Vespico v. Kass-Gerji et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 1 of 33

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

VICTORIA VESPICO, i No. 3:25cv512
Plaintiff :
(Judge Munley)

V.

ROBYN KASS-GERJI,
Defendant

MEMORANDUM

| swear, if you don't drop out of Miss Pennsylvania, / will

come to your home and set it on fire. | don't even care if

you or your mom are inside. | actually hope you are. You

both deserve to die. | am going to kill you, Robyn. | don't

understand why you don't get that. | will burn you. You will

die."

Each June, the Miss Pennsylvania competition is held in York at the Appell

Center for the Performing Arts. The winner goes on to represent the
Commonwealth in the Miss America pageant. Leading up to the 2024

competition, what may have started as a backstage rivalry escalated into

something uglier.

' (Doc. 10-2, Def. Ex. A, Transcript of Anti-Stalking Order Hearing, at 42:13-21, Kass-Gerji v.
Vespico, 2024 ASO 437 (D.C. Super. Ct. 05/29/2024)) (“ASO H.T. 05/29/2024”).

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 2 of 33

According to Defendant Robyn Kass-Gerji, it was the plaintiff, Victoria
Vespico, whose conduct went beyond the pale. Kass-Gerji claims she was
subjected to months of harassing text messages and threats against her life.
According to Kass-Gerji, Vespico also threatened to kill her mother, her
boyfriend, and her dog.

Vespico tells a very different story. She insists that she never sent a single
message and paints Kass-Gerji as the true aggressor. That is, Vespico
describes Kass-Gerji as someone willing to fabricate evidence, file a fraudulent
petition for a protection order, and lie under oath.

Days before the contestants took the stage at the Miss Pennsylvania
pageant, a hearing was convened—not before a pageant director, but a judge of
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The subject matter was credibility,
not congeniality.

After listening to both sides over the course of a two-day hearing, the judge
ruled in favor of Kass-Gerji and issued an anti-stalking order (“ASO”) against
Vespico. The judge concluded that Vespico was not believable and that she had
sent the threatening texts. He determined that Kass-Gerji was not lying or
fabricating evidence.

Vespico, however, stands firm. She points to Kass-Gerji’s conduct after

obtaining the ASO as signs that the defendant made it all up to get attention—

2

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 3 of 33

withdrawing from Miss Pennsylvania, sitting for a TV interview with a local news
affiliate during the pageant, and sharing details about the texts and legal
proceedings with a British tabloid journalist.

The tabloid involved was the Daily Mail. After the curtain fell on the 2024
Miss Pennsylvania pageant, the Mail published an article: “Miss Pennsylvania
runner-up Victoria Vespico called rival Robyn Kass-Gerji ‘piggy b***h and texted
her: ‘Are u ready to die now?’ — before landing a job mentoring America’s kids.”
The Mail used full names, referenced body shaming and death threats, and
hinted at children being at risk, and that was only the headline.

After seeing her image run through the filter of a British tabloid, Vespico
filed this abuse of process, defamation, and false light lawsuit against Kass-Gerji,
Daily Mail, and Laura Collins, the reporter who authored the article. Following
the voluntary dismissal of the Mail and Collins, the action now proceeds only
against Kass-Gerji.

Before the court is the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim. The motion will be granted. The D.C. Superior Court’s findings, detailed
below, bear directly on that determination. Because Kass-Gerji also seeks

attorneys’ fees, the court also addresses Pennsylvania’s Anti-SLAPP statute.

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 4 of 33

Background

Some additional details are necessary to address Vespico’s claims and
Kass-Gerji’s arguments in support of dismissal.2. Vespico and Kass-Gerji were
both participants in the Miss America Organization with the Pennsylvania
franchise, the Miss Pennsylvania Scholarship Foundation. (Doc. 1, Compl. {ff
12-21). Both were slated to appear at the 2024 state competition in York. Id. J]
22.

According to court documents, Kass-Gerji began receiving threatening
texts in March 2024.° Id. 46. The messages continued into April and Kass-
Gerji alleged that she received texts on April 1, 3, 4, 9, 13-15, and 25, 2024. Id.

In April 2024, Kass-Gerji reported to the Findlay Township Police
Department in Allegheny County that she received harassing, intimidating, and

threatening text messages from the plaintiff. Id. {J 35. Vespico contends that this

2 These brief background facts are derived from plaintiffs complaint. At this stage of the
proceedings, the court must accept all factual allegations in the amended complaint as true.
Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). This memorandum also
references portions of the ASO hearing transcripts and final order, which were not attached to
the complaint. In ruling on the motion to dismiss, the court may consider the transcripts and
court order as matters of public record and as documents integral to or explicitly relied upon in
the complaint. See Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).

3 At the ASO hearing, Kass-Gerji testified that she began receiving messages after competing
at the Miss York and Miss Susquehanna Valley competition earlier in 2024. (Doc. 10-2, ASO
H.T. 05/29/2024, 22:20-23:4). Messages from March 2024 included a text stating, in part,
“Just give up. Do you need more incentive than being murdered? How about | come to your
home and burn it down, bitch? | will set you and your house on fire. Pennsylvania doesn't want
you. No one wants you.” Id., 37:17-23.

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 5 of 33

was a false report. Id. According to the complaint, the Findlay Township PD
determined that there was insufficient evidence to initiate criminal proceedings.*
Id. J 38.

