Taylor v. Warden of FCI Schuylkill

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 3:26-cv-00408-MEM-SH Document4_ Filed 03/02/26 Page1of17

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NAIM TAYLOR,
Petitioner : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-408
V. : (JUDGE MANNION)
WARDEN OF FCI SCHUYLKILL,
Respondent

MEMORANDUM

Currently before the Court is pro se Petitioner Naim Taylor (“Taylor’)’s

petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2241. For the reasons
stated below, the Court will dismiss the petition with prejudice and direct the
Clerk of Court to close this case.

L. BACKGROUND

On September 7, 2023, Chief Judge Matthew W. Brann sentenced
Taylor to an aggregate sentence of ninety-six months of federal
| incarceration, followed by four years of supervised release, after Taylor
pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute forty grams

or more of fentanyl and a mixture or substance containing a detectable

amount of cocaine (21 U.S.C. §§841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B); 18 U.S.C. §2). See

Case 3:26-cv-00408-MEM-SH Document4 _ Filed 03/02/26 Page 2 of17

United States v. Taylor, No. 21-cr-172-01 (M.D. Pa.), ECF No. 656.1 When

calculating the advisory sentencing guideline range for Taylor's sentence,

i Taylor received a two-level enhancement to his offense level for possessing

firearms in connection with his drug trafficking pursuant to Section
2D1.1(b)(1) of the United States Sentencing Commission’s Guideline
Manual ("USSG"). See id., ECF No. 753 at 4—5 (citing Docs. 639 at 22-23;
705 at 8-9). Additionaily, Chief Judge Brann considered Taylor's possession
of firearms during his offense as a basis for imposing the above sentence.
See id., ECF No. 753 at 6 (explaining that “[t]his Court ultimately imposed a
within-Guidelines sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment, primarily based
upon the seriousness of the offense, Taylor’s dangerous possession of
firearms during that offense, and the fact that he was on supervision at the
time he committed that crime’).?

Taylor commenced the instant action by filing the instant Section 2241

habeas petition, which the Clerk of Court docketed on February 18, 2026.

' The Court takes judicial notice of the docket in Taylor's underlying
criminal case. See Orabi v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 738 F.3d 535, 537 (3d Cir.
2014) (citations omitted).

2 According to the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) Inmate Locator
(https:/Awww.bop.gov/inmateloc/), Taylor has an anticipated release date of
May 15, 2028.

2.

Case 3:26-cv-00408-MEM-SH Document4 _ Filed 03/02/26 Page 3of17

(Doc. 1.)° In his petition, Taylor asserts that he is currently participating in

the BOP’s Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program (“RDAP”), and the
BOP has informed him that even if he completes the program, he is ineligible
| for a reduction of his term of incarceration for up to one year because the
BOP considers his “non-violent offense” as a “crime of violence.” See (id. at
1, 2). Taylor argues that the BOP'’s definition of “crimes of violence” in its

Program Statement 5162.05, as well as 28 C.F.R. §550.55(b)(5)(i), exceeds

its statutory authority and conflicts with 18 U.S.C. §3621(e)(2)(B). See (id. at

1). For relief, Taylor seeks an Order (1) determining that the BOP’s “policy

runs afoul [of flederal law and [c]ongressional intent” and (2) classifying him
as eligible to receive the up-to-one-year reduction in his incarceration if he

completes RDAP. See (id. at 4).

ll. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Screening of Habeas Petitions

District courts are obligated to screen habeas petitions pursuant to
| Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States
District Courts. See R. 4, 28 U.S.C. foll, §2254 (“The clerk must promptly

forward the petition to a judge under the court’s assignment procedure, and

3 Although Taylor neither paid the filing fee nor applied for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis when he filed his petition (Doc. 2), he later
remitted the fee. See (Unnumbered Docket Entry After Doc. 3).

