A. E. Individually and as Parent and Natural Guardian of S.P., a minor v. Mountain View School District et al

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
A.E., Individually and as the Court
Appointed Plenary Guardian for the
Person and Estate of S.P.
Plaintiff,
V.
MOUNTAIN VIEW SCHOOL
DISTRICT
Defendant.
3:22-CV-250
: (JUDGE MARIANI)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently before the Court is a motion for reconsideration filed by Defendant
Mountain View School District ("MVSD "). (Doc. 91 ). In that motion , MVSD asks the Court
to reconsider its Memorandum Opinion & Order granting in part and denying in part its
motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs Title IX and Section 1983 claims. 	(Docs. 88-89).
Specifically, MVSD seeks reconsideration only as it relates to the Court's denying its motion
for summary judgment on Plaintiff's Section 1983 Monell claim. 	Plaintiff opposes MVSD's
motion. 	(Doc. 94).
"Motions for reconsideration should be granted sparingly as federal courts have a
strong interest in the finality of judgments." MMG Ins . Co . v. Guiro, Inc., 432 F. Supp . 3d .
471, 474 (M.D. Pa . 2020) . "A court should grant a motion for reconsideration if the party
seeking reconsideration shows '( 1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the
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availability of new evidence that was not available when the court granted the motion for
summary judgment ; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent
manifest injustice. "' Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 73 F. Supp. 3d
488, 491 (M .D. Pa . 2014) (quoting Max 's Seafood Cafe ex rel . Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros ,
176 F.3d 669 , 677 (3d Cir . 1999)) . "A motion for reconsideration is not a proper vehicle to
attempt to convince the court to rethink a decis ion it has already made." Kropa v. Cabot Oil
& Gas Corp. , 716 F. Supp. 2d. 375, 378 (M.D. Pa . 2010).
In its motion and brief in support, MVSD cla ims that the Court clearly erred by
denying its motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim. Although MVSD
does not dispute that Plaintiff raised a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process
claim in her Complaint , it nevertheless claims that the Court clearly erred because Plaintiff
never expressly pleaded an exception to the general rule that a public school does not have
a constitutional duty to protect its students from fellow students. 	Specifically, MVSD claims
that:
Plaintiff never asserted a state-created danger claim or special relationship claim
exception in support of her substantive due process. 	Because there is no obligation
to protect one student from another, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law on Count II where Plaintiff never joined the issue of an exception. 	Denying
summary judgment based on an except ion never raised in this case is error, and so
Defendant seeks reconsideration .
(Doc. 92 at 1).
As set forth in the Court's memorandum opinion denying MVSD's motion for
summary judgment:
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As for the claim alleging violation of S.P.'s right to bodily integrity under the substantive
due process claim, MVSD claims that Plaintiff failed to raise a genuine dispute as to
whether her substantiative due process rights to bodily integrity were violated. See
Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 235 (3d Cir. 2008) ("Individuals have a
constitutional liberty interest in their bodily integrity that is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment."). 	While 	'"public 	schools, 	as 	a general 	matter, 	do 	not 	have 	a
constitutional duty to protect students from private actors,' including students," there
are exceptions to this rule including the "state-created danger" doctrine and when the
plaintiff has a "special relationship" with the defendant. 	A.J. v. Mastery Charter High
Sch., 2023 WL 6804576, at *7 (3d Cir. Sept. 20, 2023) (citing Morrow v. Balaski, 719
F.3d 160, 170 (3d Cir. 2013) (en bane)); see also Swanger v. Warrior Run Sch. Dist.,
2012 WL 2395675, at *3-5 (M.D. Pa. June 25, 2012) (discussing special relationship
and state-created danger exceptions).
MVSD brief in support does not address that there are exceptions to this general rule.
(Doc. 58 at 22-25). Rather, MVSD simply present a conclusory argument without any
citations that MVSD had no constitutional obligation to protect its student like S.P. from
other students. 	(Id. 	at 23) 	("While 	Title 	IX guards 	against student-on-student
harassment, 14 th Amendment due process does not. Plaintiffs have no claim.").
