Teamsters Local Union No. 776 v. United Parcel Service

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 776, 	:
Plaintiff 	: 	No. 1:24-cv-02133
:
v. 	: 	(Judge Kane)
:
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, 	:
Defendant 	:
MEMORANDUM
In this action arising under the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), Plaintiff
Teamsters Local Union No. 776 (“Plaintiff” or “the Union”) alleges that Defendant United
Parcel Service (“Defendant” or “UPS”) has refused to comply with an arbitration award. Both
parties have moved for summary judgment. For the following reasons, the Court will grant
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.1
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Procedural Background
On December 11, 2024, the Union filed a complaint alleging that UPS “fail[ed] to
comply with the Central Pennsylvania Area Parcel Grievance Committee’s [arbitration award]”
1 The parties each, in their motions for summary judgment, move for attorney’s fees and costs.
See (Doc. No. 19 at 22); (Doc. No. 14 at 2). “Under the American rule, each party normally
must bear the burden of its own legal expenses, including attorneys’ fees. One of the narrow
exceptions to this rule is a finding that the losing party litigated in bad faith, vexatiously, or for
oppressive reasons.” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Indep. Oil Workers Union, 679 F.2d 299, 305 (3d Cir.
1982). Neither party supports their request with citations to case law, and the Court does not
find that a narrow exception to the general rule applies here. 	See Kane Gas Light & Heating Co.
v. Int’l Bhd. of Firemen & Oilers, Loc. 112, 687 F.2d 673, 683 (3d Cir. 1982) (affirming the
district court’s denial of attorney’s fees where it “found that ‘no factors have been called to our
attention justifying a fee award because the plaintiff’s actions were in bad faith, vexatious,
wanton or oppressive,’” and noting “that the fact that the Company challenged the arbitrator’s
award on the merits is not by itself sufficient to justify a grant of attorney’s fees to the party
seeking enforcement of the award” (internal citations omitted)).
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compensating a UPS employee who had been terminated and then reinstated, allegedly in
violation of the collective bargaining agreement between the parties, as well as the LMRA.
(Doc. No. 1.) Defendant filed its answer on February 14, 2025. (Doc. No. 7.) The parties filed a
case management plan on April 11, 2025, in which they jointly submitted that “discovery is
unnecessary for the purpose of resolving this action.” (Doc. No. 11 at 5.) The Court then held a
case management conference with the parties on April 16, 2025 (Doc. No. 12), after which it set
a briefing schedule requiring that motions for summary judgment be filed on or before June 30,
2025 (Doc. No. 13).
On June 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 14) with a
supporting brief (Doc. No. 15), exhibits (Doc. No. 16), and statement of undisputed material
facts (Doc. No. 17). On July 1, 2025, Defendant filed its motion for summary judgment (Doc.
No. 18) with its supporting brief (Doc. No. 19), exhibits (Doc. Nos. 18-4–18-6), and statement of
undisputed material facts (Doc. No. 18-3).2
2 On July 25, 2025, Defendant filed a motion for extension of time to move for summary
judgment, explaining that it had encountered “technical difficulties,” which resulted in
Defendant submitting its motion at “12:11a.m. on July 1, 2025, 11 minutes after the [June 30,
2025] deadline.” (Doc. No. 24 at 2.) On August 1, 2025, Plaintiff filed its opposition to
Defendant’s motion for extension of time (Doc. No. 25), to which Defendant filed its reply on
August 15, 2025 (Doc. No. 28). Under Rule 6(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
“[w]hen an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may, for good cause,
extend the time . . . on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of
excusable neglect.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). Defendant argues that there is good cause to
excuse the “11-minute delay [because it] did not result in any prejudice to Plaintiff and did not
have any impact whatsoever on the progress of this judicial proceeding.” (Doc. No. 24 at 3.) In
its opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant did not demonstrate excusable neglect because it
“did not act in good faith” by waiting “more than 20 days” to file its motion for extension of
time, and further that the reasons for the delay were “completely within the reasonable control of
UPS.” (Doc. No. 25 at 2.) Plaintiff does not cite any authority in support of its argument.
Plaintiff’s argument is easily dispensed with, and Defendant adequately demonstrates good cause
for the minor delay. See Cuff v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 23-3246, 2025 WL 1442706, at *3 (3d Cir.
May 20, 2025) (affirming a district court ruling permitting a party to file a “summary judgment
motion more than five months after its scheduling order deadline,” where the opposing party
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On July 21, 2025, Defendant filed its brief in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment (Doc. No. 20) and its answer to Plaintiff’s statement of undisputed material
facts (Doc. No. 20-1), and that same day Plaintiff filed its brief in opposition to Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 23), accompanying exhibits (Doc. No. 21), and its
answer to Defendant’s statement of undisputed material facts (Doc. No. 22). The parties’ cross
motions are now ripe for disposition.
