Blount v. Talasky et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KAREEM BLOUNT, 	:
Plaintiff 	: 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-cv-126
v. 	: 	(JUDGE MANNION)
TAYLOR TALASKY (P.A.), et al., 	:
Defendants 	:
MEMORANDUM
Currently 	before 	the 	Court 	are 	pro 	se 	Plaintiff 	Kareem 	Blount
(“Blount”)’s 	application 	for 	leave 	to 	proceed 	in 	forma 	pauperis 	(“IFP
Application”) and complaint in which he asserts causes of action under 42
U.S.C. §1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 (“RA”), and Pennsylvania state tort law. For the reasons stated
below, the Court will grant the IFP Application, dismiss Blount’s federal
claims with prejudice, decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his
state-law claims, dismiss his state-law claims without prejudice, and direct
the Clerk of Court to close this case.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Blount, 	a 	convicted 	and 	sentenced 	state 	prisoner 	currently
incarcerated at Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution Benner Township
(“SCI Benner Twp.”), commenced this action by filing his complaint, which
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the Clerk of Court docketed on January 20, 2026. (Doc. 1.) When he filed his
complaint, Blount did not pay the fee or seek leave to proceed in forma
pauperis; as such, an Administrative Order issued requiring him to either pay
the fee or apply for leave to proceed in forma pauperis within thirty days or
risk dismissal of this action. (Doc. 2.) Blount timely complied with the
Administrative Order by filing his IFP Application and certified prisoner trust
fund account statement on February 17, 2026. (Docs. 4, 5.)1
In his complaint, Blount names as Defendants: (1) Dr. Laurel R. Harry
(“Harry”), the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department
of Corrections (“DOC”); (2) Bradley Booher (“Booher”), the Superintendent
of SCI Benner Twp.; (3) Taylor Talasky (“Talasky”), a Physician’s Assistant
at SCI Benner Twp.; (4) Lisa Campbell (“Campbell”), a Registered Nurse
Supervisor (“RNS”) at SCI Benner Twp.; and (5) the DOC. See (Doc. 1 at 1–
1 The federal “prisoner mailbox rule” provides that a pro se prisoner’s
submission is deemed filed “at the time [the prisoner] delivered it to the prison
authorities for forwarding to the court clerk.” Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266,
276 (1988). When filing his IFP Application and certified account statement,
Blount 	did 	not 	include 	a 	declaration 	stating 	when 	he 	delivered 	these
documents 	to 	prison 	authorities 	for 	mailing 	to 	the 	Clerk 	of 	Court.
Nonetheless, the envelopes containing these documents are postmarked
February 17, 2026. See (Docs. 4 at 4; 5 at 5). As such, the Court uses
February 17, 2026, as the filing date even though the Clerk of Court did not
docket the IFP Application and certified account statement until February 23,
2026. Cf. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1)(A)(ii) (providing that evidence such as a
postmark may establish the date of filing of a notice of appeal by a prisoner).
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2). 	His 	allegations 	against 	Defendants 	relate 	to 	events 	that 	allegedly
occurred while he was incarcerated at SCI Benner Twp. See (id. ¶9).
Blount alleges that he suffered an asthma attack on June 29, 2025, at
approximately 5:20 p.m. See (id.). He pushed the emergency button inside
his cell, informed a correctional officer that he was experiencing an asthma
attack, and asked the correctional officer to contact the medical department.
See (id.). The correctional officer contacted the medical department, and
medical department personnel told the correctional officer to send Blount to
the medical department so he could receive medical attention for his asthma
attack. See (id. ¶10).
Blount proceeded to the medical department where he was examined
by a nurse. See (id. ¶11). The nurse “heard [Blount’s] lungs wheezing badly
and immediately [provided him with] a [d]uo-[n]ebulizer breathing treatment.”
(Id.) Blount started using the duo-nebulizer, and the nurse contacted the on-
call provider, Wellpath, via a video conference. See (id. ¶12). “Wellpath
informed the medical department to prescribe [Blount] an additional two
more [d]uo-[n]ebulizer breathing treatments.” (Id.)
On June 30, 2025, Blount went to sick call and saw Talasky. See (id.
¶13). Blount informed Talasky of his “medical emergency and having an
[a]sthma [a]ttack” the day prior, and he expressed that “the hot and humid
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weather caused [him] to suffer an asthma attack.” (Id.) As such, Blount asked
Talasky to prescribe him with a daily nebulizer due to the “hot and humid
weather which aggravates and causes [him] to suffer asthma attacks.” (Id.
¶14.) Blount asserts that Talasky “denied [him] this life[-]saving treatment
option even after [he] almost died the day before.” (Id. ¶15.)
Blount alleges that he also explained to Talasky that Wellpath had
prescribed two additional duo-nebulizers to relieve his asthma attack, and he
asked Talasky for the two duo-nebulizers as authorized by Wellpath. See (id.
¶16). Talasky denied Blount the two duo-nebulizers even though Wellpath
had prescribed them. See (id.).
Following Talasky’s actions, Blount filed a formal grievance about “this
matter.” (Id. ¶17; Doc. 1-1 at 1–2.) Blount complained as follows:
On 6-29-25 at approx. 520 [sic] p.m. I had an [a]sthma [a]ttack[.]
I hit my emergency button and informed the block officer[.] I was
then told to come to the desk at which time C/O Huyer called the
medical department[,] informing them of my medical emergency.
The medical Dept. told C/O Huyer to send me down to medical
so that I can be examined. While being examined the nurse
(Nurse Zoe) heard my lungs wezzing [sic] badly and immediately
prescribed 	me 	a 	[]mini 	nebulizer 	breathing 	treatment.
Additionally[,] 	the 	medical 	[d]ept[.] 	contacted 	[the] 	on[-]call
provider[,] Wellpath[,] via video conference to inform them of my
medical emergency[.] Wellpath prescribed me two additional
mini-nebulizer breathing treatments if I needed it. I was added to
sick call the following day on 6-30-25[.] I was seen by Physician
Assistant Taylor Talosky [sic]. I informed her of my medical
emergency with having an [a]sthma attack and letting her know
that the hot and humid weather caused by [a]sthma [a]ttack. Due
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to these events[,] I asked her . . . to prescribe me a daily mini-
nebulizer 	[b]reathing 	treatment 	because 	the 	hot 	and 	humid
weather aggravates and causes me to have asthma [a]ttacks. . . .
Talasky denied me this life saving treatment option even after I
almost [d]ied. I emphasized this point. [Talasky d]enied my pleas.
Her 	actions 	violated 	my 	Pennsylvania 	and 	United 	States
[c]onstitutional rights. The Eighth Amendment forbids failing to
act despite knowledge of a substantial risk of serous harm.
Farmer-v-Brennan [sic], 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994). Surely me
being a life long [sic] [a]sthmatic sufferer and just having an
[a]sthma attack the [d]ay before constitutes a substantial risk of
serious harm. The relief I am seeking is for me to be provided a
daily mini-nebulizer [b]reathing treatment and for my medical
case file to be removed from . . . Talasky [sic] docket. My life is
in 	[d]anger 	while 	in 	her 	care. 	Additionally[,] 	I 	seeks 	[sic]
[d]amages in the [a]mount of $500,000.
