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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MAMADOU BELLA DIALLO, : No. 3:26cv286
Petitioner :
(Judge Munley)

V.

CRAIG LOWE, in his official capacity

as the Warden of Pike

County Correctional Facility, et al.
Respondents

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MEMORANDUM

Before the court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Petitioner
Mamadou Bella Diallo pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The petitioner is a citizen of
the Republic of Guinea (“Guinea’” or “Guinea-Conakry”) and an immigration
detainee in the custody of the United States Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). He has been charged
with entering the United States without admission or inspection in violation of 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

Diallo was encountered and arrested at the southern border by the United
States Border Patrol in November 2023. He was detained for approximately one
day, released on his own recognizance, and issued a Notice to Appear at an

immigration court in Manhattan in September 2024.

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Diallo relocated to Reading, Pennsylvania. In August 2024, petitioner
applied for asylum due to fears of political persecution and torture in his birth
country. He was awaiting further immigration proceedings in the community.

On November 13, 2025, however, Diallo was arrested and taken into ICE
custody at a routine appointment with that agency in Philadelphia.

Consequently, Diallo was detained at the Moshannon Valley Correctional Center
(“MVCC’) in Clearfield County, Pennsylvania before being transferred to the Pike
County Correctional Facility (“Pike CCF”) in Lords Valley, Pennsylvania.
According to the response, Diallo is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and
has been held without a bond hearing pursuant to that section of the Immigration
and Naturalization Act (“INA”).

The petitioner, like many others before him, asserts that he is not subject to
Section 1225(b)(2)(A). Petitioner contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) applies to
him, because he had been previously released to the interior of the United
States. By its terms, Section 1226(a) allows for release from detention on
conditional parole or bond.

The specific issues in this case have been reviewed on numerous
occasions by the undersigned and other judges in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania and by other district courts throughout the country. In accordance

with hundreds of decisions and for the reasons set forth below, Diallo's detention

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falls under Section 1226(a), and his continued detention under Section
1225(b)(2)(A) violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Diallo's
Section 2241 petition will be granted, and he will be ordered released.
Background

Diallo is a citizen of Guinea. He will turn 34 years old in April. (Doc. 5-4,
Resp. Ex. 3 at 5). He has spent the last two years in the United States of
America.

As for his entry, on November 13, 2023, United States Border Patrol agents
encountered Diallo at the southern border within a group of 19 individuals, who
were travelling on foot in an area near the port of entry at Lukeville, Arizona. Id.
at 6. Diallo was arrested and transported to the Tucson Soft-Sided Facility, a
temporary tent-camp, which has since been closed. Id. Diallo admitted to
illegally crossing the international boundary approximately five hours before his
arrest. Id. at 6-7.

To reach the United States, Diallo flew from Guinea to Senegal then Turkey
then Colombia then El Salvador then Nicaragua and then traveled by land
through Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico. Id. at 55. According to Diallo, he left
Guinea and came to America due to his opposition to the current Guinean
government. Id. at 53-54. His application for asylum, filed in August 2024,

includes a statement that he was attacked by Guinean police officers while on his

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way home from work. Id. Many of his friends were beaten and imprisoned
because of their political activism. Diallo believes he will be harmed, imprisoned,
tortured, and/or killed by Guinean police because of his political opinion and
activism against the government. Id.

Diallo’s initial detention at the border was brief, not like now. Instead of
detaining him for a longer period at the Tucson tent-camp or at another facility,
DHS released Diallo on his own recognizance the next day. Id. Diallo provided
ICE with an address in the Bronx and made his way to New York. Id. at 7. The
government did not impose “Alternatives to Detention” on Diallo, i.e., an ankle
monitor, at that time. Id. Rather, it provided Diallo with a Notice to Appear
before an immigration judge (“lJ”) at the New York Broadway Immigration Court
in September 2024. (Doc. 5-2, Resp. Ex. 1 at 1). The Notice to Appear charged
Diallo with violating 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

On November 13, 2025, exactly two years after crossing the border, Diallo
was arrested by ICE, housed at MVCC, and then transferred to Pike CCF where
he has been detained and held without a bond hearing for the last three months.

