Miller v. Miller et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
COURTNEY MILLER,
Plaintiff,
v.
ERIC MILLER, et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-1454
(SAPORITO, J.)
(BLOOM, C.M.J.)
MEMORANDUM
Now before the court is a report and recommendation of Chief
United States Magistrate Judge Daryl F. Bloom, in which he recommends
that the plaintiff ’s third amended complaint (Doc. 40) be dismissed and
her motions for TRO and related motions (Doc. 2; Doc. 21; Doc. 36; Doc.
38) be denied. (Doc. 43). The plaintiff timely filed objections to the report
and recommendation listing six separate objections. (Doc. 45).
I. 	Judge Bloom’s Report and Recommendation
As Judge Bloom notes, this action filed by the
pro se plaintiff arises
out of state court custody and divorce proceedings in Luzerne County,
Pennsylvania. The plaintiff brings this action against her ex-husband
Eric Miller, Luzerne County, and an unidentified number of John and
Jane Doe county officials. She asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
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1983, alleging that the county and unidentified defendants conspired to
deprive her of procedural and substantive due process, equal protection,
and access to courts. Moreover, she contends that they retaliated against
her during family court divorce and custody proceedings. The plaintiff
also brings state tort law claims against defendant Eric Miller.
Judge Bloom first addressed the plaintiff ’s claim that the county
and its officials violated her procedural due process rights by depriving
her of her custody interest and spousal support without affording her a
meaningful opportunity to be heard in the family court proceedings.
Judge 	Bloom found that 	these 	claims were 	barred by the
	Younger
abstention doctrine because they arise directly from ongoing family court
proceedings, and the plaintiff has a hearing scheduled in state court to
address the pending motions.1
See (Doc. 43) (“Thus, the requirements for
Younger abstention―ongoing state proceedings that implicate important
state interests and give the plaintiff an adequate opportunity to raise her
claims―are met.”).
1 Judge Bloom issued his report and recommendation on February
17, 2026. (Doc. 43, at 12). The plaintiff ’s hearing in state court was
scheduled 	for 	February 	19, 	2026. 	(
Id.). 	Therefore, 	the 	plaintiff
presumably 	had 	her 	hearing 	at 	the 	time 	of 	the 	issuance 	of 	this
Memorandum.
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Next, Judge Bloom considered the plaintiff ’s state-created danger
claim, in which she alleged that the county official’s actions or inactions
heightened the risk of harm to her and her child in violation of her
substantive due process rights. Judge Bloom observed, however, that the
allegations centered on the county’s failure to act, and that “an alleged
failure
to do something, standing alone, cannot be the basis for a state-
created danger claim.” (Doc. 43, at 14) (quoting	
Johnson v. City of
Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 400―01 (3d Cir. 2020)). Therefore, Judge
Bloom recommends that the plaintiff ’s state-created danger claim be
dismissed.
Judge Bloom then addressed the plaintiff ’s First Amendment claim
predicated upon the plaintiff ’s allegations that county officials denied her
access 	to 	the 	courts 	and 	retaliated 	against 	her 	for 	filing 	motions,
complaints, and reports of abuse. Judge Bloom found that the plaintiff
failed to allege the loss of an opportunity to pursue or present her claims,
as required to state her denial-of-access claim. With respect to the
plaintiff ’s First Amendment retaliation claim, Judge Bloom concluded
that the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege a causal connection between
any protected activity and an 	adverse 	action taken against her as
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required for her claim. Accordingly, Judge Bloom recommends dismissal
of the plaintiff ’s First Amendment claims.
Judge Bloom also considered the plaintiff ’s equal protection claim,
in 	which 	she 	alleged 	that 	the 	county 	treated 	her 	differently 	than
similarly situated individuals “by stereotyping her trauma-driven safety
concerns as instability,” discounting her reports of domestic violence, and
imposing requirements based on “gender-linked stereotypes.” (Doc. 43, at
17–18) (citing (Doc. 40, at 20)). Judge Bloom concluded, however, that the
third amended complaint relied on broad and conclusory allegations of
gender 	discrimination 	and 	failed 	to 	identify 	any 	similarly 	situated
individuals 	who 	were 	treated 	more 	favorably 	than 	the 	plaintiff.
Accordingly, Judge Bloom recommends dismissal of the equal protection
claim.
