Regions Bank v. Marante et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
REGIONS BANK, 	:
Plaintiff 	: 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-1925
v. 	: 	(JUDGE MANNION)
ALBERTO MARANTE, et al., 	:
Defendants 	:
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the court is plaintiff Regions Bank’s motion to strike
defendants Alberto and Christen Marante’s affirmative defenses numbered
1, 3-6, and 8-13 from their answer to Regions Bank’s complaint. (Doc. 13).
For the reasons stated herein, Regions Bank’s motion will be DENIED
without prejudice at this time.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On October 14, 2025, Regions Bank filed a complaint in this court, in
which it alleged that Mr. Marante has refused to satisfy a debt and judgment
against him, owed to Regions Bank, 	and that “[w]orse, he is actively
attempting to evade enforcement by, upon information and belief, sheltering
assets belonging to him by placing them in an account in the name of his
spouse, Mrs. Marante.” (Doc. 1 at 2).
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More specifically, Regions Bank alleges that Mr. Marante hid his
assets and purported himself as insolvent by placing them in his wife’s name,
including his $259,000 a year salary which was deposited directly into a
checking account solely in Mrs. Marante’s name. Id. at 4. He allegedly did
so to avoid a debt he owes to Regions Bank pursuant to a personal
guarantee he made on his company’s borrowing of funds from another
company, which he defaulted on, resulting in a Florida court entering
judgment against him. Id. at 1. That judgment was then recorded by the
Lackawanna County Prothonotary. Id. at 3.
Regions 	Bank’s 	action “to avoid and recover avoidable transfers
pursuant to the Pennsylvania Uniform Voidable Transfers Act” argues that it
“is entitled to avoid and recover the amount or value of the Voidable
Transfers 	from 	Mr. 	Marante 	and 	Mrs. 	Marante 	and 	the 	John 	Does
Subsequent Transferees pursuant to 12 Pa. C.S. §5101 et seq.” Id. at 6.
In their answer to Regions Bank’s complaint, Mr. and Mrs. Marante
denied 	any 	wrongdoing, 	including 	violating 	the 	Pennsylvania 	Uniform
Voidable Transfer Act. (Doc. 8). In addition to denying any wrongdoing, Mr.
and Mrs. Marante asserted fourteen affirmative defenses. Id. Relevant for
purposes of this motion, are:
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[1] Plaintiff has failed in whole or in part to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted
[3] Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred in whole or in part by reason
of the statute of limitations.
[4] Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred in whole or in part by reason
of estoppel.
[5] Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred in whole or in part by reason
of laches.
[6] Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred in whole or in part by reason
of Plaintiff’s unclean hands.
[8] Plaintiff’s claims may be barred in whole or in part by the
doctrines of collateral estoppel, judicial estoppel and/or res
judicata.
[9] Plaintiff’s claims may be barred in whole or in part by the
doctrines of payment and/or release.
[10] Plaintiff’s claims are barred because of statutory and/or
common law.
[11] Plaintiff’s claims may be barred in whole or in part by the
doctrines of accord and satisfaction.
[12] Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of good faith
of any transferee and/or the mere conduit defense
[13] Plaintiff’s claims are barred to the extent reasonably
equivalent value was received for any alleged transfer.
Id. at 9-11.
On December 3, 2025, Regions Bank filed the present motion to strike
the affirmative defenses, as well as an accompanying brief. (Docs. 13-14).
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In its motion, Regions Bank argues that “[e]ach of the Affirmative Defenses
is conclusory recitations of its respective elements, does not contain any
factual or legal predicate, does not provide fair notice to Regions, and/or
otherwise fails as a matter of law,” and that the affirmative defenses should
therefore be stricken. (Doc. 14 at 5-6) (emphasis in original).
On December 16, 2025, the Marantes filed an amended answer. (Doc.
19).1 In their amended answer, the Marantes made only one change to the
aforementioned affirmative defenses—the third affirmative defense was
changed to “by reason of waiver,” instead of “by reason of the statute of
limitations.” Id. at 9. The next day, December 17, 2025, the Marantes filed
their brief in opposition, arguing that their affirmative defenses meet the
appropriate legal standard, and that “[t]o the extent that the Court determines
that any affirmative defense is not sufficiently articulated, the Marante
Defendants should be given the opportunity to amend their affirmative
defenses.” (Doc. 20 at 2).
On December 18, 2025, the court ordered, in accordance with the
parties’ joint case management plan, submitted on December 10, 2025,
(Doc. 15), that amended pleadings are due on February 16, 2026. (Doc. 23).
