Taylor v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ELIJAH TYRELL TAYLOR, : CIVIL NO: 1:25-CV-00070
:
Plaintiff, : (Judge Munley)
:
v. : (Magistrate Judge Schwab)
:
EXPERIAN INFORMATION :
SOLUTIONS, INC. :
:
Defendant. :
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction.
Plaintiff Elijah Tyrell Taylor claims that Defendant Experian Information
Solutions, Inc. failed to comply with its obligations under the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. §1681, et seq. Currently pending is Experian’s motion
to dismiss Taylor’s second amended complaint. For the reasons discussed below,
we recommend that the Court grant Experian’s motion to dismiss. We further
recommend that the Court not grant Taylor further leave to amend and that the
Court close this case.
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II. Background and Procedural History.
Taylor, representing himself, began this action by filing a complaint. Doc. 1.
He later filed an amended complaint asserting claims against Experian under the
FCRA and under the federal identity theft statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1028. Doc. 4.
Experian moved to dismiss the amended complaint. See doc. 13. After that
motion to dismiss was fully briefed, Judge Munley addressed the motion to
dismiss. See doc. 18. Because 18 U.S.C. § 1028 does not provide for a private
right of action, Judge Munley dismissed Taylor’s claim under that statute with
prejudice. Id. at 3 n.2, 5. Judge Munley dismissed Taylor’s claim under the FCRA
without prejudice, and she gave Taylor leave to file a second amended complaint.
Id. at 5.
In addressing Taylor’s FCRA claims in his amended complaint, Judge
Munley noted that “Taylor’s pro se filing are difficult to understand[,]” that
“[e]ven when the amended complaint is liberally construed, the court cannot
determine Taylor’s theory of liability against the defendant[,]” and that “it appears
that some of the plaintiff’s allegations are internally inconsistent.” Id. at 1. Judge
Munley construed and analyzed the amended complaint as follows:
Taylor’s amended complaint appears to allege that he
was denied a secured credit card by Discover Financial
Services, Inc. (“Discover”). (Doc. 4, Am. Compl. at ECF p. 6).
Thereafter, Taylor applied for and received an unsecured credit
card from Credit One Bank, N.A. (“Credit One”). Id. at 7.
Taylor further alleges that either Discover or Experian sold his
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consumer report to Credit One when he could not obtain a
credit card from Discover. Id.
At the same time, Taylor appears to assert that Experian
reported nine (9) entries related to Discover on his credit report,
but that this was inaccurate reporting. Id. at 10. An exhibit
attached to the complaint indicates that there were hard
inquiries on Taylor’s credit report from Discover. (Doc. 4-1,
Exhs. to Am. Compl. at ECF pp. 34–38. But based on
allegations that Taylor applied for a Discover credit card and a
Credit One credit card, one would presume that there would be
hard inquiries on a credit report from those financial
institutions. Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not reconcile
these apparent contradictions or allege any other inaccuracies in
his consumer reports. Since Taylor’s complaint fails to state a
claim under the FCRA, Experian’s motion to dismiss will be
granted. The amended complaint will be dismissed.
Id. at 2–3 (footnote omitted).
Although concluding that the amended complaint failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted under the FCRA, Judge Munley observed that “a
plausible FCRA claim against Experian may be lurking in the shadow of the extra
words and exhibits supplied by the plaintiff.” Id. at 3. Thus, she granted Taylor
leave to file a second amended complaint. Id. at 3, 5. Judge Munley advised
Taylor about the requirements for a second amended complaint and the need for
him to simply and clearly state his claims:
The second amended complaint should be a stand-alone
document, complete in itself and without reference to any
previous pleadings. The amended complaint should set forth
Taylor’s claims in short, concise, and plain statements, and in
numbered paragraphs, each limited to a single fact per
paragraph as far as practicable. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a), 8(d),
and 10. If Taylor believes that Experian furnished his
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consumer report without a statutorily provided permissible
purpose, he should identify the recipient and when it was
supplied. Taylor’s second amended complaint should not hide
any allegations about inaccuracies in his credit report. Plaintiff
is directed to state which items on his credit report are wrong,
why they are wrong, and when he discovered the errors.
Plaintiff is also directed to state when and how he notified
Experian of the discrepancies and the results of same. Taylor
need not copy and paste long passages of statutes, dictionary
entries, or court cases. Rather, plaintiff must simply state the
facts of his situation. If Taylor continues to plead his claims in
riddles or rely upon mutually exclusive facts without
explanation, his claims will be dismissed with prejudice.
