Miller v. Miller et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
COURTNEY MILLER, 	: Civil No. 3:25-CV-1454
:
Plaintiff, 	:
: (Judge Saporito)
v. 	:
: (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)
ERIC MILLER, et al., 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction
This is a civil action filed by the
pro se plaintiff, Courtney Miller. 1
Miller’s claims arise out of state court custody and divorce proceedings in
Luzerne 	County, 	Pennsylvania. 2 	According 	to 	her 	third 	amended
complaint, Miller brings this action against Eric Miller, her ex-husband;
Luzerne County; and an unidentified number of John and Jane Doe
county officials. 3 	She asserts her claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that the county and unidentified defendants conspired to deprive
1 Doc. 1.
2
Id.
3 Doc. 40. 	Miller previously named Luzerne County Children and Youth
Service, the District Attorney’s Office, and Attorney Joseph Mariotti in
as defendants but has not named these defendants in her third amended
complaint. 	As such, these defendants should be dismissed.
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her of procedural and substantive due process, equal protection, and
access to the courts, and retaliated against her during family court
divorce and custody proceedings. 4 	She also brings state law tort claims
against Defendant Eric Miller.5
Miller also filed several motions for a temporary restraining order
(“TRO”). 6 	In her first motion for TRO 7 and supplemental documents,
Miller details the unfavorable rulings she received in the underlying
state family court matters, including denial of her motions to continue or
to stay the state court proceedings and to refer the matter to the
Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office. 8 	She ultimately requests this
court’s intervention in the state matter by enjoining further custody and
protection from abuse proceedings until her motion to refer the matter to
4
Id.
5
Id.
6 Docs. 2, 8, 11, 21, 36, 38.
7 We initially addressed this motion for TRO by way of a Report and
Recommendation to the district court.
	See Doc. 6. 	That Report and
Recommendation was ultimately not adopted by the district court, and
the matter was remanded to the undersigned for further consideration of
the TRO and supplemental filings, as well as for a mandatory screening
review of the plaintiff’s amended complaint.
	See Doc. 29.
8 Docs. 2, 8, 11.
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the Attorney General’s Office is addressed. 9 	In her second motion for
TRO, Miller similarly requests some intervention in the family court
proceedings, in that she asks this court to reinstate prior visitation
conditions for her ex-husband and facilitate communication between the
plaintiff and the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) appointed to represent her
child. 10 	This second motion also encompasses claims and requested
relief on behalf of Courtney Voyton, who has filed her own, separate
action regarding her underlying family court matters. 11 	Miller’s most
recently filed motion requests similar relief based on similar allegations
of ongoing violations of her rights during these state court proceedings.12
After consideration, we will recommend that the third amended
complaint be dismissed, and the motions for TRO be denied.
II. 	Background
Miller’s third amended complaint, which is currently the operative
pleading, details her ongoing family court proceedings and underlying
9 Doc. 11 at 5.
10 Doc. 21 at 6-7.
11
Id.
12 Doc. 36.
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domestic disputes with her ex-husband. 	Thus, Miller alleges that in
October of 2023, Defendant Eric Miller assaulted her in front of their
minor child. 13 	Although the Luzerne County District Attorney’s Office
declined to charge Eric Miller with a felony, Courtney Miller received a
protection from abuse (“PFA”) order for herself and her child, which she
contends was never enforced. 14 	She asserts that her child developed
post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) as a result of witnessing the
assault.15
The amended complaint then jumps to June of 2025, at which time
Miller’s 	child 	made 	multiple 	concerning 	disclosures 	regarding 	Eric
Miller, which the plaintiff reported to ChildLine and Children and Youth
Services (“CYS”). 16 	In July, the plaintiff was informed that someone
made a ChildLine report regarding physical abuse, which was referred to
Child Protective Services and law enforcement. 17 	But the plaintiff
contends that law enforcement was never actually notified, and that
13 Doc. 40 ¶ 8.
14
Id. ¶¶ 9-11.
15
Id. ¶ 14.
16
Id. ¶¶ 16-17.
17
Id. ¶ 18.
