Larkin v. Arviza et al

3:25-cv-00795Pamd9 déc. 2025

Texte intégral

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DERREK LARKIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
ARVIZA,
et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-00795
(SAPORITO, J.)
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Derrek Larkin, a prisoner proceeding
pro se, has filed an
amended complaint (Doc. 27) raising a series of allegations against
personnel affiliated with FCC-Allenwood. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,
he will be permitted to seek injunctive relief based on his allegations of
inadequate medical care, but all other claims will be dismissed.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Larkin’s initial complaint sought injunctive relief related to the
alleged confiscation of his CPAP machine. That complaint was dismissed
as moot based on the defendant’s uncontested evidence that Larkin had
been provided a new CPAP machine,
	see (Doc. 23), but Larkin was
permitted to file this amended complaint.
Larkin broadly alleges that eight defendants affiliated with FCC-
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Allenwood have engaged in a wide variety of “verbal and mental abuse”
and “abuse of position and power.” However, the essence of his complaint
concerns his efforts to secure a CPAP machine and the defendants’
alleged retaliation after he pursued administrative remedies and filed
this lawsuit.
Larkin alleges that when he arrived at FCC-Allenwood, it took
more than six months for him to receive a CPAP machine, despite a court
order that he be provided one. He ultimately received the machine, but it
was later confiscated during a cell search. This search in turn resulted in
“falsified” 	disciplinary 	charges, 	allegedly 	imposed 	in 	retaliation 	for
Larkin filing prison grievances. Larkin was transferred to the Secure
Housing Unit, where he was refused access to a CPAP machine. He filed
numerous “cop-outs1” and had “hundreds of in person interaction[s]” with
staff about this issue, but “90 percent” of his requests went unanswered.
Larkin also made repeated requests to be seen by the “psych department”
for mental health concerns, which were allegedly ignored or denied.
1 The term “cop-out” may refer to an “Inmate’s Request to Staff
Member,” a method for prisoners to seek informal resolution.
See,
e.g.,
Milhouse v. Peoria, No. 1:10-CV-00135, 2010 WL 4853717, at *1 (M.D. Pa.
Nov. 22, 2010).
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Larkin alleges that he has been subject to ongoing harassment
based on his attempts to grieve and litigate the CPAP issue. On an
unspecified date, Lt. Carpenter and two John Doe officers allegedly
stopped 	Larkin 	to 	perform 	a 	pat-down 	search, 	during 	which 	they
allegedly “humiliated, mentally and verbally abused” Larkin. After the
search, one of the officers said: “You[’re] the sh[*]thead who likes to file
lawsuits.” Larkin said that he wanted to be able to sleep at night
(apparently in reference to the CPAP machine), “and for the staff to
realize that he still has rights to request and file if need be,” to which one
officer replied: “Well, don’t come to prison,” while another smirked and
laughed.
Larkin was then escorted to Carpenter’s office, where he allegedly
received “verbal and mental abuse . . . non-stop [and] without reason.”
Carpenter questioned him “for the better part of 10 minutes” about this
lawsuit, asking: “What chance do you really have?” and “How much good
time you really want to lose?” Carpenter then arranged for Larkin’s cell
to be searched, and allegedly told the searching officer: “Make sure you
f[*]ck it up nice for him.” Larkin was also strip searched, allegedly for no
“proper reason.”
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On October 22, 2025, Larkin requested a replacement hose for his
CPAP machine, because the hose had been damaged during a cell search.
Boyer, a “medical officer,” allegedly told Larkin that he was “too busy to
get a replacement hose,” and that he should try again next week when
his “luck might be better.” Larkin “begg[ed] and plead[ed]” for the
equipment, and asked “how he was going to sleep until ‘next week’,” to
which Boyer allegedly replied: “That[] does not look like my problem.” An
onlooking officer, Moyer, “added something on to [Boyer’s] inappropriate
statements,” but the complaint does not explain what Moyer added.
