The Travelers Home and Marine Insurance Company v. U.S. Xpress, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
THE TRAVELERS HOME AND
MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.
U.S. XPRESS, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-CV-00700
(MEHALCHICK, J.)
MEMORANDUM
The Travelers Home and Marine Insurance Company (“Travelers”) initiated this
action as subrogee of Robert Stroka by filing a complaint on May 12, 2022. (Doc. 1). Travelers
filed the operative amended complaint on September 20, 2022, alleging Defendants, U.S.
Xpress, Inc. (“U.S. Xpress”) and Matthew Vomero (“Vomero”) (together, “Defendants”), are
liable for negligence in connection with a truck accident. (Doc. 16). Before the Court is
Travelers’s motion to exclude expert testimony (Doc. 57), Travelers’s motion for summary
judgment (Doc. 58), and Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment. (Doc. 69). For
the reasons provided herein, Travelers’s motions are denied, and Defendants’ motion is
granted.
Case 3:22-cv-00700-KM Document 77 Filed 02/25/26 Page 1 of 17

2
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The following background is taken from the parties’ statements of material facts and
responses thereto.1 (Doc. 59; Doc. 66; Doc. 71; Doc. 74). On June 3, 2020, Vomero was
driving a tractor trailer when his vehicle crashed into a building insured by Travelers. (Doc.
71, ¶ 1; Doc. 74, ¶ 1). At the time of the accident, Vomero was acting in the course and scope
of his employment with U.S. Xpress. (Doc. 71, ¶ 7; Doc. 74, ¶ 7). Defendants assert that
Vomero had a syncopal episode from laughing prior to the accident, causing him to lose
consciousness and crash. (Doc. 59, ¶ 2; Doc. 66, ¶ 2). The parties dispute whether Defendants
have presented admissible evidence supporting their assertion that Vomero had such a
medical incident, and Travelers asserts that Vomero merely fell asleep while driving. (Doc.
59, ¶¶ 11, 14; Doc. 66, ¶¶ 11, 14).
On August 11, 2025, Travelers filed a motion to exclude expert testimony and a
motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 57; Doc. 58). On August 12, 2025, Travelers filed a
statement of facts, and briefs in support of both motions. (Doc. 59; Doc. 60; Doc. 61). On
August 25, 2025, Defendants filed a brief in opposition to the motion to exclude expert
testimony. (Doc. 65). On September 2, 2025, Defendants filed a response to Travelers’s
statement of facts and a brief in opposition to Travelers’s motion for summary judgment (Doc.
65; Doc. 66). Travelers timely filed reply briefs in support of both motions. (Doc. 64; Doc.
75).
On September 5, 2025, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment along with
a brief in support and statement of facts. (Doc. 69; Doc. 70; Doc. 71). On September 15, 2025,
1 Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, the Court accepts as true all undisputed material facts
supported by the record, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Case 3:22-cv-00700-KM Document 77 Filed 02/25/26 Page 2 of 17

3
Travelers filed a brief in opposition along with a response to Defendants’ statement of facts.
(Doc. 72; Doc. 74). On September 29, 2025, Defendants filed a reply brief. (Doc. 75).
II. DISCUSSION
Defendants’ expert, Dr. Adam C. Sobel (“Sobel”), a physician, offers an expert
opinion that prior to crashing his tractor trailer, Vomero suffered a “syncopal episode” as a
result of laughing, causing him to lose consciousness and the ability to steer his vehicle. (Doc.
63-1, at 7-8; Doc. 63-2, at 55-56). Travelers moves to exclude Sobel’s testimony under Rule
702. (Doc. 60, at 10-12). Travelers also moves for summary judgment arguing that Defendants’
only viable defense is that Vomero suffered a sudden medical emergency prior to the accident,
and Defendants cannot establish such a defense without Sobel’s purportedly inadmissible
testimony. (Doc. 61, at 8-12). Defendants move for partial summary judgment on all direct
claims against U.S. Xpress arguing that U.S. Xpress cannot be held directly liable because
Defendants concede that U.S. Xpress would be vicariously liable for Vomero’s actions if
Vomero is found negligent and Travelers does not seek punitive damages. (Doc. 70, at 2-6).
A. TRAVELERS’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE
Travelers avers that Sobel’s testimony is based on his subjective beliefs rather than
reliable scientific principles and methods and thus, the Court must exclude his testimony
under Rule 702. (Doc. 60, at 10-12). Travelers further argues that even if Sobel’s testimony
were based on reliable principles and methods, it should be excluded because Sobel couches
his conclusions with phrases such as “more likely than not” and “more probable than not”
which indicates that his testimony is mere guesswork. (Doc. 60, at 11-12).
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony and “has
a liberal policy of admissibility.” Kannankeril v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 806 (3d Cir.
1997). Rule 702 provides:
Case 3:22-cv-00700-KM Document 77 Filed 02/25/26 Page 3 of 17

