Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JADEN DAVID NORTON, 	: 	Civil No. 3:23-CV-763
:
Plaintiff 	:
:
v. 	: 	(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
:
FRANK BISIGNANO,1 :
Commissioner of Social Security, 	:
:
Defendant. 	:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. 	Introduction
This case presents a recurring scenario and persistent error which Courts have
identified relating to analysis of emotional impairments and reminds us of a
fundamental truth: Social Security appeals lie at the intersection of law and
medicine. While the disability determination is ultimately a question of law, that
legal issue is often necessarily shaped by medical opinions. Informed decision-
1 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 6, 2025.
Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Frank Bisignano
should be substituted as the defendant in this suit. No further action need be taken to
continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
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making in this field therefore requires that legal and medical decisionmakers share
a common and commonly understood lexicon.
What then happens when judges, lawyers and medical personnel ascribe
different meanings to terms which may determine the outcome of disability
decisions? Oftentimes the result is confusion which defeats reasoned analysis.
So it is here.
The plaintiff, Jaden Norton, applied for disability citing a cascading array of
severe physical and mental impairments, conditions which Norton stated left him
unable to work. Norton’s treating caregiver agreed, stating that he was totally
disabled by these emotional impairments. However, the Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) who decided this case disagreed with this assessment and denied this claim.
In doing so, the ALJ endeavored to navigate an array of internally inconsistent
medical opinions from non-treating sources. First, the ALJ considered two opinions
by state agency experts which used a legal term of art in a casual and casually
incoherent 	way. 	These 	state 	agency 	experts 	indicated 	that 	Norton’s 	mental
impairments were not totally disabling but then stated that he could understand one-
to-two-step tasks. These were curious opinions because the experts’ references to
one-to-two-step tasks involved a term of art in Social Security practice which
connotes jobs limited to reasoning level 1 since the definition of this reasoning level
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is confined to jobs which entail: “Apply[ing] commonsense understanding to carry
out simple one- or two-step instructions.” Dictionary of Occupational Titles,
Appendix C - Components of the Definition Trailer, 1991 WL 688702. Thus, the
state agency experts’ opinions that Norton could perform one- and two-step tasks
were tantamount to a finding that he was extremely limited in meeting the mental
demands of the workplace and could only perform the most rudimentary of tasks,
reasoning level 1 jobs.
The medical experts’ casual use of a term which has legal significance was
then compounded by the ALJ who found these medical opinions persuasive but did
not include the one-to-two-step limitation in Norton’s residual functional capacity
(RFC) assessment. Thus, the ALJ arrived at a mental residual functional capacity
assessment for Norton which was seemingly unmoored to any medical opinion and
concluded that he could perform jobs which placed greater mental demands upon
Norton than the one-and two-step tasks described by the medical opinions which the
ALJ found persuasive.
Norton now appeals this decision, in part challenging the ALJ’s mental RFC
analysis. While Norton’s legal challenge is cast broadly, we find that at least one
narrow and specific error compels remand. In our view, the ALJ’s analysis of
Norton’s mental RFC runs afoul of a basic legal tenet which has gained broad
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acceptance by the Courts. While the ALJ may choose which medical opinions are
persuasive, “[f]or each limitation opined necessary by a persuasive medical source,
the ALJ is obligated to either: (1) incorporate that limitation in the claimant's RFC,
or (2) explain the basis for discounting that limitation. Such an obligation ensures
that any omission was intentional and supported by substantial evidence in the
record.” Cruz v. Bisignano, No. 1:24-CV-1966, 2025 WL 2813882, at *7 (M.D. Pa.
Sept. 30, 2025) (citing Steinmetz v. Colvin, Civ. No. 23-CV-2066, 2025 WL 36159,
*7 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2025); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 407 (3d Cir.
1979)). Therefore, “when a medical opinion is found persuasive and contains a
limitation to one- and two-step tasks, the ALJ is obligated to either: (1) include the
limitation in the RFC and limit the claimant to reasoning level one occupations, or
(2) identify the substantial evidence that the ALJ is relying on in rejecting the
limitation.” Cruz, 2025 WL 2813882, at *8.
Applying these legal benchmarks, Courts have frequently held that the
unexplained failure of an ALJ to incorporate a one-to-two-step task limitation set
forth in a persuasive medical opinion constitutes error which may compel remand.2
2 See e.g., ADRIENNE LOMBARDO, Plaintiff v. FRANK BISIGNANO, Comm'r
of Soc. Sec., Defendant., No. 4:24-CV-56, 2026 WL 674198, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar.
10, 2026); SARAH C., Plaintiff, v. FRANK BISIGNANO, Defendant., No. 1:23-
CV-01828, 2026 WL 625094, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2026); FRED MCCLEARY,
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Finding that this error has occurred in the instant case, we will order that this case
be remanded for further consideration by the Commissioner.