1 On December 18, 2025, the court determined that this motion and the
related briefs are now in reference to the amended answer.
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Finally, on December 29, 2025, Regions Bank filed its reply brief to the
brief in opposition. (Doc. 25). The matter is thus fully briefed and ripe for
disposition.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), the court on its own or on
motion by a party may strike from a pleading “an insufficient defense or any
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(f).
“The purpose of a motion to strike is to clean up the pleadings,
streamline litigation, and avoid unnecessary forays into immaterial matters.”
McInerney v. Moyer Lumber & Hardware, Inc., 244 F.Supp.2d 393, 402
(E.D.Pa. 2002). These motions are generally disfavored and should be used
“sparingly” only “when required for the purposes of justice.” 	Landau v.
Viridian Energy PA LLC, 223 F.Supp.3d 401, 408 (E.D.Pa. 2016) (quoting
De La Cruz v. Picari Press, 521 F.Supp.2d 424, 428 (E.D.Pa. 2007)). They
are viewed unfavorably because they are often used as a dilatory tactic in
litigation. Newborn Bros. Co., Inc. v. Albion Eng’g Co., 299 F.R.D. 90, 94
(D.N.J. 2014). As such, they will usually be denied “unless the allegations
have no possible relation to the controversy and may cause prejudice to one
of the parties, or if the allegations confuse the issues in the case.” Deery v.
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Crystal Instruments Corp., No. 13-198 (WJM), 2013 WL 4517867, at *1
(D.N.J. 2013) (quoting River Rd. Dev. Corp. v. Carlson Corp., N.E., No. 89-
7037, 	1990 	WL 	69085, 	at 	*3 	(E.D.Pa. 	1990)). 	Courts 	may 	exercise
“considerable discretion” when reviewing these types of motions. Deery,
2013 WL 4517867, at *1 (quoting Tonka Corp. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 836
F.Supp. 200, 217 (D.N.J. 1993)).
Striking a pleading is a “drastic remedy” that is appropriate only “when
the grounds for striking it are readily apparent from the face of the pleadings.”
Id. (quoting Jurista v. Amerinox Processing, Inc., 492 B.R. 707, 740 (D.N.J.
2013)). Thus, these motions are to be decided on the pleadings alone. Id.
Rule 8(c) affirmative defenses must be pleaded in the defendant’s
answer, or else they are waived. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) “The purpose of
requiring the defendant to plead available affirmative defenses in his answer
is to avoid surprise and undue prejudice by providing the plaintiff with notice
and the opportunity to demonstrate why the affirmative defense should not
succeed.” Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 134-35 (3d Cir. 2002). “To do
this, at a minimum, the affirmative defense must ‘provide fair notice of the
issue involved.’” Griffin v. Don E. Bower, Inc., 2017 WL 4310091, at *3
(M.D.Pa. 2017) (quoting Tyco Fire Prods. LP v. Victaulic Co., 777 F.Supp.2d
893, 900 (E.D.Pa. 2011)). “[F]air notice requires more than a mere rote
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recitation of generally available affirmative defenses without citation to any
other fact or premise from which an inference may arise that the stated
defense is logically related to the case in any way.” Mifflinburg Tel., Inc. v.
Criswell, 80 F.Supp.3d 566, 574 (M.D.Pa. 2015). Thus, “a defendant must
state some basis for asserting the affirmative defense and may not merely
recite all potential affirmative defenses available.” Alliance Indus. Ltd. v. A-1
Specialized Servs. & Supplies, Inc., 2014 WL 4548474, at *2 (E.D.Pa. 2014).
Further, “[s]tating an affirmative defense provides ‘fair notice’ without specific
factual allegations for each element of the defense as long as the defense is
logically within the ambit of the general factual allegations of the litigation.”
Mifflinburg Tel., Inc., 80 F.Supp.3d at 574. Notably, “[t]he consensus of
district courts in this circuit is that the heightened pleading standard under
Twombly and Iqbal does not apply to [affirmative] defenses.” U.S. Bank Nat’l
Ass’n v. Gerber, 380 F.Supp.3d 429, 	438 (M.D.Pa. 2018). Given this
standard, “[g]enerally, ‘affirmative defenses [are] not to be struck unless
there was no set of facts which could be inferred from the pleadings in
support of the defenses.” Mifflinburg Tel., Inc., 80 F.Supp.3d at 573 (quoting
Dann v. Lincoln Nat. Corp., 274 F.R.D. 139, 145 (E.D.Pa. 2011)). However,
“where a defense is nothing more than a bare bones conclusory allegation,
it may be stricken.” Griffin, 2017 WL 4310091, at *2.