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additional reports to ChildLine were concealed or misrepresented. 18
Miller further alleges CYS refused to communicate with her and closed
the case as unfounded. 19 	She also accuses CYS of engaging in improper
ex parte communications with her ex-husband’s attorney. 20
The plaintiff further alleges that county officials deprived Miller of
her property rights when they terminated her spousal support in 2024
based on what she claims was a defective marital settlement agreement
(“MSA”). 21 	She asserts that this MSA was executed while she was
unrepresented, and that the county erroneously relied on this MSA
rather than the Divorce Decree, which resulted in a deprivation of her
property rights. 22 	Miller claims the county court entered a “stipulated”
order that she never agreed to, which Miller believes falsely represented
that Eric Miller had completed required evaluations. 23 	Miller also
alleges that the county failed to provide her with adequate notice, which
18
Id. ¶¶ 19-20.
19
Id. ¶¶ 22-23.
20
Id. ¶ 27.
21
Id. ¶¶ 32-44.
22
Id. ¶¶ 45, 48-51.
23
Id. ¶¶ 52-62.
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deprived her of a meaningful opportunity to be heard in her state court
proceedings. 24
Finally, Miller’s amended complaint alleges that after she reported
issues concerning the investigation and procedural hurdles she was
encountering, as well as safety issues, the county “escalated adverse
actions, including ignoring motions, relying on incomplete records, and
proceeding without necessary testimony.” 25 	She contends that she was
forced to communicate with the GAL through opposing counsel; forced to
pay 	the 	GAL’s 	fee; 	hindered 	from 	obtaining 	new 	counsel; 	and 	her
complaints 	of 	suspected 	intrusions 	into 	her 	electronic 	devices 	went
ignored. 26 	Miller alleges that these actions were taken in retaliation for
her reporting abuse and filing criminal complaints. 27
Based on these averments, Miller brings her claims against the
county and the John and Jane Doe county officials pursuant to Section
1983, alleging violations of procedural and substantive due process,
24
Id. ¶¶ 63-68.
25
Id. ¶ 69.
26
Id. ¶¶ 69-79.
27
Id. ¶ 74.
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retaliation and denial of access to the courts, equal protection violations,
and conspiracy. 28 	Miller also brings a municipal liability claim against
the county.29 	As to Eric Miller, the plaintiff asserts state law claims of
abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 30 	As
relief, 	she 	seeks 	a 	preliminary 	injunction, 	declaratory 	relief, 	and
compensatory and punitive damages.31
After consideration, we conclude that the third amended complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 	Accordingly, we
will recommend that the third amended complaint be dismissed, and the
motions for TRO be denied.
III. 	Discussion
A. Miller’s Third Amended Complaint Should be Dismissed.
We have a statutory obligation to preliminarily review
	pro se
complaints 	brought 	by 	plaintiffs 	given 	leave 	to 	proceed
	in 	forma
pauperis. 32 	We review such complaints to determine whether there are
28
Id. at 17-24.
29
Id. at 20-22.
30
Id. at 24-26.
31
Id. at 26-27.
32
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
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frivolous or malicious claims, or if the complaint fails to state a claim
upon 	which 	relief 	may 	be 	granted. 33 	This 	statutory 	preliminary
screening mirrors review under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides for dismissal of a complaint for “failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 34
With 	respect 	to 	this 	legal 	benchmark, 	under 	federal 	pleading
standards a plaintiff is required to set forth a “short and plain statement
of 	the 	claim 	showing 	that 	the 	pleader 	is 	entitled 	to 	relief.” 35 	In
determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under this
pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the
complaint as true and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the non-
movant.” 36 	However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions
or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”37
33
Id.
34 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
35 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
36
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007);
Jordan v.
Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
37
Id.;
see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
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As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:
[A]fter
Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-
part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim
should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the
complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any
legal conclusions.
	Id. Second, a District Court must then
determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are
sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for
relief.”
Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more
than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint
has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.
See Phillips,
515 F.3d at 234–35. As the Supreme Court instructed in
Iqbal,
“[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint
has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is
entitled to relief.’ ”
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility”
determination will be “a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.”