Throughout the complaint, Larkin names a series of other actions
that he attributes to retaliation. His administrative remedies have “all in
some 	way 	been 	stonewalled” 	by 	the 	staff, 	as 	part 	of 	an 	alleged
“conspiracy” to limit, delay, or obstruct grievances. “On more than one
occasion,” unspecified correctional officers have “addressed [Larkin] to
speak about” this lawsuit. He thus blames retaliation for the denial of a
visit with his wife; a “falsified threat assessment” leading to another
period in the SHU; and three “falsified shots/incident reports.” At some
unspecified time in the SHU, Larkin “stated [loud] enough so the whole
SHU range could hear him that he had ‘rights.’” An unspecified officer
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allegedly responded: “You only have the rights I give you.” A case
manager allegedly told Larkin: “This is what you get when you don’t lay
down . . . maybe now you’ll learn your lesson.” In addition, unidentified
staff allegedly withheld or delayed his legal and personal mail in the SHU
for as long as “10-16 days without reason,” “open[ed] and cop[ied legal]
mail without [Larkin’s] consent,” and “illegally denied [Larkin] all forms
of communication with his family.”
Larkin asserts constitutional violations based on retaliation, “abuse
of 	power,” 	“withholding/tampering 	with 	mail,” 	“obstruction 	of
administrative process,” “mental and verbal assault,” “intimidation,” and
deliberate 	indifference 	to 	a 	serious 	medical 	need, 	in 	various
combinations, against eight defendants: Warden Arviza, Deputy Warden
Wezneski, Dr. Cullens, Lt. Carpenter, Boyer, Moyer, and the two John
Does. 	He 	seeks 	monetary 	relief 	and 	immediate 	release 	to 	home
confinement.2
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is obligated to screen a civil
2 The complaint also includes a reference to potential “declaratory
judgment on some issues,” but does not indicate what declaratory relief
Larkin is seeking, if any.
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complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity
or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a);
James v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 230 Fed. App’x 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007). The
Court must dismiss the complaint if it is “frivolous” or “fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The
Court has a similar obligation with respect to actions brought
in forma
pauperis and actions concerning prison conditions.
	See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i);
	id. 	§ 	1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1997e(c)(1);
	see
generally Banks v. Cty. of Allegheny, 568 F. Supp. 2d 579, 587-89 (W.D.
Pa. 2008) (summarizing prisoner litigation screening procedures and
standards).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a
claim under § 1915A(b)(1), § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or § 1997e(c) is the same as
that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Brodzki v. Tribune Co., 481 Fed. App’x 705, 706
(3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam);
Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471
(M.D. Pa. 2010);
Banks, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 588. “Under Rule 12(b)(6), a
motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most
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favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds the plaintiff ’s claims lack facial
plausibility.”
Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir.
2011) (citing
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)).
In deciding the motion, the Court may consider the facts alleged on the
face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the
complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial
notice.”
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322
(2007). Although the Court must accept the fact allegations in the
complaint as true, it is not compelled to accept “unsupported conclusions
and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.”
Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting
Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. Monetary Relief
Larkin’s claims for monetary damages cannot proceed. In
Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971), the Supreme Court recognized an implied right of action for
damages against federal officials for constitutional violations. However,
the right does not extend to cases presenting a different “context” from
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those 	previously 	recognized 	by 	the 	Supreme 	Court. 	“If 	the 	case 	is
different in a meaningful way from previous
Bivens cases decided . . .
then the context is new.”
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 139 (2017). If the
case presents a new context, the Court must consider whether there are
other “special factors” that cast doubt on “whether the Judiciary is well
suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh
the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.”
Id. at
136. Ultimately, “if a court concludes that even a single reason exists to
pause before applying
	Bivens in a new context, then special factors
counseling hesitation exist and a
Bivens remedy does not lie.”
Egbert v.
Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 492 (2022) (quotations omitted).
In
Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized a damages remedy where
a plaintiff alleged that he was detained, and his apartment searched,
without 	probable 	cause.
	See 	403 	U.S. 	at 	389. 	The 	Supreme 	Court
subsequently 	permitted 	an 	Eighth 	Amendment 	claim 	for 	damages
against a federal prison officer for denial of adequate medical care. In
that case, an inmate with asthma was kept in prison against the advice
of doctors, denied medical attention for eight hours after a severe asthma
attack, given drugs that made his attack more severe, treated with a
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faulty respirator, and not timely taken to the hospital, which resulted in
his death.
