3:26-cv-00027•Voyton v. Voyton et al
Texte intégral
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA COURTNEY VOYTON, : Civil No. 3:26-CV-27 : Plaintiff, : : (Judge Munley) v. : : (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom) JOSEPH VOYTON, et al., : : Defendants. : REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION I. Introduction This is a civil action filed by the pro se plaintiff, Courtney Voyton.1 Voyton’s claims arise out of state court custody proceedings and allege violations of her civil rights by her ex-husband, Joseph Voyton; his attorney, Gregory Skibitsky, Jr.; her former attorney, James Mulligan; the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) appointed to represent her child, Cara Phillips; Luzerne County; Luzerne County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”); the Luzerne County District Attorney’s Office (“DA’s Office”); and the Nanticoke Police Department (“NPD”).2 In her complaint, she asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a conspiracy among 1 Doc. 1. 2 Id. Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 1 of 26
2 the defendants to deny her due process during these state court proceedings in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights; retaliate against her and block her right of access to the courts in violation of the First Amendment; a civil claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act; a discrimination claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); a qui tam action under the False Claims Act; and several state law claims. 3 She requests declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.4 Along with her complaint, Voyton filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”). 5 In this motion, Voyton requests that we enjoin Attorney Skibitsky’s continued participation in the ongoing custody proceedings, alleging that Skibitsky’s role as an Assistant County Solicitor for Luzerne County inherently conflicts with his role in representing Joseph Voyton in the custody proceedings. 6 Voyton further requests that the orders in state court “influenced by Skibitsky” 3 Id. 4 Id. at 18. 5 Doc. 4. 6 Doc. 5. Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 2 of 26
3 be vacated, that we appoint a new GAL for her child, and that we issue a protective order prohibiting disclosure of her mental health records. 7 Along with her complaint and motion for TRO, Voyton filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, as well as a motion to appoint counsel. Accordingly, we will recommend that her motion to proceed in forma pauperis be granted, but that her motions for TRO and to appoint counsel be denied and her complaint dismissed. II. Background Voyton’s complaint alleges that on December 5, 2023, she was involved in a domestic dispute with her ex-husband, Joseph Voyton, during which she called the NPD.8 She contends that instead of taking her complaint, the police officers told Voyton the incident “never happened” and threatened her with criminal charges.9 Voyton asserts that she reported multiple domestic violence incidents to NPD, but rather than protect her, officers told her she needed mental health treatment to 7 Id. at 3. 8 Doc. 1 ¶ 14. 9 Id. ¶¶ 14-15. Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 3 of 26
4 discredit her. 10 She further alleges that she reported these instances of abuse to the DA’s Office and was told to “get out of the county.” 11 Due to the December 5 domestic incident, the Voytons’ minor child was adjudicated dependent, and Defendant Voyton was ordered to participate in anger management and batterer programming. 12 Roughly ten months later, in October of 2024, the court closed the dependency case, finding that the child was safe in the custody of both parents. 13 The plaintiff then filed an emergency petition based on Defendant Voyton’s alleged substance abuse and refusal to permit the child to have a medically necessary surgery, as well as the child’s ongoing anxiety. 14 Voyton contends that the court refused to hear from a witness she wanted to present; appointed a GAL for the child; denied her petition; and reduced her custodial time to two hours per week.15 10 Id. ¶ 16. 11 Id. ¶ 18. 12 Id. ¶¶ 19-20. 13 Id. ¶ 22. 14 Id. ¶ 23. 15 Id. ¶¶ 25-26. Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 4 of 26
5 Voyton then sought a protection from abuse (“PFA”) order based on allegations that Defendant Voyton was sending sexually inappropriate content to a minor, as well as “finding unexplained marks on her daughter and hearing sexually inappropriate comments from the child.” 16 The PFA was denied, and Voyton was told to take her complaints to the DA’s Office, which she claims took no action.17 Voyton also takes issue with the attorney she retained to represent her in these state court proceedings, her ex-husband’s attorney, and the GAL appointed to represent her child. Thus, Voyton alleges that her former attorney, James Mulligan, “permitted a ‘stipulated’ order to be entered,” without explaining that the plaintiff was agreeing to her emergency petition being denied and to her medical records being disclosed. 18 Attorney Mulligan then withdrew as her counsel after Voyton raised concerns about “missing filings, possible tampering, and safety issues[.]”19 Mulligan gave Voyton her case file, which she claims 16 Id. ¶¶ 28-29. 17 Id. ¶ 29. 18 Id. ¶¶ 34-35. 19 Id. ¶ 36. Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 5 of 26