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Finally, “motions to strike affirmative defenses ‘should be denied
unless 	the 	challenged 	allegations 	have 	no 	possible 	relation 	or 	logical
connection to the subject matter of the controversy and may cause some
form of significant prejudice to one or more parties of the action.’” Armbruster
v. Eskola, 2022 WL 5221542, at *3 (M.D.Pa. 2022) (quoting Trivedi v.
Slawecki, 2013 WL 1767593, at *2 (M.D.Pa. 2013)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
a. Affirmative Defense 1
The Marantes’ first affirmative defense states: “Plaintiff has failed in
whole or in part to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” (Doc. 19
at 9). Regions Bank asserts that this is a “bare bones conclusory allegation,”
and that the affirmative defense “‘is not an affirmative defense at all. Rather,
it [is a recitation of] the motion to dismiss standard under Rule 12(b)(6).’”
(Doc. 14 at 8-9) (quoting Barnes v. Truck-Lite Co., LLC, 2024 WL 2979550,
at *5 (M.D.Pa. 2024)).
While Regions Bank is correct that the standard for a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim is not a proper affirmative defense, and while such
an argument would be better suited for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
than for an answer to a complaint, there are not sufficient grounds to strike
the defense.
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As noted by the court in Barnes, “general defenses such as these need
not be pled at all, because plaintiffs are always on notice that defendants will
contest elements of their prima facie case by opposing their suit.” Id. The
court further noted that the defense “causes no prejudice and striking [it]
serves no purpose.” Id. at *11; see also In re Merck & Co., 2010 WL 2557564,
at *2 (D.N.J. 2010) (“although the defense [of failure to state a claim] is
arguably redundant in that it is essentially a general denial, there is no
prejudicial harm to plaintiff and the defense need not be stricken.” (quoting
County Vanlines Inc. v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 148, 154
(S.D.N.Y. 2002))).
Thus, while this defense is technically not a proper affirmative defense,
the court will not strike it, as doing so serves no purpose.
b. Affirmative Defenses 3-6, 9, and 11
The Marantes’ third through sixth, ninth, and eleventh affirmative
defenses state:
[3] Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred in whole or in part by reason
of waiver.
[4] Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred in whole or in part by reason
of estoppel.
[5] Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred in whole or in part by reason
of laches.
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[6] Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred in whole or in part by reason
of Plaintiff’s unclean hands.
[9] Plaintiff’s claims may be barred in whole or in part by the
doctrines of payment and/or release.
[11] Plaintiff’s claims may be barred in whole or in part by the
doctrines of accord and satisfaction.
(Doc. 9 at 19).
Regions Bank argues that these affirmative defenses “are impertinent
and immaterial because they are not recognized as a defense to claims
under PUVTA [Pennsylvania Uniform Voidable Transactions Act].” (Doc. 14
at 9). Regions Bank further asserts that the defenses are “impermissible
‘mere rote recitations of generally available affirmative defenses without
citation to any other fact or premise from which an inference may arise that
the stated defense is logically related to the case in any way.’” Id. at 10
(quoting Griffin, 2017 WL 4310091, at *2).
In response, the Marantes argue that they can raise the defenses,
despite Regions Bank’s complaint making a statutory legal claim because
“[Regions Bank] seeks equitable relief in its Complaint – namely injunctive
relief.” (Doc. 20 at 6). They further argue that the defenses are logically
related to the complaint. Id. at 6-8.
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Deciding the merits of whether the defenses are “impertinent and
immaterial” would be premature at this stage, as would striking the defenses.
However, the Marantes’ third through sixth, ninth, and eleventh affirmative
defenses are indeed “mere rote recitations of generally available affirmative
defenses.” 	Therefore, 	the 	Marantes 	should 	amend 	these 	defenses 	by
February 16, 2026, in accordance with the amended pleadings deadline, or
risk their being stricken in the future.
c. Affirmative Defenses 8 and 10
The Marantes’ eighth affirmative defense states, “Plaintiff’s claims may
be barred in whole or in part by the doctrines of collateral estoppel, judicial
estoppel and/or res judicata,” and their tenth affirmative defense states,
“Plaintiff’s claims are barred because of statutory and/or common law.” (Doc.
19 at 10).
Regions 	Bank 	argues 	that 	these 	affirmative 	defenses 	should 	be
stricken because they:
suffer from the same infirmities discussed above; namely,
Defendants failed to allege or refer to any underlying facts, and
Regions 	lacks 	adequate 	notice 	of 	what 	court 	orders 	or
judgments could possibly trigger collateral estoppel on an
issue applicable to this case. Similarly, Defendants failed to
allege or cite any facts from which Regions can infer what
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statutory 	or 	common 	law 	principles 	could 	possibly 	bar
Regions’ claim.