B. 	Factual Background3
1. 	Material Facts up to the Panel’s Issuance of the Award
The Union and UPS are parties to a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). (Doc.
Nos. 18-3 ¶ 1, 17 ¶ 3.) Maria Calderon, a UPS employee and bargaining unit member of the
Union, was terminated from her employment with UPS on February 9, 2024. (Doc. No. 17 ¶ 9.)
On February 16, 2024, the Union filed a grievance asserting that she was unjustly discharged,
and the grievance was brought before the Central Pennsylvania Area Parcel Grievance
Committee (“Panel”), which is comprised of representatives from UPS and local unions. (Doc.
Nos. 18 ¶ 4, 20-1 at 3.) The Panel is authorized, under the CBA, to hear grievances and to “order
full, partial, or no compensation for time lost by a grievant whose discharge or suspension the
“has not made the ‘clearest showing that the procedures have resulted in actual and substantial
prejudice,’ which we normally require before setting aside a decision of case management”)
(citing In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982)). For the foregoing
reasons, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion for an extension of time to file its motion for
summary judgment.
3 The following relevant facts of record are taken from Plaintiff’s statement of undisputed
material facts (Doc. No. 17), Defendant’s statement of undisputed material facts (Doc. No. 18-3),
Defendant’s response to Plaintiff’s statement of undisputed material facts (Doc. No. 20-1), and
Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s statement of undisputed material facts (Doc. No. 22). Each
filing contains specific citations to the record at each numbered paragraph. The facts are
undisputed unless otherwise noted.
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[Panel] or arbitrator deems unjust.” (Doc. No. 18-3 ¶¶ 5, 6) (internal citations omitted).
Decisions of the Panel are final and binding. (Id. ¶ 7.) The Panel held a hearing on the
grievance on June 14, 2024. (Id. ¶ 14.) After review, the Panel overturned Ms. Calderon’s
discharge and awarded her partial backpay. (Id. ¶ 19.) The Panel issued its written ruling
approximately one week after the hearing. (Id. ¶ 20.) The Panel’s award stated:
[t]he discharge is reduced to a 5 day suspension. The grievant will be paid 25 days
of pay at her daily guarantee. 	The grievant is reminded from the panel that she
must follow the instructions of her supervisors.
(Id. ¶ 21; Doc. No. 17 ¶ 16.) Following the Panel’s decision, UPS reinstated Ms. Calderon.
(Doc. No. 18-3 ¶ 23.)
The parties agree that Ms. Calderon’s “daily guarantee,” as of June 14, 2024, was 3.5
hours per day. (Doc. Nos. 17 ¶ 17, 20-1 at 8.) However, they dispute the actual monetary value
of the award. Plaintiff asserts that “the total remedy from the Panel is $2,340.63.” (Doc. No. 17
¶ 17.) Defendant disputes this interpretation: “[t]he Union’s backpay calculation is contrary to
the Parties’ discussions regarding the award during the six months preceding this litigation, the
backpay award of the [] Panel in connection with Ms. Calderon’s second discharge grievance,
and contrary to the practice of the parties to the CBA.” (Doc. No. 20-1 at 8.)
2. 	Material Facts after the Panel’s Issuance of the Award
Defendant, in its statement of undisputed material facts (Doc. No. 18-3), cites to a
number of events that occurred after the Panel had issued its award. Plaintiff largely does not
dispute these factual assertions, but instead objects that post-award facts are irrelevant and
inadmissible: “[p]ursuant to Rule 56(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Union
objects to [these statements] on the grounds that events that took place after the Arbitration
Award are not relevant, and therefore not admissible for Summary Judgment raised by UPS.”
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(Doc. No. 22 ¶¶ 28–33, 37–40, 42–56.)
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make
a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence” and “the fact is of
consequence in determining the action.” See Fed. R. Evid. 401. “Rule 401 does not raise a high
standard.” Hurley v. Atl. City Police Dep’t, 174 F.3d 95, 109–10 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Spain
v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 452 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that “evidence is irrelevant only when it
has no tendency to prove the fact,” and explaining that “the rule, while giving judges great
freedom to admit evidence, diminishes substantially their authority to exclude evidence as
irrelevant”).