6 included an email chain between Mulligan, Defendant Voyton, and the GAL discussing the plaintiff’s apparent mental health issues and accusing the plaintiff of posting Defendant Voyton’s sexual conduct online. 20 Voyton also contends that her ex-husband’s attorney, Gregory Skibitsky, had a conflict of interest because he was an assistant solicitor for Luzerne County at the time he was representing Joseph Voyton in these proceedings. 21 Voyton further alleges that Cara Phillips, the GAL, “became part of the problem” because she was not permitted to communicate with Jones directly and was responsible for part of the GAL fee.22 Finally, Voyton alleges that all of these issues with her state court proceedings demonstrate a “systemic policy of deliberate indifference” to the safety of children and allegations of domestic violence by Luzerne County CYS and the NPD. 23 20 Id. ¶¶ 38-39. 21 Id. ¶¶ 40-44. 22 Id. ¶¶ 45-48. 23 Id. ¶¶ 48-51. Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 6 of 26
7 Thus, Voyton brought this action, asserting her claims against all of the defendants pursuant to Section 1983 and alleging violations of due process, denial of access to the courts and retaliation, conspiracy, and municipal liability; ADA violations; and a civil RICO claim. She also purports to bring this action as a qui tam action on behalf of the United States under the False Claims Act.24 Finally, Voyton brings state law claims of abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Voyton’s motion for TRO, requests that we enjoin Attorney Skibitsky’s participation in the underlying court proceedings due to his conflict of interest and vacate any state court orders that he purportedly influenced by Skibitsky, .25 Voyton also requests that we appoint a new GAL to represent her child, enter a protective order prohibiting the state 24 The plaintiff’s claim under the False Claims Act should be summarily dismissed, as “every circuit that has [addressed the issue] is in agreement that a pro se litigant may not pursue a qui tam action on behalf of the Government.” Gunn v. Credit Suisse Group AG, 610 F. App’x 155, 157 (3d Cir. 2015); see also Brown v. Patel, 2019 WL 2502337, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2019) (recommending dismissal of the pro se plaintiff’s False Claims Act claim). 25 Doc. 4. Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 7 of 26
8 court from compelling her mental health records and appoint counsel to represent her. 26 After consideration, we conclude that Voyton’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, we will recommend that her complaint be dismissed and her motion for TRO be denied. We will further recommend that her motion to appoint counsel be denied at this time. III. Discussion A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints – Standard of Review We have a statutory obligation to preliminarily review pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 27 We review such complaints to determine whether there are frivolous or malicious claims, or if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 This statutory preliminary screening mirrors review under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for dismissal of a complaint for “failure to 26 Id. and Doc. 6. 27 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 28 Id. Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 8 of 26
9 state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 29 With respect to this legal benchmark, under federal pleading standards a plaintiff is required to set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 30 In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the non- movant.” 31 However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”32 As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized: [A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two- part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Id. Second, a District Court must then 29 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 30 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 31 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). 32 Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”). Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 9 of 26
10 determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234–35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” determination will be “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. 33 Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public record. 34 A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached] documents.”35 Additionally, if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the court may consider such document in its determination. 36 However, the 33 Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). 34 Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). 35 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). 36 See Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 10 of 26
11 court may not rely on any other part of the record when deciding a motion to dismiss. 37 Finally, when reviewing a pro se complaint, we are reminded that such complaints are to be construed liberally, “so ‘as to do substantial justice.’” 38 We must apply the relevant law even if the pro se plaintiff does not mention it by name. 39 B. This Complaint Should be Dismissed. After consideration, we conclude that the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and should be dismissed. As we have noted, Voyton asserts several claims pursuant to Section 1983 against the defendants, alleging violations of her constitutional rights. As to CYS, Voyton’s claims are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Eleventh Amendment provides sovereign immunity to states and state agencies that are sued by citizens in federal court. 40 The 2002). 37 Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261. 38 Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f)). 39 Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002)). 40 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 11 of 26