II. 	Statement of Facts and of the Case
A. Introduction
On March 12, 2021, Jaden Norton applied for disability and disability
insurance benefits along with supplemental security income pursuant to Titles II and
XVI of the Social Security Act, alleging an onset of disability beginning April 30,
2020. (Tr. 16). In these applications Norton alleged that he was disabled due to a
cascading array of physical and mental impairments, including obesity, degenerative
disc disease, migraines, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), mood disorder,
anxiety disorder, borderline personality disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity
Plaintiff v. FRANK BISIGNANO, Comm'r of Soc. Sec., Defendant., No. 4:25-CV-
26, 2026 WL 625113, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2026); Delillo v. Bisignano, No. 4:25-
CV-523, 2026 WL 592389, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2026); Whitney v. Bisignano,
No. 4:24-CV-1950, 2026 WL 522922, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2026); 	Cruz v.
Bisignano, No. 1:24-CV-1966, 2025 WL 2813882, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2025);
Michelle M. v. Bisignano, No. 3:23-CV-02163, 2025 WL 2713737, at *7 (M.D. Pa.
Sept. 23, 2025); Warren v. Dudek, No. 1:24-CV-635, 2025 WL 1168276, at *6
(M.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2025); 	Shipman v. Kizakazi, No. 3:22-CV-00636, 2023 WL
5599607, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2023).
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disorder (ADHD), impulse control disorder, chronic pain syndrome, and right
shoulder joint replacement. (Tr. 18).
Norton was born on August 9, 1978, and was 41 years old at the time of the
alleged 	onset 	of 	his 	disability, 	making 	him 	a 	younger 	worker 	under 	the
Commissioner’s regulations. (Tr. 27). He graduated from high school and attended
college classes online. (Id.) He had prior employment as a pharmacy technician, a
laborer, a brake repairer, an automobile mechanic helper, and an electric supply
servicer. (Id.)
B. Norton’s Mental Impairments and the Expert Opinions Regarding
Those Limitations.
While 	Norton’s 	applications 	cited 	a 	series 	of 	physical 	and 	emotional
impairments, on appeal we have focused on his mental state. With respect to his
psychological impairments, the ALJ observed that:
The claimant has insomnia and has nights where he does not sleep
much. He has PTSD with symptoms of night terrors and flashbacks. He
has difficulty socializing. The claimant sees a therapist every week and
sees 	a 	psychiatrist 	once 	a 	month. 	The 	claimant 	has 	difficulty
concentrating. He gets panic attacks where he cannot breathe and his
chest hurts.
(Tr. 21).
Norton and his father confirmed that these psychological conditions affected
his ability to meet the demands of the workplace. As Norton explained:
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The claimant initially alleged disability due to chronic back pain, pain
since spinal fusion, right shoulder pain, anxiety, depression, PTSD,
ADHD, IBS, and migraine headaches (Ex. 2E). On his Function Report,
the claimant indicated that he is unable to work due to the combination
of his physical and mental impairments. He cannot stand for long
periods of time and gets anxiety and panic attacks. His impairments
affect his ability to remember, concentrate, focus, understand, follow
instructions, get along with others, use hands, climb stairs, complete
tasks, walk, sit, kneel, lift, squat, bend, stand, and reach.
(Tr. 20-21). These reports were corroborated by Norton’s father, who stated that
plaintiff: “has ADHD, anxiety, PTSD, and depression. [Norton’s] learning difficulties
limit his ability to complete tasks and concentrate.” (Tr. 21).
The clinical record, while extensive, was more complex and in some respects
contradictory. The longitudinal medical record of Norton’s mental impairments
revealed a lengthy treatment history. In some instances, the clinical findings were
relatively unremarkable; on other occasions they were more severe. As the ALJ
reported:
Regarding 	his 	mental 	impairments, 	the 	claimant’s 	primary 	care
physician 	managed 	his 	medications 	until 	he was 	able to 	find a
psychiatrist. The record showed that he regularly saw a therapist (Exs.
4F/100, 8F, 19F, 20F). In August 2021, the claimant reported doing
well and using medical marijuana for sleep, pain, and PTSD with
benefit (Ex. 10F/2). The claimant received hormone replacement
therapy (HRT) for 8 years. Treatment records noted that he felt well on
HRT and had no issues with the testosterone injections. The records
also noted a stable mood (Ex. 18F/12).
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Objective findings on mental status examination are not entirely
consistent with the claimant’s complaints. Upon examination in May
2020, the claimant had a depressive mood and affect but normal
appearance, behavior, thought processes, insight, orientation, speech,
thought content, and judgment (Ex. 8F/157). In July 2020, the claimant
presented as alert and oriented x3 with normal mood and affect (Ex.
3F/23). Treatment records from January 2021 to April 2021 showed the
claimant to have a casual appearance and cooperative behavior upon
examination. He reported increased depression but had normal motor
activity, speech, thought processes, and perception. He was alert with
fair insight and judgment. The claimant had adequate eye contact,
stable affect, intact cognition, and adequate attention/concentration
(Ex. 6F). Therapy records from April 2021 noted the claimant to have
a 	moderately 	anxious 	mood, 	but 	the 	examination 	findings 	were
otherwise 	within 	normal 	limits 	(Ex. 	8F/211). 	A 	mental 	status
examination in August 2021 was within normal limits except for
reported increased depression (Ex. 10F/3).
(Tr. 23).
Given this somewhat complicated and contradictory clinical history, the
medical opinion evidence was particularly significant in determining whether
Norton’s emotional impairments were wholly disabling. On this score, three sources
opined regarding the gravity of Norton’s mental state.