(Doc. 14 at 11).
Furthermore, in its reply brief, Regions Bank notes, with respect to the
eighth affirmative defense, that the:
[Marantes] argue in their Opposition (with no reference to
same in their Answer or Affirmative Defenses) that there could
theoretically exist a court order or decision from the Florida trial
court 	that 	could 	estop 	Regions 	from 	voiding 	the 	alleged
voidable transfers in this case. That case was limited to the
issue of Defendant Alberto Marante’s breach of the promissory
note that underlies the Judgment and thus cannot support
estoppel here. And in any event, that case has concluded, and
there is no such relevant decision or order that could warrant
estoppel.”
(Doc. 25 at 11). And, with respect to the tenth affirmative defense, Regions
Bank states, “[the Marantes] are arguing that there exists some statute in
some state (or possibly federal law or treaty) or at common law that might,
in theory, bar Region[s’] claim. Defendants cannot possibly assert in good
faith that they have properly placed Regions on notice of whatever this
affirmative defense is meant to refer to.” Id at 12.
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The court agrees with Regions Bank. These affirmative defenses are
insufficiently pleaded. They constitute “bare bones” statements, presently
seem to have been pleaded to preserve potential defenses rather than to
assert defenses grounded in the facts of the case, and do not adequately
provide Regions Bank with fair notice. However, given the standard for a
motion to strike as well as the February 16, 2026, amended pleadings
deadline, the defenses will not be stricken. The court instead instructs the
Marantes that they should amend these defenses, or risk their being stricken
in the future.
d. Affirmative Defenses 12 and 13
The Marantes’ twelfth affirmative defense states, “Plaintiff’s claims are
barred by the doctrine of good faith of any transferee and/or the mere conduit
defense.” (Doc. 19 at 10). Their thirteenth states, “Plaintiff’s claims are barred
to the extent reasonably equivalent value was received for any alleged
transfer.” Id. at 11.
Regarding the twelfth affirmative defense, Regions Bank argues in its
reply brief that:
With respect to the “doctrine” of “good faith” and the “mere
conduit defense,” Regions is unaware of any such general
“doctrine” or “defense” that could apply here, and Defendants
provide no clarity regarding the “mere conduit defense” in their
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Opposition. To the extent that the “doctrine of good faith” refers
to 	the 	statutory 	defense 	under 	12 	Pa. 	C.S. 	§ 	5108(a),
Defendants’ Answer does not put Regions on notice that that
is 	the 	defense 	they 	are 	asserting 	in 	Affirmative 	Defense
Twelve.
(Doc. 25 at 13). If §5108(a) is the defense that the Marantes are attempting
to assert in their twelfth affirmative defense, “[t]he limited statutory defense
to a PUVTA claim alleging that a debtor improperly transferred requires that
the 	transferee 	both 	(1) 	receive 	the 	transfer 	in 	good 	faith 	and 	(2) 	for
reasonably equivalent value.” (Doc. 14 at 11) (citing 12 Pa. C.S. §5108(a)).
The 	parties 	dispute 	whether 	Mr. 	Marante 	did, 	or 	even 	could, 	receive
reasonably equivalent value for the transfers he made to Mrs. Marante. The
viability of both of these defenses, assuming affirmative defense twelve is a
§5108(a) defense, largely hinges on that determination. However, such a
determination 	at 	this 	stage 	in 	the 	litigation, 	i.e., 	before 	the 	amended
pleadings deadline has even passed, would be premature.
The court thus finds that the Marantes failed to provide fair notice to
Regions Bank in their twelfth affirmative defense, as it is unclear whether or
not they were asserting a §5108(a) defense. Furthermore, seeing that their
thirteenth affirmative defense is connected to their twelfth, and that 	it
provides no basis, nor insight, as to how “reasonably equivalent value” could
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have been given, it too fails to provide fair notice to Regions. The court,
however, will not strike these affirmative defenses. Instead, the court permits
the Marantes to amend the defenses prior to the February 16, 2026,
amended pleadings deadline.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Regions Bank’s motion to strike affirmative
defenses will be DENIED without prejudice at this time. The Marantes will be
permitted to amend their answer to the extent necessary, in accordance with
the February 16, 2026, amended pleadings deadline. An accompanying
order shall issue.
s/ Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
DATE: January 22, 2026
25-1925-01
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