12 Commonwealth’s immunity exists as a matter of law unless that immunity is waived or abrogated by Congress. The Commonwealth has expressly invoked its Eleventh Amendment immunity. 41 This immunity extends to state agencies such as CYS.42 Accordingly, Voyton’s claims against CYS should be dismissed. As to Defendants Joseph Voyton, Skibitsky, Phillips, and Mulligan, it is not clear from the complaint that these defendants are state actors subject to Section 1983 liability. Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 43 “Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under 41 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b). 42 See Plaunt v. Perry Cnty. Children and Youth Servs., 2025 WL 1585037, at *8 (M.D. Pa. June 4, 2025) (finding Eleventh Amendment immunity applicable to CYS). 43 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 12 of 26
13 the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 44 Section 1983 “does not create any new substantive rights but instead provides a remedy for the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right.” 45 Accordingly, to state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must plead two elements: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a “person” acting under color of law; and (2) that conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States .46 The Third Circuit has set forth three broad tests to determine if a private entity or actor can be said to have acted under color of state law: (1) “whether the private entity has exercised powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state”; (2) “whether the private party has acted with the help of or in concert with state officials”; and (3) whether “the [s]tate has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with 44 See Shuman v. Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). 45 See id. (citation omitted). 46 See Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted); Shaw by Strain v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1141– 42 (3d Cir. 1990). Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 13 of 26
14 the acting party that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.”47 Here, there are no allegations from which we can conclude that these defendants are state actors subject to Section 1983 liability. First, it is clear that Defendant Joseph Voyton, the ex-husband of the plaintiff, is a private individual. Second, the named attorneys are privately retained or court-appointed counsel, who have routinely been found not to qualify as state actors for purposes of Section 1983.48 Further, Voyton fails to allege sufficient facts to establish that any of these private individual defendants engaged in the requisite “joint activity” with state actors to deprive her of her rights, since as we will explain, Voyton has failed to allege facts to establish a conspiracy among any of the defendants. 49 Accordingly, we conclude that these defendants are not 47 Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1142 (3d Cir. 1995)). 48 See Goodson v. Maggi, 797 F. Supp. 2d 624, 637 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (“Court appointed counsel, especially one serving as a guardian ad litem, does not qualify as a state actor for purposes of § 1983”); Haeussler v. Child Support Agency of Bucks Cnty., 2025 WL 606176, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2025) (finding private attorneys representing clients in child custody cases are not state actors under Section 1983). 49 While Voyton alleges that Attorney Skibitsky was also an assistant county solicitor at the time he represented Joseph Voyton in the state Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 14 of 26
15 state actors subject to Section 1983 liability. Regarding her conspiracy claim, Voyton’s complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to support this claim. To allege a conspiracy, a plaintiff must establish “some factual basis to support the existence of the elements of a conspiracy: agreement and concerted action.”50 “It is ‘not enough that the end result of the parties’ independent conduct caused plaintiff harm or even that the alleged perpetrators of the harm acted in conscious parallelism.’”51 Here, the complaint vaguely alleges that the Court, CYS, and the DA’s Office “worked in concert to silence Plaintiff and shield her abuser,” and that all defendants collectively “entered into an agreement, express or implied, to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” 52 These bare and conclusory allegations fall far short of what court proceedings, in our view this allegation, standing alone, is insufficient to find that Skibitsky is a state actor. See Francis v. Smith, 2024 WL 2156242, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 2024) (“[A] municipal attorney . . . does not act under color of state law simply by virtue of acting as an attorney or solicitor on behalf of a municipal entity.”). 50 Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 294 (3d Cir. 2018) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 51 Eichelman v. Lancaster County, 510 F. Supp. 2d 377, 393 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (quoting Spencer v. Steinman, 968 F. Supp. 1011, 1020 (E.D. Pa. 1997)). 52 Doc. 1 ¶ 30; Doc. 1 at 14. Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 15 of 26