Prior to his arrest, Diallo was residing in Reading, Pennsylvania. Petitioner
has no criminal history to the court’s knowledge. There is nothing in the record

indicating that Diallo attempted to flee immigration authorities at any time. He

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alleges that he has never missed any appointments or violated the terms of his
release.

Rather, Diallo’s detention is the product of a Department of Homeland
Security ("DHS") policy under which individuals present in the United States
without admission or parole are treated as applicants for admission subject to
mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) rather than discretionary

detention under § 1226(a). See Yilmaz v. Warden of the Fed. Det. Ctr. Phila., No.

25-6572, 2025 WL 3459484, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2025). The Board of
Immigration Appeals ("BIA") has since adopted this interpretation in Matter of

Yajure Hurtado, 29 |. & N. Dec. 216 (B.I.A. 2025). Thus, according to the

petitioner, an IJ will be unable to consider any request for bond in his present
circumstances.

The government opposes Diallo’s petition, arguing that: (1) petitioner is
lawfully detained under Section 1225(b)(2); and (2) his detention does not offend
due process. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently issued a decision

agreeing with the respondents’ view of the statute. See Buenrostro-Mendez v.

Bondi, --- F.4th ----, No. 25-20496, 2026 WL 323330 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026). The

court is not bound by that decision. Rather, the dissent is far more persuasive

1 The court need not defer to Hurtado, a decision of an administrative agency. See Loper
Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 400-01 (2024).

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and in line with the opinions from the district courts. Thus, for the reasons that
follow, Diallo’s Section 2241 petition will be granted, and he will be ordered
released from detention.
Jurisdiction

Federal district courts are authorized to grant a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241 where the petitioner is detained "in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The Fifth
Amendment entitles noncitizens to due process of law in the context of removal
proceedings, and thus, they are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard,

appropriate to the nature of the case. See Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 673

(2025) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993): Mullane v. Central

Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)).

Diallo filed the instant petition while he was detained within the jurisdiction
of this court, and he is still currently in ICE custody within this court’s jurisdiction.
Petitioner asserts that his continued detention violates due process. Thus, the

court has habeas jurisdiction over his Section 2241 petition. Rumsfeld v. Padilla,

542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004).
As for subject-matter jurisdiction, detention-specific questions are
reviewable on a habeas petition so long as they are not simply repackaged

challenges to actions taken as part of removal proceedings. See Khalil v.

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President, United States, 164 F.4th 259, 277 (3d Cir. 2026); E.O.H.C. v. Sec'y,

U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2020). Otherwise,

challenges to removal are funneled into the petition for review process pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), a statute which strips courts of jurisdiction.* Id. at 274—
75.

Here, Diallo does not challenge the removal proceedings or the decision to
detain him at all. He challenges only the legality of his continued detention
without a bond hearing under Section 1225(b)(2) as opposed to Section 1226(a),
which would afford him a bond hearing. This is a detention-specific question.
Additionally, Diallo cannot meaningfully obtain relief for this detention-related
question following any final order regarding removal. Furthermore, he is not
repackaging a detention challenge that is essentially identical to an argument
against removal. Consequently, the court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear

the claims within the petition. Accord Montes Ramirez v. Bondi, No. CV 26-0522,

2026 WL 321442, at *2 n. 22 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2026) (Rufe, J.); Carrero Romero

v. Lowe, No. 4:26-CV-00009, 2026 WL 296215, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2026)

(Brann, C.J.); Laguna v. Rose, No. 26-312, 2026 WL 205960, at *2 (E.D. Pa.

Jan. 27, 2026) (Brody, J.); Marcano v. Jamison, No. CV 26-239, 2026 WL

2 The court requested that the parties brief the implications of Khalil; however, the government
concedes jurisdiction. (Doc. 5 at 2, 16-18).

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196504, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2026) (Sanchez, J.); Mirdjalilov v. Warden of

Fed. Det. Ctr. Philadelphia, No. 2:25-CV-7068, 2026 WL 184249, at *4 (E.D. Pa.