The Court finds Defendant's argument[s] are insufficient to meets its burden on
summary judgment, especially when considering that exceptions to the general rule
may apply when viewing the facts and the inferences from those fact[s] in light most
favorable to Plaintiff. 	See Doe v. Red Lion Area Sch. Dist., 2025 WL 19819, at *4-5
(M.D. Pa. Jan. 2, 2025) ("Plaintiffs here allege that the Principal Langan knew about
two previous assaults of [plaintiffj but still allowed the same perpetrator to ride the
same bus without a monitor. 	The logical inference from those allegations is that
placing [plaintiffj on the bus with her assailant made her less safe than providing no
bussing system at all, and that is sufficient to state a due process claim .... Our court
of appeals concluded that because the harasser in Morrow was not regularly assigned
to the plaintiffs' bus route, the school district could not have foreseen the harasser
riding the route nor could they have acted affirmatively to prevent it. 	Not so here,
where plaintiffs allege that the assailant continued to ride his regular bus route with his
alleged victims, including, [plaintiffj, daily. 	Requiring [plaintiffj to ride the bus with her
abuser unsupervised ... placed [plaintiffj in obvious jeopardy .... Morrow does not
foreclose plaintiffs' due process claim.").
(Doc. 88 at 66-67).
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The Court denied MVSD's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's Section 1983
claims, finding that MVSD failed to carry its summary judgment burden and scheduled this
matter for trial. 	(Doc . 88 at 68) ("Again, the record is full of inconsistencies and conflicting
testimony that would be inappropriate for the Court to resolve on summary judgment."). 	In
its brief in support of its motion for summary judgment, MVSD spent fewer than three pages
arguing why summary judgment was proper on Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim. 	(Doc . 58 at
22-25). 	On the issue for which it seeks reconsideration-the failure to affirmatively plead
state created danger-MVSD did not make this argument in either a motion for dismiss or
in its motion for summary judgment. 	Rather , MVSD's argument on the failure to identify a
constitutional violation supporting a Section 1983 Monell claim is as follows:
As an initial matter the 14 th Amendment due process right to bodily integrity is to
'protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protect[s] [people] from
each other.' 	DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs ., 489 U.S. 189, 196
(1989). Public schools, as a general mater, do not have a constitutional duty to protect
students from private actors, including other students. 	A.J., 2023 U.S . App. LEXIS
27375 at *9 (quoting Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 170 (3d Cir. 2013) (en bane)).
While Title IX guards against student-on-student harassment, the 14 th Amendment
due process does not. Plaintiffs have no claim.
(Doc. 58 at 23).
The above is MVSD's argument on this issue which is now the basis for its motion
for reconsideration . The quest ion now before the Court is whether the Court clearly erred,
or a manifest injustice will ensue, by denying MVDS's motion for summary judgment
because, as MVSD claims, Plaint iff never specifically pleaded an exception to the general
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rule that a public school does not have a constitutional duty to protect students from fellow
students.
"To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , a plaintiff must allege a person acting
under color or state law engaged in conduct that violated a right protected by the
Constitution of laws of the United States. " Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165-66 (3d Cir.
2013) (en bane). "Accordingly, '[t]he first step in evaluating a section 1983 claim is to
identify the exact contours of the underlying right said to have been violated and to then
determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all ." ' Id.
at 166 (quoting Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000)).
The Due Process Clause provides that states shall not "deprive any person of life ,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Plaintiff
identified the substantive component of due process in her Complaint, which "protects
individual liberty against certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them." 	Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125
(1992). 	It is well-settled that individuals "have a constitutional liberty interest in their bodily
integrity that is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515
F.3d 224, 235 (3d Cir. 2008). 	However, "[a]s a general matter, ... a State's failure to
protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the
Due Process Clause." OeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197. Nevertheless, in OeShaneythe
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Supreme Court identified two narrow except ions to this general rule: 	special re lationship
and state created danger.
On summary judgment, the Court found that a reasonable jury could find that MVSD
violated S.P. 's right to bodily integrity under the state created danger except ion. 1 The Due
Process clause "can impose an affirmative duty to protect if the state's own actions create
the very danger that causes the plaintiff's injury ." Morrow , 719 F.3d at 167. In other words,
MVSD may be liab le under the state created danger theory when the school district's action
created or enhanced a danger that caused S.P. 's alleged injuries.
The Court previously found that MVSD's conduct in continuing to place S.P . and
Student A on the same small van to and from school following the March 2021 sexual
harassmenUassault was foreseeable and affirmative conduct , citing Red Lion supra at 3,
which held that similar conduct stated a claim against a school district for a violation of the
student's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights to bodily integrity.2 As the
The Court did not find that a special relationship ex isted between MVSD and S.P . The Third Circuit
has previously held that a school district 's authority ove r a student du ring the school day "cannot be said to
create the type of physical custody necessary to bring it within the specia l relationsh ip noted in DeShaney. "
D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Tech. Sch. , 972 F.2d 1364, 1372 (3d Cir. 1992) .
2 	In the Comp laint , Pla intiff alleged a violation of the substantive due process right to "personal security
and bodily integrity ." (Doc . 1, ,m 82 , 88) . Although MVSD init ially moved to dismiss the Complaint , (Doc .
