Gianacopoulos v. Acuity, A Mutual Insurance Company et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN GIANACOPOULOS,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOYCE JACKMAN & BELL, LLC,
d/b/a JOYCE JACKMAN & BELL
INSURORS, et al.,
Defendant.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:23-CV-992
(SAPORITO, J.)
MEMORANDUM
On May 19, 2023, the plaintiff John Gianacopoulos filed this action
against defendants Acuity, a Mutual Insurance Company (“Acuity”) and
Joyce Jackman & Bell, LLC (“JJB”)1 concerning a fire that occurred on
September 12, 2022, at 1124 Saint Ann Street in Scranton, Pennsylvania
(the “Scranton Property”). On June 16, 2023, Acuity removed this action
to 	the 	United 	States 	District 	Court 	for 	the 	Middle 	District 	of
Pennsylvania 	based 	on 	diversity 	jurisdiction. 	(Doc. 	1). 	Since 	that
1 In its earlier filings in this case, defendant Joyce, Jackman & Bell
LLC (“JJB”) averred that it was improperly designated as JJB and that
its correct name is RSC Insurance Brokerage, Inc. The parties have not
formally moved to amend the name of JJB under Rule 15(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, we will continue to refer to JJB as a party
defendant in this action.
Case 3:23-cv-00992-JFS Document 66 Filed 02/13/26 Page 1 of 15

- 2 -
removal, Acuity has been dismissed as a party in this case. (Doc. 62). The
plaintiff ’s sole remaining claim is a negligence claim against JJB. Now
before the Court is JJB’s motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 37). The
parties have briefed the motion (Doc. 38; Doc. 39; Doc. 40; Doc. 41; Doc.
42; Doc. 46; Doc. 49; Doc. 64) and the matter is now ripe for review.
I. 	Background2
At the time of the underlying events starting in September 2022,
the plaintiff owned two properties: (1) the Scranton Property, located at
1124 Saint Ann Street in Scranton, Pennsylvania; and (2) the Dunmore
Property, located at 506 North Blakely Street in Dunmore, Pennsylvania
(the “Dunmore Property”).
The plaintiff originally purchased the Scranton Property in 1998,
and in 2015, he enlisted JJB to help him obtain a homeowner’s policy for
that property. The plaintiff subsequently obtained a policy from Acuity
with a “resident premises” requirement, mandating that the plaintiff
occupy the property as his primary residence as a condition of coverage.
In February 2021, the plaintiff purchased the Dunmore Property. The
2 The facts are taken from both Acuity’s “Undisputed Statement of
Material Facts” (Doc. 38) and JJB’s “Statement of Facts” (Doc. 42) and
admitted by the plaintiff. (Doc. 64).
Case 3:23-cv-00992-JFS Document 66 Filed 02/13/26 Page 2 of 15

- 3 -
plaintiff again enlisted the help of JJB to obtain coverage and purchase
insurance 	for 	that 	property. 	The 	plaintiff 	obtained 	a 	homeowner’s
insurance policy underwritten by AmGuard Insurance Company with a
“resident premises” requirement. While the plaintiff had moved from the
Scranton Property to the Dunmore Property by September 2022, the
plaintiff still held his insurance policy with Acuity for the Scranton
Property. Thus, the plaintiff maintained two separate policies on two
different properties, each of which required that he use that property as
his primary residence.
On September 12, 2022, a fire occurred at the plaintiff ’s Scranton
Property. The plaintiff subsequently filed a claim under his insurance
policy with Acuity. In response, Acuity investigated the plaintiff ’s claim.
During that investigation, however, Acuity discovered that the plaintiff
was no longer using the Scranton Property as his primary residence
despite the policy having a “resident premises” requirement for coverage.
Instead, Acuity found that the plaintiff had been living at his Dunmore
Property and had been renting out the second floor of the Scranton
Property to an individual named Thomas Foley. Moreover, the plaintiff
had been using the first floor of the property for commercial purposes,
Case 3:23-cv-00992-JFS Document 66 Filed 02/13/26 Page 3 of 15

- 4 -
such as for his architecture business. Therefore, Acuity denied the
plaintiff ’s claim because the plaintiff ’s coverage was predicated on the
usage of the Scranton Property as his primary residence.
The plaintiff has brought this action against JJB for a claim of
negligence, arguing that JJB knew, or should have known, that the
plaintiff ’s 	homeowner’s 	insurance 	provided 	by 	JJB 	concerning 	the
Dunmore Property rendered his insurance policy covering the Scranton
Property effectively void. The plaintiff ’s contention is predicated on JJB’s
awareness that the plaintiff intended to make his Dunmore Property,
rather than his Scranton Property, his primary residence, and that JJB
owed a duty to the plaintiff to discuss the consequences of the competing
coverages. JJB contends that it had no knowledge that the plaintiff
intended to switch his primary residence from the Scranton Property to
the Dunmore Property, and even if so, it had no duty to warn the plaintiff
about his allegedly defective coverage for the Scranton Property.
II. 	Legal Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictates summary
judgment should only be granted if “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Case 3:23-cv-00992-JFS Document 66 Filed 02/13/26 Page 4 of 15