4
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the proponent
demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not that:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert's opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles
and methods to the facts of the case.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
“Rule 702 has three major requirements: (1) the proffered witness must be an expert, i.e., must
be qualified; (2) the expert must testify about matters requiring scientific, technical or
specialized knowledge [, i.e. reliability]; and (3) the expert's testimony must assist the trier of
fact [, i.e., fit].” United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 172 (3d Cir. 2010) (alterations in original)
(quoting Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237, 244 (3d Cir. 2008)). An expert is qualified if
“the witness possess[es] specialized expertise.” Schneider ex rel. Estate of Schneider v. Fried, 320
F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 2003). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
interprets the qualification requirement liberally, and notes that “a broad range of knowledge,
skills, and training qualify an expert as such.” In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717,
741 (3d Cir. 1994); Betterbox Commc'ns Ltd. v. BB Techs., Inc., 300 F.3d 325, 327-28 (3d Cir.
2002) (“[T]his specialized knowledge can be practical experience as well as academic training
and credentials”).
The second requirement under Rule 702 is that “the process or technique the expert
used in formulating the opinion is reliable.” Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742. Therefore, “the expert's
opinion must be based on the ‘methods and procedures of science’ rather than on ‘subjective
Case 3:22-cv-00700-KM Document 77 Filed 02/25/26 Page 4 of 17

5
belief or unsupported speculation’; the expert must have ‘good grounds’ for his or her belief.”
Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993)).
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court noted that the assessment
of whether testimony is based on a reliable foundation is “flexible.” 509 U.S. at 594.
The third Rule 702 requirement is that “the expert testimony must fit the issues in the
case.” Schneider, 320 F.3d at 404. This requirement is satisfied where the “expert testimony
proffered . . . is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a
factual dispute.” United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985). “Rule 702’s
‘helpfulness’ standard requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a
precondition to admissibility.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92. Although the applicable standard
for determining “fit” is “not that high,” it is nonetheless “higher than bare relevance.” Paoli,
35 F.3d at 745.
When determining whether proposed expert testimony is admissible under Rule 702,
the trial court “is not to weigh the evidence relied upon or determine whether it agrees with
the conclusions reached therein.” Walker v. Gordon, 46 F. App'x 691, 695 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing
Breidor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1134, 1138-39 (3d Cir. 1983) (“Where there is a logical
basis for an expert's opinion testimony, the credibility and weight of that testimony is to be
determined by the jury, not the trial judge.”)).
Generally, physicians are considered qualified experts even where their testimony is
about a field of medicine outside of their specialty. See Cree v. Hatcher, 969 F.2d 34, 38 n.5 (3d
Cir. 1992); see also Nichols v. Morrisey, No. 2:23-CV-00637, 2024 WL 871322, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 29, 2024). Reliability is a “flexible” standard. Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742 (3d Cir. 1994); see also
Colon v. Kinnel, No. 5:21-CV-03337, 2023 WL 2071367, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2023). Courts
Case 3:22-cv-00700-KM Document 77 Filed 02/25/26 Page 5 of 17