Kass-Gerji apparently resided in the District of Columbia during the relevant
period, not in Allegheny County. Id. If 23-26. On May 1, 2024, Kass-Gerji filed
a verified petition and affidavit for an anti-stalking order in the D.C. Superior
Court and obtained ex parte temporary relief.5 Id. (39-40. The petition
accused Vespico of texting threats of physical harm and violence. Id. 1] 41-42.
Additional messages followed later that day and on May 8 and 10, 2024.° Id. |

A6. The temporary ASO was extended through May 29, 2024. Id. {If] 44-47.

4 During her testimony at the ASO hearing, Kass-Gerji referenced several text messages she
received after she contacted the police, including; “You'll never win this. What are you going to
do now? The cops can't help you. This is all your fault. You should have just killed yourself. Go
die.” (Doc. 10-2, H.T. 05/29/2024, 72:11-15).

5 Pennsylvania’s Protection from Abuse Act requires that parties be family or household
members, sexual or intimate partners, or persons who share biological parenthood for a
protection order to be entered. 23 PA. Cons. STAT. § 6102(a). D.C.’s Anti-Stalking Act does
not. D.C. Cope § 16-1062.

6 Kass-Gerji referenced some of the messages she received after obtaining the temporary
ASO. Defendant testified that she received messages like, "You're dead. You're trying to
serve me with what? Back the fuck off, bitch. | will literally fucking kill you." (Doc. 410-2. H.T.
05/29/2024, 85:11-16). According to Kass-Gerji’s testimony, she also received a message
stating, “You fucking bitch. You filed for a restraining order. What do you think that will do?
Nothing. You are dead.” Id., 87:3-13. Furthermore, Kass-Gerji testified that she did not receive
any further threatening text messages after Vespico was served with the petition and
temporary ASO on May 13, 2024. Id., 88:15-19.

3)

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 6 of 33

A two-day hearing was conducted before the Honorable John McCabe, an
associate judge of the D.C. Superior Court, on May 29 and June 5, 2024. (Docs.
40-2 and 10-3). The parties and other witnesses testified. Both sides were
represented by counsel. Witnesses were subject to cross examination.

After weighing the evidence, Judge McCabe granted Kass-Gerji’s petition.
He also made several factual findings. He determined that Vespico sent
harassing and threatening text messages to Kass-Gerji by a preponderance of
the evidence. (Doc. 10-3, Def. Ex. B, Transcript of Anti-Stalking Order Hearing, at

106:18-21; 113:11-12, Kass-Gerji v. Vespico, 2024 ASO 437 (D.C. Super. Ct.

06/05/2024)) (“ASO H.T. 06/05/2024"). He also found no evidence that Kass-
Gerji had fabricated the texts. Id., 109:11-19, 111:12-18.

Accordingly, the D.C. court entered an ASO to protect Kass-Gerji from
stalking. (Doc. 10-4, Def. Ex. C). The order directed Vespico: (1) not to commit
or threaten to commit any criminal offenses against the defendant, her family, or
animals; (2) remain 100 feet from the defendant, her home, person, workplace,
vehicle, her boyfriend and mother; and (3) remain 20 feet away from defendant if
they participated in the same pageant. Id. In other words, the ASO did not
prevent both parties from participating in the 2024 Miss Pennsylvania

competition.

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 7 of 33

The 2024 Miss Pennsylvania pageant was a three-day event, from June 13
to June 15. (Doc. 1, Compl. J 27). Kass-Gerji, however, withdrew at some point
prior to the competition. Id. 7 87. Instead of participating, she sat for an interview
with Jasmine Brooks, a broadcast journalist with CBS 21 Harrisburg. Id. Tf] 78-
80. During a news broadcast, on June 14, 2024, Kass-Gerji stated that she
dropped out of the competition as the result of the death threats. Id. {] 87.

Vespico did not win the 2024 Miss Pennsylvania pageant. That did not
stop the story from lingering in the news cycle. Over the next month, various
media outlets reported on Kass-Gerji's claims and the ASO proceedings,
including the Daily Mail. \d. {| 90. Kass-Gerji was interviewed by Laura Collins,
an investigative reporter for the tabloid. Id. 492. According to Vespico, Kass-
Gerji shared screen shots of the text messages and a copy of the ASO with the
reporter. Id. I] 93-100. The Daily Mail referenced those messages in the
article, published on July 7, 2024. Id. I] 101-03.

As alleged by plaintiff in her complaint, Kass-Gerji falsely reported to
Collins that Vespico sent her the following messages dated April 1,3, and 9,
2024:

4. | swear if you leave DC | will ruin your life

2. | will come to DC and set your house on fire and what [sic] you
scream as your stupid dogs die

a It'll be so funny

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 8 of 33

an fF oS

10.
11.
12.
12.
14.
15.
16,
We

18.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
2!.
28.

Maybe I'll even take care of that awful boyfriend of yours

It’s not like either of you will be missed

| can’t wait to see the life leave your eyes as | crush your whole world
You will kill yourself

Or | will kill you

Hey piggy bitch

Are u ready to die now?

Just so you know no one is going to protect you.

No one believes you.

| get [sic] that ugly boyfriend of yours doesn't even believe you
Have you showed him these messages

Did you tell him that when | kill you that I’m going to kill him too
And your stupid dogs

If you come back to PA | will come down to your house and DC
and set your house on fire

| will first stab your boyfriend then set the house on fire so
everyone thinks you did it

God you are such a piece of shit

| can’t believe you’re even trying to compete
You should just kill yourself

Unless you want me to do it for you

How should | do it

Knife

Hit you with a car

What’s slower and more painful

I'll think about it

If you compete at miss Pa this year I'll do it then

8

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 9 of 33

Id. IJ] 96-99.

