Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ZAUR ALESKEROV,
Petitioner,
v.
CRAIG A. LOWE, et al.,
Respondents.
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Civil No. 1:26-CV-00420
Judge Jennifer P. Wilson
MEMORANDUM
Before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 filed by Petitioner Zaur Aleskerov (“Aleskerov”). (Doc. 1.) Aleskerov
argues that he is being wrongfully detained without a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b) and, instead, should be immediately released or provided an opportunity
for a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226. For the reasons that follow, the court
will grant Aleskerov’s petition and order him released from custody.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL H ISTORY
Aleskerov is a 44-year-old native and citizen of Georgia. (Doc. 1, ¶ 12.) He
entered the United States on or about January 1, 2024, without inspection. (Doc. 8,
p. 4.) 1 On January 3, 2025, Aleskerov was served with a Notice to Appear in
immigration court for removal proceedings under the Immigration and Nationality
Act (“INA”), §§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i), because he was in the United States without
1 For ease of reference, the court uses the page numbers from the CM/ECF header.
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being admitted or paroled. (Id.) Aleskerov was released on his own recognizance
pending his immigration proceedings. (Id.)
On April 1, 2024, Aleskerov applied for asylum in the United States, which
remains pending. (Doc. 1, ¶ 18.) On January 19, 2026, Aleskerov was arrested by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) while leaving for work. (Id. ¶ 15.)
Aleskerov was transferred to Pike County Correctional Facility on January 29,
2026, and has been detained there since that date. (Id. ¶ 15.) Aleskerov had a
hearing scheduled before an immigration judge on March 2, 2026. (Doc. 8-6,
p. 2.)
On February 19, 2026, Aleskerov filed the instant petition requesting release
from detention or a bond hearing against Craig A. Lowe, Senior Warden, Pike
County Correctional Facility; Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director, ICE; Kristi Noem,
Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security; and Pam Bondi,
Attorney General of the United States (collectively, “Respondents”). 2 (Doc. 1.)
Respondents filed a response on March 6, 2026, and Aleskerov filed a traverse on
March 11, 2026. (Docs. 8, 9.) Thus, this petition is ripe for review.
2 Respondents, in a footnote, submit that the only proper respondent is Craig Lowe because he is
the Warden of Pike County Correctional Facility. (Doc. 8, p. 1 n.1.) In this case, consistent with
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 447 (2004), Petitioner has named the Warden as a respondent.
Padilla, 542 U.S. at 447 (“Whenever a § 2241 habeas petitioner seeks to challenge his present
physical custody within the United States, he should name his warden as respondent.”) The
court will not address an argument requesting dismissal of other Respondents when only raised
in a footnote.
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S TANDARD OF REVIEW AND J URISDICTION 3
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), a district court may consider a writ of
habeas corpus when an immigration detainee is “in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Claims related to an
immigration detainee’s request for release from confinement must be brought as a
habeas petition as these “claims fall within the ‘core’ of the writ of habeas corpus.”
Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025) (quoting Nance v. Ward, 597 U.S. 167
(2022)). Jurisdiction for “core habeas petitions . . . lies in only one district: the
district of confinement.” Id. (quoting Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443
(2004)) (internal quotations omitted). Aleskerov is detained at the Pike County
Correctional Facility, which is within the Middle District of Pennsylvania. See 28
U.S.C. § 118(b).
DISCUSSION
Aleskerov argues that he was improperly detained under Section 1225(b) of
the INA, which relates to applicants for admission. (Doc. 1; Doc. 9.) Aleskerov
submits that he should have been detained, if at all, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
and provided a bond hearing because he is not an applicant for admission. (Doc. 1;
Doc. 9, pp. 4–11.) Aleskerov requests the following forms of relief: a declaration
3 Unlike prior habeas petitions before this court that presented similar issues, Respondents do not
argue that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in this case, thus, the court will not address
that issue here. (See Doc. 8.)
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that his continued detention violates the Due Process Claus, Section 1226(a), and 8
C.F.R. § 1236.1(d); and that the court issue a writ of habeas corpus ordering
Aleskerov’s immediate release or, alternatively, to provide him with a bond
hearing before an immigration judge. (Doc. 1, p. 9.)
Respondents agree that Aleskerov is detained pursuant to Section
1225(b)(2)(A). (Doc. 8, p. 2.) They assert that Aleskerov falls within the statutory
definition of “applicant for admission,” he is properly detained under Section
1225(b)(2), and Section 1226(a) is inapplicable to him. (Id. at 15–42.)