(Doc. 1-1 at 1–2.)
On 	July 	18, 	2025, 	Campbell 	issued 	an 	Initial 	Review 	Response
denying Blount’s grievance. See (Docs. 1 ¶18; 1-2 at 2–3). Campbell’s
response stated as follows:
I am in receipt of your official grievance dated 06/30/25 which
you 	claim 	you 	were 	denied 	“life 	saving 	treatment” 	of 	daily
nebulizers after “I almost died” from a[n] asthma attack. You
claim this violated your Eighth Amendment right and are seeking
$500,000 	in 	damages, 	be 	[sic] 	provided 	daily 	nebulizer
treatments[,] and for your medical case file be [sic] removed from
PA-C Talasky.
I have investigated your claims and have found the following: On
06/29/25 you were seen by nursing for complaints of shortness
of breath and wheezing after working out and exerting yourself,
with no relief after using your rescue inhaler 10 times. You were
assessed and found with wheezing in both lungs. The on-call
provider was contacted and ordered three duoneb [sic] nebulizer
treatments. 	You 	were 	administered 	the 	first 	duoneb 	[sic]
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treatment which relieved your symptoms, your lungs were clear,
you “did not wish to have the other two” treatments, and returned
to the block with a follow-up scheduled for sick call the next day.
You were educated by the nurse prior to returning to the block
with the proper use of a rescue inhaler and instructed to contact
medical if you did not get relief after two uses or if your symptoms
returned or worsened. On 06/30/25 you were assessed by PA-C
Talasky on sick call; you reported your asthma was not bothering
you anymore and your lungs were clear. You requested daily
nebulizer 	treatments 	and were told they 	were 	not 	clinically
indicated as your symptoms were resolved. There are no further
reported symptoms or sick call requests noted in your chart since
your visit 06/30/25.
The Eighth Amendment protects your rights from cruel and
unusual 	punishment. 	Furthermore, 	you 	report 	“the 	Eighth
Amendment 	forbids 	failing 	to 	act 	despite 	knowledge 	of 	a
substantial risk of serious harm[.]” A licensed provider denying a
requested 	medical 	treatment 	does 	not 	constitute 	cruel 	and
unusual punishment or demonstrate failure to act on knowledge
that may put you at substantial risk or serious harm as you claim.
PA-C 	Talasky 	made 	her 	clinical 	decisions 	based 	on 	her
assessment of your lungs which did not indicate you needed
daily nebulizer treatment.
In light of this information, you were not denied “life[-]saving
treatment” as you claim. You were properly treated for an asthma
exacerbation 	that 	resolved 	and 	no 	further 	changes 	in 	your
treatment were medically necessary. You did not almost die from
this exacerbation as you claim as your symptoms resolved after
one nebulizer treatment and your lungs remained clear thru [sic]
the next day. Therefore, this grievance is denied, you will not
beawarded [sic] 	a monetary amount or be prescribed daily
nebulizer treatments. PA-C Talasky will not be removed from
your “case file[.]” You are encouraged to continue to report any
new symptom [sic] or non-emergent medical concerns via the
sick 	call 	process 	and 	be 	receptive 	to 	the 	provider(s)
recommendations.
(Doc. 1-1 at 2.)
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Blount appealed from Campbell’s Initial Review Response on July 23,
2025. See (Docs. 1 ¶19; 1-3 at 2–3). In his appeal, Blount stated:
On 	7-18-25 	Grievance 	#1154869 	was 	denied. 	This 	appeal
follows. On 6-29-25 at approx. 5:20 p.m. I had an [a]sthma
[a]ttack due to extra heat and humidity. Upon arriving at the
medical [d]epartment[,] I was examined by Nurse Zoe. She heard
my lungs wezzing [sic] badly and immediately prescribed me a
duoneb 	[n]ebulizer 	treatment. 	Additionally, 	Nurse 	Laura
contacted the on-call provider via video conference. The on-call
provider 	ordered 	two-additionally 	[sic] 	duoneb 	[n]ebulizer
treatment [sic]. In the Initial Review Response[,] “RNS” Lisa
Campbell said I did not wish to have the other two treatments.
Using common and medical sense, after being administered one
duoneb [n]ebulizer treatment, it would have been wise to save
the additional treatments [f]or a later follow up [d]ate. Using three
[b]ack-to-back-back [sic] [d]uoneb [n]ebulizer treatments isn’t
safe. 	[T]hese 	treatments 	raises 	your 	[b]lood 	pressure 	to
[d]angerous [l]evels when used in excess amongst other reasons
I wanted to have the treatments in reserve to use later on at [sic]
a later date. The following day when I was seen at sick call [by]
Physician [A]ssistant C. Talasky[,] I informed her of my medical
emergency with having an [a]sthma [a]ttack due to extreme
[h]eat and humidity. Due to these events[,] I asked for a [d]aily
duoneb [n]ebulizer [b]reathing treatment because the hot and
humid weather aggravates and causes me to have asthma
[a]ttacks. PA-C Talasky denied me this life[-]saving treatment
option even after almost dying, even as I emphasized this point
my pleas were [d]enied. In the Initial Response[,] “RHS” Lisa
Campbell also denied my pleas. She quoted PA-C Talasky as
saying if my rescue inhaler didn’t work after two uses or if my
symptoms worsened I was to contact medical. Anything worse
then [sic] an [a]sthma [a]ttack is “[d]eath.” Why do I need to be
put in a medical [e]mergency in order to receive a duoneb
[n]ebulizer [b]reathing treatment. From October of 2018-thru
[sic]-November of 2019, I was given two-[d]aily [sic] duoneb
[n]ebulizer [b]reathing treatments here at SCI-Benner Township.
How come [sic] now, I am [b]eing [d]enied this treatment option.
Due to the [m]edical [d]epartment [sic] actions my Pennsylvania
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and United States constitutional rights were violate [sic]. The
Eighth Amendment forbids failing to act despite knowledge of a
substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer-v-Brennan [sic][,] 511
U.S. 825, 842 (1994). Surely me being a life [l]ong [a]sthmatic
sufferer and [j]ust suffering an [a]sthma attack the [d]ay before
constitutes a substantial risk of serious harm. The relief I am
seeking is for me to be [p]rovided a daily duoneb [n]ebulizer
[b]reathing treatment and for my medical case to be removed
from PA-C Talasky [d]ocket [sic]. Additionally[,] I seek [d]amages
in the [a]mount of $500,000.
(Doc. 1-3 at 2–3.)
On 	August 	4, 	2025, 	Booher 	issued 	a 	Facility 	Manager’s 	Appeal
Response in which he upheld Campbell’s denial of relief. See (Docs. 1 ¶20;
1-4 at 2). In his Response, Booher stated:
I have taken the opportunity to review your submitted appeal in
detail coupled with a thorough review of your Official Inmate
Grievance, Initial Grievance Response, and facts surrounding
your entire complaint.
I 	see 	where 	Nurse 	Campbell 	completed 	an 	accurate 	and
appropriate grievance response connected to your alleged claim.
I 	have 	consulted 	with 	Nurse 	Campbell 	as 	well 	as 	other
professional staff at the facility based on your grievance appeal.
