Young v. Spyker et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CURTIS ANTHONY YOUNG,
Plaintiff,
v.
MS. SPYKER,
et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:23-cv-01839
(SAPORITO, J.)
MEMORANDUM
Curtis Anthony Young, formerly incarcerated at SCI-Huntingdon,
alleges that seven defendants affiliated with the prison violated his
Eighth Amendment rights when he was transferred to the Restricted
Housing Unit for 20 days. All parties have moved for summary judgment
on Young’s excessive force and conditions of confinement claims. Because
he did not exhaust administrative remedies as to his excessive force
claim, and the record shows that the defendants did not violate his
Eighth Amendment rights, the Court grants summary judgment to the
defendants.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Young proceeds on an amended complaint (Doc. 35), which concerns
his temporary transfer from the Diversionary Treatment Unit (“DTU”), a
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unit designed for inmates with mental illnesses, to the RHU at SCI-
Huntingdon in June 2023. In relevant part, the complaint alleges as
follows: 	Young suffers from antisocial personality disorder and was
classified as a “D-Code”1 inmate within the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections (“DOC”). Given his mental illness, he objected to being placed
in the RHU, and when officers arrived to forcibly move him, he allegedly
tried to hang himself with a string tied to his cell door.
Defendants Lt. Johnson and CO Bollanger were among a team of
officers who intervened in his suicide attempt. Young alleges that the
officers were not carrying a “cut-off tool” that is used to remove string
during a suicide attempt and that DOC policy required them to carry.
Instead, Bollanger allegedly “yanked” the string from the door frame,
causing Young to repeatedly hit his head on the cell door. Because of the
absence of the cut-off tool, there was a further delay before the string was
fully removed from Young’s neck, during which he repeatedly yelled “I
can’t breathe.”
1 	Within the DOC, the D Stability Code generally “applies to
inmates 	who 	have 	the 	most 	significant 	mental 	health 	needs,” 	and
“entitles 	them 	to 	the 	greatest 	amount 	of 	mental 	health 	resources
available.”
Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 370 (3d Cir. 2020) (citations
omitted).
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After this incident, and despite his continual protests and threats
that he would rather “die in the DTU . . . [than] go to the RHU,” Young
was transferred to the RHU for 20 days. He alleges that the RHU was
not an “appropriate setting” for him to receive mental health care, and
that he suffered “paranoia, anxiety, [and] full blown stress.”
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the operative complaint was granted
in 	part. 	Young 	was 	ultimately 	permitted 	to 	proceed 	on 	Eighth
Amendment excessive force claims against Johnson and Bollanger, and
Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims against five other
defendants who allegedly had a “strong say-so” in transferring Young to
the RHU.
See (Docs. 69, 70). The parties have now moved for summary
judgment.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary
judgment should be granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might affect the outcome
of the case.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
dispute of material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence “is such that a
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reasonable 	jury 	could 	return 	a 	verdict 	for 	the 	non-moving 	party.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all
inferences “should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, and where the non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the
movant’s, then the non-movant’s must be taken as true.”
Pastore v. Bell
Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994). The party seeking
summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion,” and demonstrating the absence
of a genuine dispute of material fact.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes such a showing, the non-movant
must set forth specific facts, supported by the record, demonstrating that
“the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to
the jury.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52.
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must first
determine if the moving party has made a
prima facie showing that it is
entitled to summary judgment.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 331. Only once that prima facie showing has been made does the
burden shift to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a
genuine dispute of material fact.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Celotex, 477
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U.S. at 331. Both parties may cite to “particular parts of materials in the
record, 	including 	depositions, 	documents, 	electronically 	stored
information, 	affidavits 	or 	declarations, 	stipulations 	(including 	those
made for the purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory
answers or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
III. 	MATERIAL FACTS
The summary judgment record2 	reveals the following material
facts: 	Between 	May 	18, 	2023, 	and 	December 	28, 	2023, 	Young 	was
incarcerated at SCI-Huntingdon, where the events relevant to this case
occurred. Young was in prison for assaulting a guard during a prior
sentence, for which he was adjudicated guilty but mentally ill (“GBMI”).
2 Young’s summary judgment filings do not respond directly to
defendants’ 	statement 	of 	material 	facts, 	and 	cite 	inconsistently 	to
supporting evidence, including numerous references to evidence that is
not present in the record.
See (Docs. 51, 52, 72). Any factual allegations
in these filings are not competent evidence at the summary judgment
stage unless supported by evidence in the record.
See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1). Nonetheless, in evaluating the parties’ motions, the Court has
reviewed and considered all the evidence the parties have submitted.
See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) (in addition to properly cited materials, the court
“may consider other materials in the record”). Where Young has not
presented 	competent 	evidence 	to 	demonstrate 	a 	genuine 	dispute 	of
material fact, defendants’ fact statements are deemed admitted.
See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1.
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The 	DOC 	diagnosed 	him 	with 	antisocial 	personality 	disorder 	and
classified him as a D-Code inmate.