Id. 38
Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on
the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public
record. 39 	A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s]
that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the
statements, do not suffice”).
38
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
39
Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).
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plaintiff’s 	claims 	are 	based 	on 	the 	[attached] 	documents.” 	40
Additionally, if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not
physically attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in
dispute, the court may consider such document in its determination. 41
However, the court may not rely on any other part of the record when
deciding a motion to dismiss.42
Finally, when reviewing a
pro se complaint, we are reminded that
such complaints are to be construed liberally, “so ‘as to do substantial
justice.’” 43 	We must apply the relevant law even if the
pro se plaintiff
does not mention it by name. 44
After consideration, we conclude that Miller’s claims fail to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. 	The plaintiff first asserts a
claim that the county and its officials violated her procedural due process
40
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192,
1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
41
See Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir.
2002).
42
Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261.
43
Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(f)).
44
Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing
Higgins
v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002)).
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rights by depriving her of her custody interests and spousal support, and
by not providing her with a meaningful opportunity to be heard in the
family court proceedings. 	But after review, we conclude that these
claims should be barred by the
Younger abstention doctrine, as it appears
from the plaintiff’s filings that these matters are currently pending
before the state court.
As the Third Circuit has explained, “
Younger abstention is a legal
doctrine granting federal courts discretion to abstain from exercising
jurisdiction over a claim when resolution of that claim would interfere
with an ongoing state proceeding.” 45 	The doctrine contemplates three
legal 	requirements 	that 	must 	be 	met 	before 	a 	court 	exercises 	its
discretion to abstain: “(1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are
judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state
interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to
raise federal claims.”46
45
Kendall v. Russell, 572 F.3d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing
Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971)).
46
	Kendall, 572 F.3d at 131 (citing
	Matusow v. Trans–County Title
Agency, LLC, 545 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir. 2008)).
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Here, 	Miller’s 	claims 	explicitly 	arise 	out 	of 	her 	family 	court
proceedings. 	Based on Miller’s filings, it appears there is a hearing
scheduled for February 19, 2026, to address the outstanding motions in
state court. 47 	Thus, the requirements for
Younger abstention—ongoing
state proceedings that implicate important state interests and give the
plaintiff an adequate opportunity to raise her claims—are met. 	Given
the paramount importance to the state of the enforcement and resolution
of child custody and divorce matters, we believe that we should exercise
our discretion to abstain from these claims involving Miller’s ongoing
state court matters.
Miller also asserts a state-created danger claim, alleging that the
county officials’ actions or inactions resulted in increased danger to
herself and her child, violating her substantive due process rights. 	This
claim appears to be based on Miller’s allegations that county officials
“misclassified” her complaints of abuse as civil rather than criminal.
Generally, the state does not have an affirmative duty to protect citizens
47 Doc. 41-4 at 50.
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from the actions of private individuals.48 	However, an exception exists
when “the state acts to create or enhance a danger that deprives the
plaintiff of his or her Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due
process.” 49
To prevail on a state-created danger theory, a plaintiff must show:
(1) the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly
direct; (2) a state actor acted with a degree of culpability that
shocks the conscience; (3) a relationship between the state
and 	the 	plaintiff 	existed 	such 	that 	the 	plaintiff 	was 	a
foreseeable victim of the defendant's acts, or a member of a
discrete class of persons subjected to the potential harm
brought about by the state's actions, as opposed to a member
of the public in general; and (4) a state actor affirmatively
used his or her authority in a way that created a danger to the
citizen or that rendered the citizen more vulnerable to danger
than had the state not acted at all.50
The Third Circuit has noted the significance of the affirmative act
requirement, which “distinguishes cases where officials might have done
48
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198-
200 (1989).
49
Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing
Kneipp v.
Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1205 (3d Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original)).
50
Sanford, 456 F.3d at 304-04 (quoting
Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty.,
443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks and footnotes
omitted) (emphasis added).