Respondents submit that the plain language of Section 1225(b)(2) requires
detention of applicants for admission and that the section’s reference to noncitizens
“seeking admission” does not narrow the scope of Section 1225(b)(2). (Id. at 15–
29.) They further argue that their interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not
make Section 1226(a)’s discretionary detention authority superfluous and Jennings
does not undermine Respondents’ interpretation. (Id. at 29–44.) Respondents also
assert that Aleskerov’s temporary detention does not violate due process. (Id. at
38–42.) Alternatively, if the court wishes to grant Aleskerov’s petition,
Respondents request that the court order a bond hearing rather than releasing
Aleskerov. (Id. at 42.)
Section 1225 of the INA is titled “Inspection by immigration officers;
expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” 8 U.S.C.
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§ 1225. It defines “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien present in the United
States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States . . . .” Id.
§ 1225(a)(1). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides:
Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an
applicant 	for 	admission, 	if 	the 	examining 	immigration 	officer
determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a
doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a
proceeding under section 1229a of this title.
Noncitizens subject to this mandatory detention may only be released while their
removal proceedings are pending “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant
public benefit.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288. The BIA recently decided Matter of
Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 2016 (Sept. 5, 2025), wherein the BIA held that
noncitizens who enter the United States without admission are subject to
mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A), and thus, immigration judges
lack the authority to provide a bond hearing.
Conversely, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) provides, in relevant part:
(a) Arrest, detention, and release
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested
and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed
from the United States. 	Except as provided in subsection (c) and
pending such decision, the Attorney General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
(a) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and
containing 	conditions 	prescribed 	by, 	the 	Attorney
General; or
(b) conditional parole; but
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(3) may not provide the alien with work authorization (including
an ‘employment authorized’ endorsement or other appropriate
work permit), unless the alien is lawfully admitted for permanent
residence 	or 	otherwise 	would 	(without 	regard 	to 	removal
proceedings) be provided such authorization.
The parties agree that Aleskerov is detained pursuant to Section 1225(b)(2)(A) and
neither party alleges that Aleskerov is subject to Section 1226(c).4 (See Docs. 1, 8,
9.)
Federal district courts across the country and within this district have,
overwhelmingly, rejected Respondents’ position regarding the applicability of
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) to detainees like Aleskerov, a noncitizen who previously
entered and had been living in the United States prior to his detention.5 See, e.g.,
Hernandez v. Kunes, No. 1:25-cv-1847, 2026 WL 411726 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 13,
2026) (Wilson, J.) (holding Section 1225(b) was inapplicable to petitioner);
Santana-Rivas v. Warden of Clinton Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. 3:25-cv-1896, 2025
WL 3513152 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (Wilson, J.) (adopting report and
recommendation finding that Section 1225 was inapplicable to petitioner); Patel v.
O’Neil, No. 3:25-cv-2185, 2025 WL 3516865, at *4 n.7 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025)
4 Section 1226(c) requires detention of noncitizens who are inadmissible or deportable because
they have committed a criminal offense identified in this section. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
5 The court acknowledges that there are some district courts, as well as the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, who have agreed with Respondents’ interpretation of Section 1225. (See Doc. 8, pp. 3–
4.) Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, No. 25-20496, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 323330 (5th Cir. Feb. 6,
2026). However, none of these decisions are binding on this court.
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(collecting cases within the Third Circuit as of December 8, 2025); Quispe v. Rose,
3:25-cv-2276, 2025 WL 3537279 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2025) (holding that petitioner
was improperly detained under Section 1225(b)(2)(A)); Patel v. O’Neill, 3:25-cv-
2289, 2026 WL 323121 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2026) (same). “The vast majority of
courts confronting this precise issue have rejected the Government’s interpretation,
and the BIA’s interpretation of Hurtado, as contradictory to the plain text of
§ 1225.” Demirel, 2025 WL 3218243 (citing Ayala Amaya v. Bondi, No. 25-
16429, 2025 WL 3033880, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2025) (collecting cases)).
The court is persuaded by and agrees with the majority of federal district
courts that have ruled on this issue to date in rejecting Respondents’ interpretation
of Section 1225(b)(2)(A). Aleskerov’s detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) is
unlawful because Section 1225(b)(2)(A) “applies only to noncitizens who are
actively, i.e., affirmatively, ‘seeking admission’ to the United States.” Bethancourt
Soto v. Soto, No. 25-cv-16200, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2976572, at *7
(D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025). Thus, this section simply does not apply to someone like
Aleskerov, who has been residing in the United States for over two years. Id.
(collecting cases adopting the same conclusion).
