3:24-cv-01748•Scocozzo v. Henry et al
Texte intégral
1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA ANTHONY SCOCOZZO, : Civ. No. 3:24-CV-1748 : Plaintiff, : (Judge Munley) : v. : : (Magistrate Judge Carlson) : MICHELLE HENRY, et al, : : Defendants. : REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION I. Factual and Procedural Background The plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, commenced this action by a complaint, (Doc. 1), which he has amended on several occasions. (Docs. 95, 98). In this a pro se lawsuit Scocozzo names multiple local, state and federal defendants and brings a host of legal challenges relating to the ability of the plaintiff to possess firearms following what is alleged to have been his involuntary mental health commitment in 2009. Scocozzo’s amended complaint, the operative pleading in this case, stitches together disparate events involving distinct actors and distinct episodes spanning some fourteen years between 2009 and 2023 into a single seamless gestalt. (Doc. 98 passim). Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 157 Filed 01/12/26 Page 1 of 16
2 It is thus hardly surprising that this seeping complaint has inspired a series of pretrial motions, including a motion to dismiss filed by Detective Michael Mallick and the Moscow Police Department. (Doc. 102). With respect to these defendants Scocozzo’s allegations are both cryptic and dated. Moreover, some of his allegations are refuted by the exhibits which Scocozzo attaches to his pleadings. Thus, the amended complaint asserts that Defendant Mallick falsely arrested him in March of 2009 when he initiated involuntary commitment proceedings against Scocozzo based upon Scocozzo’s voiced threats of suicide. (Id. at 20). While Scocozzo alleges that Detective Mallick undertook this course of action without probable cause, the exhibits he attached to his amended complaint demonstrate that there was ample cause to believe that Scocozzo presented a threat to himself in March of 2009. According to Detective Mallick’s March 2009 declaration in support of this involuntary commitment request, during a March 9, 2009, traffic stop Scocozzo told the police officer: “I am going to take 50 ambient [sic] and 90 zanax [sic] and kill myself. I can’t take this anymore. I am going to kill myself.” (Doc. 98-1 at 31). Scocozzo’s amended complaint also reveals that he has known of this involuntary commitment, which he now alleges violated his constitutional rights, for many years prior to filing this lawsuit in October of 2024. Thus, while Scocozzo denies specifically being aware of the involuntary nature of his mental health Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 157 Filed 01/12/26 Page 2 of 16
3 commitment in March of 2009, his amended complaint plainly states that he became aware of this event in March of 2020, when he attempted to purchase a firearm and was denied the right to acquire a weapon due, in part, to this involuntary mental health commitment. (Doc. 98 at 15). Thus, on the face of his amended complaint, Scocozzo was fully aware that he had been subjected to an involuntary mental health commitment in March of 2009 no later than March of 2020. Despite this knowledge, Scocozzo failed to file any federal civil rights claims relating to Detective Mallick and this 2009 mental health commitment until October of 2024, more than four years later. Given the well-pleaded facts alleged by Scocozzo in this amended complaint, Detective Mallick and the Moscow Police Department have moved to dismiss this complaint, arguing that Mallick’s claims are both time-barred and meritless. (Doc. 102). This motion is fully briefed and is, therefore, ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the motion to dismiss be granted. II. Discussion A. Motion to Dismiss–Standard of Review The defendants have moved to dismiss Scocozzo’s amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 157 Filed 01/12/26 Page 3 of 16
4 can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that: Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, BU.S.B, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009). In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 157 Filed 01/12/26 Page 4 of 16
5 Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do.” Id., at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 679. According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must: [B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 157 Filed 01/12/26 Page 5 of 16
6 Id., at 679. Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated: [A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11. As the Court of Appeals has observed: The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, [ ] “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.’ ” Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 157 Filed 01/12/26 Page 6 of 16
7 Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1861 (2012). In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis: First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950). In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 157 Filed 01/12/26 Page 7 of 16
8 Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment”). However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining whether to dismiss a complaint or when determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which defines what a complaint should say and provides that: (a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff’s complaint must recite factual allegations that Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 157 Filed 01/12/26 Page 8 of 16