First, Norton’s treating physician, Dr. Andreas Achilleos, submitted a medical
questionnaire on February 18, 2022. (Tr. 1473-78). In this questionnaire, Dr.
Achilleos stated that, due to his physical and emotional impairments, Norton’s
prognosis was poor. (Tr. 1473). According to the doctor, Norton suffered from
depression, anxiety, PTSD, and ADD. (Tr. 1474). These impairments frequently
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interfered with Norton’s concentration. (Tr. 1474, 1477). Thus, while the doctor
suggested that Norton might be able to perform some simple tasks, Dr. Achilleos
also opined that these emotional limitations would often impede Norton’s ability to
stay on task and would result in absenteeism at work with Norton missing four days
of work per month. (Tr. 1477-78).
In contrast, two non-treating, non-examining state agency sources reached
very different conclusions based upon the same clinical record. A June 8, 2021,
initial assessment by Dr. Karen Plowman found that Norton was moderately limited
in a number of spheres of workplace functioning, including understanding detailed
instructions, working with others, and adapting to change in the job site. (Tr. 128-
31). According to Dr. Plowman, Norton “is able to meet the mental demands for
simple, one to two step tasks on a sustained basis despite the limitations associated
with [these] impairments.” (Tr. 132) (emphasis added). These conclusions were
echoed in an October 19, 2021, reconsideration evaluation by Dr. Molly Cowan who
found that Norton was moderately limited in terms of interacting with others,
maintaining concentration for extended periods, carrying out detailed instructions,
and responding to workplace changes. (Tr. 163-64). Given these limitations Dr.
Cowan concluded that “[Norton] can perform one- or two-step, routine tasks in a
stable enviro[nment].” (Tr. 164) (emphasis added). These findings were significant
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since, under the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, the ability to perform one-to-two-
step tasks confines a worker to reasoning level 1 jobs, the most severe restriction on
workplace 	reasoning. 	See 	Dictionary 	of 	Occupational 	Titles, 	Appendix 	C 	-
Components of the Definition Trailer, 1991 WL 688702. Therefore, the one-to-two-
step functional capacity found by the state agency experts implied a very high degree
of mental impairment.
C. The ALJ Hearing and Decision
It was against this medical backdrop that Norton’s disability claim came to be
heard by the ALJ on April 27, 2022, at which Norton and a Vocational Expert (VE)
testified. (Tr. 34-79). In his testimony Norton explained that he had tried to work but
had to leave several jobs when he could not meet the physical and mental demands
of work. (Tr. 39-41). In terms of his mental health, Norton described flashbacks and
night terrors which caused him to awaken screaming. (Tr. 64). He also reported
concentration difficulties and panic attacks accompanied by breathlessness and chest
pains. (Tr. 65). He further stated that he left one job due to his heightened anxiety.
(Tr. 66). The VE, in turn, testified that Norton could perform the jobs of marker,
office helper, order caller and photocopying machine operator. (Tr. 73). All of these
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tasks entailed a reasoning level of 2,3 reasoning levels which exceeded to one-to-
two-step limitations opined by the state agency experts, but the VE was never asked
to reconcile this testimony with these state agency expert opinions which stated that
Norton could perform one-to-two-step tasks. (Tr. 73-75). Thus, the disparity
between the state agency expert opinions, which described Norton’s ability to
perform one-to-two-step tasks, and the reasoning level 2 jobs identified by the VE
remained unrecognized and unreconciled at this hearing.
Following this hearing, on May 16, 2022, the ALJ issued a decision denying
Norton’s application for benefits. (Tr. 12-33). In that decision, the ALJ first
concluded that the plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social Security
Act through December 31, 2024, and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since May 30, 2020, the amended alleged onset date. (Tr. 17). At Step 2 of the
sequential analysis that governs Social Security cases, the ALJ found that Norton
3 Marker, DICOT 209.587-034,1991 WL 671802 (reasoning level 2); Office Helper,
DICOT 239.567-010, 1991 WL 672232 (same); Order Caller, DICOT 209.667-014,
1991 WL 671807 (same); Photocopying-machine Operator, DICOT 207.685-014,
1991 WL 671745 (same).
.
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had the following severe impairments: obesity, degenerative disc disease, migraines,
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), mood disorder, anxiety disorder, borderline
personality disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), impulse
control disorder, chronic pain syndrome, and right shoulder joint replacement. (Tr.
18).
At Step 3, the ALJ determined that these impairments did not meet or
medically equal the severity of any listed impairments. (Tr. 18-20).
Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ fashioned a residual functional capacity
(“RFC”), considering the plaintiff’s limitations from his impairments, stating that:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds
that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light
work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except he is
able to stand or walk 4 hours in an 8 hour day. He is able occasionally
to climb ramps and stairs, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl but can never
climb ladders and scaffolds. On the right, he is able frequently to reach
in any direction. He is not to be exposed to unprotected heights or
moving machinery. He is able to tolerate occasional exposure to heat,
cold, humidity, vibration, and respiratory irritants. He is able to tolerate
moderate noise. He is able to understand, remember, and carry out
simple instructions. He is able to tolerate occasional interactions with
supervisors and coworkers. He is able to tolerate occasional changes in
workplace routine.
(Tr. 20).