-3-

Case 3:26-cv-00408-MEM-SH Document4 Filed 03/02/26 Page 4of17

the court must promptly examine it.”). Rule 4 may be applied in habeas cases

brought under Section 2241. See R. 1(b), 28 U.S.C. foll. §2254 (“The district
court may apply any or all of these rules to a habeas corpus petition not
covered by Rule 1(a)).”). “[A] district court is authorized to dismiss a [habeas]
petition summarily when it plainly appears from the face of the petition and
any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the

district court.” Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 320 (1996); see also

McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994) (“Federal courts are authorized
to dismiss summarily any habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on
lits face.”).

B. Section 2241 Habeas Petitions

Section 2241 confers federal jurisdiction over a habeas petition that
has been filed by a federal inmate challenging “not the validity but the
execution of [their] sentence.” Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 535 (3d
Cir. 2012) (citations and footnote omitted); Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that Section 2241 “allows

a federal prisoner to challenge the ‘execution’ of his sentence in habeas’).

While “the precise meaning of ‘execution of the sentence’ is hazy[,]’ the
phrase has been interpreted as to “put into effect” or “carry out.” Woodall,

432 F.3d at 242, 243 (citation omitted). As a result, a federal inmate may

-4-

| Case 3:26-cv-00408-MEM-SH Document4 _ Filed 03/02/26 Page5of17

challenge conduct undertaken by the BOP that affects the duration of the

inmate’s custody. See, e.g., Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478-79 (3d

Cir. 1990) (finding that a federal inmate’s Section 2241 petition is actionable
where the inmate attacks the term of their custody by challenging the way
the BOP is computing their federal sentence).
lll. DISCUSSION

The Court has screened Taylor’s Section 2241 petition under Rule 4 of

the Rules Governing Section 2254 Habeas Petitions and concludes that it

plainly appears from the face of the petition and any documents attached
thereto that Taylor is not entitled to habeas relief in this case. As such, the
Court will dismiss Taylors habeas petition with prejudice.

A. RDAP and Applicable BOP Policies

The Court will first discuss RDAP and the BOP’s regulatory scheme
referenced in Taylor’s petition. RDAP “is an intensive cognitive behavioral

therapy program offered in some BOP facilities,” and allows individuals

convicted of nonviolent offenses to be set apart from the general population
for substance abuse treatment. United States v. Davis, No. 21-cr-8, 2025 WL
| 84214, at *1 n.3 (W.D. Va. Jan. 13, 2025) (citing U.S. SENT’G Commin,
RESIDENTIAL DRUG ABUSE TREATMENT PROGRAM (July 22, 2024),

https:/Awww.ussc.gov/education/residential-drug-abuse-treatment-

~5-

Case 3:26-cv-00408-MEM-SH Document4 Filed 03/02/26 Page 6 of 17

program); see also United States v. James, 151 F.4th 28, 43 (2d Cir, 2025)
| (“RDAP, which typically runs for nine months, ‘is an intensive drug treatment
program’ run by the BOP ‘for federal inmates with documented substance
abuse problems.” (quoting Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224, 1225 (9th Cir.
| 2011)). If the individual complies with RDAP’s requirements, the BOP may
reduce the individual’s term of imprisonment by up to a year. See James,
151 F.4th at 43. This reduction in sentence comports with the federal statute
| governing imprisonment of persons convicted of federal crimes, 18 U.S.C.
§3621, which provides in relevant part that “[t]he period a prisoner convicted
of a nonviolent offense remains in custody after successfully completing a
| treatment program may be reduced by the [BOP], but such reduction may
not be more than one year from the term the prisoner must otherwise serve.”
18 U.S.C. §3621(e)(2)(B).

“The BOP has sole discretion to determine an inmate's eligibility for
RDAP,, [id.] §3621(e)(5)(B), as well as to grant or deny sentence reductions
upon successful completion of the program, fd. §3621(e)(2)(B).” James, 151
F.4th at 43 (citation omitted). “Pursuant to its authority under [Section 3621],
the BOP... passed a regulation categorically excluding certain classes of
inmates from receiving sentence reductions when they complete the RDAP.”

Jenkins v. Greene, No, 25-cv-730, 2025 WL 2796766, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept.