9 are sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action. Judged against these legal guideposts, this amended complaint fails as a matter of law on several scores as discussed below. B. Defendants Mallick and Moscow Police Department Should Be Dismissed. With respect to Defendants Mallick and the Moscow Police Department, Scocozzo’s amended complaint brings claims which are both untimely and lacking in merit. 1. The Moscow Police Department is Not a Proper Defendant At the outset, as Scocozzo concedes, any claims against the Moscow Police Department should be dismissed. These claims founder on an insurmountable legal obstacle—the police department is not a proper defendant in a §1983 federal civil rights lawsuit. Indeed, it has long been held that a police department is not a proper institutional defendant under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, since police departments serve only as an administrative arm of a municipality, and it is a municipality through which any liability must flow to the police department. Indeed, it has been repeatedly held that a police department is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983 and therefore is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 action. McCreary v. Owen, No. 1:21-CV-1022, 2021 WL 11114949, at *6–7 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2021), report Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 157 Filed 01/12/26 Page 9 of 16
10 and recommendation adopted, No. 1:21-CV-01022, 2021 WL 11114480 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2021); Blackwell v. Middletown Borough Police Dep't, 1:12-CV-825, 2012 WL 6012568 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 1:12- CV-825, 2012 WL 6002689 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2012) (citing Golya v. Golya, 2007 WL 2301085, *9, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58093 (M.D. Pa. 2007)) (explaining that courts within the Third Circuit have concluded that a police department is merely a sub-unit of the local government and is not amenable to suit under § 1983)); Wivell v. Liberty Township Police Dept., 2007 WL 2155540, *2, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54306 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (explaining that police department not subject to suit in a § 1983 action); Mitros v. Cooke, 170 F.Supp.2d 504, 507 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (city police department is a sub-unit of the city government that is merely a vehicle through which the city fulfills its policing functions, and is not a separate entity for purposes of suit); Tobin v. Badamo, 3:00CV783, 2000 WL 1880262 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2000) (municipal police department is not a proper party to a section 1983 action because it is merely a subunit of the city and not a separate corporate entity); McMahon v. Westtown-East Goshen Police Dept., No. Civ.A. 98-3919, 1999 WL 236565 at *4, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5551 at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 1999) (citing Johnson v. City of Erie, 834 F. Supp. 873, 878-79 (W.D. Pa. 1993) and Agresta v. City of Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 157 Filed 01/12/26 Page 10 of 16
11 Philadelphia, 694 F. Supp. 117, 119 (E.D. Pa. 1988)); Johnson v. City of Erie, Pa., 834 F. Supp. 873, 879 (W.D. Pa. 1993). In light of this consistent case law rejecting efforts to name local departments as institutional defendants in § 1983 actions, the constitutional claims against this institutional defendant must be dismissed. 2. Scocozzo’s Claims Against Detective Mallick Are Time-Barred. With respect to Detective Mallick, Scocozzo’s claims are profoundly flawed in at least two respects. First, these allegations—which relate to a March 2009 civil commitment but were first presented in October of 2024, some fifteen years later— are clearly time barred. It is well-settled that civil rights claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985). In Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524. A cause of action accrues for statute of limitations purposes when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that constitutes the basis of the cause of action. Sameric Corp. of Delaware, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998); see also, Nelson v. County of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010 (3d Cir. 1995). While this two-year limitations period may be extended based upon a continuing wrong theory, a plaintiff must make an exacting showing to avail himself Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 157 Filed 01/12/26 Page 11 of 16
12 of this grounds for tolling the statute of limitations. For example, it is well settled that the “continuing conduct of [a] defendant will not stop the ticking of the limitations clock [once] plaintiff obtained requisite information [to state a cause of action]. On discovering an injury and its cause, a claimant must choose to sue or forego that remedy.” Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 154 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Kichline v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 800 F. 2d 356, 360 (3d Cir. 1986)). See also Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 266-68 (3d Cir. 2000). Instead: The continuing violations doctrine is an “equitable exception to the timely filing requirement.” West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 754 (3d Cir.1995). Thus, “when a defendant's conduct is part of a continuing practice, an action is timely so long as the last act evidencing the continuing practice falls within the limitations period; in such an instance, the court will grant relief for the earlier related acts that would otherwise be time barred.” Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1295 (3d Cir.1991).In order to benefit from the doctrine, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant's conduct is “more than the occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts.” West, 45 F.3d at 755 (quotation omitted). Regarding this inquiry, we have recognized that courts should consider at least three factors: (1) subject matter-whether the violations constitute the same type of discrimination, tending to connect them in a continuing violation; (2) frequency-whether the acts are recurring or more in the nature of isolated incidents; and (3) degree of permanence-whether the act had a degree of permanence which should trigger the plaintiff's awareness of and duty to assert his/her rights and whether the consequences of the act would continue even in the absence of a continuing intent to discriminate. See id. at 755 n. 9 (citing Berry v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ., 715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir.1983)). The consideration of “degree of permanence” is the most important of the factors. See Berry, 715 F.2d at 981. Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 157 Filed 01/12/26 Page 12 of 16
13 Cowell v. Palmer Township. 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2001). In this case, Scocozzo attempts to evade the bar of the statute of limitations by asserting that he was not specifically aware of the fact that he was briefly involuntarily committed at the time of these events in March of 2009. The problem with this assertion, however, is that it is evident from Scocozzo’s own complaint that he knew of this involuntary commitment no later than March of 2020, when the commitment served as the grounds for denying his application to purchase a firearm. (Doc. 98 at 15). Thus, Scocozzo concedes that he was fully aware of the fact of this involuntary commitment no later than March 2020. Yet, he did not file this lawsuit until October 2024, more than four years after the fact of this involuntary commitment was known by the plaintiff. On these facts, by March 2020 Scocozzo plainly had sufficient knowledge of his injury and its cause, that he was legally required to timely “choose to sue or forego that remedy.” Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 154 (3d Cir. 1998). Scocozzo failed to do so, waiting more than four years before bringing this claim. Therefore, his claims against Detective Mallick are time-barred and should be dismissed. Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 157 Filed 01/12/26 Page 13 of 16
14 3. Scocozzo’s Claims Against Detective Mallick Fail on Their Merits. Finally, given the factual recitals set forth in Scocozzo’s amended complaint, his false arrest claims fail on their merits. On this score, the gist of Scocozzo’s amended complaint is his insistence that Detective Mallick lacked probable cause to believe that he was a threat to himself at the time of the officer’s March 9, 2009, encounter with the plaintiff which led to his brief involuntary commitment. Yet, the actual commitment papers which Scocozzo attached to his amended complaint make it abundantly clear that Detective Mallick had ample reason to believe that Scocozzo presented a threat to himself. Detective Mallick reasonably arrived at this conclusion because Scocozzo plainly stated that he was an imminent suicide risk. According to Detective Mallick’s March 2009 declaration in support of this involuntary commitment request, during this March 9, 2009, traffic stop Scocozzo told the police officer: “I am going to take 50 ambient [sic] and 90 zanax [sic] and kill myself. I can’t take this anymore. I am going to kill myself.” (Doc. 98-1 at 31). Probable cause exists “whenever reasonably trustworthy information or circumstances within a police officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that” the subject’s detention is warranted. U.S. v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). In conducting an inquiry into whether probable cause existed, a court should Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 157 Filed 01/12/26 Page 14 of 16
15 consider the totality of the circumstances presented, and “must assess the knowledge and information which the officer[] possessed at the time of [the detention], coupled with the factual occurrences immediately precipitating the [detention].” United States v. Stubbs, 281 F.3d 109, 122 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, it is entirely undisputed that Detective Mallick was told by Scocozzo that he planned to kill himself. Given Scocozzo’s own statements, the officer had an obligation to take appropriate steps to protect the plaintiff from himself. His actions, therefore, were supported by ample probable cause, were fully justified and simply do not give rise to federal civil rights liability some seventeen years later. III. Recommendation For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendant Mallick and Moscow Police Department’s motion to dismiss, (Doc. 102), be GRANTED. The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3: Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 157 Filed 01/12/26 Page 15 of 16
16 made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Submitted this 12 th day of January 2026. S/ Martin C. Carlson Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 157 Filed 01/12/26 Page 16 of 16
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.