Vespico categorically denies sending these messages. In this action
premised upon the court's diversity jurisdiction, Vespico accuses Kass-Gerji of
misusing the legal system and spreading false information through the media.
Specifically, this action involves three state law claims against the defendant:
Count | — abuse of process, Count II — defamation per se; and Count Ill -
presentation of false light.’ As discussed below, this action will be dismissed for
failure to state a claim.

Standard of Review

Kass-Gerji has filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 42(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief which is

plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell At.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Aclaim has facial plausibility

when factual content is pled which allows the court to draw the reasonable

7 Federal diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity of citizenship between the parties
and an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. Owen
Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978). According to the complaint,
plaintiff is a citizen of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the defendant is a citizen of the
State of Maryland, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Id. qq 6-7. The court thus
exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the
diversity jurisdiction statute. A federal court sitting in diversity must apply state substantive law
and federal procedural law. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 10 of 33

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While the court must accept all well-pled factual
allegations as true and draw all inferences in the plaintiff's favor, Phillips, e15
F.3d at 221, it need not credit “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

In deciding the motion, the court may consider only the complaint, exhibits
attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly
authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these

documents. Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension

Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus.. Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.

1993)). The court may also consider a document integral to or explicitly relied
upon in the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into one for
summary judgment. Schmidt, 770 F.3d at 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing In re

Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (cleaned

up). The court takes judicial notice of the prior proceedings between the parties,

the hearing transcripts, and the ASO entered therein. ®

8 Plaintiff's brief in opposition requests that the motion to dismiss be converted into a motion
for summary judgment. (See Doc. 19 at 5-6). That request is denied. The documents from

the ASO proceedings supplied by Kass-Gerji in her brief in support of dismissal are properly
10

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 11 of 33

Analysis

The proceedings in the D.C. Superior Court are dispositive. Vespico cannot

state a claim for abuse of process, defamation per se, or false light in this action.
1. Abuse of Process

According to Vespico, the filing of the ASO petition constituted abuse of
process under the law of the District of Columbia.2 The applicable law does not
recognize recovery for the way in which Kass-Gerji used the ASO process.

In the District of Columbia, abuse of process occurs when “process has
been used to accomplish some end which is without the regular purview of the
process, or which compels the party against whom it is used to do some
collateral thing which he could not legally and regularly be required to do.”

Morowitz v. Marvel, 423 A.2d 196, 198 (D.C. 1980) (quoting Jacobson v. Thrifty

Paper Boxes, Inc., 230 A.2d 710, 711 (D.C. 1967). Proof of two elements is

required: 1) the existence of an ulterior motive; and 2) a perversion of the judicial

process and achievement of some end not contemplated in the regular

considered at this stage. An affidavit supplied by the plaintiff in opposition to the motion to
dismiss is not.

° The parties agree that the law of the District of Columbia applies to Vespico’s abuse of

process claim. (Doc. 15, Def. Br. in Supp. at ECF p. 20 n.3; Doc. 19, PI. Br. in Opp. at 22, n.
35 (citing D.C. law)). The court will assume that it does.

11

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 12 of 33

prosecution of the charge. Id. (citing Hall v. Hollywood Credit Clothing Co., 147

A.2d 866, 868 (D.C. 1959)).

The District, however, follows what has been acknowledged to be the

minority rule when it comes to abuse of process claims. Harrison v. Howard

Univ,, 846 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1993) (applying D.C. law), aff'd, 48 F.3d 562

(D.C. Cir. 1995). That is:

an application to the processes of the law, or of
government generally, even if accompanied by mens rea,
is not actionable as an abuse of process unless the
process itself is misused. “No matter what ulterior motive
may have prompted it,” Morowitz, 423 A.2d at 198...one
who invokes the legal process to obtain such relief as it
offers commits no abuse of process. lf the relief is within
the power of the court or agency to grant, and is warranted
by the merits, the process has been lawfully employed.

Id. at 2-3.

As explained, adherence to this rule in the District of Columbia encourages
“citizens with grievances to resort to the legal process, even at the cost of
tolerating mean-spirited appeals to that process by which the petitioner hopes to
gain something more than merely the relief allowed.” Id. at 2 (citing Bown v.

Hamilton, 601 A.2d 1074, 1080 (D.C. 1992)); see also Morowitz, 423 A.2d at

497-98 (‘In an effort to avoid infringing upon the right of the public to utilize our
courts, we are cautious not to adopt rules which will have a chilling and inhibitory

effect on would-be litigants of justiciable issues.”).

12

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 13 of 33

Vespico alleges that Kass-Gerji filed the ASO petition with ulterior motives
to: 1) paint herself as a victim of abuse to further her victim advocacy platform; 2)
gain media attention; 3) damage the plaintiff's reputation; 4) force plaintiff to
withdraw from the 2024 Miss Pennsylvania pageant; and 5) gain a competitive
advantage in the competition. (Doc. 1, Compl. ff] 112-116). Even accepting
these allegations as the truth (and ignoring that Kass-Gerji withdrew from the
competition), they are insufficient under D.C. law. See Bown 601 A.2d at 1080;

Morowitz, 423 A.2d at 198-99; see also Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers,

Chauffeurs & Helpers Loc. Union 639, 883 F.2d 132, 137-38 (D.C. Cir. 1989), on

reh'g in part, 913 F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Plaintiff must demonstrate not only

ulterior motive, but success in achieving illegitimate ends with resulting injury.”).
Here, Kass-Gerji petitioned for an anti-stalking order under a statute
covering the District of Columbia. D.C. CODE § 16-1 062(a). According to that
statute, a judicial officer may issue an ASO if they find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the respondent stalked the petitioner at least once within the 90
days prior to the petition. Id., § 16-1064(c). A judge of the D.C. Superior Court
held a hearing and determined that Kass-Gerji was entitled to an ASO, that is, he

concluded that Vespico stalked Kass-Gerji by sending the text messages.'° The

10 “Stalked” is defined as any conduct described by a separate provision of the D.C. Code.
D.C. Code § 16-1061(7). This definition will be discussed later in the memorandum.