Upon consideration of the foregoing, the Court will overrule Plaintiff’s objections and
admit the post-award facts for purposes of the instant summary judgment motions. The Court
finds that the post-award facts are relevant to Plaintiff’s claim—whether UPS “has refused to
comply with the Panel’s award.” (Doc. No. 15 at 3.) The Court’s determination of UPS’s
compliance or non-compliance with the award necessarily relies upon an assessment of its
actions and of events that took place after the issuance of the award. Plaintiff’s argument that
“events that took place after the Arbitration Award are not relevant” is therefore unavailing. See
generally (Doc. No. 22). Moreover, these facts are relevant to the dispute regarding the parties’
interpretation of the award, and may bear upon whether the award was ambiguous. In addition to
the foregoing, Plaintiff cites to no authority and makes no argument in its brief in support of its
evidentiary objections, and conclusory evidentiary objections are insufficient. See Williams v.
Pennsylvania State Univ., 697 F. Supp. 3d 297, 312–13 (M.D. Pa. 2023), aff’d, No. 23-3180,
2025 WL 971670 (3d Cir. Apr. 1, 2025) (finding that a party’s “bare citations to the Rules of
Evidence and conclusory statements—i.e. that portions of the [statement of material facts] are
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hearsay, confuse the issues, or were made without personal knowledge,—are insufficient to raise
legitimate objections”) (internal citations omitted). Because Plaintiff’s objections as to relevance
fail, and because Plaintiff does not controvert the material facts, the Court will deem them
admitted as set forth below. See Fireman’s Ins. Co. of Newark, N. J. v. DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965,
969 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding that once “the moving party has supplied sufficient affidavits in
support of its motion, the opposing party must respond by supplementing the record in some
manner—whether by its own affidavits or otherwise—setting forth specific facts demonstrating
that there is a genuinely disputed factual issue for trial”); see also Local Rule 56.1 (stating that
“[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be
deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be served by the
opposing party”).
After the issuance of the award, UPS asked the Union “to verify whether Ms. Calderon
had received unemployment benefits after her discharge during the period for which she was
awarded backpay.” (Doc. No. 18-3 ¶ 27.)4 The purpose of this request was “to determine the
amount of any offset from backpay.” (Id. ¶ 28.) In response, on July 11, 2024, the Union
“confirmed for UPS that Ms. Calderon had collected unemployment benefits in connection with
her discharge.” (Id. ¶ 29.) The Union “never objected to providing UPS with documentation of
Ms. Calderon’s unemployment benefits for the purpose of computing backpay at any time
between the [] Panel ruling and the filing of the Complaint in this action” on December 11,
4 The language of Plaintiff’s objection to this paragraph is slightly different from its objections
to the other post-award facts, but the Court finds that, for the same reasons articulated above, the
facts set forth in paragraph 27 are deemed admitted. See (Doc. No. 22 ¶ 27) (“Pursuant to Rule
56(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Union objects to this statement on the
grounds that other backpay awards are not relevant, and therefore not admissible for Summary
Judgment raised by UPS”).
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2024.5 (Id. ¶¶ 30, 33.)
In January 2025, “UPS suggested the Parties seek clarification of the backpay award from
the Joint Panel Chairmen who rendered the June 14, 2024 decision” (id. ¶ 35), to which the
“Union did not object or otherwise respond” (id. ¶ 36).6 On January 29, 2025, “UPS discharged
Ms. Calderon [once more], and the Union filed a grievance challenging the discharge.” (Id. ¶
37.) Having “failed to resolve Ms. Calderon’s second discharge grievance among themselves”
(id. ¶ 38), the “Union docketed the second discharge grievance” and it was “set for a hearing
before a joint panel and Arbitrator Jaffe on March 26, 2025” (id. ¶ 39). “At the outset of the []
proceeding on March 26, 2025, UPS requested that the joint panel and arbitrator review the June
14, 2024 decision reinstating Ms. Calderon and clarify the backpay award.” (Id. ¶ 40.) During
the proceeding, the parties “explained their dispute regarding whether backpay was subject to
offset for unemployment benefits” (id. ¶ 43), after which the “Panel Chairmen and Arbitrator
5 In addition to its standard objection, Plaintiff adds that, regarding Paragraph 33, “the Union
has always taken the position that the Award must be interpreted consistent with its express
terms.” (Doc. No. 22 ¶ 33.) However, Plaintiff does not cite to any record evidence in support
of this statement, and the Court will deem the facts set forth in this paragraph admitted. See
Local Rule 56.1 (requiring that “[s]tatements of material facts in support of, or in opposition to, a
motion shall include references to the parts of the record that support the statements. All
material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed
to be admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be served by the opposing
party”).