16 is needed to state a conspiracy claim against the defendants. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s conspiracy claim fails. As to Luzerne County, the DA’s Office, and the NPD, Voyton has failed to allege a claim for municipal liability against these entities. A municipal entity may be liable for a constitutional violation under Section 1983 if the violation was a direct result of the entity’s policy, custom, or practice.53 However, an entity may not be held liable “solely because injuries were inflicted by its agents or employees.”54 Rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate a “direct causal link” between the alleged constitutional violation and the municipal policy or custom. 55 In cases where a plaintiff is alleging a failure to train, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the “municipality’s failure to train [individuals] ... amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom [they] come into contact.” 56 To establish such a claim, the plaintiff must 53 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 695 (1978). 54 Jiminez v. All American Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2007). 55 City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). 56 Id. at 388. Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 16 of 26
17 demonstrate “contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or knowledge of a prior pattern of similar incidents,” coupled with “circumstances under which the supervisor’s actions or inaction could be found to have communicated a message of approval to the offending subordinate.”57 Here, Voyton attempts to establish Monell liability by asserting that these municipal defendants’ actions or inactions in her case reflect a policy or custom of the county in family court matters. But the complaint contains no factual allegations to support this assertion. Rather, Voyton solely relies on occurrences in her own family court matter, such as failing to investigate her complaints of abuse and imposing unfair financial demands regarding the guardian ad litem. The plaintiff makes one conclusory assertion that the conduct alleged in her case is similar to allegations made in another case before this court, Miller v. Miller, et al., 58 in an attempt to show that the alleged conduct 57 Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1997)). 58 Civ No. 3:25-CV-1454. Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 17 of 26
18 is a policy or custom of the county. 59 Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the alleged actions or inactions establish a policy or custom of these municipal agencies or offices such that they would be subject to Monell liability. The plaintiff also asserts a civil RICO Act claim against the defendants. “RICO provides for civil actions . . . by which ‘[a]ny person injured in his business or property’ by a RICO violation may seek treble damages and attorney’s fees.” 60 RICO violations are set forth in Section 1962, and “[a] common thread running throughout § 1962 is that an injured party must demonstrate that the defendant was engaged in a ‘pattern of racketeering activity.’” 61 The statute sets forth enumerated acts that constitute “racketeering activity.” 62 Construing the pro se complaint liberally, as we must, the complaint does not contain any allegations that, in our view, fit within the definition of “racketeering activity” under the statute. While the 59 Doc. 1 ¶ 2. 60 Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 552 (2000) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)). 61 Tabas v. Tabas, 47 F.3d 1280, 1289 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc). 62 See § 1961(1)(A)-(G). Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 18 of 26
19 plaintiff attempts to set forth four acts that she believes constitute wire fraud, mail fraud, witness tampering, and obstruction of justice, the allegations in the complaint do not align with these alleged acts of racketeering activity. For example, while the plaintiff alleges “concealment of ChildLine reports” as an act of obstruction of justice, the complaint does not contain any allegations against the defendants regarding concealing ChildLine reports.63 Accordingly, we conclude that the complaint fails to allege a pattern of racketeering activity under the statute. Additionally, while Voyton has alleged personal financial injury, loss of parental rights, and emotional distress due to the defendants’ alleged conduct, the complaint contains no allegations that Voyton’s “business or property” has been harmed by the defendants, a requirement 63 While the plaintiff in Miller made these specific allegations, the plaintiff here did not. We note that the two plaintiffs attempted to join their actions as one in Miller, which the district court did not permit. Should the court adopt our recommendation, and the plaintiff file an amended complaint, she is cautioned that her complaint should contain only her own allegations regarding her state court case and not the allegations of another matter. Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 19 of 26
20 under Section 1964(c). 64 Indeed, the Third Circuit has stated that under RICO, “a showing of injury requires proof of a concrete financial loss and not mere injury to a valuable intangible property interest.”65 Voyton has made no such showing in her complaint. Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a claim against these defendants under the RICO Act, and this claim should be dismissed. As to her claim under the ADA, we similarly conclude that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To assert a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) [s]he is a qualified individual; (2) with a disability; (3) [who] was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or was subject to discrimination by any such entity; (4) by reason of h[er] disability.” 66 Voyton alleges in a wholly conclusory fashion that Luzerne County violated the ADA when it “discriminated against Plaintiff, a qualified individual with PTSD, by 64 See Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn, 604 U.S. 593, 601-02 (2025). 65 Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 483 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 66 Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 20 of 26