I have taken a deeper dive into your situation[,] and I have
investigated your claims. Nurse Campbell gave you a fair review
and provided information where applicable. My response is direct
and to the point. We have no empirical evidence to substantiate
any 	of 	your 	claims 	around 	cruel 	and 	unusual 	punishment.
Medical had upheld all protocols, procedures [sic] linked to
policy. I do not see where any violations have occurred. You
were treated appropriately.
(Doc. 1-4 at 2.)
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On August 19, 2025, Blount filed an appeal from Booher’s decision to
the DOC Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances & Appeals (“SOIGA”). See
(Docs. 1 ¶21; 1-5 at 2–3.) In this appeal, Blount stated as follows:
On 6-29-25 at approx. 5:20 p.m.[,] I had an “[a]sthma [a]ttack”
due to the extreme heat and humidity. Upon arriving at the
medical 	department[,] 	I 	was 	examined 	by 	Nurse 	Zoe. 	She
listened 	to 	my 	lungs 	which 	was 	[sic] 	wheezing 	badly 	and
immediately 	prescribed 	me 	a 	duoneb 	[n]ebulizer 	treatment.
Additionally[,] nurse Laura contacted the on-call provider via
video 	conference. 	[T]he 	on[-]call 	provider 	ordered 	me 	two
additional duoneb nebulizer treatments. In the Initial Review
[R]esponse[,] “RNS” Lisa Campbell said I did not wish to have
the other duoneb [n]ebulizer treatments that the on-call provider
ordered 	after 	being 	administered 	one 	duoneb 	[n]ebulizer
treatment. I wanted to save the additional two treatments for a
later date in case that I needed them. Using three back-to-back-
to-back 	duoneb 	[n]ebulizer 	treatments 	isn’t 	safe. 	[T]hese
treatments raises [sic] your blood pressure to dangerous levels
when used in excess.
The following day[,] on 6-30-25[,] I was seen at sick call by
Physician Assistant C. Talasky. I informed her of my medical
emergency with me having an [a]sthma [a]ttack due to the
extreme heat and humidity. Due to this event[,] I requested a
daily duoneb nebulizer breathing treatment because of the hot
and humid weather which aggravates and causes me to have
asthma 	[a]ttacks. 	P.A. 	Talasky 	denied 	me 	this 	life[-]saving
treatment option even after almost dying, even as I emphasized
this point my pleas were denied. “RNS” Lisa Campbell quoted
P.A. Talasky as saying if my rescue inhaler didnt [sic] work after
two uses or if my symptoms worsened[,] I was to contact the
medical [d]department. Anything worse then [sic] an asthma
attack is “DEATH.” Why do I need to be put in a medical
emergency in order to receive a duoneb [n]ebulizer treatment.
[sic]
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From October of 2018 thru [sic] November of 2019[,] I was given
two daily duoneb [n]ebulizer treatments here at SCI Benner
Township. How come [sic] now I am being denied this treatment
option?
Due to the Medical Department [sic] actions my Pennsylvania
and United States constitutional rights were violated. The Eighth
Amendment 	forbids 	failing 	to 	act 	despite 	knowledge 	of 	a
substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer-v-Brennan[,] 511 U.S.
825, 	842 (1994). 	Surely me 	being a 	[l]ife[-]long [a]sthmatic
sufferer and just the day prior suffering an [a]sthma [a]ttack
constitute [sic] a substantial risk of serious harm. The relief I am
seeking is for me to be provided a daily duoneb [n]ebulizer
[b]reathing treatment and [f]or my case load [sic] to be removed
from “P.A.” C. Talasky [sic] Dockett [sic]. Additionally[,] I seek
damages in the [a]mount of $500,000. This is my second time
having to mail this appeal out. [F]irst time it wasnt [sic] mailed
out.
(Doc. 1-5 at 2–3.)
SOIGA issued a Final Appeal Decision denying Blount’s appeal on
October 1, 2025. See (Docs. 1 ¶22; 1-6 at 2). This Decision, which was
signed by DOC Chief Grievance Coordinator Keri Moore, indicated that:
[a] review of the record was conducted by the Bureau of Health
Care Services regarding your medical concerns. Your medical
record was reviewed, and it was determined that the medical
care provided was reasonable an appropriate, to include the
medical encounter on 6/30/2025. The findings of this review
concur with the Initial Review Response.
(Doc. 1-6 at 2.)
Based on these allegations, Blount asserts the following claims against
Defendants: (1) Section 1983 claims against Talasky and Campbell for
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deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution; (2) Section 1983 supervisory
liability claims against Harry, Booher, and Campbell for failure to train, failure
to supervise, and unlawful practices, policies, or customs; (3) Pennsylvania-
law professional negligence/medical malpractice claims against Talasky and
Campbell; and (4) claims for violations of Title II of the ADA and Section 504
of the RA against the DOC, Harry, and Booher. See (Doc. 1 at 6–10). Blount
asserts his claims against Talasky, Campbell, Booher, and Harry in their
individual and official capacities. See (id. ¶¶ 4–6). For relief, Blount seeks:
(1) compensatory and punitive damages against Talasky, Campbell, Booher,
and Harry in their individual capacities; (2) compensatory damages against
the DOC, as well as Harry and Booher in their official capacities, on his RA
claims; (3) prospective injunctive and declaratory relief against the DOC,
Harry, and Booher, on his RA and ADA claims; and (4) an order for
prospective injunctive relief allowing him to use daily duo nebulizer breathing
treatments, prohibiting any retaliation, and requiring monitoring. See (id. at
10–11).
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Applications for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
Under 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(1), a district court “may authorize the
commencement . . . of any [civil] suit, . . . without prepayment of fees or
security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a
statement of all assets such prisoner possesses that the person is unable to
pay such fees or give security therefor.”2 Id. This statute
“is designed to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful
access to the federal courts.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
324, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). Specifically,
Congress enacted the statute to ensure that administrative court
costs and filing fees, both of which must be paid by everyone
else who files a lawsuit, would not prevent indigent persons from
pursuing meaningful litigation. [Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d
1080, 1084 (3d Cir. 1995)]. Toward this end, §1915(a) allows a
litigant to commence a civil or criminal action in federal court in
forma pauperis by filing in good faith an affidavit stating, among
other things, that [they are] unable to pay the costs of the lawsuit.
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324, 109 S.Ct. 1827.
Douris v. Middletown Twp., 293 F. App’x 130, 131–32 (3d Cir. 2008)
(unpublished).
2 “The reference to prisoners in §1915(a)(1) appears to be a mistake.
In 	forma 	pauperis 	status 	is 	afforded 	to 	all 	indigent 	persons, 	not 	just
prisoners.” Douris v. Middletown Twp., 293 F. App’x 130, 132 n.1 (3d Cir.
2008) (unpublished).
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B. 	Screening 	Complaints 	Under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§§1915A 	and
1915(e)(2)
The Court must “review . . . a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of
a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). If such a complaint fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court must dismiss the
complaint. 	See 	id. 	§1915A(b)(1). 	The 	Court 	has 	a 	similar 	screening
obligation 	regarding 	actions 	filed 	by 	individuals 	proceeding 	in 	forma
pauperis. See id. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (“[T]he [C]ourt shall dismiss the case at
any time if the [C]ourt determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted . . . .”).