6 Plaintiff denies paragraph 35 (“[t]he Union did not agree that UPS was entitled to an offset for
unemployment compensation, nor did the Union agree to go before the Panel for clarification”
(Doc. No. 22 ¶ 35)) and paragraph 36 (“[t]he Union did not agree to seek clarification from the
CPAPGC Panel nor did the Union ever agree to place the 2024 Calderon award on the Docket
for clarification” (id. ¶ 36)). However, these so-called denials do not actually dispute the facts
asserted therein. Because the Union fails to raise genuine disputes as to paragraphs 35 and 36,
the facts set forth in these paragraphs will be deemed admitted. See Rau v. Allstate Fire & Cas.
Ins. Co., 793 F. App’x 84, 86-87 (3d Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (finding that the district court
properly deemed the moving party’s facts admitted where the opposing party filed a statement of
facts in which it denied averments by the moving party, “but then wrote answers that did not
actually reject the paragraphs it responded to”).
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Jaffe [] reviewed the June 14, 2024 decision privately in an executive session” (id. ¶ 44) and then
“confirmed for the Parties that the June 14, 2024 decision awarding backpay in connection with
Ms. Calderon’s reinstatement contemplated an offset of any unemployment benefits Ms.
Calderon had received during the period for which backpay was awarded” (id. ¶ 45). The Panel
“confirmed that Ms. Calderon was required to provide UPS with documentation of her
unemployment benefits in order for UPS to determine backpay” (id. ¶ 46), and Ms. Calderon was
ordered “to provide UPS with complete documentation of her unemployment benefits within ten
(10) days of the March 26, 2025 proceeding” (id. ¶ 47). The specific language of the decision,
read on the record, was as follows:
[t]he panel ruled and clarified that in case 24-24, Maria Calderon, heard in June of
2024 that the intent of the parties, as it’s always been, is that any financial offset
during the period of time she was back paid, meaning unemployment wages she
had earned, would need to be provided to [UPS] prior to the payment being made,
and that would be deducted from that backpay award. . . . And [UPS] will make
payment when she provides the documentation within 10 days as stated in the
contract.
(Doc. No. 18-5 at 38.)7 “On April 1, 2025, the Union provided UPS with complete
documentation of the unemployment compensation benefits Ms. Calderon received during the
period she was out of work because of her January 29, 2025 discharge.” (Doc. No. 18-3 ¶ 56.)
As to payment of the award, the parties do not dispute that UPS sent some amount to Ms.
Calderon, only whether that amount was sufficient. UPS asserts that on April 10, 2025, “UPS
remitted payment to Ms. Calderon for the backpay awarded in the June 14, 2024 and March 26,
2025 decisions” of the Panel (id. ¶ 57), and in calculating the amount, it “utilized the same
method to determine the amount of backpay owed to Ms. Calderon in connection with each
7 The Court cites directly to the record in this instance because, although Defendant references
the decision in its statement of undisputed material facts (Doc. No. 18-3 ¶¶ 45–47), it does not
quote the decision.
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[Panel] decision, namely, by calculating Ms. Calderon’s lost wages based on her hourly rate and
daily guarantee and deducting unemployment compensation based on Ms. Calderon’s weekly
benefits for the relevant period” (id. ¶ 58). The Union denies paragraph 57 insofar as, in its
view, “UPS did not remit payment to Ms. Calderon based on the plain meaning of the Arbitration
Award for the 2024 award,” and admits paragraph 58 “only to the extent that UPS calculated Ms.
Calderon’s backpay based on its own interpretation” of the award. (Doc. No. 22 ¶¶ 57, 58.) The
Union does not dispute but does object to UPS’s statement that the “method UPS used to
determine the amount of backpay owed to Ms. Calderon was consistent with the March 26, 2025
[award].”8 (Doc. No. 18-3 ¶ 59.) The Union asserts that, instead, the “total remedy from the
Panel is $2,340.63.” (Doc. No. 17 ¶ 17.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is
warranted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute
is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law, and it is genuine
only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis that would allow a reasonable factfinder to return a
verdict for the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–49
(1986). At summary judgment, the inquiry is whether the evidence presents a sufficient
8 The language of Plaintiff’s objection to this paragraph is slightly different from its objections
to the other post-award facts, but the Court finds that, for the same reasons articulated above, the
facts set forth in this paragraph will be deemed admitted. See (Doc. No. 22 ¶ 59) (“Pursuant to
Rule 56(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Union objects to this statement on the
grounds that the March 26, 2025[] Arbitration Award is not relevant, and therefore not
admissible for Summary Judgment raised by UPS”).
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disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must
prevail as a matter of law. See id. at 251–52. In making this determination, the Court must
“consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” See A.W.
v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 794 (3d Cir. 2007).