This RFC was unmoored from any of the medical opinions deemed persuasive
by 	the 	ALJ; 	moreover, 	it 	did 	not 	contain 	the 	one-to-two-step 	limitations
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recommended by the state agency experts. In reaching this result, the ALJ rejected
the treating source opinion of Dr. Achilleos, finding that opinion unpersuasive. (Tr.
25). As for the non-treating, non-examining state agency expert opinions, the ALJ
stated that:
The 	prior 	administrative 	medical 	finding 	of 	the 	State 	agency
psychological consultant at the initial level that the claimant has
moderate limitations in all areas of mental functioning but that he is
able to meet the mental demands for simple, one to two step tasks on a
sustained basis is persuasive (Exs. 1A, 2A). It is supported by a
narrative explanation with signs and findings and is consistent with the
overall evidence of record. It is consistent with the claimant’s treatment
history 	and 	objective 	findings 	of 	depressed/anxious 	mood 	but
cooperative behavior, adequate attention/concentration, normal thought
processes, normal speech, and at least fair insight and judgment (Exs.
6F, 8F, 10F). Additionally, it is consistent with the claimant’s reported
activities of daily living, including living alone, preparing meals,
housecleaning, caring for pets, driving, shopping, going out to eat,
attending school, working part-time, and spending time with friends
(Exs. 4E, 8E).
The State agency psychological consultant at the reconsideration level
found that the claimant has moderate limitations in all areas of mental
functioning except for mild limitations in understanding, remembering,
or applying information but that he is able to perform one or two step
routine tasks in a stable environment; this is somewhat persuasive (Exs.
7A, 8A). It is supported by a narrative explanation with signs and
findings and is generally consistent with the overall evidence of record.
The 	undersigned 	found 	moderate 	limitations 	in 	understanding,
remembering, or applying information based on the claimant’s reported
difficulties with memory and understanding as well as objective
findings 	of 	depressed/anxious 	mood 	(Exs. 	6F, 	8F, 	10F). 	The
undersigned also found that the claimant is not significantly limited in
interacting with the general public based on his activities of daily living.
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For example, the claimant reported shopping in stores, going out to eat,
attending school, and working part-time at a retail store (Exs. 4E, 8E).
(Tr. 24-25).
The ALJ’s treatment of these opinions was notable in several respects. First,
the ALJ declared both opinions persuasive and specifically noted that both opinions
contained one-to-two-step mental limitations. However, without explanation, the
ALJ did not include these mental limitations in the RFC which he fashioned for
Norton. Having made these findings, the ALJ then compounded this confusion when
he concluded that Norton could not return to his past work but could perform other
work in the national economy, all of which were reasoning level 2 tasks that
exceeded the one-to-two-step task mental limitations found by the state agency
experts that the ALJ deemed persuasive. (Tr. 27-28). The ALJ then determined that
the plaintiff did not meet the stringent standard for disability set by the Act and
denied this claim. (Id.)
This appeal followed. (Doc. 1). On appeal, Norton contends, inter alia, that
the ALJ’s mental RFC evaluation was flawed. After a review of the evidence, we
agree that the ALJ’s unexplained failure to incorporate or otherwise address the one-
to-two-step mental limitations described by the medical experts the ALJ deemed
persuasive does not provide us an adequate factual, legal and logical bridge between
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the evidence and the ALJ’s ultimate decision denying benefits. Therefore, we will
remand this case for further consideration by the Commissioner.
III. 	Discussion
A. Substantial Evidence Review – the Role of this Court
When reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision denying a claimant’s
application for benefits, this Court’s review is limited to the question of whether the
findings of the final decision-maker are supported by substantial evidence in the
record. See 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200
(3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp.2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012).
Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but
rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). Substantial
evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla.
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A single piece of evidence is not
substantial evidence if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a
conflict created by the evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir.
1993). But in an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be
“something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ’s decision]
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from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n,
383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “In determining if the Commissioner’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.”
Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F. Supp.2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
The Supreme Court has underscored for us the limited scope of our review in
this field, noting that:
The phrase “substantial evidence” is a “term of art” used throughout
administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency
factfinding. T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 574 U.S. ––––, ––––,
135 S.Ct. 808, 815, 190 L.Ed.2d 679 (2015). Under the substantial-
evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record
and asks whether it contains “sufficien[t] evidence” to support the
agency's factual determinations. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) (emphasis
deleted). And whatever the meaning of “substantial” in other contexts,
the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial
evidence, this Court has said, is “more than a mere scintilla.” Ibid.; see,
e.g., Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420 (internal quotation marks
omitted). It means—and means only—“such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. at 229, 59 S.Ct. 206. See Dickinson v.
Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153, 119 S.Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143 (1999)
(comparing the substantial-evidence standard to the deferential clearly-
erroneous standard).
Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154.
The question before this Court, therefore, is not whether the claimant is
disabled, but rather whether the Commissioner’s finding that she is not disabled is
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supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application
of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205,
at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been held that an ALJ’s errors of law denote
a lack of substantial evidence”) (alterations omitted); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F.
Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“The Secretary’s determination as to the status of
a claim requires the correct application of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright v.
Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal
matters is plenary); Ficca, 901 F. Supp.2d at 536 (“[T]he court has plenary review
of all legal issues . . . .”).