16) , that motion was withdrawn pursuant to a stipulation by the parties . (Doc. 28 , 1 4) ("Based on the
discussion, (a) Plaintiffs are no longer pursuing individual claims against the individual Defendants ; and (b)
Defendant withdraw their Motion without prejudice to raising their argument in a subsequent Motion. ").
Importantly, Plaint iff alleged that MVSD violated S.P .' s constitutional right to bodily integr ity by continuing to
allow S.P . and Student A to be transported in the same van to and from school despite the known sexual
harassment and assault(s) of S.P . by Student A. 	(Doc. 1, 134) ("In addition , at all times pertinent to this
matter and up to and includ ing April 16, 2021 , the School District allowed Student 'A' to be transported to and
from school with the minor , S.P. , which present a clear and present danger to S.P .") ; (Id ., 141) ("In addition ,
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Court recognized in its opinion denying summary judgment, "If a jury cred its Student A's
testimony and othe r record evidence, Mr. Barbo lish was awa re of the nature and extent of
the March 2021 fondling incident and nevertheless continued to place S.P. (who he knew
was in eighth grade and had significant intellectual disabilities and may not have been able
to consent to sexual contact) in the same small van with Student A." (Doc. 88 at 67).
The fact that Plaintiff did not affirmatively plead the magic words "state created
danger" in the Complaint , is of little to no consequence here. 	See M. T. by and through
Amber H v. Union Town Area Sch. Dist. , 2021 WL 807713, at *7 (W.D. Pa . Mar. 3, 2021)
("Mr. Dice's sole legal argument in favor of dism issal of the sec tion 1983 claim is that the
Amended Complaint does not use the words 'state created danger ' in asserting the claim
against him . He argues that deprivation of bodi ly integrity does not have distinct lega l
standing on its own absent a theory of state created danger, which has not been pleaded by
the Plaintiff . With respect to the state-created danger theory , the use of such 'mag ic words'
are not required.") (collecting cases). 	Moreover , MVSD does not dispute that the Complaint
raised a Section 1983 substantive due process claim based on S.P.'s right to bodily
integrity.3
the Mountain View School District allowed Student 'A ' to be transported in the same car pool at all times
before the April 16 , 2021 incident even though the mino r Plaintiff was sexually harassed by Student 'A' on at
least once, if not more , prior occasions. ").
3 	In MVSD 's motion to dismiss , it recognized that Plaintiff asserted three claims , including "a claim
pursuant to Section 1983 for violation of S.P .' s 14th Amendment right to bodily integr ity ." (Doc. 16 , ,I 24(b ).
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Courts generally treat allegations of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment right to
bodily integrity and state created danger as one in the same .4 Because the factual
allegations of the Complaint plausibly raised a violation of S.P.'s substantive due process
right to bodily integrity under the state created danger exception, and the summary
judgment record revealed genuine disputes of material fact that could not be resolved on
summary judgment on Plaintiff's section 1983 claim, the Court will not grant MVSD's motion
for reconsideration based on Plaintiff's failure to use the "magic words" state-created
danger. The Complaint adequately put MVSD on notice of the factual basis for Plaintiff's
allegations.
Ill. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will d 	otion for reconsideration.
A separate Order follows.
United States District Judge
4 	See , e.g., Biddinger v. Hanover Area Sch. Dist. , 2023 WL 6050577 , at *2 (M.D . Pa . Sept. 15 , 2023)
("Count I is styled as a 'bodily integrity ' claim and Count II is styled as a 'state-created danger- claim. But
these counts of the complaint are duplicative of one another ." ); Fielder v. Stroudsburg Area Sch. Dist. , 427
F. Supp. 3d 539, 550 (M .D. Pa . Dec . 9, 2019) ("[W]hen the alleged harm is directly caused by third party non-
state actors, courts generally conclude that there is no analytical distinction between an injury to bodily
integrity claim and a claim predicated on a state-created danger. Accordingly, the claim for injury to bodily
integr ity in Count II will be dismissed as duplicative to Count 111 , and I wil l consider Fielder 's claim to injury to
bodily integrity by way of the state-created danger doctrine .") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted));
Cuva v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist ., 2019 WL 1424524 , at *6 (M.D. Pa. Mar 29, 2019) ("Our research
confirms that a claim under§ 1983 for a violation of the due process right of bodily integrity is brought under
the state-created danger doctrine. ") (citing Bennett ex rel. Irvine v. City of Philadelphia , 499 F.3d 281, 286
(3d Cir . 2007)).
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