13

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 14 of 33

court then issued an order with stay-away provisions—relief that the ASO statute
authorizes. Id. § 16-1 064(c)(1)-(9).

Therefore, in this case, the ASO process was used for its intended purpose
and achieved a result it was designed to produce. Since Kass-Gerji used the
ASO framework as designed, the abuse of process claim cannot move forward
under D.C. law even if the defendant used those proceedings for other reasons

as alleged. See Rockwell Cap. Partners, Inc. v. CD Intl Enters., Inc., 311 F.

Supp. 3d 52, 55 (D.D.C. 2018) (applying D.C. law) (requiring threats or

extortionate conduct). An “unpure heart” is not enough. Spiller v. D.C., 362 P.

Supp. 3d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2019) (citing Nader v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 567 F.3d

692, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (applying D.C. law)). Vespico’s abuse of process claim
will thus be dismissed.
2. Defamation Per Se and False Light

Count II advances a claim for defamation per se. Count Ill advances a
claim for presentation of false light. These two claims target Kass-Gerji’s media
statements after entry of the ASO.

On the defamation claim, Vespico has the burden of proving: (1) “the
defamatory character” of Kass-Gerji’s communications, (2) its publication by the
defendant; (3) its application to Vespico; (4) the recipient's understanding of its

defamatory meaning; (5) the recipient's understanding “of it as intended to be

14

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 15 of 33

applied to” Vespico; (6) special harm resulting to Vespico from its publication;
and (7) the abuse of a conditionally privileged occasion by the defendants. See

Menkowitz v. Peerless Publications, Inc., 218 A.3d 797, 800 n.6 (Pa. 2019)

(citing 42 Pa. Cons. STAT. § 8343(a)). Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
defamation per se occurs “when the statement ascribes to the plaintiff any of the
following: commission of a criminal offense, a loathsome disease, serious sexual
misconduct, or conduct or characteristics that adversely affect the plaintiff's
fitness to properly conduct his profession, trade or business.” Krolczyk v.

Goddard Sys., Inc., 164 A.3d 521, 531 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) (citing RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 570).

The false light claim requires that: (1) the defendant gave publicity to a
matter concerning the plaintiff; (2) the publicity placed the plaintiff before the
public in a false light; (3) the false light would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person; and (4) the defendant had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as
to the falsity of the publicized matter in which the other would be placed. Vivian

v. Blank Rome, LLP, 318 A.3d 890, 903 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2024), app. denied, 332

A.3d 1180 (Pa. 2025) (citing Meyers v. Certified Guar. Co., LLC, 221 A.3d 662,

674 (2019); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652E). In contrast to a claim for
defamation, false light claims offer redress “not merely for the publication of

matters that are provably false, but also for that, although true, are selectively

15

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 16 of 33

publicized in a manner creating a false impression.” Id. (quoting Myers, 221 A.3d
at 674 (citation omitted)). However, “Tals with defamation, the elements of a
claim for false light include knowledge of, or reckless disregard for, the falsity of a

publication.” Coleman v. Ogden Newspapers, Inc., 142 A.3d 898, 905 (Pa.

Super. Ct. 2016)).

Accordingly, the court will address the defamation and false light claims
together because the same overarching issue is dispositive, whether Vespico
may relitigate the truth of the conduct that Kass-Gerji described in the ASO
proceedings and then in the media statements following the hearing. Kass-Gerji
argues that the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion applies to these

claims. ‘1 The court agrees.

11 In the Third Circuit, affirmative defenses like collateral estoppel may be raised in a motion to
dismiss if apparent on the face of the complaint. See Salaam v. Trump, 777 F. Supp. 3d 414,
427 (E.D. Pa. 2025) (citing Schmidt, 770 F.3d at 249; Rycoline Prods., Inc. v. C & W Unlimited,
409 F.3d 883, 886-87 (3d Cir. 1997)). Vespico’s complaint refers to text messages, a prior
hearing about those text messages involving the same two parties, and a court order entered
after a hearing where those text messages were discussed during the parties’ testimony and
entered into evidence. Therefore, Kass-Gerji’s collateral estoppel defense is discernable from
the plaintiff's allegations.

Furthermore, the parties agree that Pennsylvania law applies to Vespico’s defamation and
false light claims. The court will therefore apply Pennsylvania law to those claims. The parties
also agree that D.C. preclusion law applies. (Doc. 15, Def. Br. in Supp. at ECF p. 15; Doc. 19,
Pl. Br. in Opp. at 16-17 (citing District of D.C. and D.C. Circuit opinions)). Because the prior
adjudication was rendered by the D.C. Superior Court, the preclusive effect of that judgment is
governed by D.C. law. See Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380
(1985) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1738); see also Greenway Ctr., Inc. v. Essex Ins. Co., 475 F.3d
439, 147 (3d Cir. 2007) (looking to the law of the adjudicating state to determine the preclusive
effect of a determination on an issue)).