Several fundamental legal propositions which flow from this deferential
standard of review. First, when conducting this review “we are mindful that we must
not substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder.” Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777
F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d
Cir. 2005)). Thus, we are enjoined to refrain from trying to re-weigh the evidence.
Rather our task is to simply determine whether substantial evidence supported the
ALJ’s findings. However, we must also ascertain whether the ALJ’s decision meets
the burden of articulation demanded by the courts to enable informed judicial
review. Simply put, “this Court requires the ALJ to set forth the reasons for his
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decision.” Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000).
As the Court of Appeals has noted on this score:
In Burnett, we held that an ALJ must clearly set forth the reasons for
his 	decision. 	220 	F.3d 	at 	119. 	Conclusory 	statements 	. 	. 	. 	are
insufficient. The ALJ must provide a “discussion of the evidence” and
an “explanation of reasoning” for his conclusion sufficient to enable
meaningful judicial review. Id. at 120; see Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d
501, 505 & n. 3 (3d Cir.2004). The ALJ, of course, need not employ
particular “magic” words: “Burnett does not require the ALJ to use
particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting his
analysis.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505.
Diaz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2009).
Thus, in practice ours is a twofold task. We must evaluate the substance of the
ALJ’s decision under a deferential standard of review, but we must also give that
decision careful scrutiny to ensure that the rationale for the ALJ’s actions is
sufficiently articulated to permit meaningful judicial review.
This principle applies with particular force to legal challenges, like the claim
made here, based upon alleged inadequacies in the articulation of a claimant’s
mental RFC. In Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 212 (3d Cir. 2019), the
United States Court of Appeals recently addressed the standards of articulation that
apply in this setting. In Hess the court of appeals considered the question of whether
an RFC which limited a claimant to simple tasks adequately addressed moderate
limitations on concentration, persistence, and pace. In addressing the plaintiff’s
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argument that the language used by the ALJ to describe the claimant’s mental
limitations was legally insufficient, the court of appeals rejected a per se rule which
would require the ALJ to adhere to a particular format in conducting this analysis.
Instead, framing this issue as a question of adequate articulation of the ALJ’s
rationale, the court held that: “as long as the ALJ offers a ‘valid explanation,’ a
‘simple tasks’ limitation is permitted after a finding that a claimant has ‘moderate’
difficulties in ‘concentration, persistence, or pace.’ ” Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931
F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2019). On this score, the appellate court indicated that an ALJ
offers a valid explanation a mental RFC when the ALJ highlights factors such as
“mental status examinations and reports that revealed that [the claimant] could
function effectively; opinion evidence showing that [the claimant] could do simple
work; and [the claimant]’s activities of daily living, . . . . ” Hess v. Comm’r Soc.
Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 214 (3d Cir. 2019).
In our view, the teachings of the Hess decision are straightforward. In
formulating a mental RFC the ALJ does not need to rely upon any particular form
of words. Further, the adequacy of the mental RFC is not gauged in the abstract.
Instead, the evaluation of a claimant’s ability to undertake the mental demands of
the workplace will be viewed in the factual context of the case, and a mental RFC is
sufficient if it is supported by a valid explanation grounded in the evidence.
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B. Initial Burdens of Proof, Persuasion, and Articulation for the ALJ
To receive benefits under the Social Security Act by reason of disability, a
claimant must demonstrate an inability to “engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); see also 20
C.F.R. §404.1505(a). 	To satisfy this requirement, a claimant must have a severe
physical or mental impairment that makes it impossible to do his or her previous
work or any other substantial gainful activity that exists in the national economy. 42
U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. §404.1505(a). To receive benefits under Title II of
the Social Security Act, a claimant must show that he or she contributed to the
insurance program, is under retirement age, and became disabled prior to the date on
which he or she was last insured. 42 U.S.C. §423(a); 20 C.F.R. §404.131(a).
In making this determination at the administrative level, the ALJ follows a
five-step sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a). Under this process,
the ALJ must sequentially determine: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in
substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3)
whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) whether
the claimant is able to do his or her past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant
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is able to do any other work, considering his or her age, education, work experience
and residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4).
Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ must also assess a claimant’s residual
functional capacity (RFC). RFC is defined as “that which an individual is still able
to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).” Burnett v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R.
§§404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(1). In making this assessment, the ALJ considers all of
the claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including any non-severe
impairments identified by the ALJ at step two of his or her analysis. 	20 C.F.R.
§404.1545(a)(2).
There is an undeniable medical aspect to an RFC determination, since that
determination entails an assessment of what work the claimant can do given the
physical limitations that the claimant experiences. Yet, when considering the role
and necessity of medical opinion evidence in making this determination, courts have
followed several different paths. Some courts emphasize the importance of medical
opinion support for an RFC determination and have suggested that “[r]arely can a
decision be made regarding a claimant's residual functional capacity without an
assessment from a physician regarding the functional abilities of the claimant.”
Biller v. Acting Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 962 F. Supp. 2d 761, 778–79 (W.D. Pa. 2013)
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(quoting Gormont v. Astrue, Civ. No. 11–2145, 2013 WL 791455 at *7 (M.D. Pa.