The moving party has the initial burden of identifying evidence that it believes shows an
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364
F.3d 135, 145–46 (3d Cir. 2004). Once the moving party has shown that there is an absence of
evidence to support the non-moving party’s claims, “the non-moving party must rebut the motion
with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal
memoranda, or oral argument.” See Berckeley Inv. Grp. Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d
Cir. 2006); accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). If the non-moving party
“fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial,” summary judgment is
warranted. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence that the
non-moving party must provide, a court should grant a motion for summary judgment when the
non-movant’s evidence is merely colorable, conclusory, or speculative. See Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 249–50. There must be more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the non-moving party and
more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. See id. at 252; see also Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Furthermore, a party may not
defeat a motion for summary judgment with evidence that would not be admissible at trial. See
Pamintuan v. Nanticoke Mem’l Hosp., 192 F.3d 378, 387 (3d Cir. 1999).
The summary judgment standard remains the same when addressing cross-motions for
summary judgment. See Transguard Ins. Co. of Am., Inc. v. Hinchey, 464 F. Supp. 2d 425, 430
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(M.D. Pa. 2006) (citing Appelmans v. City of Phila., 826 F.2d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 1987)). “When
confronted with cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must rule on each party’s
motion on an individual and separate basis, determining for each side, whether a judgment may
be entered in accordance with the Rule 56 standard.” Castlepoint Nat. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of
Pennsylvania, No. 14-cv-00792, 2015 WL 2339092, at *3 (M.D. Pa. May 13, 2015) (internal
citations omitted). “If review of cross-motions reveals no genuine issue of material fact, then
judgment may be entered in favor of the party deserving the judgment in light of the law and
undisputed facts.” Transguard, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 430 (citing Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 150
F.3d 298, 302 (3d Cir. 1998)).
B. 	Standard for Review of an Arbitration Award
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) governs “[s]uits for
violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in
an industry affecting commerce . . ., or between any such labor organizations.” See 29 U.S.C. §
185(a); see also Wooddell v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Loc. 71, 502 U.S. 93, 98 (1991)
(holding that “a suit properly brought under § 301 [of the LMRA] must be a suit either for
violation of a contract between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in
an industry affecting commerce or for violation of a contract between such labor organizations”).
“Section 301 [of the LMRA] governs claims founded directly on rights created by collective-
bargaining agreements, and also claims ‘substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-
bargaining agreement.’” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987) (citing Elec.
Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 859 n.3 (1987) and Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S.
202, 220 (1985)).
It is settled law that “the courts play only a limited role when asked to review the
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decision of an arbitrator.” See United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484
U.S. 29, 36 (1987). In such disputes, “the question of interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement is a question for the arbitrator.” See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960). “It is the arbitrator’s construction which was bargained
for; and so far as the arbitrator’s decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have
no business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his.” Id.
Thus:
the arbitrator’s award settling a dispute with respect to the interpretation or
application of a labor agreement must draw its essence from the contract and cannot
simply reflect the arbitrator’s own notions of industrial justice. But as long as the
arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the
scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not
suffice to overturn his decision.
See Misco, 484 U.S. at 38.
Generally, “once an arbitration panel renders a decision regarding the issues submitted,
the panel becomes functus officio and lacks any power to reexamine that decision.” See
Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Omaha Indem. Co., 943 F.2d 327, 331 (3d Cir. 1991). However, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recognizes three exceptions to the functus
officio doctrine:
(1) 	an arbitrator can correct a mistake which is apparent on the face of his
award;
(2) 	where the award does not adjudicate an issue which has been submitted,
then as to such issue the arbitrator has not exhausted his function and it
remains open to him for subsequent determination; and
(3) 	[w]here the award, although seemingly complete, leaves doubt whether the
submission has been fully executed, an ambiguity arises which the arbitrator
is entitled to clarify.
See id. at 332 (cleaned up) (quoting La Vale Plaza, Inc. v. R. S. Noonan, Inc., 378 F.2d 569, 573
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(3d Cir. 1967)). The third exception provides that “when the remedy awarded by the arbitrators
is ambiguous, a remand for clarification of the intended meaning of an arbitration award is
appropriate.” See Colonial Penn, 943 F.2d at 334. “Such a remand avoids the court’s
misinterpretation of the award and is therefore more likely to give the parties the award for
which they bargained.” Id.
Where an arbitrator has clarified their award, “[u]nflagging deference to arbitrators’
‘clarifications’ would effectively give them the power to revisit the merits of prior decisions,
thus completely eliminating the functus officio doctrine.” See Verizon Pennsylvania, LLC v.
Commc’ns Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, Loc. 13000, 13 F.4th 300, 309 (3d Cir. 2021).
Therefore, when “an arbitrator has actually decided an issue but the ruling is ambiguous, we
defer to the arbitrator’s post hoc interpretation of his award only if it is a rational clarification of
the ambiguity; otherwise, the arbitrator is revising the award, not clarifying it.” See id.