The plaintiff also asserted a claim against the county for municipal
liability under
Monell, but Judge Bloom found that the plaintiff failed to
allege any facts supporting the existence of a policy, custom, or practice
that 	caused 	the 	alleged 	constitutional 	violations. 	Specifically, 	“[t]he
plaintiff makes one conclusory assertion that the conduct alleged in her
case ‘mirrors the pattern documented in other cases arising in the same
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County.’” (Doc. 43, at 21).
Judge Bloom further addressed the plaintiff ’s § 1983 conspiracy
claim, in which she alleged that unnamed county officials agreed to
deprive her of her constitutional rights in the state court proceedings.
Judge Bloom concluded that the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege a
necessary element of her conspiracy claim, namely that the unnamed
officials reached an agreement or came to a meeting of the minds to
violate her constitutional rights. Therefore, Judge Bloom recommends
dismissal of these claims.
Judge Bloom also recommends that the court decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction against the plaintiff ’s state law tort claims of
abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional distress against
her ex-husband, finding that the plaintiff ’s federal claims fail. In light of
his findings, Judge Bloom recommends denying the plaintiff ’s request for
injunctive relief, as her failure to demonstrate a likelihood of success on
the merits precludes her from satisfying the standard for preliminary
relief.
II. 	The Plaintiff ’s Objections to the Report and Recommendation
On February 27, 2026, the plaintiff filed her objections to Judge
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Bloom’s report and recommendation. (Doc. 45). The plaintiff ’s objections
fall into two categories. First, the plaintiff argues that Judge Bloom erred
in 	recommending 	the 	dismissal 	of 	her 	claims 	under 	the
	Younger
abstention doctrine. Second, the plaintiff contends that Judge Bloom
erred in recommending the dismissal of her claims based on the merits
of those claims.
We 	first 	address 	the 	plaintiff ’s
	Younger 	abstention 	objection
concerning her procedural due process claims. The plaintiff, as she has
maintained 	prior, 	argues 	that 	the
	Younger 	abstention 	doctrine 	is
inappropriate because her action “does not seek to modify, overturn, or
appeal any custody, support or domestic-relations order.” (Doc. 45-1, ¶ 3)
(quoting (Doc. 40, at 1)). But we find that no matter how artfully the
plaintiff frames her third amended complaint, she cannot escape the fact
that 	her 	claims 	explicitly 	arise 	out 	of 	her 	pending 	family 	court
proceedings, ones that fall under the purview of the
Younger abstention
doctrine. 	As 	Judge 	Bloom 	noted, 	the
	Younger 	abstention 	doctrine
contemplates 	three 	legal 	requirements 	before 	a 	court 	exercises 	its
discretion to abstain: “(1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are
judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state
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interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to
raise federal claims.”
Kendall v. Russell, 572 F.3d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citing
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971)).2 Here, the plaintiff ’s
third 	amended 	complaint 	implicates 	all 	three 	requirements. 	The
allegations concern 	ongoing divorce 	and child custody matters that
implicate 	important 	state 	interests, 	and the 	record shows that the
plaintiff has been afforded an adequate opportunity to raise her claims.
(Doc. 43, at 12). By her own admission, she has been consistently involved
in the child custody dispute and her divorce proceedings, and as we
mentioned above, she most recently had a hearing in state court to
address her outstanding motions. 	(Doc. 	41-4, 	at 	50). 	Moreover, 	the
plaintiff has failed to cite any authority supporting her objection that
2 We note that, although the issue of
Younger abstention implicates
the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the case, the Third Circuit has
noted 	that 	“[d]ismissal 	on 	abstention 	grounds 	without 	retention 	of
jurisdiction is in the nature of a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).”
Gwynedd Props., Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd Twp., 970 F.2d 1195, 1206 n.18
(3d Cir. 1992);
see also PDX N., Inc. v. Comm’r N.J. Dep’t of Labor &
Workforce Dev., 978 F.3d 871, 881 n.8 (3d Cir. 2020) (suggesting that
Younger abstention is properly considered under Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule
12(c)). Thus, we have considered abstention under the Rule 12(b)(6)
standard, rather than Rule 12(b)(1). Moreover, we note that “a court may
raise
Younger abstention sua sponte.”
Altice USA, Inc. v. N.J. Bd. of Pub.
Utils., 26 F.4th 571, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 2022);
see also O’Neill v. City of
Phila., 32 F.3d 785, 786 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994).
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runs contrary to Judge Bloom’s recommendation. Therefore, we agree
with 	Judge Bloom’s recommendation to 	abstain 	from 	the 	plaintiff ’s
procedural 	due 	process 	claims 	involving 	the 	plaintiff ’s 	state 	court
matters under the
Younger abstention doctrine.