- 5 -
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might affect the outcome
of the case.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
dispute of material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence “is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”
Id. at
248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all inferences “should be
drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the
non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the movant’s, then the non-
movant’s must be taken as true.”
Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d
508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994).
Parties seeking summary judgment bear “the initial responsibility
of 	informing 	the 	district 	court 	of 	the 	basis 	for 	its 	motion,” 	and
demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact.
Celotext
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes such a
showing, the non-movant must set forth specific facts, supported by the
record, 	demonstrating 	that 	“the 	evidence 	presents 	a 	sufficient
disagreement to require submission to the jury.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at
251–52. A court must first determine if the moving party has made
prima
facie showing that it is entitled to summary judgment when evaluating
such a motion.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331. Only
Case 3:23-cv-00992-JFS Document 66 Filed 02/13/26 Page 5 of 15

- 6 -
once that
prima facie showing has been made does the burden shift to the
nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of
material fact.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331.
Parties may cite to “particular parts of materials in the record,
including 	depositions, 	documents, 	electronically 	stored 	information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for the
purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers or other
materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). “An affidavit or declaration used to
support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out
facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or
declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(4). “Although evidence may be considered in a form which is
inadmissible at trial, the content of the evidence must be capable of
admission at trial.”
Bender v. Norfolk S. Corp., 994 F. Supp. 2d 593, 599
(M.D. Pa. 2014);
see also Pamintuan v. Nanticoke Mem’l Hosp., 192 F.3d
378, 387 n.13 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that it is not proper, on summary
judgment, to consider evidence that is not admissible at trial).
III. 	Discussion
Before analyzing the case on its merits, we must first clarify the
Case 3:23-cv-00992-JFS Document 66 Filed 02/13/26 Page 6 of 15

- 7 -
issue before the Court. To do so, we must recount some important facts
from the record. At the time of the fire occurring at the Scranton Property,
the plaintiff held a homeowner’s insurance policy with Acuity for that
property 	which 	required 	that 	he 	use 	the 	property 	as 	a 	“resident
premises.” The plaintiff, however, failed to abide by his policy’s terms as
he was using his Dunmore Property as his “resident premises” rather
than his Scranton Property. Acuity therefore denied the plaintiff ’s claim
because the plaintiff violated those terms.
The plaintiff argues that JJB helped the plaintiff “procure a policy
for the Dunmore Property which voided his insurance policy for the
[Scranton Property].” (Doc. 46-2, at 8). Specifically, he states that “JJB
obtained [for] him two policies for … two properties, both of which
required that the property be Plaintiff ’s primary residence … which could
not be in effect at the same time.” (
Id.). But we must note that the
plaintiff ’s claim for fire damage was not denied by Acuity because the
plaintiff held a second policy for his Dunmore Property. Acuity denied the
claim because the plaintiff failed to use his Scranton Property as his
primary residence in violation of the policy’s terms. Accordingly, this
action rests on JJB’s alleged failure to advise the plaintiff that his move
Case 3:23-cv-00992-JFS Document 66 Filed 02/13/26 Page 7 of 15

- 8 -
required updated coverage for the Scranton Property, rather than on any
failure to assist the plaintiff in procuring coverage for the Dunmore
Property. Thus, both this motion and the action as a whole turn on the
scope of the professional duty, if any, which JJB owed the plaintiff as an
insurance broker and whether that duty encompassed the plaintiff ’s
particular 	circumstances. 	We 	must 	therefore 	analyze 	the 	scope 	of
professional duty which an insurance broker owes its insured in the
acquisition of insurance for improved real estate.
To prevail on a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must establish that:
(1) the defendant owed a duty of care to the injured party; (2) the
defendant breached that duty; (3) the injured party suffered actual harm;
and (4) a causal relationship exists between the breach of duty and that
harm.
Mitchell v. Shikora, 209 A.3d 307, 314 (Pa. 2019). Pertinent to this
case, “[a] licensed insurance agent … [i]s required to exercise the skill
and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession and
his failure to do so render[s] him liable for any loss of coverage.”
Pressley
v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp., 817 A.2d 1131, 1138 (Pa. Super. 2003).
Pennsylvania courts have often stressed that “the insured has both the
capacity and the duty to inquire about the scope of insurance coverage,
Case 3:23-cv-00992-JFS Document 66 Filed 02/13/26 Page 8 of 15