6
should deny motions to exclude expert testimony where the movant’s challenge is based on
the expert disagreeing with the movant over a contested question of fact. See Walker v. Gordon,
46 F. App'x 691, 695-96 (3d Cir. 2002) (nonprecedential) (stating “[a]n expert is, nonetheless,
permitted to base his opinion on a particular version of disputed facts”); see also Johnson v.
Duffy, 855 F. Supp. 2d 311, 320 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (stating the same). A physician presents
reliable testimony by reaching a conclusion through differential diagnosis. See Kannankeril v.
Terminix Int'l, Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 807 (3d Cir. 1997), as amended (Dec. 12, 1997); see also In re
Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., 890 F. Supp. 2d 552,
562 (E.D. Pa. 2012). Differential diagnosis involves a physician considering various
conditions an individual may have experienced and reaching a conclusion as to which
condition occurred by ruling out the other conditions based on the physician’s medical
expertise and review of evidence in the record. See Kannankeril, 128 F.3d at 807; see also In re
Diet Drugs, 890 F. Supp. 2d at 562. A physician is not required to personally conduct a physical
examination of an individual to reach a reliable conclusion regarding that individual’s
medical condition so long as the physician examined the individual’s medical records and
other evidence in the record. See Kannankeril, 128 F.3d at 807; see also Lorenzo-Noda v. Kazak,
No. CV 18-13414, 2025 WL 900404, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 24, 2025) (noting that while a
physical examination “would have strengthened [the expert’s] opinion” because the expert
reviewed the plaintiff’s medical records, the absence of a physical examination spoke “to the
weight of the expert testimony” rather than admissibility). Further, a physician is not required
to cite to scholarly articles supporting their position and may reliably testify based off their
experience and medical expertise. See Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 155 (3d Cir.
1999); see also Yarchak v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 208 F. Supp. 2d 470, 499 (D.N.J. 2002); see also
Case 3:22-cv-00700-KM Document 77 Filed 02/25/26 Page 6 of 17

7
Wichterman v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 16-5796, 2019 WL 2568340, at *9 (E.D. Pa. June
20, 2019).
In diversity cases applying Pennsylvania tort law, for a medical expert’s opinion to be
both reliable and helpful to the jury (i.e. meet the “fit” requirement), the expert must testify
that he made a diagnosis or came to a medical conclusion with “a reasonable degree of medical
certainty.” Heller, 167 F.3d at 153 n.4 (emphasis in original); see Keller v. Feasterville Fam. Health
Care Ctr., 557 F. Supp. 2d 671, 676 (E.D. Pa. 2008). While the reasonable degree of medical
certainty standard recognizes that physicians often cannot reach a conclusion with one
hundred percent certainty, it is insufficient for an expert physician to testify that his diagnosis
or conclusion is merely “more likely than not.” Hoefling v. U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Co., LLC,
576 F. Supp. 3d 262, 286 (E.D. Pa. 2021) (stating “[a] reasonable degree of medical certainty
requires more than a finding by a preponderance of the evidence”); see also Hook v. Whiting
Door Mfg. Corp., No. CV 3:15-281, 2019 WL 7515289, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 2019) (stating
“[a] ‘reasonable degree of [medical] certainty’ is just that, however—reasonable; neither
absolute nor certain” but noting that “[l]anguage such as ‘possibly’ or ‘could have’ is
insufficient under this standard”). It is not the Court’s role to determine whether a jury would
be persuaded to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that an individual suffered from a
condition. See Redland Soccer Club, Inc., 55 F.3d 827, 852-53 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that the
Court’s role at summary judgment is not to determine whether an expert’s “testimony will
persuade the factfinder”); see also Alfrey v. Whitley, No. 3:21-CV-01629, 2024 WL 3833322, at
*1 (M.D. Pa. July 26, 2024) (stating “[t]o the extent the defendants challenge the certainty of
[the expert]'s opinions, their challenge goes to the weight of the evidence, not its
admissibility”). Rather, the Court must determine whether the expert is willing to testify to a
Case 3:22-cv-00700-KM Document 77 Filed 02/25/26 Page 7 of 17