The plaintiff also objects to Judge Bloom’s analysis concerning the
merits of the remainder of her claims. The plaintiff first objects to Judge
Bloom’s finding concerning her state-created danger claims. The Third
Circuit has succinctly classified the theory of state-created danger as
follows:
The 	government has no 	general legal duty to 	keep
people safe. But it assumes one when it affirmatively
places [a] person in a position of danger [that] the person
would not otherwise have faced. Then, the government
must protect people from the dangers it created. The
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires
it to do so.
Mears v. Connolly, 24 F.4th 880, 883 (3d Cir. 2022) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). The plaintiff asserts that Judge Bloom
erred 	in 	analyzing 	her 	state-created 	danger 	claims 	because 	he
categorized 	her 	allegations 	as 	those 	of 	inaction, 	rather 	than 	those
constituting 	affirmative 	acts. 	But 	upon 	review 	of 	the 	plaintiff ’s
objections, many of the actions she characterizes as affirmative conduct
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are, in fact, instances of inaction.
See e.g., (Doc. 40, ¶¶ 13, 104) (“The
District Attorney’s refusal to investigate or prosecute…” and “[t]he DA …
declined 	to 	investigate 	complaints 	involving 	County 	actors….”).
Moreover, while the plaintiff has alleged some actions of affirmative
conduct on behalf of the defendants, such as maintaining that the county
actors affirmatively misclassified domestic violence orders, closing a child
abuse 	investigation 	without 	the 	necessary 	investigative 	steps, 	and
entering into a stipulated custody order that the plaintiff claims was
knowingly unsigned, 	we 	note 	that 	the 	Third Circuit 	has cautioned
against expansion of the state-created danger doctrine based on Supreme
Court precedent.
See Henry v. City of Erie, 728, F.3d 275, 286 (3d Cir.
2013) (stating that courts must “exercise the utmost care whenever …
asked to break new ground in this field.”) (quoting
Collins v. City of
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). Here, the plaintiff has failed
to cite any authority supporting her contention that these acts can serve
as the basis for a state-created danger claim, and approaching the
plaintiff ’s claim with caution in light of the Third Circuit’s guidance, we
agree with Judge Bloom’s recommendation that the plaintiff has failed to
allege sufficient factual support for her claims.
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The plaintiff also objects to Judge Bloom’s recommendation that her
First Amendment claims for retaliation and denial of access to courts
should be dismissed. To state a denial of access to the courts claim under
the First Amendment, a plaintiff must show (1) that he suffered an
“actual injury,”
i.e., that he lost a chance to pursue a “nonfrivolous” or
“arguable” underlying claim; and (2) that he has no other “remedy that
may be awarded as recompense” for the lost claim other than in the
present denial of access suit.
Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205–06 (3d
Cir. 2008) (quoting
Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)).
Upon review of the plaintiff ’s third amended complaint, Judge Bloom
found that the plaintiff failed to allege a concrete injury because she
merely alleged that her filed motions were either ignored or decided
against her, rather than sufficiently alleging she had lost the opportunity
to present her claims. The plaintiff objects to Judge Bloom’s finding,
arguing that she had sufficiently alleged an actual injury for her claims.
But upon review of the plaintiff ’s objections, we find that the plaintiff has
failed to articulate exactly how she was denied access to the courts and
how that denial led to an injury. Rather, she generally alleges that “the
County’s systemic corruption of the evidentiary record made it impossible
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for [her] to present her non-frivolous claims regarding child safety.” (Doc.
45, at 5). Moreover, the plaintiff ’s objections fail to address the deficiency
noted in Judge Bloom’s recommendation. The plaintiff fails to cite any
authority to overcome that deficiency. Therefore, we agree with Judge
Bloom’s recommendation of dismissal of this claim.
To plead a retaliation claim under the First Amendment, a plaintiff
must show: (1) that she engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2)
that she suffered “retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of
ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights”; and (3) a
causal connection between the protected activity and the retaliatory act.
Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 296 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing
Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003)). Upon review of the
plaintiff ’s third amended complaint, Judge Bloom found that the plaintiff
failed to sufficiently allege a causal connection between a protected
activity and a retaliatory act because the plaintiff failed to identify any
retaliatory acts that occurred after her alleged protected activity. The
plaintiff objects to Judge Bloom’s finding, arguing that the third amended
“complaint details a clear chronology” of retaliatory actions. (Doc. 45, ¶
9). But upon review of the plaintiff ’s third amended complaint, we find
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those alleged retaliatory actions still fail to provide enough specificity to
support her claim. It is not enough that the plaintiff argues that her
allegations 	convey 	a 	sufficient 	temporal 	proximity 	and 	pattern 	of
antagonism to plausibly allege her claim. She must allege facts with
enough detail to sufficiently support that conclusion, and here, she has
failed to do so. As Judge Bloom noted in his report, her third amended
complaint “does not indicate when the plaintiff engaged in this protected
activity relative to when the alleged adverse actions occurred.” (Doc. 43,
at 17). Therefore, the plaintiff ’s objections do not meaningfully address
the deficiency noted in her third amended complaint. Accordingly, we are
not persuaded by the plaintiff ’s objections as to these claims.
The plaintiff also objects to Judge Bloom’s finding concerning her
equal protection claim. To establish an equal protection claim, a plaintiff
“must point to an existing and relevant comparator.”
Smith v. City of Atl.
City, 138 F.4th 759, 778 (3d Cir. 2025). This is because “the Fourteenth
Amendment proscribes unequal treatment only among persons similarly
situated according to a relevant standard of comparison.”
Stradford v.
Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 53 F.4th 67, 74 (3d Cir. 2022). Judge Bloom noted
that 	an 	equal 	protection 	challenge 	must 	allege 	more 	than 	“broad
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generalities” in identifying a comparator for purposes of the plaintiff ’s
claim. But he found that the plaintiff ’s third amended complaint only
asserted 	“broad 	generalities” 	when 	alleging 	that 	she 	was 	treated
differently than others as a result of gender-linked stereotypes. In her
objections, the plaintiff argues that her allegations of “channeling …
domestic-violence survivors and protective mothers into a civil forum,
while simultaneously denying them access to the criminal investigative
processes available to other victims” is enough to make this distinction.
(Doc. 45, ¶ 13). But as Judge Bloom noted, this objection still “fails to
identify any similarly situated individuals, much less establish that the
plaintiff was treated differently based on a protected characteristic.”
(Doc. 43, at 19). Indeed, although the plaintiff devotes three paragraphs
to responding to Judge Bloom’s finding, she spends only a single sentence
addressing the deficiency noted in Judge Bloom’s report. She also fails to
cite 	any 	authority 	in 	support 	of 	her 	allegations 	to 	overcome 	that
deficiency. Thus, we are not persuaded by the plaintiff ’s objections.
The plaintiff objects to Judge Bloom’s recommendation for the
dismissal of her municipal liability claim under
Monell. Under
Monell
liability, a municipality can be liable only if the conduct alleged to be
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unconstitutional either “implements or executes a policy statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by
that body’s officers” or is “visited pursuant to government ‘custom’ even
though such a custom has not received formal approval through the
body’s official decision-making channels.”
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of
City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 659 (1978). Under that standard, Judge
Bloom found that the plaintiff ’s allegations solely rely on occurrences in
her own family court matter, rather than a policy or custom on behalf of
the county that would be subject to
Monell liability. In her objections, the
plaintiff argues that her third amended complaint demonstrates that the
unconstitutional policies were the result of “widespread, persistent, and
well-settled County customs.” (Doc. 45, ¶ 15). But again, as Judge Bloom
noted, these allegations are based solely on events in her own family
court matter, and do not rise to an attributable policy or custom utilized
by the County. The plaintiff has therefore failed to address the deficiency
noted in Judge Bloom’s report, and she has not provided the court with
any authority to support the existence of the pattern that she alleges
occurred 	in 	this 	action. 	Accordingly, 	the 	plaintiff ’s 	objections 	are
meritless.
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Finally, the plaintiff objects to Judge Bloom’s recommendation for
the dismissal of her conspiracy claim under Section 1983. The plaintiff
contends that, contrary to Judge Bloom’s finding, she has alleged “a
pattern of coordinated and mutually reinforcing acts by separate County
departments that cannot be plausibly as mere coincidence.” (Doc. 45, ¶
17). But we agree with Judge Bloom that the plaintiff ’s allegations fall
short of establishing that any individuals came to the necessary “meeting
of the minds” requirement to violate her constitutional rights, even
drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff ’s favor. As we read the
third amended complaint, it is not enough to allege a conspiracy based
solely on the plaintiff ’s belief that the challenged actions could not have
been 	coincidental. 	A 	plaintiff 	must 	“allege 	specific 	facts 	that 	the
Defendants 	reached 	an 	understanding 	or 	agreement 	to 	violate 	the
[plaintiff ’s] 	constitutional 	rights.”	
