Dous v. Carroll et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 1:25-cv-01329-JFS Document7 Filed 02/26/26 Page 1 of 22

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MENA DOUS, : No. 1:25-CV-1329
Plaintiff : (Saporito, J.)
Vv. : (Caraballo, M.J.)

MICHAEL CARROLL, et al.,
Defendants
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

The undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court dismiss
without prejudice Plaintiff Mena Dous’s complaint (Doc. 1) and pending
motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. 3), and grant him leave to
submit an amended pleading, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a). Dous alleges that the Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation (“PennDOT”) indefinitely suspended his driving
privileges under Title 75, Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes,
Section 1533, for a citation received in Bedminster, New Jersey.!

Docs. 1 at 6; 6-8. According Dous, subsequent administrative and

1 The undersigned notes that, according to Dous, the citation was received in
“Bedminster, NJ Pennsylvania[.]” Doc. 1 at 6. Given that Dous submitted a court
document from New Jersey, Doc. 6-3, the undersigned construes the allegation as
stating that the underlying ticket was issued in New Jersey.

Case 1:25-cv-01329-JFS Document7 Filed 02/26/26 Page 2 of 22

judicial proceedings left him “indefinitely suspended without a
conviction, hearing, or effective remedy,” and his truck became “the
target of various police agencies in the Harrisburg area .. . any time [it]
was allegedly observed in motion, whether [Dous] was the one driving
or not.” Doc. 1 at 6—10.

Based on those allegations, Dous presents eight claims for relief
against Defendants the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (“the
Commonwealth”); PennDOT;? Josh Shapiro, the Governor of
Pennsylvania; Michael Carroll, the Secretary of PennDOT; Larry
Shifflet, the Executive Deputy Secretary of PennDOT; and Kara
Templeton, the Deputy Secretary for PennDOT’s Driver & Vehicle
Services (collectively “the Defendants”). Id. at 3-4. Six of the eight
causes of action are substantive claims, presented pursuant to Title 42,
United States Code, Section 1983:

1. Count I: Denial of procedural due process under the

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
(facial challenge);

2 The undersigned observes that neither the Commonwealth nor PennDOT are
listed as defendants in the case caption, but are identified as parties in the text.
Doc. 1 at 1, 4. This failure, though it runs afoul of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
10(a) (‘The title of the complaint must name all the parties.”), has no impact on this
R&R’s analysis.

Case 1:25-cv-01329-JFS Document7 Filed 02/26/26 Page 3 of 22

2. Count II: Denial of procedural due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment (as-applied challenge);

3. Count III: Denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment;

4. Count IV: Denial of substantive due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment;

5. Count VII: Cruel and unusual punishment in the form of
excessive fines, pursuant to the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution; and

6. Count VIII: Cruel and unusual punishment in the form of
“a lifetime driving prohibition,” pursuant to the Eighth
Amendment.
Id. at 18-25. Dous also seeks declaratory relief (Count V) deeming
75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1533 unconstitutional; and injunctive reliefs
(Count VD) “enjoining PennDOT from ... enforc[ing] § 1533 against
him or others similarly situated without prior notice, hearing, or
conviction,” and “reinstat[ing |his driving privileges and recognition of

the certified disposition.” Jd. at 22-23. Dous also attempts to

commence a putative class action.? Id. at 14-18.

3 Dous may not maintain a class action as a pro se litigant. See, e.g., Polsky v.
United States, 844 F.3d 170, 172 n.2 (3d Cir. 2016); Blue v. Def. Log. Agency, 181 F.
App’x 272, 275 (38d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). “Even if we were to accept [Dous]’s
argument that the first three requirements (numerosity, commonality, and
typicality) are met, as a pro se plaintiff, []he cannot adequately represent the
interests of other class members.” Blue, 181 F. App’x at 275.

3

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As set below, Dous fails to articulate a cognizable claim for relief
as a matter of law. All of the pending Section 1983 claims are barred by
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. As for the injunctive and
declaratory reliefs, they target the Commonwealth and would interfere
with the sovereign’s public administration, and thus fail to establish a
viable exception to sovereign immunity under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908).

As Dous has yet to amend his complaint, however, the
undersigned recommends that the complaint be dismissed without
prejudice, and that Dous be given 21 days to file an amended complaint,
pursuant to Rule 15(a). Finally, the pending motion for a preliminary
injunction should be denied without prejudice, as the complaint fails to
show a likelihood of success on merits.