8
reasonable degree of medical certainty. See Redland Soccer Club, Inc., 55 F.3d at 852-53; see also
Alfrey, 2024 WL 3833322, at *1. A court should not exclude expert testimony prior to trial
where the expert explicitly stated in a deposition or report that they reached their conclusions
to a reasonable degree of medical certainty but also made statements which seemingly
contradict that assertion because such contradictions speak the credibility of the expert not
admissibility. See Redland Soccer Club, Inc., 55 F.3d at 852-53 (reversing a district court’s grant
of summary judgment because the district court improperly discounted parts of an expert’s
testimony where the expert explicitly stated that he reached his conclusions with a reasonable
degree of medical certainty); see also Hook, 2019 WL 7515289, at *4 (stating “[t]he fact that
‘an expert may have used less definite language does not render his entire opinion speculative
if at some time . . . he expressed his opinion with reasonable certainty’” (quoting Vicari v.
Spiegel, 936 A.2d 503, 509 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007), aff'd, 605 Pa. 381, 989 A.2d 1277 (2010)); see
also Newhouse v. GEICO Cas. Co., No. 4:17-CV-00477, 2019 WL 1082640, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar.
7, 2019) (denying a motion to exclude expert testimony where an expert made both statements
consistent with the reasonable degree of medical certainty standard and inconsistent with the
standard).
Travelers does not challenge Sobel’s qualifications but seeks to have Sobel’s testimony
excluded as unreliable and unhelpful to the jury because 1) his testimony is not supported by
evidence in the record, 2) Sobel did not review enough of the record to come to a reliable
conclusion, 3) Sobel does not cite to any scholarly materials supporting his diagnosis, and 4)
Sobel fails to testify that he came to his conclusions with a reasonable degree of medical
certainty. (Doc. 60, at 10-12). The Court finds Travelers’s argument that Sobel’s testimony is
unreliable to be contradicted by evidence in the record. (Doc. 60, at 10). Travelers avers that
Case 3:22-cv-00700-KM Document 77 Filed 02/25/26 Page 8 of 17

9
the record, which includes a video of the crash, establishes that Vomero was not laughing
prior to the crash but rather, simply fell asleep while driving. (Doc. 60, at 10). According to
Travelers, because Vomero was not laughing prior to the crash, Sobel’s conclusion that
Vomero suffered a laughter induced syncopal episode is frivolous. (Doc. 60, at 10). However,
Defendants present the testimony of Nicholas Rice (“Rice”), a fellow truck driver, who stated
that he was speaking with Vomero on the phone prior to and during the crash. (Doc. 63-5, at
29-30). Rice testified that during his phone call with Vomero, he heard Vomero laughing,
heard Vomero go silent for fifteen to twenty seconds, and then heard a crash. (Doc. 63-5, at
29-30). Defendants further present Vomero’s testimony in which he stated that prior to the
crash, he was laughing and joking with Rice but cannot recall what happened next. (Doc. 63-
3, at 60-61). The video of the crash begins approximately six seconds before Vomero’s vehicle
veers off the road, hits a road guard, and crashes. (Travelers’s Exhibit F Flash Drive).
According to Rice, Vomero stopped laughing and went silent fifteen to twenty seconds before
the crash so under Rice’s versions of events, Vomero would have been silent during those six
seconds. (Travelers’s Exhibit F Flash Drive; Doc. 63-5, at 29). In the video, Vomero does not
make any clear noises during the six seconds, so a reasonable jury could conclude that Rice’s
testimony is supported by the video. (Travelers’s Exhibit F Flash Drive). Based on this
evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that Vomero was laughing prior to the incident,
and the Court may not find Sobel’s testimony unreliable or unhelpful simply because it relies
on one version of a genuine dispute of material fact. See Walker, 46 F. App'x at 695-96; see also
Johnson, 855 F. Supp. 2d at 320.
The Court further rejects Travelers’s assertion that Sobel did not review sufficient
evidence to come to a reliable medical conclusion. (Doc. 60, at 10-11). According to Sobel’s
Case 3:22-cv-00700-KM Document 77 Filed 02/25/26 Page 9 of 17