-6-

Case 3:26-cv-00408-MEM-SH Document4 Filed 03/02/26 Page 7 of 17

| 29, 2025) (citing 28 C.F.R. §550.55). This regulation provides that, inter alia,
“inmates who have been convicted of a ‘[a]n offense that involved the
carrying, possession, or use of a firearm’ are precluded from receiving an
RDAP sentence reduction.” /d. (quoting 28 C.F.R. §550.55(b)(5)(ii)).

To further guide determining whether a nonviolent offender is eligible
for a sentence reduction under Section 3621(e)(2)(B) upon completing

RDAP, the BOP considers Program Statement 5162.05: Categorization of

Offenses. See PROGRAM STATEMENT 5162.05, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
lor JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS (Mar. 16, 2009),
httos:/Avww.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5162_005.pdf (“PS 5162.05"); Romero
v. Warden F.C.!. Marianna, No. 25-cv-48, 2025 WL 2394887, at *2 (N.D. Fla.
July 23, 2025) (explaining that “[tlhe BOP’s Program Statement for
| Categorization of Offenses provides further guidance” on a federal inmate’s
eligibility for a sentence reduction under Section 3621(e)(2)(B)), report and
recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2394347 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 2025).* As
applicable here, this Program Statement lists Taylor's Section 841 controlled

substances conviction as among the “offenses that at the [BOP] Director's

4 The Court takes judicial notice of BOP Program Statement 5162.05.
See Bains v. Quay, No. 21-cv-353, 2021 WL 5343485, at *8 n.22 (M.D. Pa.
Oct. 27, 2021) (“The court may properly take judicial notice of a BOP
program statement.” (citations omitted)), report and recommendation
adopted, 2021 WL 5330841 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2021).

-7-

Case 3:26-cv-00408-MEM-SH Document4 _ Filed 03/02/26 Page 8 of 17

discretion shall preclude an inmate[ from] receiving certain [BOP] program
benefits.” PS 5162.05 at 8, 12 (cleaned up). It also provides the following

example, which is specifically applicable here:

Section 841 of Title 21, United States Code makes it a crime to
manufacture, distribute, or possess with the intent to distribute
drugs. Under the Sentencing Guidelines (§2D1.1 and §2D1.11),
the defendant could receive an increase in his or her base
offense level because of a “Specific Offense Characteristic” (for
example, if a dangerous weapon was possessed during
commission of the offense), the court would increase the
defendant’s base offense level by two levels. This particular
“Specific Offense Characteristic” (possession of a dangerous
weapon during the commission of a drug offense) poses a
serious potential risk that force may be used against persons or
property. Specifically, as noted in the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines §2D1.1., application note 3, the enhancement for
weapon possession reflects the increased danger of violence
when drug traffickers possess weapons. Accordingly, an inmate
who was convicted of manufacturing drugs, (21 U.S.C. §841) and
received a two-level enhancement for possession of a firearm
has been convicted of an offense that will preclude the inmate
from receiving certain Bureau program benefits.

Id. at 10.

B. Analysis

Taylor contends that Program Statement 5612.05 and 28 C.F.R.
§550.55 exceed the BOP’s statutory authority and otherwise conflict with 18
| U.S.C. §3621(e)(2)(B). See (Doc. 1 at 1.) He argues that the BOP cannot
use the USSG §2D1.1(b)(1) sentencing enhancement to deny an inmate

eligibility for a reduced sentence under Section 3621(e)(2)(B) because it

-8-

Case 3:26-cv-00408-MEM-SH Document4 _ Filed 03/02/26 Page 9 of17

does not constitute a “crime of violence.” See (id. at 2-3). Taylor’s arguments
lack merit.