I. Background

On July 21, 2025, Dous, proceeding pro se, commenced this action
against the Defendants. Doc. 1. Though the complaint is not a model of
clarity, partly due to liberal recitations and summaries of what appear
to be arguments, lacking context, from briefs submitted to state courts

in the course of underlying state proceedings, the undersigned has

Case 1:25-cv-01329-JFS Document7 Filed 02/26/26 Page 5 of 22

attempted to discern Dous’s averments in a sensible fashion, as
summarized below. See Rivera v. Monko, 37 F.4th 909, 914 (8d Cir.
2022); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e).

This suit arises out of a traffic citation that Dous received on
August 10, 2020. Doc. 6-3. According to the complaint, Dous “fully
resolved the matter in court.” Doc. 1 at 6. Subsequently, PennDOT
suspended Dous’s license based on “a failure to respond,” pursuant to
75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1533. Id. Dous produced “a certified court
disposition demonstrating that he had resolved the citation,” which was
to be presented “at the license hearing” before the Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania. Id. “Because no hearing had occurred in the
lower court, the appellate record was empty. When [Dous] submitted
the certified disposition on appeal, the Commonwealth Court struck the
evidence, reasoning that it was not part of the original record.” Jd. His
right to appeal reportedly expired after 30 days, “and he remained
indefinitely suspended[.|” Jd. Dous was cited and convicted for driving
while suspended. Jd. Dous also complains that he filed “a license

appeal,” to no avail. Id. at 7.

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Based on these allegations, Dous appears to take umbrage with
the continued enforcement of 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1533, even though a
similar provision (Title 75, Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, Section
1532(c)) was reportedly repealed in 2018. Jd. Dous complains that he
“became the target of various police agencies in the Harrisburg area
who colluded to either pull over [his] truck any time it was spotted, or to
mail [him] citations, any time his truck was allegedly observed in
motion, whether [he] was the one driving or not.” Jd. at 10.

Dous, surmising that he “exhausted all appellate remedies in PA,”
id., filed this action on July 21, 2025. Doc. 1. He simultaneously
applied for and was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Docs. 2;
5, with the complaint’s service held in abeyance pending the Court’s
screening obligations. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (requiring sua sponte
dismissal when an action “fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted ....”). Dous’s pending motion for a preliminary injunction
requests that the Court “enjoin[] Defendants from suspending drivers’
licenses solely on the basis of non-traffic related infractions|,|” and

“reinstate[| ... licenses that have been unconstitutionally suspended.”

Doc. 3 at 1.

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II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

The Court has a statutory duty to conduct a preliminary review of
the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Among the statutory
grounds for an action’s dismissal is its “fail[ure] to state a claim on
which relief may be granted.” Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). That language
mirrors the provision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which
permits dismissal of a complaint on motion of a party, and thus is
subject to a similar analysis. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Schreane V.
Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (8d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Allah v.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (8d Cir. 2000)).

A court may dismiss a complaint for its “failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[A]
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Connelly v. Lane
Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (8d Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted)
(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)); see also Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a)(2) (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain a short

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and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.”).

Plausibility in this context means neither possibility nor
probability. United States ex rel. Bookwalter v. UPMC, 946 F.3d 162,
177 (8d Cir. 2019). Instead, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Connelly, 809 F.3d at 786 (quotation omitted) (first citing
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; and then citing Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp.,
609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (8d Cir. 2010)).

The Court of Appeals employs a three-step inquiry when
determining a complaint’s sufficiency under Rule 12(b)(6). Santiago v.
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 1380 (8d Cir. 2010); see, e.g., Lutz v.
Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 49 F.4th 328, 328 (8d Cir. 2022);
Connelly, 809 F.3d at 787. First, the reviewing court “tak[es] note of the
elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Connelly, 809 F.3d
at 787 (second alteration in original) (quotation omitted) (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 675). The second phase is to “identify allegations that,

‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the

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assumption of truth.” Id. (first quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; and then
citing Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 224 (3d Cir. 2011)).
Finally, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the]
court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. (alterations in
original) (quotation omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). This last
step is done “in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff].” Kedra v.
Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 434 (3d Cir. 2017) (alteration in original)
(quotation omitted) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d
224, 228, 230 (8d Cir. 2008)). “If, after completing this process, the
complaint alleges ‘enough fact|s] to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary elements of a claim,
then it plausibly pleads a claim.” Lutz, 49 F.4th at 328 (alteration in
original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2009)).
If “a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Jd. (quotation omitted) (quoting
Bell, 550 U.S. at 556). That is, “[clonclusory allegations of liability are

insufficient.” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (8d Cir. 2019)