In reviewing legal claims under Sections 1915A(b) or 1915(e)(2)(B),
the Court applies the standard governing motions to dismiss filed under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Smithson v. Koons, No.
15-cv-1757, 2017 WL 3016165, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 26, 2017) (“The legal
standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim 	under
§1915A(b)(1) [and] §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) . . . is the same as that for dismissing
a 	complaint 	pursuant 	to 	Rule 	12(b)(6) 	of 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Civil
Procedure.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 3008559 (M.D.
Pa. July 14, 2017); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa.
2010) (explaining that when dismissing a complaint pursuant to Section
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1915A, “a court employs the motion to dismiss standard set forth under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). To avoid dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6), a plaintiff must set out “sufficient factual matter” in the complaint to
show that their claims are facially plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). This plausibility standard requires more than a mere possibility
that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. “[W]here the well-
pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility
of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that the
pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2)).
When evaluating the plausibility of a complaint, the Court accepts as
true all factual allegations and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from those allegations, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See
id.; In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010).
However, the Court will not accept legal conclusions as true, and “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not survive a district
court’s screening under Sections 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B). Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007).
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In addition, in the specific context of pro se litigation, the Court must
be mindful that a document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.” Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); see Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333,
339 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that “when presented with a pro se litigant, we
have a special obligation to construe [their] complaint liberally” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, a pro se complaint, “however
inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted) 	(quoting 	Estelle, 	429 	U.S. 	at 	106).
Moreover, when construing a pro se complaint, the Court will “apply the
relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name it.” Mala
v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013). However, pro
se litigants “cannot flout procedural rules—they must abide by the same rules
that apply to all other litigants.” Id. at 245.
C. 	Section 1983
Section 1983 is the vehicle by which private citizens may seek redress
for violations of federal constitutional rights committed by state officials. See
42 U.S.C. §1983. This statute states in pertinent part:
Every 	person 	who, 	under 	color 	of 	any 	statute, 	ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
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thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution or laws, shall be liable to the party
injured 	in 	an 	action 	at 	law, 	suit 	in 	equity, 	or 	other 	proper
proceeding for redress . . . .
Id. “Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights,” but is merely a means
through which “to vindicate violations of federal law committed by state
actors.” Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa.
2004) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284–85 (2002)). “To
state a claim under §1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show
that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	The IFP Application
After reviewing the IFP Application, it appears that Blount lacks the
financial means to prepay the filing fee in this matter. Therefore, the Court
will grant the IFP Application and allow Blount to proceed in forma pauperis
in this action.3
3 However, because Blount is a prisoner, he is advised that he will be
obligated to pay the filing fees for this case in installments in accordance with
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), regardless of the outcome. See
28 U.S.C. §1915(b).
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B. 	Screening the Complaint
1. 	Section 1983 Claims
a. 	Eighth 	Amendment 	Deliberate-Indifference-to-
Serious-Medical-Needs Claims
i. 	Against Talasky
Blount alleges that Talasky was deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs on June 30, 2026, when she denied his request for a daily
nebulizer for his asthma as well as his request for the two additional duo-
nebulizers that Wellpath ordered at the time he was suffering from an asthma
attack the prior day. See (Doc. 1 ¶¶13–16, 28–29). These allegations are
insufficient to state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim against Talasky; as
such, the Court will dismiss this claim for the failure to state a claim under
Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
For Blount to state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim based on the
failure to provide adequate medical treatment, he must allege facts indicating
that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). A prison official is not
deliberately indifferent “unless the official knows of 	and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and [they] must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. A
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plaintiff properly alleges deliberate indifference “where the prison official (1)
knows of a prisoner’s need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to
provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment based on a non-medical
reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended
medical treatment.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999); see
also Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017)
(explaining that a prisoner-plaintiff can show deliberate indifference where
prison official “intentionally den[ied] or delay[ed] access to medical care or
intentionally 	interfer[ed] 	with 	the 	treatment 	once 	prescribed” 	(internal
citations and quotation marks omitted)). Allegations of medical malpractice
and mere disagreement regarding proper medical treatment are insufficient
to establish a constitutional violation. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235
(3d Cir. 2004); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (explaining that complaints
that a physician or a medical department “has been negligent in diagnosing
or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical
mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment [as] medical malpractice does
not 	become 	a 	constitutional 	violation 	merely 	because 	the 	victim 	is 	a
prisoner”); Hope v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 330 (3d Cir.
2020) 	(“Deliberate 	indifference 	requires 	significantly 	more 	than
negligence.”); Montanez v. Price, 154 F.4th 127, 141 (3d Cir. 2025) (pointing
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out that “disagreement between the prisoner and medical personnel over the
proper course of treatment” does not show deliberate indifference (citing
Spruill, 372 F.3d at 235)).
Here, Blount’s allegations against Talasky fail to show that she was
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs for several reasons.4
First, Blount does not allege that he required medical treatment when he met
with Talasky during sick call on June 30, 2025. Although he suffered from an
asthma attack the prior day, he does not allege that he was still suffering
from the attack at the time he saw Talasky. In other words, this is not an
instance where he was suffering from an asthma attack and Talasky did not
give him a nebulizer treatment to treat the attack.
Second, Blount does not allege that Talasky denied him necessary
medical treatment based on a non-medical reason. Third, he does not allege
that Talasky prevented him from receiving needed or recommended medical
treatment. 	Regarding 	the 	two 	additional 	nebulizers 	Wellpath 	allegedly
ordered, as already stated, Blount does not allege that he was suffering from
an asthma attack at the time he visited with Talasky; instead, he had the
attack the prior day. In addition, although Wellpath prescribed him two
4 The Court presumes that Blount’s asthma constitutes a serious
medical need for purposes of this Memorandum.
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additional nebulizers at the time he was suffering from his asthma attack,
Talasky’s decision to not allow him to take them with him to his cell does not
plausibly demonstrate her deliberate indifference. He does not allege that
Wellpath ordered that he receive the two nebulizers to take with him following
his asthma attack subsiding, i.e., he could take them with him for his personal
use as needed.5 He also does not allege that Talasky told him that those
nebulizers were unavailable to him if the circumstances warranted it. She
just did not let him take the nebulizers with him to his cell like he wanted to
do.
This same rationale applies to Blount’s claim pertaining to Talasky’s
denial of daily nebulizer treatments for him. He does not allege that any
medical professional prescribed those treatments for him or determined that
they were necessary to treat his asthma generally or in light of the hot and
humid weather. Moreover, Blount’s allegations relating to his asthma attack
belie his claim that he needed to have a daily nebulizer treatment or possess
the two additional nebulizer treatments with him in his cell. He alleges that
upon suffering his asthma attack in the late afternoon on June 29, 2025, he
pressed an emergency button in his cell to get the attention of a correctional
5 In his appeal to the Facility Manager, Blount stated that he “wanted
to have the treatments in reserve to use later on at a later date.” (Doc. 1-3 at
2–3.)