Although he cites to various district court and circuit court of appeals
decisions he believes supports his arguments in this case, Taylor omits any
reference to the case which forecloses his arguments, namely, the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230 (2001). In
Lopez, the BOP determined that the Section 2241 habeas petitioner, who
had been convicted of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §841, was qualified to participate in RDAP but
categorically ineligible for early release if he completed the program because
the sentencing court enhanced his sentence by two levels under USSG
§2D1.1(b)(1) after finding that the petitioner possessed a firearm in
connection with the offense. See 531 U.S. at 236. The BOP based its
ineligibility determination on 28 C.F.R. §550.58(a)(1)(vi), which was
essentially a prior version of the regulation at issue in the instant case. See
id.; see also Hendricks v. Jenkins, No. 19-cv-4427, 2020 WL 5430821, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2020) ("The particular regulation addressed in Lopez,
former 28 C.F.R. §550.58, has been redesignated and is now 28 C.F.R.
§550.55.” (citing 69 Fed. Reg. 39887—02 (2004))). The BOP’s regulation

“categorically denie[d] early release to prisoners whose current offense is a

-9-

Case 3:26-cv-00408-MEM-SH Document4 _ Filed 03/02/26 Page 10 of 17

felony attended by ‘the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm.’”” 531 U.S.
at 232-33.

The Supreme Court rejected the petitioner’s challenge to the BOP’s
regulation. See id. at 244. The Court first pointed out that Congress granted
the BOP discretion “to decide whether to reduce a sentence” under Section
362 1(e)(2)(B). /d. at 241. As such, “[w]hen an eligible prisoner successfully
completes drug treatment, the [BOP] thus has the authority, but not the duty,
both to alter the prisoner’s conditions of confinement and to reduce [their]
term of imprisonment.” /d.

The Court then determined that the BOP was not required to “rely only
on case-by-case assessments” when determining eligibility for a sentence
reduction under Section 3621(e)(2)(B) because such “case-by-case
decisionmaking in thousands of cases each year could invite favoritism,
disunity, and inconsistency.” /d. at 243-24. Instead, the BOP “may
categorically exclude prisoners based on their preconviction conduct.” /d. at
244,

Finally, the Court held that the BOP’s regulation excluding the
petitioner from a sentence reduction under Section 3621(e)(2)(B) was
“permissible.” /d. The Court explained that ‘“[t]he [BOP] reasonably

concluded that an inmate’s prior involvement with firearms, in connection

-10-

Case 3:26-cv-00408-MEM-SH Document4 _ Filed 03/02/26 Page 11 of 17

with the commission of a felony, suggests [their] readiness to resort to life-
| endangering violence and therefore appropriately determines the early
release decision.” /d. (footnote omitted).

In the instant case, the regulation Taylor challenges, 28 C.F.R.
| §550.55(b)(5)(ii), contains language that is in all relevant respects identical
to the regulation the Court upheld in Lopez. Compare 28 C.F.R.
§550.55(b)(5)(ii) ("As an exercise of the Director's discretion, the following
categories of inmates are not eligible for early release: .. . (5) Inmates who
| have a current felony conviction for: . . . (ii) An offense that involved the
carrying, possession, or use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon or
explosives (including any explosive material or explosive device).”), with

| Lopez, 531 U.S. at 235 ("(1) As an exercise of the discretion vested in the

Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the following categories of inmates

are not eligible for early release: .. . (vi) Inmates whose current offense is a
| felony: ... (B) That involved the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm or
other dangerous weapon... .” (quoting 28 C.F.R. §550.58(a) (2000))).

Therefore, “Lopez controls this [Cjourt’s analysis and compels the [C]ourt to
[dismiss Taylor's] petition because [Lopez] upholds the validity of an earlier
regulation that is identical in all relevant respects to the regulation [Taylor]

chailenges” here. Jenkins, 2025 WL 2796766, at *2.

-11-

Case 3:26-cv-00408-MEM-SH Document4_ Filed 03/02/26 Page 12 of 17

Although the Court will dismiss Taylor’s Section 2241 habeas petition
because the Lopez Court squarely rejected the type of claim Taylor asserts
in this case, a brief discussion of the case law Taylor cites in support of his
claim is warranted. Taylor attaches to his petition a portion of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals’ decision in Arrington v. Daniels, 516 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir.
2008). See (Doc. 1-2 at 1-3). In Arrington, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
28 C.F.R. §550.58(a)(1)(vi)(B) violated the Administrative Procedures Act
(“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A), because it was “arbitrary and capricious.” 516
F.3d at 1112.