Boykin 	v. 	Bloomsburg 	Univ. 	of
Pennsylvania, 893 F. Supp. 409, 417 (M.D. Pa. 1995),
aff ’d, 91 F.3d 122
(3d Cir. 1996). The plaintiff has failed to do so here, as she only alleges
the existence of a “symbiotic system of obstruction” within the court
system rather than 	specifics concerning an agreement 	between the
defendants. Moreover, as we have found in the plaintiff ’s other claims,
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she has failed to cite any authority to overcome the deficiencies noted in
Judge Bloom’s report.
It appears that the plaintiff does not directly object to Judge
Bloom’s recommendation that we should decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over her state law claims. Nonetheless, we will address Judge
Bloom’s recommendation concerning those claims. Where a district court
has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction, the court
may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Whether the court will exercise supplemental
jurisdiction is within its discretion.
Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 650 (3d
Cir. 2009). That decision should be based on “the values of judicial
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.”
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.
Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988);
Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45
F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995). “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law
claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors … will point
toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law
claims.”
Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350 n.7. Upon consideration of these factors
and the record before us, we find nothing to distinguish this case from
the usual case. Therefore, we agree with Judge Bloom’s recommendation
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that we should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
plaintiff ’s state-law claims.
Moreover, 	while 	the 	plaintiff 	does 	not 	directly 	contest 	Judge
Bloom’s recommendation to deny the plaintiff ’s requests for a temporary
restraining order, we will also address that recommendation here. A
granting of preliminary injunctive relief, such as the plaintiff ’s request
here, is an “extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in
limited circumstances.”
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Winback
and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1426 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting
Frank’s GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motor Corp., 847 F.2d 100,
102 (3d Cir. 1988)). When determining whether to grant a motion seeking
preliminary injunctive relief, the Third Circuit considers four factors.3
United States v. Bell, 238 F. Supp. 2d 696, 699 (M.D. Pa. 2003). One of
the “most critical” factors is whether the plaintiff can show a likelihood
of success on the merits of his claim.
Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d
173, 17 (3d Cir. 2017). Put differently, a movant for preliminary equitable
3 The four factors are: (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2)
irreparable harm resulting from a denial of the relief; (3) the harm to the
non-moving party if relief is granted; and (4) the public interest.
See Bell,
238 F. Supp. 2d at 699.
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relief “must demonstrate that it can win on the merits.”
Id. Here, after
dismissing 	the 	plaintiff ’s 	federal 	claims 	and 	declining 	to 	exercise
jurisdiction 	over 	the 	plaintiff ’s 	state 	law 	claims, 	Judge 	Bloom
recommends that the plaintiff ’s requests for a TRO should be denied
because the plaintiff ’s third amended complaint fails to state a claim
likely to succeed on the merits. In other words, Judge Bloom recommends
that 	the 	Court 	deny 	the 	plaintiff ’s 	requests 	because 	she 	cannot
demonstrate she can win this case on the merits. We agree. In moving for
injunctive relief, the plaintiff bears the burden to establish entitlement
to relief by clear evidence.
Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d
518, 526 (3d Cir. 2018) (“A moving party ‘must establish entitlement to
relief by clear evidence.’”). Here, the plaintiff has failed to carry that
burden; she cannot demonstrate that she can win her case on the merits.
Therefore, 	we 	agree 	with 	Judge 	Bloom’s 	recommendation 	that 	the
plaintiff ’s requests for TRO should be denied.
III. 	Conclusion
After conducting a de novo review of the contested portions of the
report, we deem the plaintiff ’s objections to be unpersuasive.
See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
United States v. McLaughlin, 607 F. Supp. 3d 522, 529
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(M.D. Pa. 2022). We conclude that following an independent review of the
report and the record, and having afforded “reasoned consideration” to
the uncontested and contested portions of the report,
E.E.O.C. v. City of
Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 99 (3d Cir. 2017), we are satisfied “that there
is no clear error on the face of the record,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) advisory
committee note to 1983 amendment. We find Judge Bloom’s analysis to
be well-reasoned and fully supported by the record and applicable law.
Accordingly, the court will adopt the report and recommendation as the
decision of the court, as supplemented and modified by this memorandum
opinion.
An appropriate order follows.
Dated: March 10, 2026
	s/Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States District Judge
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