16

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 17 of 33

Collateral estoppel:

renders conclusive in the same or a subsequent action
[the] determination of an issue of fact or law when (1) the
issue is actually litigated and (2) determined by a valid, final
judgment on the merits; (3) after a full and fair opportunity
for litigation by the parties or their privies; (4) under
circumstances where the determination was essential to
the judgment, and not merely dictum.

Davis v. Davis, 663 A.2d 499, 501 (D.C. 1995) (citing Washington Med. Ctr., Inc.

v. Holle, 573 A.2d 1269, 1283 (D.C. 1990) (additional citations omitted).

An Actually Litigated Issue — The actually litigated element looks to whether

the issue of fact or law had previously been submitted for a determination by a
court. See id. The central issue underlying plaintiff's defamation and false light
claims is whether defendant’s statements about harassment and threats from the
text messages were false. This was addressed in Washington D.C. There, the
court concluded by a preponderance of evidence that Vespico engaged in
conduct constituting stalking under D.C. law. To do so, the D.C. Superior Court
had to assess the theory Vespico advances in this case—that Kass-Gerji
fabricated the texts and lied about them. The court also had to resolve conflicts
in the testimony that Vespico threatened Kass-Gerji in person at a Miss
Pennsylvania orientation session.

The D.C. statute defining stalking provides that it is unlawful for a person to
purposefully engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific individual with

the intent to cause that individual to: (A) fear for her safety or the safety of
va

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 18 of 33

another person; (B) feel seriously alarmed, disturbed, or frightened; or (C) suffer
emotional distress. D.C. CODE § 22—3133(a)(1). It is also against the statute to
knowingly or with a should-have-known state of mind engage in a course of
conduct designed to cause an individual to fear, feel, or suffer in those manners.
Id. § 22-3133(a)(2)-(3). Under the statute, “to engage in a course of conduct”
means “directly or indirectly, or through one or more third persons, in person or
by any means, on 2 or more occasions to: [flollow, monitor, place under
surveillance, threaten, or communicate to or about another individuall[.]” Id., § 22-
3122(8)(A).
Upon review of the allegations in the complaint and the transcript from the

ASO proceedings, the D.C. Superior Court determined that Vespico violated the
stalking statute by engaging in the very harassment and threats that Kass-Gerji
later described to the media, which are the alleged false statements in the
complaint under review. What follows are portions of Judge McCabe's statement
of reasons for entering the ASO:

| think it's not a question of whether the conduct meets the

legal description of stalking. It's whether Ms. Kass-Gerji

has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the
threatening messages were in fact sent by Ms. Vespico.

And so | start with the fact that these are from a number
that clearly is a phone number that Ms. Vespico has used.
But also the content of the messages gives details about

18

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 19 of 33

the beauty pageants and so forth that, you know, obviously
both Ms. Vespico and Ms. Kass-Geri would know about.

But a lot of the details seem to be ones that not anyone
else would necessarily know about, such as the details
about the police being called.

And then on May 8th, Exhibit 14. This is at a time after there
had been an attempt at service. And the message is, you're
trying to serve me with what? And then on May 10th,
Exhibit 16 is at 8:03 a.m., which is about 20 minutes after
Ms. Casey served the papers. There's a text message
saying, you filed for a restraining order.

So sometime later on May 10th is when a judge signed an
anti-stalking order, and that was served on Ms. Vespico on
May 13th, as Ms. Casey testified. And no threatening texts.
There was no evidence of any threatening text after that,
which again, would seem consistent with Ms. Vespico
knowing that she's on notice now that she's facing possible
criminal charges for violating a temporary anti-stalking
order.

But in the Court's view, in this case, the only person who
really could've sort of framed Ms. Vespico would've been
Ms. Kass-Gerji herself. | mean, just the amount of detail of
things like the service, you know, unless -- it's just hard to
imagine who else possibly could've had this type of
information to make this up as a way to sort of frame Ms.
Vespico. But you know, there isn't any evidence of that,
that Ms. Kass-Gerji in some way manufactured evidence
or made this up.

19

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 20 of 33

[lif Ms. Kass-Gerji was really out to get Ms. Vespico,
presumably she would have pushed this more with the
police, you know, as opposed to just an anti-stalking order,
which, of course, you know, I'm sure can have
consequences for anyone, but certainly someone like Ms.
Vespico, who wants to participate in, you know, beauty
contests and pageants. And you know, | don't know what
exactly will happen. But | certainly believe that it's possible
it'll interfere with her ability to do that.

But for all of the reasons that | have indicated, | do find that
Ms. Vespico is the one who sent the text messages that
were Exhibits 1 through 8, 10 through 14, and 16; and also
that she made the in-person threat on April 13th. And |
guess the main reason for that is I just, you know, obviously
| believe her, that she received these messages and didn't
manufacture them. And you know, | don't believe Ms.
Vespico when she says that she didn't send these texts.
And so | also think it would be more obvious that she'd be
the one not to testify truthfully about the April 13th threat.

And | do make those logical inferences based upon the
screenshots of the photograph -- the screenshots of the
text messages from Ms. Kass-Gerji's phone, as well as all
the content of what was in the text, is what leads me to
conclude that Ms. Vespico is the person who, sadly, typed
those horribly threatening comments to Ms. Kass-Gerji.

(Doc. 10-3, ASO H.T. 06/05/2024, 105:14-18; 107:10-18; 108:5-10; 109:11-19;
110:21-111:17; 113:7-12).