III. 	DISCUSSION
Both parties agree that the Panel’s award here draws its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement and is enforceable. See (Doc. No. 15 at 5) (Plaintiff states that the
“arbitration award draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement”); (Doc. No. 20 at
13) (Defendant states that “[t]here is no question the [] Panel award draws its essence from the
CBA”); see also Misco, 484 U.S. at 38 (stating that “the arbitrator’s award settling a dispute with
respect to the interpretation or application of a labor agreement must draw its essence from the
contract and cannot simply reflect the arbitrator’s own notions of industrial justice”). However,
Defendant argues that, because this is not a suit to vacate or modify the award, the “inquiry is
irrelevant here,” because “[w]hether an arbitration award draws its essence from a collective
bargaining agreement is primarily relevant to the Court’s authority to disturb the award.” (Doc.
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No. 20 at 9.) Regardless, the Court agrees with both parties and finds that the award here drew
its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. The Panel has the authority, under the
parties’ collective bargaining agreement, to hear grievances and to “order full, partial, or no
compensation for time lost by a grievant whose discharge or suspension the [Panel] or arbitrator
deems unjust.” (Doc. No. 18-3 ¶¶ 5, 6) (internal citations omitted). Decisions of the Panel are
final and binding. (Id. ¶ 7.) As such, the award—overturning Ms. Calderon’s discharge and
awarding partial backpay (id. ¶ 19)—is in a “rational way derived from the collective bargaining
agreement.” See Pennsylvania Power Co. v. Loc. Union No. 272, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
AFL-CIO, 276 F.3d 174, 178 (3d Cir. 2001).
Although the parties agree that the Panel’s award is valid and enforceable, they dispute
whether the award was ambiguous and disagree as to its meaning. As cited above, the Panel’s
award to Ms. Calderon stated as follows:
The discharge is reduced to a 5 day suspension. The grievant will be paid 25 days
of pay at her daily guarantee. 	The grievant is reminded from the panel that she
must follow the instructions of her supervisors.
(Doc. Nos. 18-3 ¶ 21, 17 ¶ 16.) Plaintiff argues that there is “no ambiguity in the [a]ward,” and
that “this is not a situation where the parties are unable to calculate the damages owed based on
the language of the arbitration award.” (Doc. No. 15 at 13.) Plaintiff states, “[t]he award
directed the Employer to pay Ms. Calderon 25 days of pay at her daily guarantee. [] Under
Article 50 of the CBA, a part-time employee, such as Ms. Calderon, is guaranteed 3.5 hours a
workday.” (Doc. No. 15 at 14.) Plaintiff argues that, given the award’s lack of ambiguity, there
is no genuine issue of material fact that Defendant “has refused to comply with the Panel’s
award.” (Id. at 3.)
Defendant counters that:
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[t]he undisputed record clearly establishes UPS did not fail to comply with the
backpay award. The fact that UPS reasonably believed the backpay award required
offset and endeavored to satisfy the award based on such interpretation is
undisputed and dispositive, and the Court should grant the Company’s Motion on
that basis. The Court cannot find that UPS failed to comply with the backpay award
absent a clear directive from the CPAPGC. The record in this matter is devoid of
evidence that UPS violated any such directive.
(Doc. No. 27 at 3.) Moreover, Defendant argues that the “absence of language regarding offset
is not dispositive,” and the Panel’s decision “fails to address other key components of backpay
too, such as the relevant timeframe, the grievant’s regular work period, and the grievant’s rate of
pay.” (Id. at 3–4.) Defendant adds that:
[i]f the Parties agreed on the amount of the backpay award, this dispute would not
be before the Court. 	The Union contends the grievant was owed $2,340.63,
whereas UPS maintains it satisfied the award by remitting payment to the grievant
in the amount of $15.625. [] The Joint Panel decision fails to resolve this
disagreement on its face. The award is therefore ambiguous.
(Id. at 4.)
As noted supra, ordinarily, “once an arbitration panel renders a decision regarding the
issues submitted, it becomes functus officio and lacks any power to reexamine that decision.”
See Colonial Penn, 943 F.2d at 331. Plaintiff argues that here “the Panel was functus officio
after issuing the June 14, 2024 [award].” (Doc. No. 23 at 13.) Defendant counters that the
“functus officio rule does not bar remand in cases where, as here, the Parties only differ as to the
remedy awarded.” (Doc. No. 20 at 14.) Defendants quote Local 825 of International Union of
Operating Engineers v. Tuckahoe Sand & Gravel, No. 06-cv-04784, 2007 WL 1797657, at *9
(D.N.J. June 20, 2007) for the proposition that, “where back pay or other benefits are the subject
of an initial award, and a dispute arises as to the nature or amount of the initial award, the normal
course of action is to treat the award as ambiguous and remand the dispute to the original
arbitrator to clarify the award.” The district court in Tuckahoe found that the situation at issue
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fell “into the third exception to the functus officio doctrine; it clarified ambiguities in the initial
Opinion and Award, and therefore did not exceed the scope of the arbitrator's authority.” See id.