21 weaponizing her diagnosis, denying meaningful access to proceedings, and conditioning custody on disclosure of privileged mental health records.” 67 This single, conclusory allegation is insufficient to state a discrimination claim under Title II of the ADA. Accordingly, this claim should be dismissed. Voyton also asserts state law claims against the defendants of abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Because we have concluded that the plaintiff’s federal claims fail, this court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these state law claims. 68 C. Voyton’s Motion for TRO Should be Denied. Voyton has also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. A plaintiff seeking preliminary injunctive relief must meet exacting substantive requirements. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 requires 67 Doc. 1 at 15. 68 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if- ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 21 of 26
22 a plaintiff to show “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that granting preliminary relief will not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) that the public interest favors such relief.”69 The Supreme Court has underscored that “a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”70 As discussed above, we have concluded that Voyton’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot show a likelihood that she will succeed on the merits of her claims, and as such, fails to meet the requirements for preliminary injunctive relief at this time. Thus, her motions for TRO should be denied. D. The Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel Should be Denied. Finally, we recommend that the court deny Voyton’s motion to 69 Kos Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999)). 70 Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 22 of 26
23 appoint counsel at this time. While we understand the plaintiff’s interest in securing court-appointed counsel, we also recognize that there is neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to counsel for civil litigants. 71 Instead, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) provides that “[t]he court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to employ counsel.” The decision to appoint counsel under §1915(e)(1) is discretionary and must be made on a case-by-case basis.72 The Court of Appeals has set forth six factors to guide our consideration of the plaintiff’s request for counsel: (1) the plaintiff’s ability to present his or her own case; (2) the complexity of the legal issues; (3) the degree to which factual investigation will be necessary and the ability of the plaintiff to pursue such investigation; (4) the amount a case is likely to turn on credibility determinations; (5) whether the case will require the testimony of expert witnesses; [and] (6) whether the plaintiff can attain and afford counsel on his own behalf. 73 Additionally, the Court has recognized several practical considerations which we must consider, such as the number of pro se actions filed in 71 Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 456-57 (3d Cir. 1997); Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993). 72 Tabron, 6 F.3d at 157-58. 73 Parham, 126 F.3d at 457. Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 23 of 26
24 federal court; the lack of funding for court-appointed counsel; and the limited number of lawyers willing to undertake representation without compensation. 74 “[V]olunteer lawyer time is extremely valuable. Hence, district courts should not request counsel under § 1915(d) indiscriminately.” 75 Here, our analysis of these factors leads us to conclude that counsel should not be appointed at this time.76 At the outset, this case is in its early stages, with the plaintiff being given an opportunity to file an amended complaint, which will be subject to a mandatory screening review due to the plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status. While the plaintiff generally cites her indigent status and unfamiliarity with the law to indicate she is unable to proceed pro se, the facts of this case appear to be well known to the plaintiff, who has filed a detailed complaint and asserted various legal theories and claims against the 74 Tabron, 6 F.3d at 157. 75 Id. 76 We decline the plaintiff’s invitation to recognize the appointment of counsel as a “reasonable accommodation” under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, as our research has yielded no authority to support such a finding. Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 24 of 26
25 defendants. Accordingly, we recommend that the plaintiff’s request for counsel be denied at this time without prejudice to re-examining this issue at the request of the plaintiff, or sua sponte, as this litigation progresses. IV. Recommendation Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that: 1. The plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed IFP be conditionally granted for screening purposes; 2. The complaint be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; 3. The motion for TRO be DENIED; 4. The motion to appoint counsel be DENIED; and 5. The plaintiff be permitted to file an amended complaint within 21 days of any dismissal order. The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3: Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 25 of 26
26 matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Submitted this 24th day of February 2026. s/ Daryl F. Bloom Daryl F. Bloom Chief United States Magistrate Judge Case 3:26-cv-00027-JKM Document 10 Filed 02/24/26 Page 26 of 26
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