Hinshaw v. Moore et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JASON DEWIGHT HINSHAW,
Plaintiff,
v.
CO1 P. KYLE,
et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:24-cv-00769
(SAPORITO, J.)
ORDER
Jason Dewight Hinshaw, a prisoner proceeding
	pro se, asserts
Eighth 	Amendment 	excessive 	force 	claims 	against 	two 	correctional
officers at SCI-Huntingdon. The defendants have moved for summary
judgment (Doc. 26), and Hinshaw has not responded despite an extension
of the deadline to do so. Because Hinshaw did not exhaust administrative
remedies, and the record shows that the defendants did not violate his
Eighth Amendment rights, the Court grants summary judgment to the
defendants.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The Court received Hinshaw’s unverified complaint on May 7, 2024.
(Doc. 1). The complaint alleges that on August 22, 2022, defendants CO1
Kyle and CO1 Rivers conducted a “security check” of his cell. The officers
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allegedly “snatched” family photos from the wall and “laughed . . . and
made jokes” about the photos. When the search was complete, the officers
allegedly “slamm[ed Hinshaw’s] head into the wall,” pushed him down a
set of stairs while he was in restraints, and “slammed [him] onto the
ground on [his] face.” Hinshaw was permitted to proceed on Eighth
Amendment excessive force claims against Kyle and Rivers, while a claim
of 	“failure 	to 	train, 	supervise, 	and 	discipline” 	against 	five 	other
defendants was dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.1
See (Doc. 9).
On May 26, 2025, after discovery closed, defendants moved for
summary judgment. When Hinshaw failed to respond within the time
allotted, the Court issued an order extending the deadline to September
5, 2025, and warning that the motion would be deemed unopposed if
Hinshaw did not respond.2 (Doc. 34). Hinshaw has not responded.
1 Defendants’ motion construes Hinshaw as asserting a Fourth
Amendment claim premised on an allegedly improper search of his cell.
See (Doc. 31 at 17-18). However, that was not among Hinshaw’s listed
claims for relief, nor does the complaint indicate that he intended to raise
such a claim.
See (Doc. 1).
2 A prior order mailed to Hinshaw was returned undeliverable, but
the Clerk found that Hinshaw had been transferred to SCI-Fayette and
updated his address accordingly.
See (Doc. 30).
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary
judgment should be granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might affect the outcome
of the case.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
dispute of material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence “is such that a
reasonable 	jury 	could 	return 	a 	verdict 	for 	the 	non-moving 	party.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all
inferences “should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, and where the non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the
movant’s, then the non-movant’s must be taken as true.”
Pastore v. Bell
Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994). The party seeking
summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion,” and demonstrating the absence
of a genuine dispute of material fact.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes such a showing, the non-movant
must set forth specific facts, supported by the record, demonstrating that
“the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to
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the jury.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52.
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must first
determine if the moving party has made a
prima facie showing that it is
entitled to summary judgment.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 331. Only once that prima facie showing has been made does the
burden shift to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a
genuine dispute of material fact.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Celotex, 477
U.S. at 331. Both parties may cite to “particular parts of materials in the
record, 	including 	depositions, 	documents, 	electronically 	stored
information, 	affidavits 	or 	declarations, 	stipulations 	(including 	those
made for the purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory
answers or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
Although the motion is unopposed, the Court must still review the
record to establish “that the facts specified in or in connection with the
motion 	entitle 	the 	moving 	party 	to 	judgment 	as 	a 	matter of 	law.”
Anchorage Assocs. v. Virgin Islands Bd. of Tax Rev., 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3d
Cir. 1990). Because Hinshaw has not responded to defendants’ motion,
their properly supported statements of fact are deemed unopposed.
See
M.D. Pa. L.R. 56-1.
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III. 	MATERIAL FACTS
The summary judgment record indicates as follows: On August 22,
2022, Hinshaw was subjected to a security check on his cell in the
Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) at SCI-Huntingdon. He watched from
outside of his cell as defendants Kyle and Rivers searched the cell.
Hinshaw testified that he had placed a picture of his sister in an area “on
the wall where it wasn’t supposed to be,” and that Rivers “yanked” the
picture from the wall, ripping the picture in the process. When the search
concluded, the officers ordered Hinshaw to return to his cell, but he
refused to reenter his cell without speaking to a lieutenant. (Hinshaw
Dep. 13:17-14:6, 18:8-19:15, 47:3-49:4) (Doc. 32-2).
Defendants have produced surveillance video of the incident in
question (Doc. 33). The video shows that Hinshaw initially walked
toward his cell, escorted by the officers, until he reached the entrance. At
the entrance, he began struggling against the officers, who tried to push
him into the cell. The officers briefly pinned Hinshaw’s body against the
frame of the door. Although Hinshaw’s head touched the door frame,
Hinshaw moved his head to the frame on his own, after he was already
pinned; the officers did not push his head or neck or “slam” his head into
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the frame.3
At this point, the officers moved Hinshaw to the “strip cage,” which
was downstairs from his cell. Although the officers initially attempted to
walk Hinshaw to the strip cage, he resisted by flailing and dragging his
feet. After they descended the stairs, Hinshaw continued to resist, and
the officers tackled him and pinned him to the ground. The three camera
angles do not clearly depict what happened after Hinshaw was pinned,
but he was pinned for approximately 45 seconds while another officer
placed leg restraints on him. Hinshaw testified that during this time, he
experienced a “snap out,”4 during which he tried to harm himself by
slamming his head against the floor.