Jan. 23, 2026) (Leeson, J.); Kourouma v. Jamison, No. CV 26-0182-KSM, 2026

WL 120208, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 2026) (Marston, J).
Analysis
1. Section 1226(a) Applies to Diallo, Not Section 1225(b)(2)(A)

This case, like nfany others before it, turns on whether 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A) or § 1226(a) applies to the petitioner. That determination requires
interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2)(A)— “whether the phrase ‘an alien seeking
admission’ in § 1225(b)(2)(A) limits the sweep of persons subject to mandatory
detention under the statute, or whether it merely restates the category of
‘applicant for admission’ defined by § 1225(a)(1) and reproduced in §

1225(b)(2)(A)'s first phrase.” Buenorostro-Mendez, 2026 WL 32330 at *11

(Douglas, J., dissenting op.). “[E]very district court in the Third Circuit to consider
this issue has found that detainees similarly situated...are not subject to the
mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and that the

[(rlespondents’ interpretation of the INA is wrong.” Patel v. O'Neil, No. 3:25-CV-

2185, 2025 WL 3516865, at *4 n.7 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (Mariani, J)
(collecting 56 cases decided on or before December 5, 2025).

The court reaches the same result.

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Briefly, Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides: “in the case of an alien who is an
applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an
alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,
the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Individuals detained under Section 1225 are not entitled

to a bond hearing. See Jennings v. Rodriquez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018) (Alito,

J., plurality op.) (“And neither § 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2) says anything
whatsoever about bond hearings.”).

“Applicant for Admission” — Section 1225(a)(1) provides that “[a]n alien

present in the United States who has not been admitted (whether or not at a
designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United
States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters)
shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.” 8
U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Definitionally, all unadmitted persons, including Diallo, are
“applicants for admission.”

“Alien Seeking Admission” — Unlike “applicant for admission,” the phrase

“alien seeking admission’ is not defined in Section 1225. The government
argues that every “applicant for admission” is synonymous with “seeking
admission.” (Doc. 5 at 24-39). According to that view, this would subject all

unadmitted aliens to mandatory detention without bond pending removal

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proceedings regardless of whether they are located at the border or have spent
months or years living in the interior. Under that reading, “for purposes of

immigration detention, the border is now everywhere.” Buenrostro-Mendez, No.

25-20496, 2026 WL 323330 at *18 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting op.).

In contrast, the consensus district court view is that the phrase “alien
seeking admission” does independent work and requires “active and ongoing
conduct, such as physically attempting to come into the United States at a border

or port of entry[,]” Quispe v. Rose, No. 3:25-CV-02276, 2025 WL 3537279, at *5

(M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2025) (Mehalchick, J.) (citations omitted), and does not apply
to “noncitizens like [p]etitioner who have resided in the United States for years[,]”
Patel, 2025 WL 3516865 at *5 (citations omitted).

As these district court cases and the Buenorostro-Mendez dissent have

recognized, to adopt the government's position would, inter alia, negate the plain
meaning of the text, ignore context and history, violate the rule against
surplusage, and render the mandatory detention of “criminal aliens” under
Section 1226(c) (as expanded last year by the Laken Riley Act) as arising from a
redundant statutory provision. See Patel, 2025 WL 3516865 at *5 (citing Centeno

Ibarra v. Warden of the Fed. Det. Ctr. Philadelphia, No. CV 25-6312, 2025 WL

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3294726, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2025) (Rufe, J.)); Buenorostro-Mendez, 2026

WL 323330 at *11—*16 (Douglas, J., dissenting op.).

Here, Diallo was residing in New York and Reading for approximately two
years when he was re-arrested and re-detained. Consequently, a reading of
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) against petitioner’s circumstances reflects that this statute
does not apply to him.

At this point, Diallo’s detention would thus be governed by Section 1226(a).
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (Alito, J., plurality op.). Section 1226(a) “sets out the
default rule: The Attorney General may issue a warrant for the arrest and
detention of an alien ‘pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed
from the United States.’ ” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). Pending such
decision, the Attorney General may: 1) “continue to detain the arrested alien”;
and 2) “may release the alien on...bond of at least $1,500 with security approved
by, and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General;
or...conditional parole[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)-(2). “At a bond hearing, a
noncitizen ‘may secure his release if he can convince the officer or immigration

judge that he poses no flight risk and no danger to the community.’ ” Quispe,

3 Diallo’s pending asylum application does not make him an “alien seeking admission” or
provide him with lawful entry to the United States; rather that application is to obtain a lawful
means to remain here. Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 488 n.7 (S.D.NLY.
2025).

a

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2025 WL 3537279, at *6 (quoting Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397-98

(2019)).