- 9 -
rather than rely on ‘hand holding and substituted judgment.’”
Wisniski
v. Brown & Brown Ins. Co. of PA, 906 A.2d 571, 579 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2006);
see Kilmore v. Erie Ins. Co., 595 A.2d 623, 626 (Pa. Super. 1991),
appeal
denied, 604 A.2d 1030 (Pa. 1992). An insurance broker is simply “a
middle man between the insured and the insurance company.”
Allegrino
v. Conway E & S, Inc., No. CIV.A. 09-1507, 2010 WL 3943939, at *7 (W.D.
Pa. Oct. 6, 2010) (citations omitted). Accordingly, “a broker’s relationship
with the insured is ordinarily an arm’s length transaction, rather than
one which is inherently marked by extreme dependence and trust.”
Wisniski, A906 A.2d at 579 n.6.
“Once the insurance contract takes effect … the insured must take
responsibility for his policy.”
Treski v. Kemper Nat. Ins. Companies, 674
A.2d 1106, 1114 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citations omitted). In turn, a broker
does not have a duty to an insured to “provide ongoing advice concerning
the limits of its coverage.”
Id. For this reason, courts have found that
professional negligence causes of action against insurance agents or
brokers arise only in limited circumstances: (1) where the broker fails to
procure the requested insurance coverage; (2) where the broker does not
follow the client’s instructions; or (3) where the policy is void or materially
Case 3:23-cv-00992-JFS Document 66 Filed 02/13/26 Page 9 of 15

- 10 -
defective through the broker’s fault.
Laventhol & Horwath v. Dependable
Ins. Assoc. Inc., 579 A.2d 388, 391 (Pa. Super. 1990).
Here, the plaintiff ’s purchase of coverage for the Scranton Property
and the plaintiff ’s subsequent purchase of coverage for his Dunmore
property would typically be viewed in isolation to the “arm’s length
transaction” 	between 	the 	parties.
	Wisniski, 	906 	A.2d 	at 	579 	n.6.
Therefore, JJB would have no duty to monitor the plaintiff ’s coverage or
provide ongoing advice to the plaintiff concerning the policy for the
Scranton Property once the policy took effect.
See Treski, 674 A.2d at
1114. It would be the plaintiff ’s duty, rather than JJB’s, to “inquire about
the scope of insurance coverage” as pertaining to both his properties.
Wisniski, 906 A.2d at 579 n.6. But we reiterate that JJB still had a duty
to the plaintiff “to exercise care that a reasonably prudent businessman
in the brokerage field would exercise under similar circumstances.”
Al’s
Café, Inc. v. Sanders Ins. Agency, 820 A.2d 745, 750 (Pa. Super. 2003)
(quoting
Consol. Sun Ray, Inc. v. Lea, 401 F.2d 650, 656 (3d Cir. 1968)).
Accordingly, if the plaintiff conveyed to JJB that he necessitated a change
in coverage concerning his Scranton Property in conjunction with his
inquiry for coverage for his Dunmore Property, rather than purchasing
Case 3:23-cv-00992-JFS Document 66 Filed 02/13/26 Page 10 of 15

- 11 -
coverage for the Dunmore Property in isolation, we find that a reasonable
factfinder could determine that JJB owed a duty to the plaintiff to discuss
those coverage options. Our review of the record indicates that there
remains a genuine dispute of material fact as to this issue, thereby
preventing summary judgment.
First, it remains unclear whether JJB knew that the plaintiff was
changing his primary residence 	from the 	Scranton 	Property to 	the
Dunmore Property, and, if so, whether that knowledge was sufficient to
put JJB on notice that the plaintiff needed to obtain new coverage. JJB
contends that it had no reason to know the plaintiff had changed his
residential premises, citing record evidence that the plaintiff admitted he
never informed JJB that the property was being used for commercial
purposes or that he no longer resided there. (Doc. 41, at 7–8). Moreover,
JJB notes that two Acuity representatives confirmed that the plaintiff
never directly advised them that he was “using the Scranton Property for
his business, no longer living there, or renting it out.” (
Id., at 8). In
response, the plaintiff notes that his Acuity policy listed his address as
the Dunmore Property, (Doc. 46-5), and that documents concerning
coverage for his Dunmore Property list his residence premises as the
Case 3:23-cv-00992-JFS Document 66 Filed 02/13/26 Page 11 of 15