Id. at 4. After Judge Munley dismissed his amended complaint but gave him leave
to amend, Taylor filed a second amended complaint. Doc. 19. Judge Munley then
referred this case to the undersigned for pretrial management. See doc. 20.
Upon reviewing the second amended complaint, we noticed that it was not
signed. Id. We directed the Clerk of Court to send Taylor a copy of his second
amended complaint so that he may sign it and return it to the court if he intends to
proceed under the second amended complaint. See Doc. 32. Taylor then signed his
second amended complaint. See doc. 37 at 48.
Like his amended complaint, Taylor’s second amended complaint is difficult
to understand, unclear, and contains few factual allegations. Taylor alleges that
Experian has been reporting “negative and false information on [his] consumer
report[,]” including “inaccurate personal information.” See doc. 37 at 46. But he
does not specify what that negative, false, or inaccurate information is. Taylor also
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alleges that he “submitted a valid dispute, Defendant received it, and instead of
reinvestigating within the 30-day period mandated by § 1681i(a)(1)(A), Defendant
issued a stall letter demanding unnecessary documentation for the purpose of
delaying its statutory obligations.” Id. at 45. But he does not allege what he
disputed or what purportedly unnecessary documentation Experian demanded.
Similarly, Taylor alleges that Experian did not conduct a proper investigation or
reinvestigation, see id. at 44–46, but he does not specify what required
investigation or reinvestigation. Further, Taylor alleges that he has not received
“any written document or permissible purpose by ‘Experian’ which therefore
indicates a thorough, true, and accurate investigation did not take place.” Id. at 46.
But again he does not specify what investigation or reinvestigation was required,
and to the extent Taylor is suggesting that Experian provided his credit report to
others who did not have a permissible purpose for obtaining his report, he does not
specify who those entities or individuals were. Taylor also alleges that he did not
initiate a consumer credit transaction with Experian and therefore he does not and
should not have an account with Experian. Id. at 47. But he does not allege that
Experian reported on his consumer report that he had an account with Experian.
Further, although Taylor alleges that “Experian did not provide [him] with a 1099-
C for any reported charged off accounts reflecting negative balance[,]” see id., he
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does not allege that Experian charged off any account or that Experian, as a credit
reporting agency, would charge off accounts.
Although the second amended complaint contains few facts, it contains
multiple conclusory assertions that Experian violated the FCRA. Id. at 44–47. As
relief, Taylor seeks actual and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief
compelling Experian “to fix negative errors on the report[.]” Id. at 3, 48.
Taylor attached numerous exhibits to his second amended complaint. He
attached correspondence from Experian regarding four separate disputes, a credit
report generated on January 12, 2026, postal receipts, some Rules and Regulations
of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection published in the Federal Register,
and a one-page summary of an Advisory Opinion by the Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection titled “Fair Credit Reporting: Permissible Purposes for
Furnishing, Using, and Obtaining Consumer Reports.” Id. at 5–43, 49–79.
We now address Experian’s motion to dismiss the second amended
complaint, which has been fully briefed. See docs. 21, 22, 28, 31.
III. Motion to Dismiss Standards.
In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court may dismiss a
complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” When
reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “[w]e must accept all factual
allegations in the complaint as true, construe the complaint in the light favorable to
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the plaintiff, and ultimately determine whether plaintiff may be entitled to relief
under any reasonable reading of the complaint.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223,
229 (3d Cir. 2010). In making that determination, we “consider only the
complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as
undisputedly authentic documents if the [plaintiff’s] claims are based upon these
documents.” Id. at 230.
“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the
pleading requirements of Rule 8(a).” I.H. ex rel. D.S. v. Cumberland Valley Sch.
Dist., 842 F. Supp. 2d 762, 769–70 (M.D. Pa. 2012). “Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a ‘short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 677–78 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). The statement required by
Rule 8(a)(2) must give the defendant fair notice of the nature of the plaintiff’s
claim and of the grounds upon which the claim rests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 93 (2007). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but more is required
than “labels,” “conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “In other
words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.”
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). “A complaint has
to ‘show’ such an entitlement with its facts.” Id.
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In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, the court “‘must accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true
and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.’”
Krieger v. Bank of Am., N.A., 890 F.3d 429, 437 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Flora v.
Cty. of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2015)). But a court “need not credit a
complaint’s bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to
dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). A
court also need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff
has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council
of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
Following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more
than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, it must recite factual allegations
sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere
speculation. In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint
entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a
plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should
identify allegations that, “because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”
Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a
court should assume their veracity and then determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”
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Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (footnote and
citations omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679).