2. Diallo Will Be Released

The petitioner enjoys the protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment. J.G.G., 604 U.S. at 673. Whether Diallo’s continued detention
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates procedural due process requires a
consideration of: 1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and 3) the
government's interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the

additional or substitute procedures would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.

319, 335-(1976).
Each factor favors Diallo. First, his private interest is the interest of not
being physically detained by the government, which “is the most elemental of

liberty interests[.]’ Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). “The restriction

of liberty is particularly acute here where, absent a bond hearing, he would be

detained for months or even years while his case proceeds.” Cunin v. McShane,

No. 3:25-CV-1887, 2025 WL 3542999, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2025) (Neary, J.)
(citation omitted). Second, he has been detained erroneously under Section

1225(b) without any apparent procedural safeguards, including the ability to

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obtain a bond hearing. See id. (“There is a certainty—not merely a risk—that the
failure to grant [petitioner] a bond hearing would unlawfully deprive him of the
opportunity to make the case for his release and incarcerate him indefinitely.”);

see also Patel, 2025 WL 3516865, at *6 (citing Bethancourt Soto v. Soto, No. 25-

CV-16200, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2976572, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025);
Quispe, 2025 WL 3537279, at *7 (citations omitted). Third, the government's
interest in detaining noncitizens “to ensure the appearance of aliens at future
immigration proceedings and to prevent danger to the community” is important,

but there is no indication that Diallo is a convicted criminal or engaged in any

criminal activity. See Quispe, 2025 WL 3537279, at *7. In response to the
petition, the government has not provided any information suggesting that Diallo
is a flight risk. Rather, upon entry to this country, the government released the
petitioner on his own recognizance. And they gave him a hearing date ten
months into the future. Consequently, Diallo’s continued detention without bond
under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) violates his procedural due process rights. The court
will therefore grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Habeas courts “have the power to order the conditional release of an
individual unlawfully detained—though release need not be the exclusive remedy
and is not the appropriate one in every case in which the writ is granted.”

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008). Therefore, respondents shall

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immediately release Diallo from their custody because he was unlawfully

detained without the opportunity for a bond hearing. See Kashranov v. Jamison,

No. 2:25-CV-05555-JDW, 2025 WL 3188399, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2025)
(Wolson, J).

Respondents, including DHS and ICE will be permanently enjoined from re-
detaining Diallo under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Id. Respondents will be
temporarily enjoined from re-arresting Diallo for a period of 14 days to ensure
that this habeas remedy is effective. Id. Respondents, including ICE, may not
impose any other restrictions on Diallo’s release, including any form of body-worn
electronic monitoring. Diallo may move to reopen this matter if the government
later seeks to detain him under Section 1226(a) and fails to schedule a timely
bond hearing in which an lJ assesses whether he poses a flight risk or a danger
to the community. Id.

3. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Finally, Diallo requests attorneys’ fees and costs under the Equal Access to

Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412. The Third Circuit recently confirmed that a

habeas proceeding challenging immigration detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is

* To the extent that Craig Lowe, Warden of Pike CCF is the only proper respondent in this
matter, Lowe is acting as an agent of ICE and the government will be bound by the order. See
Vadel v. Lowe, No. 3:25-CV-02452, 2025 WL 3772059, at *1n.1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2025).

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a ‘civil action” for purposes of the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28

U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), and that the EAJA “unambiguously applies to habeas

challenges to immigration detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” Michelin v. Warden

Moshannon Valley Corr. Ctr., No. 24-2990, 2026 WL 263483, at *1-2, *10 (3d

Cir. Feb. 2, 2026). Diallo will thus be permitted to file a motion for costs and fees
pursuant to the EAJA within 30 days of the entry of judgment. 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(1)(B); Villa Hernandez v. Kunes, No. 1:25-CV-01847, 2026 WL 411726,

at “7 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2026) (Wilson, J.).
Conclusion

The petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 will be
granted with provisions consistent with this memorandum. An appropriate order

follows.

JUDGE JULIA K. a
United States Distriét Court

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