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(citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “Evaluating a motion to dismiss is ‘a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.” Bookwalter, 946 F.3d at 177
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

As is relevant here, “[c]Jomplaints filed by pro se litigants, . . . are
liberally construed, but must still ‘allege sufficient facts ... to support a
claim.” Rivera, 37 F.4th at 914 (first citing Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94;
and then quoting Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245
(3d Cir. 20138) (citation omitted)). As the Court of Appeals has
repeatedly explained, pro se litigants “cannot flout procedural rules—
they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.”
Vogt v. Weitzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (8d Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted)
(quoting Mala, 704 F.3d at 244-45).

B. Sovereign Immunity Bars Monetary Relief

The undersigned recommends that all Section 1983 claims for
monetary relief be dismissed, pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. Under sovereign immunity principles, federal jurisdiction is
absent over state governments. U.S. Const. amend. XI (“The Judicial

power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit

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in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States....”). And “[t]he [E]leventh [A]mendment’s bar extends to suits
against departments ... of the state having no existence apart from the
state,” including PennDOT. See Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 28,
25 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)); Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations,
Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc). Further, “a suit against
a state official in his or her official capacity is... a suit against the
official’s office,” and thus “is no different from a suit against the State
itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)
(citations omitted).

Here, sovereign immunity shields the Defendants and therefore
precludes the Section 1983 claims for monetary relief. Dous names as
defendants the Commonwealth, PennDOT, Shapiro, Carroll, Shifflet,
and Templeton. Doc. 1 at 3-5. The Commonwealth is a state
government, and PennDOT is one of its executive departments, lacking
existence independent of the Commonwealth. Likewise, as the
remaining four individuals are sued in their official capacities, id. at 1,

they, too, are immune from this suit. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.

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159, 165-66 (1985) (“Official-capacity suits[] . . . ‘generally represent
only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an
officer is an agent.” (quoting Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978))).

Although two exceptions to sovereign immunity exist, neither
applies here. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999). “Congress may authorize such a
suit in the exercise of its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
.... Id. (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)).
Alternatively, “a State may waive its sovereign immunity by consenting
to suit.” Jd. (citing Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 486, 447-48 (1888)).
That is, “the State [must] makel] a ‘clear declaration’ that it intends to
submit itself to [federal] jurisdiction.” Jd. at 676 (quoting Great N. Life
Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944)). Absent such an indication, “an
unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by
her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State.” Jones v.
Sussex Correctional Inst., 725 F. App’x 157, 159 (8d Cir. 2017) (per
curiam) (quotation omitted) (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,

662-63 (1974)).

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There is no indication, nor does Dous offer any authority, that
Congress authorized a lawsuit through which a citizen may sue his or
her own state over the suspension of driving privileges, as a part of
legislative effort to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. See Walker v.
Beard, 244 F. App’x 439, 440 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“Congress did
not abrogate states’ sovereign immunity when it enacted 42 U.S.C.

§ 19838.” (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 66)). As for the second exemption, the
Commonwealth, through its statutes, has specifically declined to waive
its sovereign immunity. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b) (“Nothing
contained in this subchapter shall be construed to waive the immunity
of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts guaranteed by the
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”). Thus,
both exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity are inapplicable.

Accordingly, as all of the Defendants are entitled to sovereign
immunity, all Section 1983 claims for monetary relief (Counts I-IV,
VII-VIII) warrant dismissal.

C. Injunctive and Declaratory Remedies Under the
Young Exception Are Unavailable

The undersigned also recommends that Dous’s request for

injunctive and declaratory reliefs be dismissed, as granting the requests

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would interfere with Pennsylvania’s public administrative efforts.
Young permits a third, narrow exception to sovereign immunity. The
rule posits that “official-capacity actions for prospective relief [from
ongoing violations of federal law] are not treated as actions against the
State.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10 (quotation omitted) (first quoting
Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 167 n.14; and then citing Young, 209 U.S. at 159-
60).