In this case, Arrington is inapplicable because Taylor does not assert
that 28 C.F.R. §550.55 is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA.
See (Doc. 1 at 1-4). Even if he did, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Arlington
is not binding on this Court. See, e.g., Walfon v. Montgomery Cnty. Cmty.
Coll., No. 24-cv-6420, 2025 WL 345087, at *3 n.4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2025)
(explaining that “Ninth Circuit precedent is not binding on this Court’).
Instead, this Court is bound to follow the precedent set forth by the United
States Supreme Court and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Third
Circuit expressly declined to follow the Ninth Circuit's decision in Arrington
and instead held that “28 C.F.R. §550.58(a)(1)(vi)(B) (2000) is not arbitrary

and capricious within the meaning of §706 of the APA.” Gardner v.

-42-

Case 3:26-cv-00408-MEM-SH Document4 _ Filed 03/02/26 Page 13 of 17

Grandolsky, 585 F.3d 786, 793 (3d Cir. 2009). The Third Circuit's decision in
Gardner is binding precedent on this Court: whereas, the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Arrington is inapplicable to this case.

In addition to Arrington, Taylor cites to a Third Circuit case, Roussos
v. Menifee, 122 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 1997), in his petition. See (Doc. 1 at 2). In
Roussos, the habeas petitioner was convicted for conspiring to distribute
narcotics in violation of 21 U.S.C. §846. See 122 F.3d at 160. The sentencing
court, pursuant to a plea agreement, applied the two-level enhancement
under USSG §2D1.1(b)(1) for possessing a firearm during a drug trafficking
offense. See id.

The BOP determined that the petitioner was ineligible for a sentence
reduction for completing a drug treatment program under Section
3621(e)(2)(B) because its Program Statement classified the petitioner's
offense as a crime of violence. See id. at 160, 161. The Program Statement
provided that Section 841 or 846 convictions qualify as crimes of violence “if
the sentencing court increased the base level of the sentence for possession
of a dangerous weapon during commission of the offense because
‘possession of a dangerous weapon during commission of a drug offense
poses a substantial risk that force may be used against persons or property.”

id. at 160-61. The petitioner challenged the BOP’s Program Statement and

-13-

Case 3:26-cv-00408-MEM-SH Document4 _ Filed 03/02/26 Page 14 of 17

ineligibility determination because “he was convicted of a ‘nonviolent offense’
in that his offense has not been regarded as a crime of violence under [18

U.S.C. §924(c)].” id. at 161.

The Third Circuit agreed with the petitioner and determined that the
BOP’s Program Statement unlawfully classified his Section 846 conviction
as acrime of violence. See id. at 163. It explained that the petitioner:

has been denied eligibility for sentence reduction under
§3621(e)(2)(B) not because his offense has been classified as a
“crime of violence” under §924(c)(3), but based solely upon the
Program Statement that categorically declares all inmates with
two-level sentencing enhancements for firearm possession
ineligible. By ignoring the offense of conviction and looking only
to sentencing factors, the BOP has attempted to transmogrify a
“nonviolent offense” into “a crime of violence.” In other words, the
BOP converted a nonviolent crime into a violent one by means
of a Program Statement that is inconsistent with the language of
the statute, and its own regulations. More specifically, ... we find
the BOP’s interpretation of a nonviolent offense in the Program
Statement to be in conflict with both 18 U.S.C. §3621(e)(2)(B)
and 28 C.F.R. §550.58 and therefore erroneous.

Id. Accordingly, the Third Circuit concluded that the BOP could not “rely on
[the petitioner's] sentencing enhancement to deny him eligibility for the
sentence reduction” under Section 3621(e)(2)(B). id. at 164.