- 12 -
Dunmore Property. (Doc. 46-6). The plaintiff also points to an email
addressed to JJB where he explicitly informed JJB that his mailing
address is the Dunmore Property. (Doc. 46-7). The parties’ contentions
therefore create a genuine dispute of material fact as to JJB’s knowledge
of the plaintiff ’s changed residency. The extent of JJB’s knowledge,
however, is a question better left for the jury rather than the Court.
Moreover, there remains a factual issue as to whether JJB owed the
plaintiff a duty to advise him of potential coverage conflicts between the
Scranton 	and 	Dunmore 	properties, 	even 	if 	JJB 	was 	aware 	of 	the
plaintiff ’s change in residency. The plaintiff contends that once JJB
became aware of the change in the plaintiff ’s residence, it had a duty to
advise him that coverage for the Scranton Property needed to be modified
to remove the residency requirement. The plaintiff ’s argument relies on
an expert report and testimony from its witness James Stevenson, an
underwriter, consultant, and broker with over thirty-years of experience
in the insurance field. Based on the evidence provided to him, Mr.
Stevenson concluded that JJB breached its professional duty of care by
failing to procure the “correct policy for John Gianacopoulos,” by failing
to “explain the differences in coverages between a homeowners’ insurance
Case 3:23-cv-00992-JFS Document 66 Filed 02/13/26 Page 12 of 15

- 13 -
policy … versus a dwelling fire insurance policy.” (Doc. 37-7, at 5).
JJB 	has 	moved 	to 	exclude 	Mr. 	Stevenson’s 	expert 	report 	and
testimony, 	arguing 	that 	they 	are 	inadmissible 	because 	it 	lacks 	the
requisite reliability and application to the specific facts of this case in
violation of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. (Doc. 41, at 10);
See Fed. R. Evid. 702 (explaining that a witness who is qualified as an
expert may testify in the form of an opinion if “the testimony is based on
sufficient facts or data” and “the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods.”). Viewing the record in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, however, we find that Mr. Stevenson has satisfied both
contested prongs of Rule 702. Mr. Stevenson’s opinion is supported by his
“education, 	training, 	experience 	and 	expertise 	in 	the 	property 	and
liability insurance industry over the past [thirty-seven] years,” (Doc. 37-
7, at 5), and moreover, his opinion concerns facts pertinent to this case.
He has stated in his report that JJB should have been aware of the
plaintiff ’s changed residence and “[o]nce [JJB] was made aware that
John Gianacopoulos had purchased a new home and was making it his
residence, [JJB] was or should have been aware that the [Scranton
Property] was no longer [his] residence.” (
Id., at 3). He further opined
Case 3:23-cv-00992-JFS Document 66 Filed 02/13/26 Page 13 of 15

- 14 -
that JJB breached its duty by failing to procure the correct policy for the
plaintiff ’s Scranton Property, a dwelling fire insurance policy, that would
have provided property coverage for the fire loss at the property. (
Id., at
4–5). 	Moreover, Mr. Stevenson further explained in his deposition that
“it’s up to the agent, being the trained expert they are in the insurance
industry, to recommend or explain the coverages available and the
policies available to the insured/prospect” (Doc. 37-8, at 7), and that JJB
had an obligation to advise the plaintiff in this action because “[y]ou can’t
have two homeowners’ policies with primary residences.” (
Id., at 15);
see
also (
Id., at 17) (“Again, it goes back to that – on the application, you can’t
have two, you know, primary residences on there.”). Accordingly, Mr.
Stevenson’s expert opinion is relevant to this case and may assist the
trier of fact.
Kenney v. Watts Regul. Co., 512 F. Supp. 3d 565, 579 (E.D.
Pa. 2021) (“The expert’s testimony must be relevant for the purpose of
the case and must assist the trier of fact. Our Court of Appeals instructs
[that] the Rules of Evidence embody a strong preference for admitting
any evidence that may assist the trier of fact under 401 generally, and
Rule 702 has a liberal policy of admissibility.”) (quotations and citations
omitted). Mr. Stevenson’s opinion as expressed in his report and at his
Case 3:23-cv-00992-JFS Document 66 Filed 02/13/26 Page 14 of 15

- 15 -
deposition creates a genuine dispute of material fact as to the duty that
JJB owed the plaintiff which must be determined by a factfinder rather
than the Court.3
IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, JJB’s motion for summary judgment will
be denied.
An appropriate order follows.
Dated: February 13, 2026
	s/Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States District Judge
3 At this stage, and based upon the record before us, we find that
Mr. Stevenson’s expert report (Doc. 37-7) and testimony (Doc. 37-8)
satisfy the requirements of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Our finding does not, however, preclude either party from requesting a
Daubert hearing or filing a motion
in limine to challenge the reliability
or define the permissible scope of any expert report or testimony.
Case 3:23-cv-00992-JFS Document 66 Filed 02/13/26 Page 15 of 15