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more from cases where officials created or increased the risk itself.” 51
Thus, the Court has continued to find that “an alleged failure
to do
something, standing alone, cannot be the basis for a state-created danger
claim.” 52
Here, while Miller attempts to couch her claims in terms of state
action, the gravamen of her allegations is the county’s
inaction—that the
county 	failed 	to 	take 	certain 	actions 	or 	precautions, 	or 	failed 	to
investigate her complaints, which she claims led to an increased danger
to 	herself 	and 	her 	child. 	Accordingly, 	we 	conclude 	that 	the 	third
amended complaint fails to state a state-created danger claim against the
defendants and should be dismissed.
Next, Miller asserts claims under the First Amendment, alleging
that the county officials violated her right of access to the courts and
retaliated against her for filing motions, complaints, and reports of
51
G.S. v. Penn-Trafford Sch. Dist., 813 F. App’x 799, 802 (3d Cir. 2020)
(quoting
Morrow, 719 F.3d at 179).
52
Johnson v. City of Phila., 975 F.3d 394, 400-01 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing
Burella v. City of Phila., 501 F.3d 134, 146–47 (3d Cir. 2007) (police
officers’ failure to intervene in domestic-violence situation did not satisfy
element four)).
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abuse. 	She 	asserts 	that 	after 	she 	reported 	instances 	of 	domestic
violence and abuse, county officials “escalated adverse actions, including
ignoring motions, relying on incomplete records, and proceeding without
necessary 	testimony.” 53 	She 	also 	takes 	issue 	with 	the 	GAL
requirements, in that she was required to pay half of the GAL’s fee and
to communicate with the GAL through opposing counsel, since she was
unrepresented. 54 	According to Miller, these actions were taken in
retaliation for her reporting abuse and filing complaints.
To state an access-to-courts claim, a plaintiff “must establish that
[s]he was denied access to the courts and that [s]he suffered an actual
injury as a result.”55 	A plaintiff asserting that she was prohibited from
presenting a claim must show “(1) that [she] suffered an ‘actual injury’—
that [she] lost a chance to pursue a ‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’’ underlying
claim; and (2) that [she] ha[s] no other ‘remedy that may be awarded as
recompense’ for the lost claim other than in the present denial of access
53 Doc. 40 ¶ 69.
54
Id. ¶ 76, 79.
55
Bacon v. Taylor, 414 F. Supp. 2d 475, 481 (D. Del. 2006) (citing
Hudson
v. Robinson, 678 F.2d 462, 466 (3d Cir. 1982)).
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suit.” 56 	Here, the third amended complaint does not allege that Miller
lost an opportunity to present her claims—she merely alleges that some
of her motions were ignored or were decided against her, and that she
was unable to find counsel to represent her. 	Additionally, while Miller
takes issue with the way in which she was required to communicate with
the GAL, she does not allege that this caused her an actual injury, in that
she was unable to assert her claims in state court. 	Thus, we conclude
that the third amended complaint fails to state an access-to-courts claim.
Similarly, Miller fails to allege sufficient facts to state a retaliation
claim. 	To state a retaliation claim under the First Amendment, the
plaintiff must show: (1) that she engaged in constitutionally protected
conduct; (2) that she suffered “retaliatory action sufficient to deter a
person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights”;
and (3) a causal connection between the protected activity and the
retaliatory act. 57 	Even assuming the plaintiff can establish the first two
56
Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing
Christopher
v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)).
57
Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 296 (3d Cir. 2006).
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elements, she has not sufficiently alleged a causal connection between
her protected activity and any adverse action taken against her. 	Miller
states in a wholly conclusory fashion that the alleged adverse actions
“occurred 	after 	Plaintiff 	engaged 	in 	protected 	activity, 	including
reporting 	abuse, 	filing 	criminal 	complaints, 	and 	seeking 	court
protection.” 	But the amended complaint does not indicate when the
plaintiff engaged in this protected activity relative to when the alleged
adverse 	actions 	occurred. 	From 	the 	allegations 	that 	do 	contain
timeframes, it appears that at least some of the alleged adverse actions,
e.g., the conduct regarding the marriage dissolution and supporting
documents, occurred
before the plaintiff engaged in protected activity. 58
Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the amended complaint sufficiently
sets forth allegations supporting a First Amendment claim.