See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16 n.1 (1980).3 However,
Larkin’s allegations do not fit into either context.
To the extent Larkin intended to assert a Fourth Amendment claim
based on allegedly unreasonable searches, “[t]here can be little doubt
that [his] Fourth Amendment claim is a new context because it involves
allegations regarding the search of a prison cell – not a private residence
as 	was 	the 	case 	in
	Bivens.”
	Leinheiser 	v. 	Decker, 	No.
CV204380RBKAMD, 2024 WL 1298880, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2024)
(citing examples). Other factors counsel against extending
Bivens into
this 	context, 	including 	prison 	administrators’ legitimate 	interest 	in
limiting contraband and maintaining prison security.
	See Parkell v.
Danberg, 	833 	F.3d 	313, 	326 	(3d 	Cir. 	2016) 	(given 	these 	interests,
prisoners’ Fourth Amendment rights are “very narrow”).
Larkin’s 	medical 	care 	claim 	also 	presents 	a 	different 	context.
“Although the Court does not discount any discomfort, pain, or emotional
3 The Supreme Court has also recognized a
Bivens remedy in the
context of a gender discrimination claim,
see Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S.
228, 244 (1979).
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distress [Larkin] has suffered,” this complaint, unlike
Carlson, does not
describe an imminent medical emergency.4 Moreover, the provision of
chronic medical care “is a specialized activity requiring a high degree of
training and qualification,” which courts are ill-equipped to regulate,
particularly in the prison context.5 Therefore, Larkin states no viable
claim for monetary relief based on any of the alleged constitutional
violations.
B. Injunctive Relief
The Court must also consider whether Larkin has alleged facts
sufficient to pursue injunctive relief. As an initial matter, regardless of
the merit of his claims, the Court cannot grant his request of release to
home confinement.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)(5) (placement decisions of the
Bureau of Prisons are “not reviewable by any court”);
United States v.
Robinson, 	2020 WL 5793002, 	at 	*5 n.2 	(M.D. 	Pa. 	Sept. 	28, 	2020).
4
Gayle v. Mowatt et al., No. 1:23-CV-00861, 2025 WL 903832, at
*15-16 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2025);
see also Holton v. Finley, No. 4:21-CV-
737, 2024 WL 1919238, at *9-10 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2024), report and
recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 1913172 (M.D. Pa. May 1, 2024).
5
Peguero v. Quay, No. 1:22-CV-00057, 2023 WL 2410882, at *9
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2023) (citation omitted);
Holton, 2024 WL 1919238, at
*10.
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However, construing the complaint liberally, as required for a
pro se
plaintiff, the Court interprets Larkin as requesting the cessation of any
ongoing constitutional violations.
See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534
U.S. 61, 64 (2001) (where a
Bivens remedy is unavailable, injunctive
relief 	is 	“the 	proper 	means 	for 	preventing 	entities 	from 	acting
unconstitutionally”).
The Court finds no plausible basis for injunctive relief based on
Larkin’s 	claims 	of 	retaliation. 	To 	state 	a
	prima 	facie 	case 	of 	First
Amendment retaliation, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was engaged
in constitutionally protected conduct, (2) he suffered an “adverse action”
by prison officials sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from
exercising his First Amendment rights, and (3) the protected conduct was
a “substantial or motivating factor” in the prison officials’ decision to take
the adverse action.
Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 2017)
(quoting
Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 781 (3d Cir. 2010)).
Larkin attributes a wide variety of actions to “retaliation,” but in
general, he has not pled facts (beyond conclusory speculation) that show
a retaliatory motive for these actions. For example, he does not identify
who was involved with the alleged mail interference, the denial of a visit
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with his wife6, or the confiscation of his CPAP machine, nor explain why
these unnamed individuals would be motivated by his administrative
grievances or this lawsuit.
See,
e.g.,
Smith v. Price, No. 3:11-CV-1581,
2012 WL 6541008, at *17 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2012) (complaint reflected
“a preternatural, global, subjective sensitivity to alleged retaliation, with
[the plaintiff] ascribing some retaliatory motive to virtually every action
that occurs at the prison”).
