Kalapach v. Columbia County Prison et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ASHLEY KALAPACH, 	: Civil No. 1:24-CV-1478
:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)
:
COLUMBIA COUNTY PRISON, et al.,:
:
Defendants. 	:
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I. 	Introduction
This is a civil action brought by the plaintiff, Ashley Kalapach,
against 	various 	defendants, 	alleging violations 	of 	her 	constitutional
rights while she was incarcerated in the Columbia County Prison in
2021.1 In December of 2025, Kalapach’s counsel moved to withdraw from
representation, a request which we granted.2 We then stayed this matter
to afford the plaintiff an opportunity to obtain new counsel. 3 	Hearing
nothing from the plaintiff, and after being unable to contact her prior to
a scheduled case management conference, we issued an order directing
1 Doc. 1.
2 Docs. 40, 41.
3 Doc. 41.
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the plaintiff to show cause on or before February 13, 2026 as to why this
matter should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.4
This deadline has passed with no filings from, or contact by, the
plaintiff in this matter. 	Accordingly, we will dismiss this action due to
the plaintiff’s failure to prosecute.
II. 	Discussion
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a court
to dismiss a civil action for failure to prosecute or to comply with the
Federal Rules or court orders. 5 	Dismissal under this rule rests with the
discretion of the court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion. 6 	The court’s discretion is governed by what are commonly
referred to as the
Poulis factors:
To determine whether the District Court abused its discretion
[in dismissing a case for failure to prosecute], we evaluate its
balancing of the following factors: (1) the extent of the party’s
personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary
caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond
to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the
conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith;
(5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which
4 Doc. 43.
5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
6
Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).
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entails 	an 	analysis 	of 	alternative 	sanctions; 	and 	(6) 	the
meritoriousness of the claim or defense.7
In 	making 	this 	determination, 	“no 	single
	Poulis 	factor 	is
dispositive.” 8 Moreover, “not all of the
Poulis factors need be satisfied” to
dismiss a complaint for failure to prosecute. 9 As the Court of Appeals has
explained, “[i]n balancing the
Poulis factors, [courts] do not [employ] a . .
. ‘mechanical calculation’ to determine whether a District Court abused
its discretion in dismissing a plaintiff’s case.”10
In this case, an analysis of the
Poulis factors leads us to conclude
that this case should be dismissed. Consideration of the first factor—the
party’s personal responsibility—indicates that the delays are entirely
attributable to the plaintiff, who has failed to abide by court orders or
contact the court in any way regarding her case.
The second factor—prejudice to the adversary—also weighs heavily
in favor of dismissal. 	This factor is entitled to great weight, since the
Third Circuit has explained:
7
Emerson, 296 F.3d at 190 (citing
Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.,
747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984)).
8
Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003).
9
Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992).
10
Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting
Mindek, 964
F.2d at 1373).
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“Evidence of prejudice to an adversary would bear substantial
weight in support of a dismissal or default judgment.”
Adams
v. Trustees of New Jersey Brewery Employees’ Pension Trust
Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 873-74 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Generally, prejudice includes
“the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable dimming of
witnesses’ 	memories, 	or 	the 	excessive 	and 	possibly
irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party.”
Id. 	at 	874 	(internal 	quotation 	marks 	and 	citations
omitted). . . . . 	However, 	prejudice 	is 	not 	limited 	to
“irremediable” or “irreparable” harm.
Id.;
see also Ware v.
Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003);
Curtis T.
Bedwell & Sons, Inc. v. Int’l Fidelity Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 683,
693-94 (3d Cir. 1988). It also includes “the burden imposed by
impeding a party’s ability to prepare effectively a full and
complete trial strategy.”
Ware, 322 F.3d at 222.11
Here, the defendants are plainly prejudiced by the plaintiff’s failure to
comply with court orders or litigate this case, and we find that this factor
weighs in favor of dismissal.12
Considering 	the 	history 	of 	dilatoriness 	on 	the 	plaintiff’s 	part,
dismissal is appropriate. As the Third Circuit has stated, “[e]xtensive or
repeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such
11
Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 259-60.
12
See e.g.,
Tillio v. Mendelsohn, 256 F. App’x 509 (3d Cir. 2007) (failure
to timely serve pleadings compels dismissal);
	Reshard v. Lankenau
Hospital, 256 F. App’x 506 (3d Cir. 2007) (failure to comply with discovery
compels dismissal);
Azubuko v. Bell National Organization, 243 F. App’x
728 (3d Cir. 2007) (failure to file amended complaint prejudices defense
and compels dismissal).
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as consistent non-response . . . , or consistent tardiness in complying with
court orders.”13 	In the instant case, it is undisputed that the plaintiff
has failed to comply with multiple court orders directing her to respond.
We further conclude that the fourth factor—whether the conduct of
the party was willful or in bad faith—weighs in favor of dismissal. With
respect to this factor, we must assess whether the party’s conduct is
willful, 	in 	that 	it 	involved 	“strategic,” 	“intentional 	or 	self-serving
behavior,” or a product of mere inadvertence or negligence.14 	Here,
where the plaintiff has failed to comply with our instructions directing
her to act, we are compelled to conclude that these actions are not
inadvertent but reflect an intentional disregard for our instructions and
for this case.
The fifth factor—the effectiveness of lesser sanctions—also cuts
against the plaintiff in this case. 	Cases construing
Poulis agree that
when confronted with a
pro se litigant who refuses to comply with court
orders, lesser sanctions may not be an effective alternative.15 	Here, by
13
Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 260-61 (quoting
Adams v. Trustees of New Jersey
Brewery Employees’ Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 874 (3d Cir. 1994))
(quotations and some citations omitted).
14
Adams, 29 F.3d at 875.
15
See e.g., Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262-63;
Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191.
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entering our prior orders and advising the plaintiff of her obligations, we
have tried lesser sanctions to no avail. Accordingly, dismissal is the only
available sanction remaining.
Finally, we are cautioned to consider the meritoriousness of the
plaintiff’s claims. 	However, we find that consideration of this factor
cannot save the plaintiff’s claims, as she has been wholly noncompliant
with her obligations as a litigant. 	As we have explained, no one
Poulis
factor is dispositive, and not all factors must be satisfied for the plaintiff’s
case to be dismissed.16 	Accordingly, in our view, the untested merits of
the plaintiff’s claims, standing alone, cannot prevent the dismissal of
those claims. 	Thus, this action will be dismissed with prejudice for the
plaintiff’s failure to prosecute.17
16
See Ware, 322 F.3d at 222;
Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373.
17
See e.g.,
Green v. Klepacki, 2020 WL 7624834, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21,
2020) (dismissing an action with prejudice for failure to prosecute where
the plaintiff failed to respond to discovery or court orders).
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III. 	Order
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
THAT this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to Rule
41(b) for the plaintiff’s failure to prosecute. The Clerk of Court is directed
to close this case.
So ordered this 19th day of February 2026.
S/ Daryl F. Bloom
Daryl F. Bloom
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
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