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officer. A correctional officer responded, listened to Blount’s request to
contact the medical department because he was suffering from an asthma
attack, contacted the medical department, and informed Blount that he was
to go to the medical department. Blount then presumably walked to the
medical department (as he does not allege that he was transported there via
a wheelchair or gurney), was examined by a nurse, and received a nebulizer
treatment which appears to have provided him with relief from the asthma
attack. No aspect of this series of events remotely shows that Talasky or
anyone in the medical department would not give him a nebulizer treatment
if he suffered from a future asthma attack. These events also show that it
was unnecessary for Blount to have a nebulizer in his cell.
Finally, Blount’s claims relating to Talasky declining to allow him to take
the two nebulizers to his cell and denying his request for a prescription for a
daily nebulizer “essentially amount to a mere disagreement as to the proper
medical treatment,’ which does not support a claim of deliberate indifference.
See Moy v. Keenan, No. 18-cv-1575, 2022 WL 480880, at *16 (M.D. Pa.
Feb. 16, 2022) (quoting 	Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v.
Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987)), aff’d sub nom., 2023 WL
3717517 (3d Cir. May 30, 2023) (unpublished). Overall, Blount’s allegations
show that Talasky did not intentionally refuse to provide him with needed
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medical treatment, delayed necessary medical treatment for a non-medical
reason, or prevented him from receiving needed or recommended medical
treatment. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Blount’s Section 1983 Eighth
Amendment deliberate-indifference-to-serious-medical-needs claim against
Talasky for failure to state a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
ii. 	Against Campbell
Blount alleges that Campbell was deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs because she “participated in [the] grievance review and
medical operations.” (Doc. 1 ¶4.) He also asserts that Campbell “consciously
disregarded the on[-]call provider medical treatment plan by denying [his
d]uo-nebulizer breathing treatment,” “interfer[ed] with access to treatment,”
and “fail[ed] to provide treatment for diagnosed conditions,” all of which
“caused unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain [and] deterioration.” (id.
¶29.) 	These 	allegations 	are 	insufficient 	to 	state 	a 	plausible 	Eighth
Amendment deliberate-indifference-to-serious-medical-needs claim against
Campbell.
Initially, 	the 	Court 	notes 	that 	it 	is 	questionable 	that 	Blount 	has
sufficiently 	alleged 	Campbell’s 	personal 	involvement 	in 	any 	Eighth
Amendment violation. A plaintiff asserting a Section 1983 claim must allege
the personal involvement of each defendant in the alleged constitutional
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violation; in other words, the plaintiff must state how each defendant was
involved in the events and occurrences giving rise to the claims in the
operative complaint. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.
1988) (“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement
in the alleged wrongs” to be liable.); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (explaining that
“[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . §1983 suits, a plaintiff must
plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution”). “A plaintiff makes sufficient
allegations 	of 	a 	defendant’s 	personal 	involvement 	by 	describing 	the
defendant's participation in or actual knowledge of and acquiescence in the
wrongful conduct.” Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d
Cir. 2015) (citing Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207); Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366,
374 (3d Cir. 2020) (stating that “[p]ersonal involvement requires particular
‘allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence’”
(quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207)); see also Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d
187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007) (explaining that Section 1983 defendants “must have
personal involvement in the alleged wrongs to be liable and cannot be held
responsible for a constitutional violation which [they] neither participated in
nor approved”).
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Additionally, 	in 	pursuing 	any 	Section 	1983 	claim 	against 	prison
officials, 	a 	plaintiff 	may 	not 	rely 	solely 	on 	respondeat 	superior, 	see
Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 227 (“[Plaintiff] cannot predicate liability on her
§1983 claims on a respondeat superior basis.” (citing Rode, 845 F.2d at
1207)), which is a theory of liability that “arises ‘solely on the basis of the
existence of an employer-employee relationship,’ regardless of whether the
employer had any part in causing harm[,]” see Santiago v. Warminster Twp.,
629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of
City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)). Instead, if Blount seeks to hold a
supervisory official such as Campbell liable for unconstitutional acts by her
or her subordinates, his allegations must satisfy one of two theories of
supervisory liability: First, “[i]ndividual defendants who are policymakers may
be liable under §1983 if it is shown that such defendants, with deliberate
indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy,
practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm[;]” and
second, 	“a 	supervisor 	may 	be 	personally 	liable 	under 	§1983 	if 	[they]
participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them,
or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in [their]
subordinates’ violations.” A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juv. Det. Ctr.,
372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); see Barkes v. First Corr.
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Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014) (explaining requirements for
supervisory liability in section 1983 claim and describing “two general ways
in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for unconstitutional acts
undertaken by subordinates”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Taylor v.
Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (2015).
To allege a plausible claim for supervisory liability under the first
theory—the policy-and-practice strand of supervisory liability—a plaintiff
must
(1) identify the specific supervisory practice or procedure that the
supervisor failed to employ, and show that (2) the existing
custom and practice without the identified, absent custom or
procedure created an unreasonable risk of the ultimate injury, (3)
the supervisor was aware that this unreasonable risk existed, (4)
the supervisor was indifferent to the risk; and (5) the underling’s
violation resulted from the supervisor’s failure to employ that
supervisory practice or procedure. Put another way, the inmate
must 	identify 	the 	supervisor’s 	specific 	acts 	or 	omissions
demonstrating the supervisor’s deliberate indifference to the
inmate’s risk of injury and must establish a link between the
supervisor, the act, and the injury.
Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 227 (quoting Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d
205, 216 (3d Cir. 2001)). For the second theory of supervisory liability—
participating in, directing others to, or knowledge and acquiescence of
constitutional 	violation—generalized 	allegations 	that 	a 	supervisory
defendant is “in charge of” or “responsible for” an office or facility are
insufficient to allege personal involvement in an underlying constitutional
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violation. 	See 	Saisi 	v. 	Murray, 	822 	F. 	App’x 	47, 	48 	(3d 	Cir. 	2020)
(unpublished) (“Saisi asserted that some defendants were in charge of
agencies that allowed this to happen, and that liability stemmed merely from
defendants’ ‘belief’ that their conduct would be ‘tolerated.’ However, a
director cannot be held liable ‘simply because of [their] position as the head
of the [agency].’” (quoting Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 354 (3d Cir.
2005))); Zigler v. Warren, No. 21-cv-19474, 2022 WL 903383, at *2 (D.N.J.
Mar. 	28, 	2022) 	(“In 	simpler 	terms, 	a 	supervisor 	is 	not 	liable 	for 	the
unconstitutional 	conduct 	of 	his 	employees 	solely 	because 	he 	is 	a
supervisor.”). Additionally, “[a]lthough a court can infer that a defendant had
contemporaneous knowledge of wrongful conduct from the circumstances
surrounding 	a case, 	the 	knowledge must 	be 	actual, 	not 	constructive.”
Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 222 (citing Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186,
1194 (3d Cir. 1995); Rode, 845 F.2d at 1201 n.6).
Here, Blount’s allegations do not satisfy the first theory of supervisory
liability because he has not pleaded facts showing that Campbell established
a policy, practice, or custom leading to an Eighth Amendment violation. His
only allegation about a policy, practice, or custom is when he alleges that:
[Campbell, 	Booher, 	and 	Harry] 	maintained 	or 	tolerated
polices/customs that allowed a known [a]sthmatic patient who
just suffered an asthmatic attack to be denied his treatment plan
that was 	authorized 	and prescribed by 	the on-call provider
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(Wellpath) and failed to train/supervise staff to ensure that [sic]
proper asthmatic care and ADA/RA compliance. With actual or
constructive knowledge of these practices, [these Defendants]
failed to correct them causing [his] constitutional injuries.