Consequently, the truth of whether Vespico sent threatening or intimidating
texts to Kass-Gerji has already been litigated and those findings were critical to the

entry of the ASO by the D.C. Superior Court.

20

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 21 of 33

Determined by a Valid, Final Judgment on the Merits — As discussed

above, a judicial officer may issue an ASO only upon finding by a preponderance
of the evidence that the respondent stalked the petitioner. D.C. CODE § 16—
1064(c). ASO orders are appealable. Id., § 16-1064(f). As it stands, the order
issued by Judge McCabe has not been vacated, modified, or reversed on appeal;
thus, it constitutes a final merits-based judicial determination. See Davis, 663
A.2d at 502-04.

Full and Fair Opportunity to Litigate - Vespico appeared at the ASO

hearing, was represented by counsel, and had the opportunity to call witnesses,
present evidence, and cross-examine Kass-Gerji about her theory that the text
messages were fabricated. Vespico also had the opportunity to litigate her
theory that the text messages did not come from her phone or from a person
acting on her behalf. Having contested the truth about the matter fully and lost
on the merits, Vespico is attempting to relitigate the same factual determinations
through different causes of action in a different forum.

Essential to the Judgment — Finally, for collateral estoppel to apply, the

previous determinations cannot be incidental dictum or an alternative holding.
Judge McCabe’s finding that Vespico engaged in stalking—including the
harassment and threats defendant later described to the media—was necessary

to enter the order, see D.C. CoDE § 16—1064(c), as were determinations related

21

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 22 of 33

to whether Vespico intended to cause Kass-Gerji to fear for her safety or the
safety of another person, feel seriously alarmed, disturbed, or frightened, or
suffer emotional distress, see id. §§ 22—-3132(8)(A), 22-3133. Determinations
about the sender of the text messages were essential to the judgment, as was
the veracity of an in-person threat. See Holle, 573 A.2d at 1263.

Therefore, because all four elements of D.C.'s collateral estoppel doctrine
are met, the D.C. Superior Court's determination that Vespico engaged in the
harassment and threats that Kass-Gerji described to the media is conclusive and
may not be relitigated. 28 U.S.C. § 1738. As for the claim for defamation per se,
truth is an absolute defense under Pennsylvania law regardless of the per se
characterization. 42 Pa. CONS. STAT. § 8343(b)(1). The findings of the D.C.
Superior Court establish the truth of Kass-Gerji's statements, and thus Vespico
cannot meet her burden of proving falsity. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8343(a)(7). As
for the false light claim, the same preclusive findings from the D.C. Superior
Court foreclose Vespico’s assertions that Kass-Gerji’s statements placed her
before the public in a false light. Under Pennsylvania law, a false light claim
cannot be sustained through true statements of fact and statements of opinion
that did not imply the existence of undisclosed false factual assertions. Vivian,
318 A.3d at 904. Describing conduct adjudicated by a court to have occurred

does not create a false light.

22

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 23 of 33

Vespico’s picayune arguments cannot save her case. Specifically, the
plaintiff points to one paragraph of her complaint (out of 259) to argue that her
defamation and false light claims should move forward to discovery despite all
the other statements impacted by collateral estoppel. That is, Vespico alleges
that Kass-Gerji falsely reported to the Daily Mail that her car was vandalized by
the plaintiff on the eve of the 2024 Miss Pennsylvania Scholarship Competition.
(Doc. 1, Compl. {| 94). Judge McCabe could not have ruled on the truth of that
allegation since the ASO hearing concluded the week or so prior to the pageant.
Understandably, the collateral estoppel analysis cannot extend to this particular
statement. This does not mean that Vespico’s defamation and false light claims
must move forward.

Under Pennsylvania law, truth as a defense to defamation does not require
literal accuracy in every detail. “The law does not require perfect truth, so long
as any inaccuracies do not render the substance and ‘gist’ of the statements

untrue.” ToDay's Hous. v. Times Shamrock Commce'ns, Inc., 21 A.3d 1209, 1215

(Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) (citation omitted). The “gist” of a statement is true “if the
effect upon a reader is the same regardless of the inaccuracy.” Id.; see also

Dunlap v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 448 A.2d 6, 15 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)

(explaining that the proof of “truth” must go to the “gist” or “sting” of the

defamation and that the test is whether the publication would have a different

23

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 24 of 33

effect on the mind of the reader than what the pleaded truth would have
produced). “Substantial truth ‘absolve[s] a defendant even if she cannot justify
every word of the alleged defamatory matter; it is sufficient if the substance of the
charge be proved true, irrespective of slight inaccuracy in the details.’ ” Rubin v.

CBS Broad. Inc., 170 A.3d 560, 565 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) (quoting Masson v.

New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516-17 (1991)).

The gist of Kass-Gerji's media statements, taken as a whole, is that
Vespico engaged in a pattern of harassment, threats, and stalking directed at the
defendant. A court determined that such conduct occurred after a contested two-
day evidentiary hearing. The car vandalism allegation, even if unproven, does
not alter the gist or sting of Kass-Gerji’s statements. It is of the same character
as the conduct the D.C. Superior Court found to be true. It does not place
Vespico in a different category or attribute a materially different type of
misconduct. A reasonable reader who learns that Vespico stalked, harassed,
and threatened Kass-Gerji to the point that a court entered an ASO would not
form a materially different impression upon additionally learning that the
defendant also alleged that the plaintiff vandalized her car. Substantial truth
tolerates minor imperfections.