Mar. 4, 2013)). In other instances, it has been held that: “There is no legal
requirement that a physician have made the particular findings that an ALJ adopts
in the course of determining an RFC.” Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 F. App’x 6, 11
(3d Cir. 2006). Further, courts have held in cases where there is no evidence of any
credible medical opinion supporting a claimant’s allegations of disability that “the
proposition that an ALJ must always base his RFC on a medical opinion from a
physician is misguided.” Cummings v. Colvin, 129 F. Supp. 3d 209, 214–15 (W.D.
Pa. 2015).
These 	seemingly 	discordant 	legal 	propositions 	can 	be 	reconciled 	by
evaluation of the factual context of these decisions. Those cases which emphasize
the importance of medical opinion support for an RFC assessment typically arise in
the factual setting where a well-supported medical source has identified limitations
that would support a disability claim, but an ALJ has rejected the medical opinion
which supported a disability determination based upon a lay assessment of other
evidence. Biller, 962 F.Supp.2d at 778–79. In this setting, these cases simply restate
the commonplace idea that medical opinions are entitled to careful consideration
when making a disability determination, particularly when those opinions support a
finding of disability. In contrast, when an ALJ is relying upon other evidence, such
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as contrasting clinical or opinion evidence or testimony regarding the claimant’s
activities of daily living, to fashion an RFC courts have adopted a more pragmatic
view and have sustained the ALJ’s exercise of independent judgment based upon all
of the facts and evidence. See Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 F. App'x 6, 11 (3d Cir.
2006); Cummings v. Colvin, 129 F. Supp. 3d 209, 214–15 (W.D. Pa. 2015). In either
event, once the ALJ has made this determination, our review of the ALJ's assessment
of the plaintiff's RFC is deferential, and that RFC assessment will not be set aside if
it is supported by substantial evidence. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 129 (3d
Cir. 2002); see also Metzger v. Berryhill, No. 3:16-CV-1929, 2017 WL 1483328, at
*5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2017), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Metzgar
v. Colvin, No. 3:16-CV-1929, 2017 WL 1479426 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2017); Rathbun
v. Berryhill, No. 3:17-CV-00301, 2018 WL 1514383, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 12,
2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-301, 2018 WL 1479366
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2018).
At Steps 1 through 4, the claimant bears the initial burden of demonstrating
the existence of a medically determinable impairment that prevents him or her in
engaging in any of his or her past relevant work. Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064. Once this
burden has been met by the claimant, it shifts to the Commissioner at Step 5 to show
that jobs exist in significant number in the national economy that the claimant could
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perform that are consistent with the claimant’s age, education, work experience and
RFC. 20 C.F.R. §404.1512(f); Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064.
The ALJ’s disability determination must also meet certain basic substantive
requisites. Most significant among these legal benchmarks is a requirement that the
ALJ adequately explain the legal and factual basis for this disability determination.
Thus, in order to facilitate review of the decision under the substantial evidence
standard, the ALJ's decision must be accompanied by “a clear and satisfactory
explication of the basis on which it rests.” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d
Cir. 1981). Conflicts in the evidence must be resolved and the ALJ must indicate
which evidence was accepted, which evidence was rejected, and the reasons for
rejecting certain evidence. Id. at 706-07. In addition, “[t]he ALJ must indicate in his
decision which evidence he has rejected and which he is relying on as the basis for
his finding.” Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999).
C. Legal Benchmarks for the ALJ’s Assessment of Medical Opinions
The plaintiff filed this disability application following a paradigm shift in the
manner in which medical opinions were evaluated when assessing Social Security
claims. Prior to March 2017, ALJs were required to follow regulations which defined
medical opinions narrowly and created a hierarchy of medical source opinions with
treating sources at the apex of this hierarchy. However, in March of 2017, the
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Commissioner’s regulations governing medical opinions changed in a number of
fundamental ways. The range of opinions that ALJs were enjoined to consider were
broadened substantially, and the approach to evaluating opinions was changed from
a hierarchical form of review to a more holistic analysis. As one court as aptly
observed:
The regulations regarding the evaluation of medical evidence have been
amended for claims filed after March 27, 2017, and several of the prior
Social Security Rulings, including SSR 96-2p, have been rescinded.
According to the new regulations, the Commissioner “will no longer
give any specific evidentiary weight to medical opinions; this includes
giving controlling weight to any medical opinion.” Revisions to Rules
Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence (“Revisions to Rules”),
2017 WL 168819, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, at 5867–68 (Jan. 18, 2017), see
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). Instead, the Commissioner
must consider all medical opinions and “evaluate their persuasiveness”
based 	on 	the 	following 	five 	factors: 	supportability; 	consistency;
relationship with the claimant; specialization; and “other factors.” 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a)-(c), 416.920c(a)-(c).
Although the new regulations eliminate the perceived hierarchy of
medical sources, deference to specific medical opinions, and assigning
“weight” to a medical opinion, the ALJ must still “articulate how [he
or she] considered the medical opinions” and “how persuasive [he or
she] find[s] all of the medical opinions.” Id. at §§ 404.1520c(a) and
(b)(1), 416.920c(a) and (b)(1). The two “most important factors for
determining the persuasiveness of medical opinions are consistency and
supportability,” 	which 	are 	the 	“same 	factors” 	that 	formed 	the
foundation of the treating source rule. Revisions to Rules, 82 Fed. Reg.
5844-01 at 5853.