At most, the complaint plausibly alleges retaliation on a single day
during which Larkin received a pat-down and a cell search and Lt.
Carpenter and the two John Doe officers commented on his lawsuit.7
6 	An 	attached 	“Inmate 	Request 	to 	Staff 	Member” 	shows 	that
Larkin’s request for a “special visit for 8-9-25 for [his] wife” was denied
“due to the receipt of [two] 100 level incident reports . . . in the past year.”
The identity of the decision-maker is not discernable from this document.
See (Doc. 27-1 at 15).
7 Larkin notes “more than one” instance of officers approaching him
to “speak about” his lawsuit, but does not explain how those officers were
responsible for actions against him. Disparaging comments or other
verbal harassment, although distressing, are not themselves “adverse
actions” that sustain a retaliation claim.
See Burgos v. Canino, 358 F.
App’x 302, 306 (3d Cir. 2009);
Booth v. King, 228 Fed. Appx. 167 (3d Cir.
2007). Although the Court acknowledges Larkin’s allegations of fear that
he will suffer unspecified abuse or retaliation, Larkin’s subjective fear is
not sufficient to grant injunctive relief.
See Zokaites v. Land-Cellular
Corp., 424 F. Supp. 2d 824, 832 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (“Injunctive relief will not
(continued on next page)
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Assuming that the searches were in some way motivated by the lawsuit,
the complaint does not say when this interaction occurred or suggest
ongoing conduct by these officers or ongoing consequences from this
incident.8 Similarly, his allegations of interference with mail during prior
confinement in the SHU do not plausibly suggest an ongoing violation
justifying injunctive relief.
See (Doc. 27 at 8, 14).
However, Larkin may proceed on a claim for injunctive relief
premised 	on 	deliberate 	indifference 	to 	his 	serious 	medical 	needs,
including the alleged failure to properly maintain his CPAP machine and
provide mental health care.9
See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 64;
Pearson v.
be granted merely to allay the fears and apprehensions or to soothe the
anxieties of the parties.”).
8
See Doe v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Examiners, 210 F. App’x 157, 159-60
(3d Cir. 2006) (“To establish standing in an action for injunctive relief, a
plaintiff must show that he or she is likely to suffer future injury from
the defendant’s illegal conduct. Past illegal conduct is insufficient to
warrant injunctive relief unless it is accompanied by continuing, present
adverse effects.”) (quotations and citations omitted).
Larkin points to the October 22, 2025, incident in which he was
allegedly denied a replacement hose for his CPAP machine. While the
response Larkin attributes to Boyer is deplorable, the complaint does not
plausibly 	allege 	that 	Boyer’s 	response 	was 	motivated 	by 	Larkin’s
grievances or lawsuit, or that Boyer was even aware of them.
9 Larkin’s complaint alludes to other legal theories that suggest no
(continued on next page)
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Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017). The appropriate
defendant for such a claim is an official “responsible for ensuring that
any injunctive relief is carried out.”
Parkell, 833 F.3d at 332 (citation
omitted). Therefore, Larkin will be permitted to proceed against Warden
Arviza.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Larkin may proceed on a claim for injunctive relief against Warden
Arviza premised on deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, but
all other claims will be dismissed. An appropriate order follows.
Dated: December 9, 2025
	s/Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States District Judge
plausible claim for injunctive relief. A prisoner has no constitutional right
to a grievance process, so his allegations that administrative remedies
were “stonewalled” do not suggest a viable claim.
See Burnside v. Moser,
138 F. App’x 414, 416 (3d Cir. 2005). To the extent he intended to assert
a claim premised on searches of his cell, “prisoners do not have a Fourth
Amendment right to privacy in their cells,”
Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309,
316 (3d Cir. 2001), and the complaint does not suggest a risk of an ongoing
constitutional violation justifying injunctive relief.
	See,
	e.g.,
	Jones v.
Harry, No. 24-CV-5692, 2024 WL 4940547, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2024),
aff'd, No. 25-1387, 2025 WL 2255096 (3d Cir. Aug. 7, 2025).
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