In reaching this conclusion, the court holds that Respondents’ interpretation
of “seeking admission” violates the rule against surplusage and contradicts the
plain meaning of the statutory text. Bethancourt Soto, 2025 WL 2976572 at *5
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(finding that respondents’ interpretation “violates the rule against surplusage and
negates the plain meaning of the text.”); see also Patel, 2025 WL 3516865, at *5
(citing Centeno Ibarra v. Warden of Fed. Det. Ctr. Phila., No. 25-cv-6312, 2025
WL 3294726, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2025)) (same). If Section 1225(b)(2)(A)
applied to every “applicant for admission,” the phrase “seeking admission” would
become unnecessary and surplusage. 6 Bethancourt Soto, 2025 WL 2976572 at *6
(citations omitted); see also United States ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res.,
Inc., 599 U.S. 419 (2023) (explaining that “every clause and word of a statute
should have meaning” and “no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous,
void, or insignificant”). Further, “seeking admission” connotes “some affirmative,
present-tense action” such that it “requires an act currently underway not a static
condition.” Id. at *5 (citations omitted). Thus, Respondents’ argument that
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not require any “affirmative act” is contrary to the
plain meaning of the words “seeking admission.”7
6 Bethancourt Soto, 2025 WL 2976572 at*6, provides a helpful example of why Respondents’
interpretation violates the rule against surplusage:
[R]emoving the words “seeking admission” from § 1225(b)(2)(A) would not alter its
meaning under Respondents’ theory: “[I]n the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission
is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained[.]”
That result is inconsistent with the principle that courts must interpret a statute to give
meaning to “every clause and word” that Congress chose to include. See Polansky, 599
U.S. at 432, 143 S.Ct. 1720 (quotation marks omitted).
7 Again, the examples provided by the court in Bethancourt Soto, 2025 WL 2976572 at *6, are
illustrative of why Respondents’ argument fails:
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Respondents’ interpretation also makes Section 1226(c)’s mandatory
detention provision superfluous and redundant. Centeno Ibarra, 2025 WL
3294726 at *6 (“Under the government’s interpretation, § 1225 would require such
mandatory detention regardless of criminal charges or convictions. If this was the
case, Congress would have no need to create additional requirements for
mandatory detention.”).
In sum, Aleskerov is not currently “seeking admission” to the United States.
That was his status in January 2024. At that time, an immigration official made the
decision to release him in the United States on his own recognizance. Therefore,
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to him as he is not currently “seeking
admission” to the United States.
Addressing Aleskerov’s constitutional claims, it is undisputed that “once an
alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process
Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether
For example, one could deem every person in the country a “potential homebuyer,” but
they are not “seeking to buy a home,” without taking some affirmative action towards that
goal. Nor is every “employable adult” in the country “applying for a job,” simply because
jobs exist. 	Or, as Judge Ho explained in Benitez, “someone who enters a movie theater
without purchasing a ticket and then proceeds to sit through the first few minutes of a film
would not ordinarily then be described as ‘seeking admission’ to the theater. Rather, that
person would be described as already present there.” Benitez, ––– F.Supp.3d at ––––, 2025
WL 2371588, at *7. Further, “[e]ven if that person, after being detected, offered to pay for
a ticket, one would not ordinarily describe them as ‘seeking admission’ ... at that point—
one would say that they had entered unlawfully but now seek a lawful means of remaining
there.” Id.
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their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 693 (citations omitted). Thus, the court must determine what process is due
to Aleskerov, who is currently subject to mandatory detention without a bond
hearing, by applying the balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976). Mathews requires the court to weigh three factors: (1) “the private interest
that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. at 335.
The first factor weighs heavily in Aleskerov’s favor because the “official
action” has deprived him of his physical liberty. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 529 (2004) (“[T]he most elemental of liberty interests—the interest in being
free from physical detention by one’s own government.”). The second factor
similarly swings in Aleskerov’s favor because he “is presently and erroneously
detained under the mandatory detention provisions of § 1225, without an
opportunity for a bond hearing.” Bethancourt Soto, 2025 WL 2976572 at *8
(emphasis in original). As to the third factor, the court recognizes Respondents’
interest in detaining noncitizens to ensure “the appearance of aliens at future
immigration proceedings” and “preventing danger to the community.” Zadvydas,
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533 U.S. at 690. Still, this factor weighs in favor of Aleskerov because
Respondents do not contend that he has a criminal record, that he poses a danger to
the community, or that he is a flight risk. Accordingly, the Mathews factors weigh
in Aleskerov’s favor and the court finds that his mandatory detention without a
bond hearing under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) violates his procedural due process
rights. See Bethencourt Soto, 2025 WL 2976572 at *8 (“Taken together, the Court
finds that the Mathews factors weigh decisively in Petitioner’s favor, and as such
his mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates his procedural due process
rights.”) (citations omitted); Patel, 2025 WL 3516865 at *6 (holding same). Thus,
the court will grant Aleskerov’s petition and release him on his own recognizance
as the United States Border Patrol did in January 2024.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the court will grant Aleskerov’s petition for writ of habeas
corpus and order his immediate release. An appropriate order follows.
s/Jennifer P. Wilson
JENNIFER P. WILSON
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated: March 13, 2026
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