In sum, although “[w]e accept as true all factual matters [the plaintiff]
alleges, . . . his complaint cannot survive unless the facts it recites are enough to
state plausible grounds for relief.” Beasley v. Howard, 14 F.4th 226, 231 (3d Cir.
2021) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. But “[a] claim that relies just on ‘conclusory statements,’ or on ‘threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action’ without supporting factual allegations,
does not establish plausible grounds for relief.” Id. (quoting Fischbein v. Olson
Rsch. Grp., Inc., 959 F.3d 559, 561 (3d Cir. 2020)).
A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and
“‘however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). “Notwithstanding the rule of liberal
construction, a pro se complaint may not survive dismissal if its factual allegations
do not meet Iqbal’s basic plausibility standard.” Beasley, 14 F.4th at 231.
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IV. Discussion.
Taylor claims that Experian violated the FCRA. For the reasons set forth
below, we conclude that the second amended complaint fails to state a FCRA
claim against Experian upon which relief can be granted.
“A credit report can determine everything from whether a person can secure
a credit card, purchase a home, win a new job, or start a small business.” Dep’t of
Agric. Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42, 45 (2024).
“Recognizing the importance of accuracy in credit reporting, Congress adopted the
Fair Credit Reporting Act in 1970 (FCRA).” Id. The FCRA “created a regulatory
framework governing consumer credit reporting.” Seamans v. Temple Univ., 744
F.3d 853, 860 (3d Cir. 2014). “That framework ‘was crafted to protect consumers
from the transmission of inaccurate information about them, and to establish credit
reporting practices that utilize accurate, relevant, and current information in a
confidential and responsible manner.’” Id. (quoting Cortez v. Trans Union, LLC,
617 F.3d 688, 706 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted)).
“The consumer credit reporting system involves two primary parties: (1)
consumer reporting agencies—like Experian—which compile reports on
consumers and make them available to lenders, insurers, employers, landlords, and
other users, and (2) furnishers. . . which provide information about consumers to
consumer reporting agencies.” Ingram v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 83 F.4th 231,
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237 (3d Cir. 2023) (italics in original). The “FCRA imposes a variety of
obligations on both furnishers and CRAs.” Seamans, 744 F.3d at 860.
“With a few narrow exceptions, the FCRA provides a right of action to
consumers against furnishers or consumer reporting agencies who are either willful
or negligent ‘in failing to comply with any requirement imposed under [the
FCRA].’” Ingram, 83 F.4th at 237 (quoting 15 U.S.C.§ 1681o and citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681n).
Here, because Taylor cites both 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (“Civil liability for
willful noncompliance”) and 15 U.S.C. § 1681o (“Civil liability for negligent
noncompliance”), we construe the second amended complaint as raising claims
that Experian both willfully and negligently violated the FRCA. Taylor cites
various provisions of the FCRA, but the second amended complaint is unclear and
confusing. Nevertheless, liberally construing that second amended complaint, we
address below the claims that we think Taylor is—or may be—attempting to raise.1
1 Taylor includes facts in his brief in opposition that he did not include in his
second amended complaint. “Although a court on a motion to dismiss ordinarily
‘must accept the allegations in the complaint as true,’ it is not compelled to accept
assertions in a brief without support in the pleadings.” Chavarriaga v. New Jersey
Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 232 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Morrow v. Balaski, 719
F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013)). “After all, a brief is not a pleading.” Id. Thus, we
do not accept the factual assertions in Taylor’s brief that do not appear in his
second amended complaint.
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A. 15 U.S.C. §1681e(b) and § 1681i(a).
Taylor alleges that Experian reported false information on his credit report,
and that he submitted a valid dispute, but Experian did not conduct a proper
investigation or reinvestigation. See doc. 37 at 44–46. And Taylor cites 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681e(b) and § 1681i(a). Thus, we analyze whether the second amended
complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted under either § 1681e(b)
or § 1681i(a). As explained below, to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted under either § 1681e(b) or § 1681i(a), a plaintiff must plausibly allege,
among other things, that his credit report was inaccurate. “A report is inaccurate
under the FCRA if a reasonable reader would understand it to convey information
that is materially false or misleading.” Bandes v. TransUnion LLC, No. 25-3184,
2026 WL 1266110, at *1 (3d Cir. May 8, 2026). And because Taylor has not
alleged facts that plausibly support an inference that his credit report was
inaccurate, we conclude that the second amended complaint fails to state either a
§ 1681e(b) or a § 1681i(a)(1)(A) claim upon which relief can be granted.