(Doc. 1 ¶31.)
These allegations are insufficient to show that Campbell established a
policy, practice, or custom because he does not sufficiently identify the policy
at issue. Instead, he tries to manufacture a policy, practice, or custom based
on his interaction with Talasky and Campbell’s denial of his grievance and
request for daily nebulizers. He also does not identify any facts showing that
he did not receive proper asthmatic care; he just did not get what he wanted.
He further does not allege any facts showing that Campbell was deliberately
indifferent to any known risk. Moreover, any policy, practice, or custom in
place did not lead to an Eighth Amendment violation because Talasky did
not commit a violation, and Blount was not injured by her conduct. See Allen
v. Eckard, 804 F. App’x 123, 127 (3d Cir. 2020) (concluding that plaintiff’s
failure to train and supervise claims asserted against supervisor defendants
were 	meritless 	where 	they 	failed 	to 	make 	a 	plausible 	showing 	of 	an
underlying constitutional violation by a subordinate official).
As for the second theory of supervisory liability, Blount does not allege
that Campbell directed Talasky or any other SCI Benner Twp. employee to
violate his constitutional rights. Thus, Blount can only show Campbell’s
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personal involvement if she participated in violating his rights or knew of and
acquiesced in Talasky violating his rights.
The only conduct Blount attributes to Campbell in his complaint is her
denial of his grievance. The mere filing of a grievance is generally insufficient
to 	impute 	the 	actual 	knowledge 	that 	is 	necessary 	to 	demonstrate 	a
defendant’s personal involvement in an asserted constitutional violation. See
Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207–08 (finding that the filing of a grievance with the
Governor-defendant’s 	office 	was 	insufficient 	to 	demonstrate 	that 	the
Governor himself had personal knowledge of the alleged wrongdoing).
Moreover, grievances that complain of events that have already occurred
and that are in the past are insufficient to show that defendants who respond
to such grievances were personally involved in the asserted constitutional
violations. See Sims v. Wexford Health Sources, 635 F. App’x 16, 19–20 (3d
Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (“If an official’s only involvement is the investigation
or adjudication of an inmate grievance after the event giving rise to the
grievance has happened, that is not considered to be personal involvement.”
(citing Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208)); Robles v. Casey, No. 10-cv-02663, 2011
WL 398203, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2011) (concluding that plaintiff had not
shown 	personal 	involvement 	where 	“plaintiff’s 	grievance 	only 	reported
violations that had occurred in the past”); see also Mincy v. Chmielsewski,
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508 F. App’x 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (“[T]he District Court is
correct that an officer’s review of, or failure to investigate, an inmate’s
grievances generally does not satisfy the requisite personal involvement.”)
(citation omitted)).
The 	Third 	Circuit 	Court 	of 	Appeals 	has, 	under 	certain, 	limited
circumstances, 	determined 	that 	a 	supervisory 	official’s 	response 	to 	a
grievance may be sufficient to show that official’s personal involvement in
the plaintiff’s asserted constitutional claims. See, e.g., Sutton v. Rasheed,
323 F.3d 236, 249–50 (3d Cir. 2003), as amended (May 29, 2003) (finding
that prisoner-plaintiffs established the personal involvement of a defendant
who played an “active role” in the continued denial of their access to religious
texts and basing this finding, in part, on the fact that the defendant issued a
written response denying a final-grievance-appeal letter from one of the
plaintiffs, 	which requested access to such religious 	texts); 	Johnson v.
Wireman, 809 F. App’x 97, 100 (3d Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (concluding that
plaintiff’s 	allegations 	that 	state 	prison 	superintendent’s 	and 	grievance
officer’s responses to grievances which went beyond merely denying the
grievances to allegedly coerce the plaintiff to change his religious practices
showed sufficient personal involvement); Diaz v. Palakovich, 448 F. App’x
211, 215 (3d Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (vacating district court’s grant of
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summary judgment where the district court failed to consider grievances
pertaining to a pattern of ongoing wrongful conduct, and explaining that a
reasonable factfinder could find that (a) the defendants had knowledge of
such 	wrongful 	conduct 	through 	the prisoner’s 	grievances 	and 	(b) 	had
acquiesced in such conduct by failing to address the ongoing pattern of
wrongful conduct). However, the facts in those cases involved either: (1) the
supervisory officials response to the grievances constituting an alleged
constitutional violation, such as by encouraging the plaintiff to change their
religious 	practices, 	see 	Sutton, 	323 	F.3d 	at 	249–50 	(determining 	that
evidence showing that supervisory official responded to final appeal of
grievance in which the plaintiff complained that he was denied religious texts
by criticizing those texts, “appear[ed] to have play an active role” in the
alleged constitutional violation); 	Johnson, 809 F. App’x at 100 & n.20
(concluding that district court erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s claims for First
Amendment violations against grievance officer and prison superintendent
because the plaintiff alleged that the grievance officer and superintendent
advised the plaintiff to observe the fasting practice of a different religion); or
(2) the supervisory officials learned about the alleged constitutional violations
through a grievance and acquiesced in the violations by failing to address an
ongoing constitutional violation, see Diaz, 448 F. App’x at 215 (concluding
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that “a reasonable factfinder could find that these [supervisory] defendants
had knowledge of the violations through [the plaintiff’s] grievances and
acquiesced in the violations by failing to address a practice of opening legal
mail outside of an inmate’s presence”); McCollum v. Pries, No. 22-cv-1710,
2024 WL 1416502, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 2024) (“[R]esponding to a
grievance that complains of events that are ongoing and denying the
requested relief may constitute the knowledge and acquiescence that is
necessary to show personal involvement in a Section 1983 action.”); Roberts
v. Luther, No. 21-cv-958, 2021 WL 5233318, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2021)
(“Several courts have concluded that a supervisory official may be held liable
in connection with a review of grievances alleging an ongoing violation
because the official ‘is personally involved in that violation because [they are]
confronted with a situation [they] can remedy directly.’” (quoting Mayo v.
Oppman, No. 17-cv-311, 2018 WL 1833348, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2018),
report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 943528 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 20,
2018))).
Here, Blount does not identify an ongoing constitutional violation in his
grievance to Campbell. Rather, he identifies a single incident in which
Talasky denied his request for a prescription for daily nebulizers as well as
his request to take the two, already-ordered nebulizers with him to his cell.
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Moreover, he filed his grievance on the same day that Talasky denied his
requests, which further shows that he complains about a single incident.
Therefore, Blount has not plausibly pleaded that Campbell acquiesced in any
alleged violation by failing to address an ongoing constitutional violation.