Miller also attempts to assert an equal protection claim, alleging
that 	the 	county 	treated 	her 	differently 	than 	similarly 	situated
individuals 	“by 	stereotyping 	her 	trauma-driven 	safety 	concerns 	as
58
	See Doc. 40 ¶ 45-59 (detailing issues with the divorce decree in
September of 2024 and March of 2025) and Doc. 40 ¶ 16 (detailing the
plaintiff’s reports of abuse beginning in June of 2025).
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instability,” discounting her reports of domestic violence, and imposing
the GAL requirements on her, which she claims is the result of “gender-
linked stereotypes.” 59 	The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no
state may “deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of
the laws.” 60 	To state a claim for discrimination under the Equal
Protection clause, the plaintiff must show that she endured purposeful
discrimination based on membership in a protected class of individuals. 61
Accordingly, she must establish that she was subjected to “(1) disparate
treatment in relation to other similarly situated individuals, and (2) that
the 	discriminatory 	treatment 	was 	based 	on 	[the 	protected
characteristic].” 62 	“[A]n equal-protection challenge must allege more
than ‘broad generalities’ in identifying a comparator.” 63 	Moreover, “the
failure to identify similarly situated persons dooms an equal-protection
59 Doc. 40 at 20.
60 U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.
61
Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1293 (3d Cir. 1997).
62
Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Com. System of Higher Education,
97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 667 (W.D. Pa. 2015).
63
Stradford v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 53 F.4th 67, 74 (3d Cir. 2022)
(citation omitted).
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claim.” 64
Here, Miller’s amended complaint does no more than assert “broad
generalities” in that she vaguely alleges she was treated differently
because of her status as a domestic violence survivor and “a protective
mother seeking safety for her child.” 65 	The complaint fails to identify
any similarly situated individuals, much less establish that the plaintiff
was treated differently based on a protected characteristic. 	Accordingly,
her equal protection claim fails as a matter of law.
Miller’s amended complaint also asserts a claim against the county
for municipal liability under
Monell. 	A municipal entity may be liable
for a constitutional violation under Section 1983 if the violation was a
direct result of the entity’s policy, custom, or practice. 66 	However, an
entity may not be held liable “solely because injuries were inflicted by its
agents or employees.”67 	Rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate a “direct
64
Id. (citations omitted).
65 Doc. 40 at 20.
66
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 695
(1978).
67
Jiminez v. All American Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir.
2007).
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causal 	link” 	between 	the 	alleged 	constitutional 	violation 	and 	the
municipal policy or custom. 68 	In cases where a plaintiff is alleging a
failure to train, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the “municipality’s
failure to train [individuals] ... amounts to deliberate indifference to the
rights of persons with whom [they] come into contact.”69 	To establish
such 	a 	claim, 	the 	plaintiff 	must 	demonstrate 	“contemporaneous
knowledge of the offending incident or knowledge of a prior pattern of
similar 	incidents,” 	coupled 	with 	“circumstances 	under 	which 	the
supervisor’s actions or inaction could be found to have communicated a
message of approval to the offending subordinate.”70
Here, Miller attempts to establish
Monell liability by asserting that
the county’s actions or inactions in her case reflect a policy or custom of
the county in family court matters. 	But Miller’s amended complaint
contains no factual allegations to support this assertion. 	Rather, Miller
solely relies on occurrences in her own family court matter, such as
68
City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).
69
Id. at 388.
70
Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing
Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1997)).
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misclassifying her complaints of abuse as civil matters, failing to notify
law enforcement of abuse complaints, and relying on incomplete records
to show that the county has a policy or custom of mishandling custody or
divorce matters. 	The plaintiff makes one conclusory assertion that the
conduct alleged in her case “mirrors the pattern documented in other
cases arising from the same County.”71 	Accordingly, we cannot conclude
that the alleged actions or inactions establish a policy or custom of the
county such that the county would be subject to
Monell liability.