3 Because the video clearly contradicts Hinshaw’s testimony that
Kyle “grabbed [him] by the back of [the] neck and slammed [his] face in
the door frame” (Hinshaw Dep. 14:1-6), that testimony is not considered
for summary judgment purposes.
See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380
(2007) (“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could
believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes
of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”).
4 Hinshaw testified that when he is restrained, “I get depressed and
I start[ ] punching the wall or I get mad. I punch the wall. I just, I snap
out. I can’t tell you exactly what snap out is because it could be anything
for me. I can start punching a wall, head butting stuff . . . those are all
snap outs.” (Hinshaw Dep. 26:5-21).
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Defendants ultimately carried Hinshaw into the strip cage with
assistance from two other officers.5 In the strip cage, he was examined by
a nurse and photos of his injuries were taken. He sustained a quarter-
sized hematoma to the center of his forehead and abrasions on his cheek
and neck.
See (Docs. 32-3, 32-4).
The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) provides a
three-part procedure for inmate grievances: initial review by a Grievance
Officer, appeal to the Facility Manager, and final appeal to the Secretary’s
Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (“SOIGA”). As relevant here,
the 	final 	appeal 	to 	SOIGA 	must 	be 	accompanied 	by 	“all 	required
documentation relevant to the appeal,” including copies of the initial
grievance, the appeal, and the responses.
See DC-ADM 804 (Doc. 32-5 at
24-58), § 2.B.1.j.
On August 25, 2022, three days after the incident in question,
Hinshaw filed Grievance No. 995129, reciting similar allegations to those
he 	made 	in 	this 	complaint. 	On 	January 	30, 	2023, 	following 	an
5 The video does not clearly depict the strip cage, but Hinshaw does
not allege that he was subjected to excessive force in the strip cage.
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investigation6, the Grievance Officer denied the grievance.
See (Doc. 32-
5 at 14-22). The Facility Manager denied Hinshaw’s appeal. Hinshaw
attempted to appeal to SOIGA, but his appeal was dismissed for his
failure to attach copies of the initial grievance, initial response, and
appeal to the Facility Manager.
See (Doc. 32-6 at 11). The record does not
indicate that Hinshaw tried to resubmit his appeal.
IV. 	DISCUSSION
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment because Hinshaw
did not properly exhaust administrative remedies. Under the Prison
Litigation 	Reform 	Act 	(“PLRA”), 	prisoners 	complaining 	about 	the
conditions of their confinement must exhaust available administrative
remedies before they may file suit in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
The 	PLRA 	requires 	proper 	exhaustion, 	meaning 	plaintiffs 	must
administratively grieve their claims in accordance with the procedural
rules of the prison in which they are incarcerated.
Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of
Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 305 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.
6 When a grievance alleges abuse of an inmate, the applicable rules
permit 	an 	indefinite 	extension 	of 	the 	time 	to 	respond 	while 	the
allegations are investigated.
See DC-ADM 804, § 1.D;
Tomlin v. Smolke,
No. 1:24-CV-628, 2025 WL 3515257, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025).
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81, 88 (2006)). Therefore, exhaustion within the DOC requires appeal to
SOIGA, the third and final step of the process.
See Spruill v. Gillis, 372
F.3d 218, 232 (3d Cir. 2004).
Here, the undisputed evidence shows that Hinshaw did not follow
the rules of the grievance process in attempting to appeal to SOIGA, and
SOIGA dismissed the appeal without considering it on the merits. An
inmate who fails to provide the required documentation for a final appeal,
and has the appeal dismissed on that basis, has not exhausted available
remedies and cannot sue in federal court.
See,
e.g.,
Sanders v. Sec’y
Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 602 F. App’x 54, 57 (3d Cir. 2015);
Hall v.
Wahl, No. 3:23-CV-0494, 2024 WL 1077321, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 12,
2024);
Buehl v. Fisher, No. 3:10-CV-2288, 2014 WL 1334219, at *11 (M.D.
Pa. Apr. 2, 2014).
Even if the Court 	could consider Hinshaw’s claim, the record
forecloses any reasonable inference of excessive force. When an inmate
disobeys a verbal order and attempts to physically resist a cell placement,
prison officers are permitted to use force as necessary to subdue the
inmate.
See,
e.g.,
Washington v. Ondrejka, 822 F. App’x 104, 106 (3d Cir.
2020);
Tindell v. Beard, 351 F. App’x 591, 595-56 (3d Cir. 2009). It is
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undisputed that Hinshaw resisted defendants’ efforts to return him to his
cell and continued to resist when they attempted to place him in the strip
cage. No reasonable jury viewing the video could conclude that it was
excessive to pin Hinshaw to the ground when he had physically resisted
the officers for almost 30 seconds, or that the officers did so “maliciously
and sadistically to cause harm.”
Banks v. Meck, 531 F. App’x 205, 207 (3d
Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). Contrary to Hinshaw’s allegations, they
did not “slam” his head into a wall, and the medical evidence shows that
he sustained only superficial injuries from this incident.
V. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. 	Defendants’ 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	(Doc. 	26) 	is
GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to enter JUDGMENT in favor of
defendants and against plaintiff.
2. 	Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute (Doc.
36) is DENIED as moot.
3. 	The Clerk is directed to mark this case as CLOSED.
Dated: March 10, 2026
	s/Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States District Judge
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