 330 (2016) (footnote omitted). And section “1962(d) makes it unlawful
to conspire to violate any of the other three prohibitions.” Id. To state a civil RICO
claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege the following elements: “(1) conduct (2) of
an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.” Ins. Brokerage
Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 362 (3d Cir. 2010). RICO defines “racketeering
activity” to include “a host of so-called predicate acts” listed in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1). Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 647 (2008).
These predicate acts include “dozens of state and federal offenses.” RJR Nabisco,
579 U.S. at 330. “A predicate offense implicates RICO when it is part of a ‘pattern
of racketeering activity’—a series of related predicates that together demonstrate
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the existence or threat of continued criminal activity.” Id. A “pattern of
racketeering activity requires at least two acts of racketeering activity” within a
ten-year period. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). Here, Vasapolli conclusively asserts that
predicate acts have occurred including “wire fraud (electronic bouncing [sic] of
whistleblower disclosures), mail fraud (false IRS data), obstruction of justice
(Lavin transfer), and extortion (casino seizure of winnings).” Doc. 21 at 2. But
these allegations are conclusory, such that we do not assume their truth. There are
no non-conclusory factual allegations of behavior which amount to a predicate act
or racketeering activity. See id. Moreover, Vasapolli does not allege any
agreement between Lavin and any other individual as required to state a conspiracy
claim. Vasapolli thus fails to state a RICO claim against Lavin.
Finally, Vasapolli “requests this Court refer the conduct of [] Lavin . . . to the
appropriate federal authorities for investigation” regarding a purported crime under
18 U.S.C. § 1503. Id. Because 18 U.S.C. § 1503 is a criminal statute, Vasapolli
cannot seek these punishments through a civil complaint because there is no “federal
right to require the government to initiate criminal proceedings.” Rodriquez v. Salus,
623 F. App’x 588, 590 (3d Cir. 2015); see also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.
614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the
prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”). Vasapolli, therefore, fails to state a
claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1503.
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IV. Leave to Amend.
Before dismissing a complaint under a screening provision of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915, the court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint unless
amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.,
293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). “Under Rule 15(a), futility of amendment is a
sufficient basis to deny leave to amend.” Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox
Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 175 (3d Cir. 2010). “Futility ‘means that the
complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.’” Id. (quoting In re Merck & Co. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 493
F.3d 393, 400 (3d Cir. 2007)). Thus, in determining whether an amendment would
be futile, we apply the same standard as we apply in determining whether a
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6). Id. “In other words, ‘[t]he District Court determines futility by taking
all pleaded allegations as true and viewing them in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff.’” Id. (quoting Winer Family Trust v. Queen, 503 F.3d 319, 330–31 (3d
Cir. 2007)).
Because Vasapolli has not presented a single complaint with all of his
allegations, and because so many of the allegations he does present in his amended
complaint are conclusory, we cannot say at this juncture that it would be futile for
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him to amend his complaint. We thus recommend that the court grant him leave to
amend.
V. The Pending Emergency Motions.
The pending emergency motions seek temporary restraining orders or
preliminary injunctions. Docs. 22, 23. We recommend the court deny both of the
pending emergency motions.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs temporary restraining orders and
preliminary injunctions. Motions for temporary restraining orders and preliminary
injunctions are judged against exacting legal standards. Preliminary injunctive
relief “is not granted as a matter of right.” Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d
440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982). Rather, it “is an ‘extraordinary remedy.’” Doe by &
through Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 526 (3d Cir. 2018)
(quoting Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004)). A
motion for such is properly granted only if such relief is the “only way of
protecting the plaintiff from harm.” Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight,
Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989). “It has been well stated that upon an
application for a preliminary injunction to doubt is to deny.” Madison Square
Garden Corp. v. Braddock, 90 F.2d 924, 927 (3d Cir. 1937).
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“When evaluating a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, a court
considers four factors: (1) has the moving party established a reasonable likelihood
of success on the merits (which need not be more likely than not); (2) is the
movant more likely than not to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief; (3) does the balance of equities tip in its favor; and (4) is an
injunction in the public interest?” Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140, 152
(3d Cir. 2019). “The first two factors are prerequisites for a movant to prevail.”
Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 286 (3d Cir. 2018). “If these gateway factors are
met, a court then considers the remaining two factors and determines in its sound
discretion if all four factors, taken together, balance in favor of granting the
requested preliminary relief.” Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d
Cir. 2017).
Here, our decision rests on the first factor: whether Vasapolli has established
a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. For the foregoing reasons, we
conclude that he has not. Accordingly, we recommend that the court deny the
pending emergency motions.
VI. Recommendations.
As discussed above, we recommend that the court deny the pending
emergency motions. Docs. 22, 23. We further recommend that the court dismiss
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Vasapolli’s amended complaint (doc. 21) and grant him leave to file a second
amended complaint which is complete in all respects and will stand alone from
both preceding complaints.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings,
recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in
28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the
disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party
shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and
all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to
which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The
briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A
judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the
report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.
The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her
discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record
developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own
determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive
further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the
magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 18th day of March 2026.
S/Susan E. Schwab
Susan E. Schwab
United States Magistrate Judge
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