On 	the 	other 	hand, 	Blount 	possibly 	plausibly 	alleges 	Campbell’s
personal involvement insofar as Campbell, a medical professional, expressly
denied his request for daily nebulizer treatments in her response to his
grievance. See (Doc. 1-2 at 2 (“[T]his grievance is denied, you will not
beawarded 	[sic] 	a 	monetary 	amount 	or 	be 	prescribed 	daily 	nebulizer
treatments.”)). However, even if Campbell’s denial of his request for a daily
nebulizer is sufficient to show personal involvement, his allegations still fail
to state a plausible claim for deliberate-indifference-to-his-serious-medical-
needs claim against Campbell. Similar to his allegations against Talasky,
Blount does not allege any facts showing that Campbell intentionally refused
to provide him with needed medical treatment, delayed necessary medical
treatment for a non-medical reason, or prevented him from receiving needed
or recommended medical treatment. Accordingly, the Court will also dismiss
Blount’s Section 1983 Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference-to-serious-
medical-needs claim against Campbell for failure to state a claim under
Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
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b. 	Section 	1983 	Failure-to-Train, 	Failure-to-
Supervise, and Unconstitutional Policy, Practice,
or Custom Claims
Blount asserts that Campbell, Booher, and Harry are liable under
Section 	1983 	due 	to 	their 	failure 	to 	train, 	failure 	to 	supervise, 	and
maintenance of an unconstitutional policy, practice, or custom. See (Doc. 1
at 7–8). The Court will dismiss these claims due to Blount’s failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
As for Blount’s assertion that Campbell, Booher, and Harry maintained
an 	unconstitutional 	policy, 	practice, 	or 	custom, 	the 	Court 	has 	already
determined 	that 	Blount 	failed 	to 	plead 	facts 	showing 	that 	Campbell
established 	an 	unconstitutional 	practice, 	policy, 	or 	custom. 	The 	same
rationale applies to Blount’s similar claims against Booher and Harry.
Regarding a failure to train or failure to supervise, Blount fails to allege
facts for a plausible claim of supervisory liability against Campbell, Booher,
or Harry. As noted above, a supervisory claim requires “a showing that there
was an actual constitutional violation at the hands of subordinates” before
finding liability on the part of the supervisor prison official. See Allen, 804 F.
App'x at 127; Telepo v. Palmer Twp., 40 F. Supp. 2d 596, 612 (E.D. Pa.
1999) (“The Court having found that there was no constitutional violation
committed by the underlying officers, supervisory liability cannot be imposed
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upon Chief Fretz for an alleged failure to train and supervise.”), aff’d, 242
F.3d 371 (3d Cir. 2000). Blount has not plausibly pleaded any constitutional
violation by a subordinate. Therefore, his failure-to-train and failure-to-
supervise claims fail as well. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Blount’s
Section 1983 claims for failure to protect, failure to supervise, and for an
unconstitutional practice, policy, or custom, for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted under Section 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).6
2. 	ADA and RA Claims
Blount asserts claims under Section 504 of the RA and Title II of the
ADA against the DOC, and against Harry and Booher in their official
capacities. (Doc. 1 at 9.) As with Blount’s other claims, the Court concludes
that he fails to state plausible claims for relief under the ADA or RA and will
dismiss them for failure to state a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
The ADA and RA “establish ‘an affirmative obligation for public entities
to 	make 	benefits, 	services, 	and 	programs 	accessible 	to 	people 	with
disabilities.’” Haw. Disability Rts. Ctr. v. Kishimoto, 122 F.4th 353, 361 (9th
Cir. 2024) (quoting Updike v. Multnomah Cnty., 870 F.3d 939, 949 (9th Cir.
2017)). One of the purposes of the RA is “to empower individuals with
6 These 	claims 	were 	not 	included 	in 	any 	part 	of 	Blount’s 	initial
grievance or administrative appeals. See (Docs. 1-1, 1-3, 1-5).
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disabilities 	to 	maximize 	employment, 	economic 	self-sufficiency,
independence, and inclusion and integration into society . . . .” 29 U.S.C.
§701(b)(1). As for the ADA, it 	“embodies a ‘national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities[,]’ 42 U.S.C.
§12101(b)(1)[, which is] performed across ‘three titles of regulation—Title I
(employers), Title II (governments), and Title III (public accommodations).’”
Zangara v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Examiners, Nos. 24-2664, 24-2672, 2025 WL
1218188, at *4 (3d Cir. Apr. 28, 2025) (unpublished) (quoting Matheis v. CSL
Plasma, Inc., 936 F.3d 171, 176 (3d Cir. 2019)). Because the DOC, Harry,
and Booher are a state entity and state employees, respectively, Title II of
the ADA applies to Blount’s ADA claims against them.
Title 	II 	of 	the 	ADA 	and 	Section 	504 	of 	the 	RA 	provide 	similar
protections. Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in
or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C.
§12132(1). Section 504 states that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a
disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination
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under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29
U.S.C. §794(a).
In addition to providing similar protections, Title II and Section 504
require substantially similar factual allegations to state plausible claims for
relief. Under both statutes, plaintiffs must allege that “(1) they are qualified
individuals; (2) with a disability; and (3) they were excluded from participation
in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or were subjected to discrimination by any such entity; (4) by reason
of their disability.” Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 225 (3d Cir. 2023) (citing
Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 178 (3d Cir. 	2018)). 	Also, 	“[w]here
compensatory damages are sought, a plaintiff must also show intentional
discrimination under a deliberate indifference standard.” Id. (citing Furgess
v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 933 F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 2019)); see also D.E. v.
Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2014) (requiring plaintiff
seeking to establish deliberate indifference to show “(1) [actual] knowledge
that a federally protected right is substantially likely to be violated . . . and (2)
failure to act despite that [actual] knowledge” (quoting S.H. ex rel. Durrell v.
Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 265 (3d Cir. 2013))).
“Congress has directed the courts to construe the ADA and the [RA]
such that conflicting standards do not arise.” New Directions Treatment
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Servs. v. City of Reading, 490 F.3d 293, 300 n.4 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998)); see also S.H. ex rel. Durrell, 729
F.3d at 260 (“The same standards govern both the RA and the ADA claims.”).
Nevertheless, “the ADA and the [RA] are not exactly the same.” 	New
Directions Treatment Servs., 490 F.3d at 300 n.4. For instance, under
Section 504, a plaintiff must also allege that “the program in question
received federal dollars.” Durham, 82 F.4th at 225 (citing 29 U.S.C. §794 and
Gibbs v. City of Pittsburgh, 989 F.3d 226, 229 (3d Cir. 2021)); see also
Jeremy H. by Hunter v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 279 (3d Cir.
1996) (explaining that the ADA “extends 	the nondiscrimination rule of
Section 504 of the [RA] to services provided by any ‘public entity’ without
regard to whether the entity is a recipient of federal funds”).
Additionally, the causation elements of Section 504 and Title II differ.
See Durham, 82 F.4th at 226. Section 504 requires a plaintiff to establish
that “the disability [was] the sole cause of the discriminatory action.” Id. (citing
CG v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 734 F.3d 229, 235–36 & n.11 (3d Cir. 2013)); see
also 29 U.S.C. §794(a) (“No otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . .
shall, 	solely 	by 	reason 	of 	her 	or 	his 	disability, 	be 	excluded 	from 	the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”).
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Thus, “[a]n alternative cause of why a plaintiff was treated differently is fatal
to a claim under the [RA] ‘because disability would no longer be the sole
cause.’” Lewald v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., No. 22-cv-4625, 2025 WL 1568286, at
*3 (E.D. Pa. June 3, 2025) (quoting CG, 734 F.3d at 236 n.11). On the other
hand, Title II “only requires but-for causation,” Durham, 82 F.4th at 226 (citing
CG, 734 F.3d at 235–36 & n.11), i.e. that the plaintiff establish that the
discriminatory action was “by reason of [the plaintiff’s] disability.” 42 U.S.C.