Although Roussos would appear to support Taylor’s arguments in this
case, he does not mention what occurred after that decision was issued in
July 1997. Shortly thereafter, the BOP amended 28 C.F.R. §550.58 so that

it no longer “excluded inmates convicted of drug offense violations with

-~14-

Case 3:26-cv-00408-MEM-SH Document4_ Filed 03/02/26 Page 15 of 17

sentence enhancements for possession of a weapon from receiving 18
U.S.C. §3621(e)(2)(B)’s early release benefit" by “defining the statutory term

‘prisoner convicted of a nonviolent offense’ under 18 U.S.C. §3621{e)(2)(B)

or 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(3)’s cognate term ‘crimes of violence.” Muolo v.
Quintana, 593 F. Supp. 2d 776, 780 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 345 F. App'x 736 (3d
Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (citations omitted); see also Gardner, 585 F.3d at
790 (discussing the BOP’s amendment of 28 C.F.R. §550.58). Instead, the

regulation “relied upon ‘the discretion allotted to the Director of the Bureau

of Prisons in granting a sentence reduction to exclude’ such inmates.” Muolo,
593 F. Supp. 2d at 780; see also Gardner, 585 F.3d at 790 (“[T]he current
BOP regulation continues to provide that ‘[a]ls an exercise of the discretion
| vested in the Director of the [BOP], the following categories of inmates are
not eligible for early release: . . . [iJnmates whose current offense is a felony
_. . [t]hat involved the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm or other

dangerous weapon... .” (all alterations other than third alteration in original)

| (quoting 28 C.F.R. §550.58(a)(7}{vi)(B) (2000))).

The BOP’s amendment to 28 C.F.R. §550.58 removed the basis upon
ll which the Third Circuit decided Roussos, i.e., the prior version defining the
phrase “crime of violence” by reference to Section 924(c)(3) of the Criminal

Code. Given that the Supreme Court then upheld the BOP’s new version of

-15-

Case 3:26-cv-00408-MEM-SH Document4 _ Filed 03/02/26 Page 16 of 17

28 C.F.R. §550.58 as a valid exercise of the BOP’s discretion in Lopez, see
531 U.S. at 241-44, and the pertinent language in this former regulation is
identical to the relevant language in 28 U.S.C. §550.55, Taylor’s reliance on
Roussos is misplaced.°

Finally, it appears that every federal court to address Taylor’s claim in
this case has rejected it. See, e.g., Britt v. Plumley, 787 F. App’x 431, 431-
32 (9th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (affirming district court's denial of Section
2241 petition in which the petitioner, who was convicted of violating Section
841 and received the two-level enhancement under USSG §2D1.1(b)(1),
chailenged the BOP excluding him from a sentence reduction under Section
3621(e)(2)(B)); Hendricks, 2020 WL 5430821, at *4 (‘[T]he BOP had the
discretion to preclude from early release consideration those inmates whose
drug offenses under 21 U.S.C. §841 involved the possession of a firearm.”).

Accordingly, because it plainly appears from Taylor’s petition and the

5 Moreover, to the extent that Taylor's statutory-interpretation
argument is premised in part on Section 3621(e)(2)(B)’s eligibility
requirement of a “nonviolent” offense, he would not be entitled to habeas
relief because the Lopez Court “made clear that in promulgating the policy
by which it denies a sentence reduction if the offense involved the
possession of a firearm, the BOP was not interpreting the term ‘nonviolent
offense,’ but was instead acting pursuant to its discretion concerning whether
to grant sentence reductions under the statute.” Greene-McNeil v. Warden,
No. 24-cv-414, 2025 WL 2740400, at *10 (S.D.W. Va. June 9, 2025) (citing
Lopez, 531 U.S. at 235), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL
2736924 (S.D.W. Va, Sept. 25, 2025).

- 16 -

Case 3:26-cv-00408-MEM-SH Document4_ Filed 03/02/26 Page 17 of 17

documents attached thereto that he is not entitled to habeas relief, the Court
will dismiss his Section 2241 petition with prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court will dismiss Taylor's Section
2241 habeas petition with prejudice and direct the Clerk of Court to close this

case. An appropriate Order follows.

MALACHY\E. MANNION
United States District Judge

DATE: 3/2[24

26-0408-01

-17-