The plaintiff also asserts a conspiracy claim under Section 1983,
alleging that the unnamed county officials agreed to deprive her of her
constitutional rights in these state court proceedings. 	To allege a
conspiracy, a plaintiff must establish “some factual basis to support the
existence of the elements of a conspiracy: agreement and concerted
action.” 72 	“It 	is 	‘not 	enough 	that 	the 	end 	result 	of 	the 	parties’
independent conduct caused plaintiff harm or even that the alleged
71 Doc. 40 at 21.
72
	Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 294 (3d Cir. 2018)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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perpetrators 	of 	the 	harm 	acted 	in 	conscious 	parallelism.’” 73 	Here,
Miller’s allegations fail to establish that any individuals came to an
agreement or meeting of the minds to deprive her of her constitutional
rights. 	Her allegations of “coordinated efforts” to obstruct her rights or
“coordinated reliance” on incomplete records, while possibly suggestive of
“conscious parallelism,” fall short of alleging that any individuals came
to 	a 	meeting 	of 	the 	minds 	to 	violate 	her 	constitutional 	rights.
Accordingly, the amended complaint fails to state a conspiracy claim
against the John and Jane Doe county officials.
Finally, Miller alleges state law tort claims against her ex-husband,
Eric Miller, including abuse of process and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 	Because we have concluded that the plaintiff’s
federal claims fail, this court should decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over these state law claims.74
73
Eichelman v. Lancaster County, 510 F. Supp. 2d 377, 393 (E.D. Pa.
2007) (quoting
Spencer v. Steinman, 968 F. Supp. 1011, 1020 (E.D. Pa.
1997)).
74 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if- ... the
district 	court 	has 	dismissed 	all 	claims 	over 	which 	it 	has 	original
jurisdiction.”);
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
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Accordingly, we conclude that Miller’s third amended complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and should be
dismissed.
B. Miller’s Motions for TRO Should be Denied.
Miller has also filed motions for a temporary restraining order. 	A
plaintiff 	seeking 	preliminary 	injunctive 	relief 	must 	meet 	exacting
substantive requirements. 	Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 requires
a plaintiff to show “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that it will
suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that granting
preliminary relief will not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving
party; and (4) that the public interest favors such relief.”75 The Supreme
Court has underscored that “a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary
We also note that Miller has not asserted any federal claim against
Defendant Miller, further supporting this court’s recommendation to
decline supplemental jurisdiction over these state law claims.
	See
Culver v. Specter, 2013 WL 5488649 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2013) (declining
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims against an
individual defendant despite retaining jurisdiction over federal claims
against other defendants).
75
Kos Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir.
2004) (citing
Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d
Cir. 1999)).
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and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant,
by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”76
As discussed above, we have concluded that Miller’s third amended
complaint fails to state a claim. 	Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot show
a likelihood that she will succeed on the merits of her claims, and as such,
fails to meet the requirements for preliminary injunctive relief at this
time. 	Thus, her motions for TRO should be denied.
IV. 	Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED
that:
1. The 	plaintiff’s 	motions 	for 	TRO 	and 	related 	motions 77 	be
DENIED; and
2. The plaintiff’s third amended complaint be DISMISSED.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule
72.3:
Any 	party 	may 	object 	to 	a 	magistrate 	judge’s 	proposed
findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or
76
	Mazurek 	v. 	Armstrong, 	520 	U.S. 	968, 	972 	(1997) 	(citation 	and
quotation marks omitted).
77 Docs. 2, 21, 36, 38.
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25
matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a
recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a
habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being
served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk
of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties,
written 	objections 	which 	shall 	specifically 	identify 	the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report
to which objection is made and the basis for such objections.
The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall
apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those
portions 	of 	the 	report 	or 	specified 	proposed 	findings 	or
recommendations to which objection is made and may accept,
reject, 	or 	modify, 	in 	whole 	or 	in 	part, 	the 	findings 	or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her
discretion or where required by law, and may consider the
record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or
her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge
may 	also 	receive 	further 	evidence, 	recall 	witnesses 	or
recommit 	the 	matter 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	with
instructions.
Submitted this17th day of February 2026.
s/ Daryl F. Bloom
Daryl F. Bloom
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
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