15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b), which deals with a consumer reporting agency’s
duties regarding procedures to assure accuracy of a consumer report in the first
instance, provides that “[w]henever a consumer reporting agency prepares a
consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible
accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report
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relates.” “Negligent noncompliance with FCRA § 1681e(b) consists of four
elements: ‘(1) inaccurate information was included in a consumer’s credit report;
(2) the inaccuracy was due to defendant’s failure to follow reasonable procedures
to assure maximum possible accuracy; (3) the consumer suffered injury; and
(4) the consumer’s injury was caused by the inclusion of the inaccurate entry.’”
Bibbs v. Trans Union LLC, 43 F.4th 331, 342 (3d Cir. 2022) (footnote omitted)
(quoting Cortez, 617 F.3d at 708). “[W]illful violations of the FCRA . . . require
the additional showing that the defendant acted knowingly or with reckless
disregard of the statute’s terms.” Id. at 342 n.16.
15 U.S.C. § 1681i deals with procedures in cases where a consumer disputes
the accuracy of a consumer report. “When a consumer notifies a consumer
reporting agency that they dispute the accuracy or completeness of the information
in their consumer file, the agency has two principal obligations.” Ingram, 83 F.4th
at 238. “First, within five (5) days of receiving the dispute, the agency must
provide notice of the dispute to the furnisher that provided the disputed
information.” Id. (citing § 1681i(a)(2)(A)). “Second, within thirty (30) days of
receiving the dispute, the agency ‘shall’ conduct a ‘reasonable’ investigation to
determine whether the disputed information is inaccurate.” Id. (quoting
§ 1681i(a)(1)(A)). “After completing the investigation, the consumer reporting
agency is required, among other responsibilities, to delete any information that
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could not be verified from the consumer’s file and notify the consumer in writing
of the results of the investigation.” Id. at 238–39 (citing §§1681i(a)(5)(A), (6)).
Nevertheless, “the FCRA explicitly allows a consumer reporting agency to
‘terminate’ its investigation into a[] . . . dispute ‘if the agency reasonably
determines that the dispute by the consumer is frivolous or irrelevant, including by
reason of a failure by a consumer to provide sufficient information to investigate
the disputed information.’” Id. at 239 (quoting § 1681i(a)(3)(A)). “If the agency
determines that a dispute is frivolous or irrelevant, it must notify the consumer,
provide the reasons for the determination, and identify any information that is
needed to investigate the dispute.” Id. (citing §§ 1681i(a)(3)(B)–(C)). But
“[a]ssuming the agency does not reasonably determine as a threshold matter that
the dispute is frivolous or irrelevant, the agency must perform an investigation into
the disputed information and update or delete it as necessary.” Id. at 237.
As noted, when a consumer notifies a consumer reporting agency of a
nonfrivolous dispute, the agency must “conduct a reasonable reinvestigation to
determine whether the disputed information is inaccurate[.]” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681i(a)(1)(A). The “decisive inquiry” as to whether a consumer reporting
agency’s reinvestigation was reasonable is whether the agency “could have
determined that there was an inaccuracy if it had reasonably investigated the
matter.” Bibbs, 43 F.4th at 344 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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Thus, “without a showing that the reported information was in fact inaccurate, a
claim brought under §1681i must fail.” Id. (footnote, internal quotation marks, and
citations omitted).
In sum, to state a claim under either § 1681e(b) or § 1681i(a), a plaintiff
must allege that his credit report was inaccurate. Id. at 342 (“An inaccuracy is the
threshold requirement for a § 1681e(b) claim.”), at 344 (holding that a claim under
§ 1681i “must fail” “without a showing that the reported information was in fact
inaccurate”). And conclusory allegations in that regard without supporting facts
are insufficient. See e.g. Williams v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 23-3167, 2024
WL 3439776, at *1 (3d Cir. July 17, 2024) (affirming dismissal of FCRA claims
where the plaintiff’s allegations concerning inaccuracies “consist almost entirely of
conclusory allegations that Experian included ‘inaccurate’ information in his
report[,]” and “[t]he only exception is his allegation that ‘[t]he inaccurate
information includes a credit card account from [PSECU] that represented a
balance and a late payment[,]” but noting that “even there Williams did not allege
how or why that information was inaccurate or how Experian should have reported
it[,]” and concluding that “[w]ithout any allegations in that regard, his complaint
does not permit the reasonable inference that his credit report was inaccurate, let
alone that Experian was liable for that inaccuracy”); Anigbogu v. Midland Credit
Mgmt., Inc., No. 23-CV-21732, 2025 WL 99581, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 15, 2025)
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(concluding that the complaint failed to state claims under §§ 1681e(b) and
1681i(a), where “the Plaintiff allege[d] that his credit report was ‘inaccurate[,]’”
but he alleged nothing regarding “the part of the report that was allegedly
inaccurate or why he believes it was” inaccurate and collecting cases that stand for
the proposition that “failure to plausibly allege an inaccuracy cuts off claims under
both § 1681e(b) of the FCRA and § 1681i(a)); Harris v. Trans Union LLC, No.