§12132.
In this case, Blount’s allegations in his complaint fail to allege a
plausible Section 504 or Title II official-capacity claim against Defendants.
Preliminarily, the Court notes that Blount’s official-capacity claims against
Harry and Booher are duplicative of his claims against the DOC. 	See
Kentucky 	v. 	Graham, 	473 	U.S. 	159, 	165-66 	(1985) 	(“Official-capacity
suits . . . ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against
an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690
n.55)). As such, the Court will dismiss Blount’s official-capacity ADA and RA
claims against Harry and Booher as duplicative.
As for Blount’s claims 	against the DOC, presuming that 	he has
sufficiently alleged that he is a qualified individual with a disability, he does
not allege facts showing how he was excluded from participation in or denied
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any benefits from the services, programs, or activities of SCI Benner Twp.
As 	stated 	above, 	Blount 	could 	receive 	a 	nebulizer 	treatment 	if 	the
circumstances warranted it. His dissatisfaction with Talasky’s decision to
deny his request to take the two nebulizers back to his cell as well as his
request for a daily nebulizer, does not equate to him being excluded from or
denied services.
Just as importantly, Blount does not allege facts creating a reasonable
inference that he was excluded from or denied any services solely, or in part,
because of his disability. To the contrary, the complaint contains only
conclusory allegations of discrimination, see, e.g., (Doc. 1 ¶39), and no
allegations about any failure to accommodate. Overall, Blount’s allegations
are wholly insufficient to plausibly plead the causation necessary to support
that he was denied the two nebulizers and daily nebulizer treatment solely
or by reason of his disability. See, e.g., Alvarez v. City of Phila., No. 23-cv-
3570, 2023 WL 6520507, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2023) (dismissing ADA claim
for failure to accommodate where plaintiff alleged only in conclusory fashion
that her employer failed to provide reasonable accommodations for her
disability); Elbert v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 751 F. Supp. 2d 590,
595 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[C]ourts routinely dismiss ADA suits by disabled
inmates that allege inadequate medical treatment, but do not allege that the
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inmate was treated differently because of his or her disability.”). Further,
while 	Blount 	complains 	that 	Talasky 	and 	Campbell 	were 	deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs because they denied his requests for
daily nebulizers and the two, additionally ordered nebulizers, any deficient
treatment does not create a reasonable inference that he was treated in a
particular manner solely based on or because of his disability. See, e.g.,
Iseley v. Beard, 200 F. App’x 137, 142 (3d Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (“Iseley
does not claim that he was excluded from any program on the basis of his
disability. Rather he claims that he was denied medical treatment for his
disabilities, which is not encompassed by the ADA’s prohibitions.” (citation
omitted)); see also Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding that “the [ADA] would not be violated by a prison[] simply failing to
attend to the medical needs of its disabled prisoners”). Accordingly, Blount
has failed to state plausible claims for relief under either Title II of the ADA
or Section 504 of the RA against the DOC, or Harry and Booher in their
official capacities, and the Court will dismiss these claims for failure to state
a 	claim 	upon 	which 	relief 	can 	be 	granted 	pursuant 	to 	Section
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).7
7 Although this is not the basis for the Court dismissing Blount’s ADA
and RA claims, he included no statements in his grievance or administrative
(footnote continued on next page)
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3. 	State-Law Negligence and Medical Malpractice Claims
Blount asserts state-law negligence and medical malpractice claims
against Talasky and Campbell. See (Doc. 1 at 8). However, due to the
Court’s resolution of Blount’s Section 1983, ADA, and RA claims, there is
currently no viable federal claim before the Court supporting the exercise of
supplemental 	jurisdiction 	over 	his 	state-law 	claims. 	See 	28 	U.S.C.
§1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)
(“[I]f 	the 	federal 	claims 	are 	dismissed 	before 	trial, 	even 	though 	not
insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed
as well.”); Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that
“where the claim over which the district court has original jurisdiction is
dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to decide the pendent
state claims unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and
fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing so”). The
Court 	finds 	that 	consideration 	of 	“judicial 	economy, 	convenience, 	and
fairness to the parties” does not “provide an affirmative justification” for
retaining 	jurisdiction 	over 	Blount’s 	negligence 	and 	medical 	malpractice
claims. See Hedges, 204 F.3d at 123. Therefore, the Court will decline to
appeals indicating that he believed he was discriminated against. He also
does not mention Booher or Harry in these documents.
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exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Blount’s state-law negligence and
medical malpractice claims.8
There is also no independent basis for jurisdiction over this state-law
claim pursuant to the diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. §1332(a). Blount
does not sufficiently allege the citizenship of the parties insofar as he pleads
only his place of incarceration and Defendants’ places of employment. See
Washington v. Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating hat
an individual is a citizen of the state where they are domiciled, meaning the
state where they are physically present and intend to remain indefinitely);
Pierro v. Kugel, 386 F. App’x 308, 309 (3d Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (“[T]he
domicile of a prisoner before [their] imprisonment presumptively remains
[their] domicile during [their] imprisonment.”). Accordingly, the Court will
dismiss Blount’s negligence and professional negligence claims without
prejudice to him refiling them in the appropriate Pennsylvania forum.
C. 	Leave to Amend
Having determined that Blount’s claims against Defendants in his
complaint are subject to dismissal, the Court must decide whether to grant
8 42 Pa. C.S. §5103 provides the process that a litigant can follow to
ensure that their claims dismissed in federal court can be transferred (by the
litigant, not by the court) to state court to preserve the statute of limitations
on any claim.
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him leave to file an amended complaint. Although district courts should
generally give leave to amend, they may dismiss a complaint with prejudice
where leave to amend would be inequitable or futile. See Fletcher-Harlee
Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007)
(“[I]n civil rights cases district courts must offer amendment—irrespective of
whether it is requested—when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim
unless doing so would be inequitable or futile.”); Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (“When a plaintiff does not seek
leave to amend a deficient complaint after a defendant moves to dismiss it,
the court must inform the plaintiff that [they have] leave to amend within a
set period of time, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.”). “In
determining whether [amendment] would be futile, the district court applies
the same standard of legal sufficiency as [it] applies under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d
Cir. 1997).
In this case, the Court will not grant Blount leave to file an amended
complaint because doing so would be futile. There is nothing about the
events described in Blount’s complaint, which he repeats almost verbatim in
his grievances and administrative appeals, that would provide an avenue for
him to amend his complaint to state plausible claims under Section 1983, the
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ADA, or the RA. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss with prejudice Blount’s
Section 1983, ADA, and RA claims under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will: (1) grant Blount’s IFP
Application; (2) dismiss with prejudice his Section 1983, ADA, and RA
claims; (3) decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Blount’s state-
law claims and dismiss those claims without prejudice to him raising them in
the appropriate Pennsylvania state court; and (4) direct the Clerk of Court to
close this case. An appropriate Order follows.
s/ Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
DATE: March 4, 2026
26-0126-01
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