10
report, Sobel reviewed Vomero’s medical records, lab tests, and various other parts of the
record such as a police report and Vomero’s deposition transcript. (Doc. 63-1, at 5). Sobel’s
review of the record is sufficient because he reviewed Vomero’s medical records and
testimony and questions regarding whether he should have reviewed additional evidence
speak to weight rather than admissibility. See Kannankeril, 128 F.3d at 807; see also Lorenzo-
Noda, 2025 WL 900404, at *3. Further, Sobel relied on the reliable method of differential
diagnosis because Sobel testified that based off his review of the record and his medical
expertise, he concluded that Vomero could not have fallen asleep, as Travelers claims he did,
but instead, lost consciousness due to a laughter induced syncopal episode. (Doc. 63-2, at 54-
55); see Kannankeril, 128 F.3d at 807; see also In re Diet Drugs, 890 F. Supp. 2d at 562.
The Court similarly rejects Travelers’s contention that Sobel’s conclusions regarding a
laughter induced syncopal episode are unreliable because Sobel does not cite to any scholarly
articles regarding such a condition. (Doc. 60, at 11). A medical expert is not required to cite
to scholarly or peer reviewed articles in order to provide a reliable opinion and Traveler’s own
expert, Dr. Jeffrey S. Fierstein, acknowledges that a laughter induced syncopal episodes are
“recognized in medical literature.” (Doc. 63-6, at 6); See Yarchak, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 499; see
also Wichterman, 2019 WL 2568340, at *9.
Finally, the Court does not accept Travelers’s conclusion that Sobel’s testimony is
neither reliable nor helpful to the jury because he does not testify that he reached his
conclusions to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. (Doc. 60, at 11-12). The Court
acknowledges that Sobel’s report contains statements such as “[i]t is more probable than not
that a person laughing does not simply fall asleep . . . [and it is] more likely than not [that
Vomero] had a syncopal episode.” (Doc. 63-1, at 8). While such language would indicate that
Case 3:22-cv-00700-KM Document 77 Filed 02/25/26 Page 10 of 17

11
Sobel did not reach his conclusions to the degree of medical certainty required by
Pennsylvania law, see Hoefling, 576 F. Supp. 3d at 286, during his deposition, Sobel testified
that there was close to a one hundred percent chance that Vomero did not fall asleep prior to
the accident and confirmed that he reached his opinions to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty. (Doc. 63-2, at 55-56). While a reasonable jury could choose to discredit Sobel’s
testimony due to perceived inconsistencies, Sobel’s testimony is sufficient for purposes of the
instant motion and such inconsistencies are proper topics for cross examination. See Redland
Soccer Club, Inc., 55 F.3d at 852-53; see also Hook, 2019 WL 7515289, at *4; see also Newhouse,
2019 WL 1082640, at *2. Accordingly, Traveler’s motion to exclude Sobel’s testimony is
DENIED. (Doc. 57).
B. TRAVELERS’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment should be
granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might
affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
dispute of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence “is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary
judgment motion, all inferences “should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, and where the non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the movant’s, then the
non-movant’s must be taken as true.” Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir.
1994). However, a party opposing a summary judgment motion must comply with Local Rule
56.1, which specifically directs the oppositional party to submit a “statement of the material
facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the statement required [to be filed
Case 3:22-cv-00700-KM Document 77 Filed 02/25/26 Page 11 of 17

12
by the movant], as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried”; if the
nonmovant fails to do so, “[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement required to be served
by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted.” See M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1.
A federal court should grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court’s function is not to make credibility
determinations, weigh evidence, or draw inferences from the facts. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
Rather, the court must simply “determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson,
477 U.S. at 249.
The party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion,” and demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute
of any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes
such a showing, the non-movant must go beyond the pleadings with affidavits or declarations,
answers to interrogatories, or the like, to demonstrate specific material facts which give rise
to a genuine issue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The non-movant must
produce evidence to show the existence of every element essential to its case, which it bears
the burden of proving at trial, because “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential
element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex,
477 U.S. at 323. Furthermore, mere conclusory allegations and self-serving testimony,
whether made in the complaint or a sworn statement, cannot be used to obtain or avoid
summary judgment when uncorroborated and contradicted by other evidence of record. See
Case 3:22-cv-00700-KM Document 77 Filed 02/25/26 Page 12 of 17