For the following reasons, the Court finds that the initial arbitration award is ambiguous
and that the Panel’s clarification meets the third exception to the functus officio doctrine. The
text of the award—prescribing “25 days of pay at her daily guarantee” (Doc. No. 16-4 at 2)—is
not sufficiently clear as to leave the Court without doubt. See United Mine Workers of Am.
Dist. No. 5 v. Consolidation Coal Co., 666 F.2d 806, 811 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding that “[i]f the
court has any doubt, the parties should be returned to their grievance procedure and arbitration,
for it is an arbitrator, and not the court, who is to decide whether the same issue has already been
resolved in an earlier proceeding”); see also SEIU Healthcare Pennsylvania, CTW, CLC v. Reg’l
Hosp. of Scranton, 106 F. Supp. 3d 523, 547 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (finding remand necessary and
quoting Tuckahoe).9 The text of the award does not specify a dollar figure. To determine the
value of the award, then, the Court would need to look to extrinsic evidence. Both parties, in
fact, steer the Court to elements beyond the text of the award to guide their interpretations.
Plaintiff points to the parties’ understanding of the meaning of the term “daily guarantee,” as
well as to Ms. Calderon’s pay rate. (Doc. No. 15 at 14.) Defendant points to the parties’ practice
of offsetting arbitration awards based on any unemployment compensation received, as well as
9 Plaintiff argues that an “alleged ambiguity does not provide grounds for a remand when the
employer does not present mitigating evidence to the arbitrator,” citing International Union of
Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers, Local 5 v. Inter-State Tile & Mantel Co., No. 1:07-cv-01150,
2010 WL 2034693 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL
2034695 (M.D. Pa. May 18, 2010). (Doc. No. 15 at 19.) However, in that case, the court found
that “remand would, in effect, call upon us to generally re-open this arbitration decision under
the guise of assessing the amount of the company’s contribution and would invite the arbitrator
to reexamine the merits of this decision three years after it was entered on grounds that were not
timely presented.” See Inter-State Tile, 2010 WL 2034693, at *12. The Court finds the situation
at issue in Inter-State Tile materially different from the facts at hand.
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the parties’ understandings and actions in the wake of the instant award’s issuance. (Doc. No. 19
at 6–13.) Although the Court could endeavor to interpret the award based upon these competing
renderings, the law is clear that the parties are owed the arbitrator’s, not the Court’s,
interpretation. See United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 599 (“[i]t is the arbitrator’s construction
which was bargained for”). In such a case, the answer is to remand, not to guess. See Dist.
1199C v. Genesis Healthcare, No. 08-cv-01791, 2008 WL 5116899, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 2, 2008)
(remanding the matter to the arbitrator to clarify the award, noting that “[i]t is possible that the
arbitrator intended one of the methods of calculation proposed by the parties. It is also possible
that upon remand, the arbitrator would explain that he intended another method of calculation”);
Pennsylvania Nurses Ass’n, Loc. 729, OPEIU/AFL-CIO v. John F. Kennedy Med. Ctr., 247 F.
Supp. 2d 665, 675 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (finding remand appropriate because “the Court cannot
conclude with positive assurance that the Award was intended to cover this category of nurses”)
(internal quotations omitted). Because of the Court’s limited role in arbitration matters, and
given the conflicting evidence, the Court deems the initial award ambiguous.
Because the award is ambiguous, the third exception to the functus officio doctrine
applies. See Colonial Penn, 943 F.2d at 334 (noting that the third exception provides that “when
the remedy awarded by the arbitrators is ambiguous, a remand for clarification of the intended
meaning of an arbitration award is appropriate”). Ordinarily the proper recourse would be to
remand for clarification, but that clarification was already sought and provided here. In January
2025, “UPS suggested the Parties seek clarification of the backpay award from the Joint Panel
Chairmen who rendered the June 14, 2024 decision” (id. ¶ 35) to which the “Union did not
object or otherwise respond” (id. ¶ 36). On January 29, 2025, “UPS discharged Ms. Calderon [a
second time], and the Union filed a grievance challenging the discharge.” (Doc. No. 18-3 ¶ 37.)