The same analysis applies to the false light claim. The operative inquiry is

the overall impression created by the publication, whether the “false light” would

24

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 25 of 33

be “highly offensive to a reasonable person.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
652E. The car vandalism allegation does not place Vespico in a materially
different light than the light the true statements already place her in. She is
portrayed as a person who engaged in harassing, threatening, and intimidating
conduct directed at Kass-Gerji, a portrayal that is substantially accurate in light of
the D.C. Superior Court's findings. The addition of a single allegation of property
damage, consistent in character with the pattern of conduct the court found to
have occurred does not alter that overall impression in a way that would be
independently actionable.

Additionally, Vespico’s “fraud upon the court” argument is meritless. Like
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Vespico had one year to file a motion for
relief from the ASO order on the grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, or
misconduct by an opposing party. D.C. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), (c). She
did not. Consequently, there is no evidence that Vespico has done anything
other than make superficial allegations of fraud. That is insufficient to stop the

court from dismissing this case under Rule 12(b)(6).'7

12 The court need not reach Kass-Gerji’s other arguments about res judicata or Pennsylvania's
judicial privilege.

29

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 26 of 33

3. Pennsylvania’s Uniform Public Expression Protection Act

In the final paragraph of her brief in support, Kass-Gerji invokes the
provisions of Pennsylvania's Anti-SLAPP Act, more formally known as the
Uniform Public Expression Protection Act or Act 72 of 2024, 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§§ 8320.1, 8340.11-8340.18. Kass-Gerji specifically requests an award of
attorneys’ fees and costs under the Act.

The Anti-SLAPP Act adds a relatively new wrinkle to this case, as it came
into effect approximately one month after the 2024 Miss Pennsylvania
competition. In response to Kass-Gerji’s fee request, Vespico argues that
defendant’s media statements do not constitute “orotected public expression”
within the meaning of the Act. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8340.13. In her reply
brief, Kass-Gerji focuses on that same statutory definition, contending that her
statements fall within the Act's scope as communications “on an issue under
consideration or review” in a judicial proceeding, or alternatively, as an exercise
of her rights to freedom of speech on a matter of public concern.

After considering the parties’ arguments and carefully reviewing the statute,
the Act may well apply to the circumstances of this case. However, the current
record is insufficient to permit a fee award at this time and the issues involved
warrant more focused briefing than the parties have provided. Consequently, the

court will review the statutory framework, identify the remedial paths available to

26

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 27 of 33

the defendant, and establish a procedure by which she may elect to pursue her
statutory remedies.

a. The Statutory Framework

Pennsylvania’s Anti-SLAPP statute was enacted to address what the
General Assembly found to be “a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily
to chill the valid exercise of protected public expression.” 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §
8340.12(1). The Act “grants immunity to those groups or parties exercising the
rights to protected public expression” and “awards attorney fees to parties that
are forced to defend against meritless claims arising from the exercise of the
rights to protected public expression.” Id., § 8340.12(3)(i)-(ii).

Section 8340.13 defines “protected public expression” to include three
categories of activity: (1) communication in a legislative, executive, judicial, or
administrative proceeding; (2) communication on an issue under consideration or
review in such a proceeding; or (3) the exercise of rights to freedom of speech,
press, assembly, petition, or association on matters of public concern, as
guaranteed by the First Amendment or Article |, Sections 7 and 20 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. Id., § 8340.13.

Section 8340.14 sets forth the scope of the Anti-SLAPP Act. It does not
apply to claims seeking damages for bodily injury or death unless the claim is for

1) defamation; 2) publication of private facts; 3) false light invasion of privacy; 4)

27

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 28 of 33

misappropriation of likeness; 5) intentional or negligent infliction of emotional
distress; or 6) arises solely from a communication on a matter of public concern.
Id., § 8340.14. Here, the defamation and false light claims are covered.

Section 3340.15 is the immunity provision. Pursuant to Section 8340.15, a
person is immune from civil liability for a cause of action based on protected
public expression if the opposing party: (1) fails to establish a prima facie case as
to each essential element of the cause of action; (2) fails to state a cause of
action upon which relief can be granted; or (3) there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact, and the person against whom the cause of action has been
asserted is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id., § 8340.15. Based on the
ruling granting a Rule 12(b) motion for failure to state a claim, an award of
attorneys’ fees in this matter appears to turn on whether Kass-Gerji’s statements
were matters of public concern.

Separately, the Act creates a freestanding cause of action under 42 PA.
Cons. STAT. § 8320.1—the SLAPP-back provision—which authorizes a person to
bring an independent action for fees and damages where: (1) the person would
have prevailed on a ground under Section 8340.15 in a prior action; but (2) the
court presiding over the prior action did not make a determination on immunity.
Id., § 8320.1(a). A prevailing party under a Section 8320.1 cause of action may

recover attorney fees, court costs, and expenses of litigation from the underlying

28

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 29 of 33

action, and punitive damages upon proof that the underlying action “was
commenced or continued for the sole purpose of harassing, intimidating,
punishing or maliciously inhibiting” protected public expression. Id., § 8320.1(b).

b. No Immunity Determination

Above, the court has dismissed Vespico’s claims with prejudice. In so
doing, the undersigned is not making a formal determination of Kass-Gerji's
immunity under 42 Pa. CONS. STAT. § 8340.15.