13
Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990); see also Thomas v. Delaware State Univ.,
626 F. App’x 384, 389 n.6 (3d Cir. 2015) (not precedential) (“[U]nsupported deposition
testimony, which is contradicted by the record, is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.”);
Nat’l Labor Rel. Bd. v. FES, 301 F.3d 83, 95 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[The plaintiff’s] testimony. . .
amounts to an unsupported, conclusory assertion, which we have held is inadequate to satisfy
the movant’s burden of proof on summary judgment”).
Travelers avers that it is entitled to summary judgment because Defendants’ only
viable defense is the sudden medical emergency doctrine and there is no admissible evidence
in the record suggesting Vomero suffered from a sudden medical emergency. (Doc. 61, at 12).
Travelers’s argument is reliant on the Court excluding Sobel’s testimony. (Doc. 61, at 8-12).
Defendants counter that they present evidence sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of
material fact regarding the sudden medical emergency doctrine through Sobel’s testimony,
lay testimony, and video evidence. (Doc. 65, at 4-13).
Under Pennsylvania law, the sudden medical emergency doctrine is an affirmative
defense against negligence claims in which a defendant involved in a car crash must prove
that the crash was caused by an unforeseeable sudden loss of consciousness or another
temporary incapacitation. See Shiner v. Ralston, 64 A.3d 1, 4-5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (stating
“[u]nforeseeable loss of consciousness, if proven, is a complete defense to negligence, and the
defendant bears the burden of establishing the defense”); see also Jones v. Cobbs, 258 A.3d 520
at *2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2021) (considering whether the doctrine applied to a driver who
experienced a seizure while driving). The application of the doctrine is generally a fact-based
inquiry for a jury to decide unless there is no conflicting evidence in the record regarding
whether 1) the defendant was incapacitated by a sudden medical incident or 2) the medical
Case 3:22-cv-00700-KM Document 77 Filed 02/25/26 Page 13 of 17

14
incident was unforeseeable. See Shiner, 64 A.3d at 5 (finding that the application of the medical
emergency doctrine was a question for the jury where there was conflicting evidence regarding
whether a plaintiff suffered from an unforeseeable heart event while driving); see also Jones,
258 A.3d at *2-3 (finding the same where the record contained conflicting evidence regarding
whether a seizure rendered a driver fully incapacitated); see also Yenchik Elliott v. GTC Logistics,
Inc., No. 3:23-CV-00194, 2025 WL 257603, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2025) (denying summary
judgment where “the record contain[ed] disputes of material fact about whether there was a
sudden emergency [prior to a car accident] and the cause of [the emergency]”).
As discussed supra Section II.A, Sobel’s testimony is admissible. A reasonable jury
could conclude based off Sobel’s testimony that Vomero suddenly lost consciousness due to
an unexpected medical event prior to the accident. (Doc. 63-1, at 7-8; Doc. 63-2, at 55-56).
Further, even outside of Sobel’s testimony, Rice testified that he heard Vomero laughing
before Vomero suddenly went silent fifteen to twenty seconds before Rice heard the crash.
(Doc. 63-5, at 29-30). Vomero testified that he remembers laughing and joking with Rice prior
to the accident but cannot remember anything after that. (Doc. 63-3, at 60-61). The video of
the crash shows Vomero not making any clear noises approximately six seconds before
veering off the road. (Travelers’s Exhibit F Flash Drive). The video could support either a
conclusion that Vomero lost consciousness as Defendants contend or fell asleep as Travelers
contends. As there is contradictory evidence regarding whether Vomero suddenly and
unexpectedly lost consciousness and the application of the sudden medical emergency is a
jury question, Travelers’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED. See Shiner, 64 A.3d at
5; see also Jones, 258 A.3d at *2-3; see also Yenchik Elliott, 2025 WL 257603, at *6.
C. DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Case 3:22-cv-00700-KM Document 77 Filed 02/25/26 Page 14 of 17