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This second discharge grievance was “set for a hearing before a joint panel and Arbitrator Jaffe
on March 26, 2025.” (Id. ¶ 39.) During the proceeding, the parties “explained their dispute
regarding whether backpay was subject to offset for unemployment benefits” (id. ¶ 43), after
which the “Panel Chairmen and Arbitrator Jaffe [] reviewed the June 14, 2024 decision privately
in an executive session” (id. ¶ 44) and then “confirmed for the Parties that the June 14, 2024
decision awarding backpay in connection with Ms. Calderon’s reinstatement contemplated an
offset of any unemployment benefits Ms. Calderon had received during the period for which
backpay was awarded” (id. ¶ 45). The Panel “confirmed that Ms. Calderon was required to
provide UPS with documentation of her unemployment benefits in order for UPS to determine
backpay” (id. ¶ 46), and Ms. Calderon was ordered “to provide UPS with complete
documentation of her unemployment benefits within ten (10) days of the March 26, 2025
proceeding” (id. ¶ 47). The specific language of the clarification, read on the record, was:
[t]he panel ruled and clarified that in case 24-24, Maria Calderon, heard in June of
2024 that the intent of the parties, as it’s always been, is that any financial offset
during the period of time she was back paid, meaning unemployment wages she
had earned, would need to be provided to [UPS] prior to the payment being made,
and that would be deducted from that backpay award. . . . And [UPS] will make
payment when she provides the documentation within 10 days as stated in the
contract.
(Doc. No. 18-5 at 38.)
Where an arbitrator has clarified their award, “[u]nflagging deference to arbitrators’
‘clarifications’ would effectively give them the power to revisit the merits of prior decisions,
thus completely eliminating the functus officio doctrine.” See Verizon, 13 F.4th at 309.
Therefore, when “an arbitrator has actually decided an issue but the ruling is ambiguous, we
defer to the arbitrator’s post hoc interpretation of his award only if it is a rational clarification of
the ambiguity; otherwise, the arbitrator is revising the award, not clarifying it.” See id.
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Here, the arbitrator rationally clarified the ambiguity in the arbitration award. The
clarification, which articulated the method of calculating the backpay with more specificity, is
squarely within the scope of the original award and does not revisit its merits. See Prospect Cap.
Mgmt. L.P. v. Stratera Holdings, LLC, No. 22-mc-00089, 2024 WL 4678392, at *2 (D. Del.
Nov. 5, 2024) (finding that the arbitrator rationally clarified the ambiguity in the award and
distinguishing the facts as “wholly dissimilar from Verizon, where it was ‘obvious’ that the
arbitrators had revised an earlier decision when their later decision permitted recovery for a
particular issue despite having previously ‘explicitly stated’ in the earlier decision that recovery
should be denied because that issue was already ‘settled’”); see also San Antonio Newspaper
Guild Loc. No. 25 v. San Antonio Light Div., 481 F.2d 821, 825 (5th Cir. 1973) (finding that
“[t]he normal course of action in such cases, then, is for the court to remand the matter to the
original arbitrator for clarification. To do so in this case, however, would be a pointless gesture.
There has already been a clarification of Arbitrator Florey's award”). Because this clarification
does not attempt to modify the substance or alter the ruling as to the merits of the controversy,
the clarification stands. See La Vale Plaza, 378 F.2d at 573 (permitting the arbitrator to clarify
an ambiguous award to “remove the cloud of doubt,” in a way that would “in no way reopen the
merits of the controversy”). This clarification had the same effect as a remand—to “avoid[] the
court’s misinterpretation of the award,” and therefore to “give the parties the award for which
they bargained.” See Colonial Penn, 943 F.2d at 334.
In assessing cross-motions for summary judgment, if the Court’s review “reveals no
genuine issue of material fact, then judgment may be entered in favor of the party deserving the
judgment in light of the law and undisputed facts.” See Transguard Ins. Co. of Am., Inc., 464 F.
Supp. 2d at 430 (citing Iberia Foods, 150 F.3d at 302). Even viewing the facts in the light most
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favorable to Plaintiff, there is no genuine issue of material fact. UPS did not refuse to comply
with the Panel’s award. Instead, it interpreted the award to be offset by any unemployment
compensation that Ms. Calderon may have received, it made efforts to obtain the documentation
to determine the amount it owed her, and it sought clarification from the Panel to confirm
whether it had properly interpreted the award. The Panel confirmed UPS’s understanding.
Defendant is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court will grant
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Defendant
and deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Further, the Court will grant Defendant’s
motion for an extension of time to file its motion for summary judgment, and will deny both
parties’ requests for attorney’s fees. An appropriate Order follows.
s/ Yvette Kane
Yvette Kane, District Judge
United States District Court
Middle District of Pennsylvania
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