An ALJ is specifically required to “explain how [he or she] considered
the supportability and consistency factors” for a medical opinion. 20
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C.F.R. 	§§ 	404.1520c 	(b)(2), 	416.920c(b)(2). 	With 	respect 	to
“supportability,” the new regulations provide that “[t]he more relevant
the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented
by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical
opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” Id. at §§
404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1). The regulations provide that with
respect to “consistency,” “[t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) or
prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other
medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more
persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s) will be.” Id. at §§ 404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2).
Under the new regulations an ALJ must consider, but need not
explicitly discuss, the three remaining factors in determining the
persuasiveness of a medical source's opinion. Id. at §§ 404.1520c(b)(2),
416.920c(b)(2). However, where the ALJ has found two or more
medical opinions to be equally well supported and consistent with the
record, but not exactly the same, the ALJ must articulate how he or she
considered those factors contained in paragraphs (c)(3) through (c)(5).
Id. at §§ 404.1520c(b)(3), 416.920c(b)(3).
Andrew G. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:19-CV-0942 (ML), 2020 WL 5848776, at
*5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2020).
Oftentimes, as in this case, an ALJ must evaluate various medical opinions.
When presented with a disputed factual record, it is well-established that “[t]he ALJ
– not treating or examining physicians or State agency consultants – must make the
ultimate disability and RFC determinations.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667
F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011). However, the ALJ must still fully articulate the basis
of this medical opinion evaluation. Thus, when evaluating medical opinions “the
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ALJ may choose whom to credit but ‘cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the
wrong reason.’” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Mason,
994 F.2d at 1066). It also follows that “when a medical opinion is found persuasive
and contains a limitation to one- and two-step tasks, the ALJ is obligated to either:
(1) include the limitation in the RFC and limit the claimant to reasoning level one
occupations, or, (2) identify the substantial evidence that the ALJ is relying on in
rejecting the limitation.” Cruz, 2025 WL 2813882, at *8.
These legal benchmarks guide us in the instant case.
D. This Case Will Be Remanded.
After a review of the record, we conclude that the ALJ’s failure to more
thoroughly address or incorporate the state agency experts’ opinions which the ALJ
deemed persuasive that limited Norton to one- and two-step tasks was error. At the
outset, in reviewing this ALJ’s decision we find ourselves at the intersection between
two well-settled paradigms in the Social Security field. First, our highly deferential
standard of review empowers “[t]he ALJ – not treating or examining physicians or
State 	agency 	consultants 	– 	[to] 	make 	the 	ultimate 	disability 	and 	RFC
determinations.” Chandler, 667 F.3d at 361. Thus, our decision in this case in no
way undercuts the legal tenet that an ALJ is not required to adopt every limitation
opined by the experts but “can formulate an RFC based on different parts from the
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different medical opinions.” Durden, 191 F.Supp.3d at 455. However, at base, an
ALJ must draft a reviewable opinion that is grounded in the evidence and provides
the court with an adequately articulated rationale for the limitations adopted. Here,
without the benefit of an explanation by the ALJ, we are unable to determine whether
the ALJ’s failure to address the limitation to one- and two-step tasks in the sole
medical opinion the ALJ found persuasive was inadvertent or based upon the
substantial evidence of record.
This assessment by the ALJ runs afoul of several well-settled legal tenets.
First, as enumerated above, an ALJ's decision must be accompanied by “a clear and
satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests.” Cotter, 642 F.2d at 704.
Furthermore, the ALJ must also “indicate in his decision which evidence he has
rejected and which he is relying on as the basis for his finding.” Schaudeck, 181 F.3d
at 433. Moreover, it is well-settled that an ALJ should refrain from substituting his
own lay opinion in place of a medical opinion. Morales 225 F.3d at 319. These
mandates apply here in the context of the ALJ’s assessment of medical opinion
evidence limiting a claimant to one-to-two-step tasks. Indeed, this court, and others,
have applied these paradigms in specifically concluding that “when a medical
opinion is found persuasive and contains a limitation to one- and two-step tasks, the
ALJ is obligated to either: (1) include the limitation in the RFC and limit the claimant
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to reasoning level one occupations, or (2) identify the substantial evidence that the
ALJ is relying on in rejecting the limitation.” Cruz, 2025 WL 2813882, at *8. See
also Rita R. v. Kijakazi, No. 21 C 5631, 2023 WL 2403139, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
8, 2023) (“Indeed, an ALJ is required to provide a thorough and appropriate
explanation for rejecting a state agency psychologist's opinion that a claimant is
limited to one-to-two step tasks.”) The ALJ’s decision in this case neither included
the one-to-two-step limitation, nor explained why it was not incorporated into the
RFC. This was error.
This error is not harmless here since the ALJ’s conclusion that Norton was
not disabled is based upon his ability to perform work in occupations requiring a
reasoning level of 2, a reasoning level that was inconsistent with a limitation to one-
to two-step tasks. As this court explained:
The 	DOT 	defines 	occupations 	by 	reasoning 	level 	and 	defines
“reasoning 	level 	one” 	as 	the 	ability 	to 	“apply 	commonsense
understanding to carry out simple one-or two-step instructions.” The
similarity of that language to “one- and two-step tasks,” leads us to
conclude that an individual limited to “one-and two-step tasks” is
likewise limited to “reasoning level one” occupations. Importantly, this
limitation is dischargeable: an ALJ may find otherwise, so long as they
rely on and cite to substantial evidence that adequately explains why
they are omitting the limitation in the claimant's RFC despite having
found the relevant medical opinion to be persuasive.