In determining whether Young “avoids an Eleventh Amendment
bar to suit, a court conducts a straightforward inquiry into whether the
complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief
properly characterized as prospective.” Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (cleaned up). That is, “[t]he
relief sought must be prospective, declaratory, or injunctive relief
governing an officer’s future conduct and cannot be retrospective, such
as money damages.” MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl. Pa., 271 F.3d
491, 506 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102—03 (1984)).

Relevantly, there are at least two caveats to the Young exception.

First, since Young concerns suits against individual officials, it “has no

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application in suits against the States and their agencies, which are
barred regardless of the relief sought.” P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v.
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 189, 146 (1993). Second, Young is
inapplicable if “[a] State is generally the real, substantial party in
interest,” which is the case if the requested relief would, among other
things, “interfere with public administration.” Waterfront Comm'n of
N.Y. Harbor v. Governor of N.J., 961 F.3d 234, 239 (8d Cir. 2020)
(citations and quotation omitted).

Here, Dous seeks several injunctive and declaratory reliefs. More
specifically, he requests: (1) “a permanent injunction enjoining
Defendants, their agents, employees, and all persons acting in concert
with them from enforcing § 1533 against [him] or others similarly
situated without prior notice, a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and
a valid judicial determination”; (2) “a mandatory injunction requiring
PennDOT to immediately reinstate [his] driver’s license, reorganize the
certified disposition proving resolution of the citation, and update all
agency records accordingly”; and (8) a “forward-looking declaratory

relief that any conviction or penalty issued solely on the basis of a

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suspension imposed under § 15338, without conviction or hearing, is
unconstitutional and unenforceable.” Doc. 1 at 25—26.

None of those requests are available under Young, for two reasons.
First, Dous effectively presents his requests against state entities.
While the case caption does not mention the Commonwealth or
PennDOT, id. at 1, the two governmental entities are listed among the
Defendants in Dous’s allegations. Id. at 3-4. Consequently, the
requested injunctive reliefs, which specifically encompass “Defendants”
and PennDOT, id. at 25-26, contravene the Young doctrine, and
therefore warrant dismissal. See Aqueduct, 506 U.S. at 146; see also Ex
parte State of N.Y., 256 U.S. 490, 500 (1921) (establishing that Young’s
_ scope is “determined not by the mere names of the titular parties but by
the essential nature and effect of the proceeding.” (citations omitted)).

Second, the nonmonetary reliefs, if granted, would interfere with
the Commonwealth’s scheme of public administration. The requested
remedies, as a whole, would compel the Commonwealth to reinstate
Dous’s driving privileges and, in the process, interfere with the
sovereign’s administrative system. See Doc. 1 at 25-26; Waterfront,

961 F.3d at 239 (mentioning the restructuring of state system among

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reliefs outside of Young’s scope). While Dous also names Shapiro,
Carroll, Shifflet, and Templeton in an “attempt]]| to bring this case

22 ¢

within the reach of... Young,” “[t]hat attempt is unavailing.” See
Waterfront, 961 F.3d at 240; see also N.Y., 256 U.S. at 500. As the relief
sought “would operate against the State itself, [Pennsylvania] is the
real, substantial party in interest.” See Waterfront, 961 F.3d at 239-40.

Accordingly, as the requested injunctive and declaratory remedies
are unavailable under the Young exception, the undersigned
recommends that the associated claims (Counts V—VI) be denied.

D. Leave to Amend Should Be Granted

The undersigned further recommends that the Court grant Dous
an opportunity to file an amended complaint. After determining that a
claim falls short of the plausibility standard, “a district court should
generally permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would
be inequitable or futile.” Lutz, 49 F.4th at 328 (quotation and citation
omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The Court “must provide the plaintiff
with this opportunity even if the plaintiff does not seek leave to amend”

and “inform the plaintiff that he or she has leave to amend the

complaint within a set period of time.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245 (first

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citing Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004); and then citing
Grayson v. Mayview State Hops., 293 F.3d 108, 108 (8d Cir. 2002)).

The five-factor analysis articulated in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.
178 (1962), governs amendments of pleadings. Id. at 182; see, e.g.,
Great W. Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 174
(3d Cir. 2010); Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1484 (citations omitted). The
five factors are: (1) “undue delay,” (2) “bad faith or dilatory motive,” (8)
“repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed,” (4) “undue prejudice to the [nonmovant] by virtue of allowance
of the amendment,” and (5) “futility of [the] amendment.” Foman,

371 U.S. at 182. These five factors are not exhaustive. Seeid. “[T]he
grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of
the District Court.” Id.