3:25-CV-279-RPC-RP, 2026 WL 1162288, at *5 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 29, 2026)
(“Courts routinely dismiss Section 1681(e)(b) and 1681i claims that fail to describe
the specific misstate[ments] or inaccuracies within credit reports and explain why
they are incorrect.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
Here, Taylor alleges that Experian reported false information on his credit
report. But he does not allege what in his credit report was inaccurate much less
why it was inaccurate. This despite Judge Munley’s explicit direction that he do
so. See doc. 18 at 4 (“Taylor’s second amended complaint should not hide any
allegations about inaccuracies in his credit report. Plaintiff is directed to state
which items on his credit report are wrong, why they are wrong, and when he
discovered the errors.”). Because Taylor fails to plausibly allege that his credit
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report was inaccurate, the second amended complaint fails to state a claim under
§ 1681e(b) or § 1681i(a) upon which relief can be granted.2
B. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2.
Taylor also cites to 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2, which deals with blocking
information resulting from identity theft. Section 1681c-2(a) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, a consumer
reporting agency shall block the reporting of any information in
the file of a consumer that the consumer identifies as
information that resulted from an alleged identity theft, not later
than 4 business days after the date of receipt by such agency
of—
(1) appropriate proof of the identity of the consumer;
(2) a copy of an identity theft report;
(3) the identification of such information by the consumer; and
(4) a statement by the consumer that the information is not
information relating to any transaction by the consumer.
Although Taylor makes a passing reference to § 1681c-2, he does not allege that he
was the victim or identify theft, that he submitted an identity theft report to
2 In connection with his allegations regarding § 1681i(a), Taylor purports to
cite to Younger v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 2d 1114 (W.D.
Wash. 2011). See doc. 37 at 45. But, as Experian points out in its brief, see doc. 22
at 7, there does not appear to be such a case. Experian concludes that it is possible
that Taylor meant to refer to Younger v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 817 F. App’x
862, 863 (11th Cir. 2020). Doc. 22 at 7. That conclusion is reasonable. In addition
to the Eleventh Circuit case citation beginning with “817” as does the purported
case cited by Taylor, the Eleventh Circuit’s case deals with an appeal of a district
court decision with a docket number that Taylor also cites. See doc. 37 at 47. Even
so, the Eleventh Circuit’s Younger decision does not assist Taylor as that case dealt
with an appeal following a jury trial. See Younger, 817 F. App’x at 863. It did not
address the standard for pleading a claim under § 1681i(a).
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Experian, or that he informed Experian that there was information in his file that
resulted from identity theft. Thus, the second amended complaint fails to state a
§ 1681c-2 claim upon which relief can be granted.
C. Other Provisions of the FCRA.
Taylor makes passing references to several other provisions of the FCRA.
He cites to § 1681b, which is titled “Permissible purposes of consumer reports.”
Section 1681b(a) sets forth numerous circumstances under which a consumer
reporting agency may furnish a consumer report. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(1)–(6).
Taylor purports to cite to 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(2)(i). See doc. 37 at 47. But there
is no such subsection. Rather, one of the circumstances set forth when a consumer
reporting agency may provide a credit report is when it is “[i]n accordance with the
written instructions of the consumer to whom it related.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(2).
But § 1681b(a)(2) is not further subdivided: i.e., there is no § 1691b(a)(2)(i), as
suggested by Taylor. Moreover, § 1681b(a) provides numerous circumstances
under which a credit reporting agency may provide a credit report. Thus, to the
extent that Taylor may be suggesting that Experian may only provide his credit
report in accordance with his written instructions, he is mistaken.