15
Travelers alleges that U.S. Xpress is both directly liable for its own negligence and
vicariously liable for Vomero’s negligence. (Doc. 16, ¶¶ 19-25). Defendants aver that U.S.
Xpress cannot be both directly and vicariously liable unless Travelers seeks punitive damages.
(Doc. 70, at 2-6). According to Defendants, they are entitled to summary judgment on
Travelers’s direct claims against U.S. Xpress because Defendants concede that U.S. Xpress
would be vicariously liable for Vomero’s actions should Vomero be found negligent and
Travelers does not assert a claim for punitive damages. (Doc. 70, at 2-6). Travelers avers that
it may assert direct and vicarious claims against U.S. Xpress because U.S. Xpress was
negligent in hiring and training Vomero. (Doc. 72, at 5-15).
Under Pennsylvania law, an employer could be held vicariously liable for the
negligence of its employees through a respondeat superior theory or directly liable for “negligent
entrustment, instruction, supervision, monitoring, and hiring of its employees.” Carson v.
Tucker, 530 F. Supp. 3d 560, 563 (E.D. Pa. 2021). However, negligence cases in which an
employer is held liable both vicariously and directly liable typically involve claims for punitive
damages. See Scampone v. Highland Park Care Ctr., LLC, 618 Pa. 363, 369 (2012) (finding a
nursing home could be held both vicariously liable for the actions of its staff and directly liable
for negligent hiring and supervision where the plaintiff sought punitive damages); see also
Carson, 530 F. Supp. 3d at 565 n.1 (distinguishing cases). While the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has not addressed the issue, the majority rule amongst states is that direct claims against
an employer should be dismissed where the employer concedes that they may be vicariously
liable for their employees’ negligence and the plaintiff does not seek punitive damages. See
Villagran v. Freightbull, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 3d 807, 812 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (describing the majority
rule); see also Calhoun v. Van Loon, No. 3:12-CV-458, 2014 WL 3428876, at *4 (M.D. Pa. July
Case 3:22-cv-00700-KM Document 77 Filed 02/25/26 Page 15 of 17

16
11, 2014) (describing the same). Pennsylvania federal courts have consistently applied the
majority rule and granted defendants’ motions for partial summary judgment on direct
liability claims against employers where 1) the employer concedes that it may be vicariously
liable if their employee is found negligence and 2) the plaintiff does not seek punitive
damages.2 See Carson, 530 F. Supp. 3d at 563; see also Calhoun, 2014 WL 3428876, at *6; see
also Collins v. Tate, No. 2:17-CV-00318, 2019 WL 3817570, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2019).
As noted by Defendants, Chief Judge Brann of this Court recently applied the majority rule
in a case involving U.S. Xpress and granted U.S. Xpress summary judgment on all direct
claims against it where 1) U.S. Xpress conceded that it may be held vicariously liable if its
employee was found negligent and 2) the court dismissed all claims for punitive damages
against U.S. Xpress. (Doc. 76; Doc. 76-1, at 20-21).
Here, it is undisputed that “Vomero was acting in the course and scope of his
employment with [U.S. Xpress] at the time of the incident giving rise to this litigation.” (Doc.
71, ¶ 7; Doc. 74, ¶ 7). Defendants concede that if Vomero is found liable, U.S. Xpress “would
be [vicariously] liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.” (Doc. 70, at 2). It is further
undisputed that Travelers “has not sought punitive damages.” (Doc. 71, ¶ 10; Doc. 74, ¶ 10).
Under the majority rule applied by Pennsylvania federal courts, Defendants are entitled to
2 The Court notes that in Villagran v. Freightbull, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 3d 807, 813 (E.D. Pa.
2023), a court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania declined to adopt the majority rule.
However, the Villagran court nonetheless granted an employer summary judgment on direct
claims against it because the court found that the evidence of the employer’s negligence was
inadmissible due to the evidence having little probative value where the employer admitted it
would be vicariously liable if its employee was found negligent and the plaintiff did not seek
punitive damages. 698 F. Supp. 3d at 813; see also Galovich v. Morrissette, No. 3:21-CV-1532,
2024 WL 2962843, at *14-16 (M.D. Pa. June 12, 2024) (granting summary judgment on direct
claims against an employer and noting that summary judgment is warranted under either the
majority rule or the Villagran rule).
Case 3:22-cv-00700-KM Document 77 Filed 02/25/26 Page 16 of 17

17
summary judgment on Travelers’s direct claims against U.S. Xpress. See Carson, 530 F. Supp.
3d at 563; see also Calhoun, 2014 WL 3428876, at *6; see also Collins, 2019 WL 3817570, at *6.
U.S. Xpress may still be held vicariously liable if Vomero is found negligent. Defendants’
motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED. (Doc. 69).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Travelers’s motion to exclude expert testimony (Doc. 57)
and motion for summary judgment (Doc. 58) are DENIED. Defendants’ motion for partial
summary judgment is GRANTED. (Doc. 69). Travelers’s direct claims against U.S. Xpress
are DISMISSED.
An appropriate Order follows.
Dated: February 25, 2026 s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States District Judge
Case 3:22-cv-00700-KM Document 77 Filed 02/25/26 Page 17 of 17