Additionally, courts in eight of the eleven circuits where a District court
has considered this issue have held that “simple repetitive tasks” and
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“one- and two-step tasks” are legally distinct limitations. And all but
one of these cases also found that a limitation to “one- and two-step
tasks” 	necessarily 	limits 	the 	claimant 	to 	reasoning 	level 	one
occupations.
Cruz, 2025 WL 2813882, at *7. See also Id. at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2023). See
also Rita R., 2023 WL 2403139, at *3–4 (“The ALJ's error is of crucial importance
because a limitation to ‘simple tasks’ (the RFC limitation the ALJ found here)
encompasses jobs that may involve complexity beyond one-to-two step tasks”);
Daniel M. v. Kijakazi, No. 2:21-CV-243, 2023 WL 154909, at *3 (D. Vt. Jan. 11,
2023) (collecting cases) (concluding reasoning Levels 2 and 3 are not consistent with
“simple, one-to-two step tasks”).
While in certain circumstances this error may be harmless, we cannot find the
error harmless on the facts of the instant case for at least two reasons. First, at bottom,
to sustain this decision we would have to discount the ALJ’s statement that the state
agency experts’ opinions that Norton can perform one- and two-step tasks were
persuasive. Thus, to affirm this decision we would necessarily have to reweigh the
evidence. This we may not do. See Chandler, 667 F.3d at 359 (citing Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (“Courts are not permitted to re-weigh the
evidence or impose their own factual determinations”); see also Gonzalez v. Astrue,
537 F.Supp.2d 644, 657 (D. Del. 2008) (“In determining whether substantial
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31
evidence supports the Commissioner’s findings, the Court may not undertake a de
novo review of the Commissioner’s decision and may not re-weigh the evidence of
the record”) (internal citations omitted)). In addition, we would have to substitute a
different rationale for this decision, one which would partially discount the ALJ’s
evaluation of the state agency exert opinions. We cannot follow this course since it
is well-settled that “[t]he ALJ's decision must stand or fall with the reasons set forth
in the ALJ's decision; [we] may not offer a post-hoc rationalization.” Schuster v.
Astrue, 879 F. Supp. 2d 461, 466 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (citations omitted).
Simply put, more was needed here by way of explanation on the ALJ’s part.
Indeed, a rising tide of caselaw supports the view that the ALJ erred in failing to
incorporate or otherwise address the one and two step task limitation opined by the
expert whose opinion he found persuasive.4 Since the ALJ’s burden of articulation
4 See e.g., ADRIENNE LOMBARDO, Plaintiff v. FRANK BISIGNANO, Comm'r
of Soc. Sec., Defendant., No. 4:24-CV-56, 2026 WL 674198, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar.
10, 2026); SARAH C., Plaintiff, v. FRANK BISIGNANO, Defendant., No. 1:23-
CV-01828, 2026 WL 625094, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2026); FRED MCCLEARY,
Plaintiff v. FRANK BISIGNANO, Comm'r of Soc. Sec., Defendant., No. 4:25-CV-
26, 2026 WL 625113, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2026); Delillo v. Bisignano, No. 4:25-
CV-523, 2026 WL 592389, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2026); Whitney v. Bisignano,
No. 4:24-CV-1950, 2026 WL 522922, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2026); 	Cruz v.
Bisignano, No. 1:24-CV-1966, 2025 WL 2813882, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2025);
Michelle M. v. Bisignano, No. 3:23-CV-02163, 2025 WL 2713737, at *7 (M.D. Pa.
Sept. 23, 2025); Warren v. Dudek, No. 1:24-CV-635, 2025 WL 1168276, at *6
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is not met in the instant case, this matter will be remanded for further consideration
by the Commissioner.
Yet, while we find that these errors compel a remand in this case, nothing in
this Memorandum Opinion should be deemed as expressing a judgment on what the
ultimate outcome of any reassessment of this evidence should be. Instead, that
judgment should remain to province of the ALJ. Finally, because we have vacated
and remanded the decision of the Commissioner on these grounds, we decline to
address any other issues presented by the parties since “[a] remand may produce
different results on these claims, making discussion of them moot.” Burns v. Colvin,
156 F.Supp.3d 579, 598 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2016).
Finally, we close as we began, by observing that one root cause of this remand
is an issue which courts have repeatedly observed, the apparent failure of legal and
medical professionals to attach a common meaning to the words they use. Thus, we
note for the Commissioner that the casual conflation of one-to-two-step RFCs in
medical opinions with widely varying assessments of the claimant’s degree of
impairment, if unaddressed, will continue to compel remands in the future.
(M.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2025); 	Shipman v. Kizakazi, No. 3:22-CV-00636, 2023 WL
5599607, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2023).
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IV. 	Conclusion
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s request for a new
administrative hearing is GRANTED, the final decision of the Commissioner
denying these claims is vacated, and this case is remanded to the Commissioner to
conduct a new administrative hearing.
An appropriate order follows.
s/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
DATED: March 18, 2026
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