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Taylor also cites § 1681b(f), which provides:
A person shall not use or obtain a consumer report for any
purpose unless--
(1) the consumer report is obtained for a purpose for which
the consumer report is authorized to be furnished under this
section; and
(2) the purpose is certified in accordance with section 1681e
of this title by a prospective user of the report through a
general or specific certification.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1681b(f). He further cites to § 1681e(e)(1), which provides:
A person may not procure a consumer report for purposes of
reselling the report (or any information in the report) unless the
person discloses to the consumer reporting agency that
originally furnishes the report—
(A) the identity of the end-user of the report (or information);
and
(B) each permissible purpose under section 1681b of this title
for which the report is furnished to the end-user of the report
(or information).”
And he cites to § 1681q,3 which provides that “[a]ny person who knowingly and
willfully obtains information on a consumer from a consumer reporting agency
under false pretenses shall be fined under Title 18, imprisoned for not more than 2
years, or both.”
Here, Taylor does not allege facts that plausibly support an inference that
Experian provided his credit report in violation of § 1681b(a) or any other
3 Taylor actually references § 619 of the FCRA, which is codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1681q.
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provision of the FCRA. Although Taylor does not explicitly cite § 1681e(a), we
note that that provision provides:
Every consumer reporting agency shall maintain reasonable
procedures designed to avoid violations of section 1681c of this
title and to limit the furnishing of consumer reports to the
purposes listed under section 1681b of this title. These
procedures shall require that prospective users of the
information identify themselves, certify the purposes for which
the information is sought, and certify that the information will
be used for no other purpose. Every consumer reporting agency
shall make a reasonable effort to verify the identity of a new
prospective user and the uses certified by such prospective user
prior to furnishing such user a consumer report. No consumer
reporting agency may furnish a consumer report to any person
if it has reasonable grounds for believing that the consumer
report will not be used for a purpose listed in section 1681b of
this title.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1681e(a). When giving Taylor leave to file a second amended
complaint, Judge Munley warned Taylor that if he “believes that Experian
furnished his consumer report without a statutorily provided permissible purpose,
he should identify the recipient and when it was supplied.” Doc. 18 at 4. But
Taylor has not done so. Further, §§ 1681b(f), 1681e(e)(1), 1681q, which Taylor
cites, concern using, obtaining, or procuring a credit report rather than a credit
reporting agency furnishing a credit report to a third party. In sum, Taylor fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Experian under §§ 1681b(a),
1681b(f), 1681e(a), 1681e(e)(1), 1681q.
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Further, although Taylor does not include a citation to 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2
in his second amended complaint, he quotes a portion of § 1681s-2(a). See doc. 37
at 45. But that provision is titled “Duty of furnishers of information to provide
accurate information,” and it addresses duties of persons who provide information
to consumer reporting agencies. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a). It does not address duties
of consumer reporting agencies, such as Experian, and Taylor fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted against Experian under § 1681s-2(a).
In sum, Taylor has not alleged facts from which it can reasonably be inferred
that Experian violated the FCRA. Thus, the second amended complaint fails to
state a FCRA claim upon which relief can be granted.4
D. Leave to Amend.
Judge Munley previously gave Taylor leave to amend, and she advised him
that he needed to present a short and plain statement of his claims, and if he fails to
do so, his claims will be dismissed with prejudice. Yet, Taylor has failed to set
4 Taylor also cites to 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(2), which sets forth the definition of
the term “account” under the Electronic Funds Transfer Act. He alleges that he has
“not initiated a consumer credit transaction with, therefore, [he] do[es] not and
should not have an ‘account’ as defined under 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(2) with the
‘Defendant.’” Doc 37 at 47. But it is entirely unclear what Taylor is attempting to
claim in this regard. In any event, in addition to not alleging facts that plausibly
support an inference that Experian violated the FCRA, Taylor does not allege facts
that plausibly support an inference that Experian violated the Electronic Funds
Transfer Act.
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forth a short and plain statement of claims. And he has failed to allege facts that
plausibly support an inference that Experian violated the FCRA. Further leave to
amend would be futile. Thus, we recommend that the court dismiss the second
amended complaint without giving Taylor further leave to amend.
V. Recommendations.
For the reasons set forth above, we recommend that the court grant
Experian’s motion (doc. 21) to dismiss the second amended complaint with
prejudice and that the court close this case.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings,
recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in
28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the
disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party
shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and
all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to
which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The
briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A
judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the
report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.
The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her
discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record
developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own
determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive
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further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the
magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 12th day of August, 2026.
S/Susan E. Schwab
Susan E. Schwab
United States Magistrate Judge
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