There are two reasons for this. First, the parties’ briefing on Pennsylvania's
Anti-SLAPP Act was a little light compared to the rest of their submissions.
Kass-Gerji raised the issue in a single paragraph at the conclusion of her brief in
support of the motion to dismiss. Vespico’s opposition brief contested the
threshold applicability of the Act, specifically, whether extra-judicial media
statements qualify as “protected public expression” under Section 8340.13.
However, Vespico’s opposition did not address the immunity standard of Section
8340.15 or the fee-shifting mechanics of Section 8340.18 in the requisite detail.
Subsequently, Kass-Gerji’s reply brief sharpened her definitional argument under
Section 8340.13 but did not provide the court with a developed record on her
actual fees.

Additionally, neither party addressed the Erie implications of applying the

provisions of Pennsylvania’s Anti-SLAPP Act in a federal diversity action. These

29

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 30 of 33

are issues of first or early impression in this Circuit which warrant careful
analysis. Specifically, at least one district court has determined that
Pennsylvania’s Anti-SLAPP statute does not apply in federal court. Salaam v.
Trump, 350 F.R.D. 14, 21 (E.D. Pa. 2025), app. filed, 25-2230 (3d Cir. July 9,

2025); see also Jakes v. Youngblood, 782 F. Supp. 3d 210, 218 (W.D. Pa. 2025)

(determining that Section 8340.15 is in direct conflict with Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) and 56). On the other hand, the Act appears to contain at
least a partially-congruent immunity section, 42 Pa. CONS. STAT. § 8340.15, which
stands out among numerous procedural sections, id., §§ 8340.16 (authorizing
special pretrial motions and stays), 8340.17 (creating interlocutory appeal as of

right). See also Paucek v. Shaulis, 349 F.R.D. 498, 513-18 (D.N.J. 2025)

(determining that a defendant can shift fees, costs, and expenses under New
Jersey’s uniform Anti-SLAPP statute if he succeeds under Rule 12 or Rule 56).
Second, even if the court were prepared to make a Section 8340.15
immunity determination at this juncture, the record contains no information from

which an award could be calculated. Kass-Gerji has not submitted billing
records, an affidavit of counsel attesting to hours expended and rates charged,
documentation of costs incurred, or any of the other materials necessary for the

court to apply the lodestar method. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433

(1983) (requiring documentation of hours and rates to support a fee award); see

30

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 31 of 33

also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8340.18 (requiring an award of “attorney fees, court
costs and expenses of litigation” without specifying a methodology, thus inviting
the application of established fee-petition practice). Vespico would need such
information to make a formal challenge. Therefore, the fee request is not
competition-ready.

c. Election of Remedies

As a final consideration, if Vespico’s conduct in filing this lawsuit triggers
Pennsylvania’s Anti-SLAPP Act, then Kass-Gerji must be able to elect her
remedies; otherwise, the General Assembly would not have enacted the SLAPP-
back provision at Section 8320.1, which created a separate statutory cause of
action for punitive damages.

Accordingly, the court’s disposition without a Section 8340.15
determination specifically preserves two statutory paths for Kass-Gerji, each with
distinct limitations and advantages. The undersigned will permit Kass-Gerji to
make an informed election.

Option 1 — Motion for Determination of Immunity and
Fee Award in this Action

Kass-Gerji may file a motion within 21 days of the date of this
memorandum requesting that the court make a formal determination of immunity
under 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8340.15 and award attorneys’ fees and costs under

Section 8340.18. If Kass-Gerji elects this path, the motion shall include, at a
a1

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 32 of 33

minimum: 1) a fee petition with supporting documentation, including
contemporaneous billing records, an affidavit of counsel setting forth the hours
reasonably expended and the rates charged, and an itemization of costs and
expenses; and 2) a more-detailed brief addressing whether the defendant's
media statements constitute “protected public expression” under Section
8340.13. The brief must also address the applicability of the Act’s provisions in
federal court. Vespico will then have 14 days to respond with reply briefing due
14 days after that.

This path offers the advantage of potentially resolving Kass-Gerji’s fee
claim in this action without commencing a new lawsuit. It does not, however,
permit an award of punitive damages. Compare 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8320.1
with § 8340.18.

Option 2 — Separate Action Under Section 8320.1 in
the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas

Alternatively, Kass-Gerji may elect not to file a motion for fees in this action
and instead pursue a freestanding cause of action under 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §
8320.1 in a county Court of Common Pleas. Because the undersigned has not
decided immunity under Section 8340.15, Kass-Gerji would be able to aver that
the statutory predicates for a Section 8320.1 SLAPP-back action are satisfied in

her Court of Common Pleas complaint. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8320.1(a)(1)—(2).

32

Case 3:25-cv-00512-JKM Document 21 Filed 03/16/26 Page 33 of 33

The second path offers a broader remedy. This path also avoids the Erie
question entirely, as the action would be brought in a state court. It does,
however, require a separate lawsuit, with attendant filing costs, service
obligations, and independent briefing.

These two paths are mutually exclusive. If the court makes a formal
determination of immunity under Section 8340.15 in this action, after getting over
any Erie hurdle, that prong of Section 8320.1(a) will no longer be satisfied, and
the SLAPP-back cause of action will be foreclosed. Kass-Gerji cannot obtain a
fee award under Section 8340.18 in this action and then separately pursue
punitive damages under Section 8320.1 in state court. She must therefore
choose one path or the other. However, in the event that Kass-Gerji does not file
a motion or notice of election within 21 days, an order will be entered closing the
case.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, Kass-Gerji’s motion to dismiss will be
granted and her request for attorneys’ fees and costs under Pennsylvania’s Anti-
SLAPP statute will be deferred pending an election of remedies. An appropriate

order follows.

Date: ot 6