Here, while the operative complaint fails to state a cognizable
claim for relief, Dous has yet to amend his complaint. Nor is it clear at
this juncture that an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Thus,
the undersigned recommends that the Court grant him leave to submit
an amended complaint that cures any potential deficiencies in the

original complaint, with the understanding that the new complaint

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“must be complete in all respects”’—that is, “[i]t must be a new pleading
which stands by itself as an adequate complaint without reference to
the complaint already filed.” Young v. Keohane, 809 F Supp. 1185, 1198
(M.D. Pa. 1992). Further, the amended instrument must also comply
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (including Rules 8,4 10,5 and
12°) and the Middle District of Pennsylvania Local Rules.? See Vogt,

8 F.4th at 185.

E. Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and a Hearing
Should Be Denied

Finally, the undersigned recommends that the pending motion for
a preliminary injunction be denied without prejudice. The motion,
based on the complaint’s allegations, requests that the Court “enjoin[]

Defendants from suspending drivers’ licenses solely on the basis of non-

4 “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a short and plain
statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, .. . ; (2) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (8) a
demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)-(8). Also, “[eJach allegation
must be simple, concise, and direct.” Jd. R. 8(d).

5 “The title of the complaint must name all the parties.” Jd. R. 10(a).

6 Under the Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standard, “[c]onclusory allegations of liability
are insufficient.” Garrett, 938 F.3d at 92 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

7 For instance, Local Rule 5.1(c) states that “[m]argins must be at least one inch on
all four sides.” M.D. Pa. L. R. 5.1(¢).

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traffic related infractions ..., and... reinstate[]... licenses that have
been unconstitutionally suspended.” Doc. 8 at 1.

“The standard for granting a preliminary injunction... is the
same as that for issuing a [temporary injunction order].” Cerro
Fabricated Prods. LLC v. Solanick, 300 F. Supp. 3d 632, 646 n.5 (M.D.
Pa. 2018) (first citing Pileggi v. Aichele, 843 F. Supp. 2d 584, 592 (E.D.
Pa. 2012); and then citing Bieros v. Nicola, 857 F. Supp. 445, 446 (E.D.
Pa. 1994)). A movant seeking a preliminary injunction must show that:
“(1) he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) he will suffer irreparable
harm without preliminary relief, (8) the balance of equities favors an
injunction, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest.” Veterans
Guardian VA Claim Consulting LLC v. Platkin, 133 F.4th 213, 218 (8d
Cir. 2025) (citing Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).

“TA] likelihood of success on the merits means only a ‘reasonable
probability’ of suecess—odds that are ‘significantly better than
negligible but not necessarily more likely than not.” Jd. (quoting Reilly
v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176, 179 (8d Cir. 2017)). The
movant bears the burden of establishing this prong. Jd. As set forth

above, this motion is unlikely to succeed on the merits and thus should

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be denied. A corollary is that the motion for a hearing, presented in the

motion for a preliminary injunction, would be premature at this stage,

and thus also warrants denial.

Ill. Conclusion

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:

1.

2.

The complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED;

The pending motion for a preliminary injunction and for a
hearing (Doc. 3) be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
The Clerk’s Office be DIRECTED to TERMINATE all
pending defendants in this action;

Dous be afforded 21 days to submit an amended complaint
that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Middle District of Pennsylvania Local Rules, with the
understanding that, if Dous fails to comply, chooses against
complying, or lodges a notice to stand on the dismissed |
complaint, this action may be closed; and

This matter be referred back to the undersigned for further

pretrial management.

Dous is also placed on notice that, pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:

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Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed
findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or
matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 686 (b)(1)(B) or making a
recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a
habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being
served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk
of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties,
written objections which shall specifically identify the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report
to which objection is made and the basis for such objections.
The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall
apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made and may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her
discretion or where required by law, and may consider the
record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or
her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge
may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or
recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.

M.D. Pa. L. R. 72.3. Failure to file timely objections to the foregoing
R&R may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights. See Nara v.

Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 194 (8d Cir. 2007).

Date: February 26, 2026 S/ Phillip J. Caraballo
Phillip J. Caraballo
United States Magistrate Judge

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