See generally (Doc. 67-10).
This 	case 	concerns 	Young’s 	June 	1, 	2023, 	transfer 	from 	the
Diversionary Treatment Unit (“DTU”) to the Restricted Housing Unit
(“RHU”), where he remained for 20 days. In general, the RHU is a unit
intended for inmates placed in administrative or disciplinary custody.
The DTU is intended for inmates with mental illnesses who “may need
to be placed a secure housing unit or setting,” but not to be “exposed to
Restrictive Housing.” Inmates in the DTU “are immediately scheduled
and offered . . . a minimum of 20 hours out-of-cell programming per
week.” If a DTU inmate is temporarily moved to the RHU, the DTU
programming is made available to them in the RHU.
See DOC Policy
Statement 	13.8.1, 	Access 	to 	Mental 	Health 	Care 	Manual 	(§ 	14.A,
Glossary); (Doc. 67-10 at 57).
A. Transfer to RHU
On May 26, 2023, Young was involved in a fight with an inmate in
the general population and ignored orders to stop, for which he received
disciplinary charges. On May 30, in the DTU, he refused an order to meet
with security staff and used obscene and abusive language toward staff,
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for which he received additional charges.
See (Doc. 67-2 (Young Dep. 12:1-
7); Docs. 67-3, 67-4).
With these charges pending, Young’s Program Review Committee
(“PRC”)3 determined that Young would be moved from the DTU to the
RHU on May 31, 2023.4 The DOC’s records indicate that on the morning
of May 31, in the DTU, Young appeared “quiet,” and accepted meals and
medication, but refused exercise. (Doc. 67-12 at 2). Young testified that
when he learned he would be moved to the RHU, he protested and told
multiple officers he would “rather die on the DTU than go live on the
RHU.” Young then attempted to suffocate himself using a string that he
tied to his cell door. Defendants have produced video showing a team of
officers, led by defendant Johnson, entering Young’s cell to intervene.
See
(Doc. 68).
The video depicts as follows: Johnson ordered a team of officers to
3 In general, a PRC consists of three staff members that “make[]
decisions regarding continued confinement in the [RHU],” among other
duties.
	See Policy Statement 13.8.1, Access to Mental Health Care
Manual (Glossary).
4 	On 	June 	1, 	Young 	received another 	disciplinary citation 	for
abusive and sexually harassing language toward staff. He was ultimately
found guilty on the charges from all three of these incidents. (Doc. 67-4).
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deploy OC spray into Young’s cell, enter the cell, and cut the string from
the door. The string was cut within 15 seconds of Young’s door opening.5
Young was walked in handcuffs from his cell to a “strip cage,” which took
approximately 25 seconds, during which a portion of the string remained
tied around his neck. After approximately 10 seconds in the strip cage,
Young is heard to say: “I can’t breathe,” and Johnson immediately called
for a “911 tool . . . get that stuff off his neck with the 911 tool please.”
Another officer yelled: “I’m working on it.” Within 15 seconds of Young’s
statement that he could not breathe, an officer had cut the remainder of
the string from Young’s neck.
The strip cage was a rectangular enclosure that included a concrete
wall. Young remained in the strip cage while he was “decontaminated”
and examined by a nurse. He continued to complain to the officers about
his planned transfer to the RHU. When his handcuffs were removed, he
5 Young testified that no officer had the appropriate tool to cut the
string, and that Bollanger yanked on the string to remove it from the
door, injuring Young; however, the video plainly shows an officer using a
tool to cut the string from the door.
See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380
(2007) (“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could
believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes
of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”).
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began repeatedly ramming his forehead and shoulder into the wall. When
he refused an order to stop, an officer deployed another round of OC
spray. Young was decontaminated, placed in a smock, and escorted to the
medical department in a wheelchair. After one day in a psychiatric
observation cell, he was ultimately transferred to the RHU.
On July 3, 2023, more than a month later, Young was examined by
medical 	staff 	for 	a 	complaint 	of 	“continuous 	neck 	pain,” 	which 	he
attributed to the self-harm incident. He was observed to have full range
of motion in his neck and no “swelling, markings, rashes [or] bruising.”
(Doc. 67-10 at 37-38). He was referred for a spine x-ray, which was
performed on July 6, and showed “mild degenerative changes without
evidence of acute fracture.” (Doc. 67-11).
B. Prison Grievance Procedure
The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) provides a
three-part procedure for inmate grievances: initial review by a Grievance
Officer, appeal to the Facility Manager, and final appeal to the Secretary’s
Office 	of 	Inmate 	Grievances 	and 	Appeals 	(“SOIGA”). 	To 	begin 	the
grievance process, the prisoner must provide submit the appropriate
form and provide a factual summary of the claim, identify the individuals
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involved, and state the relief requested. The grievance must be submitted
within 15 working days of the underlying incident.
See (Doc. 67-5) (DC-
ADM 804, § 1.A). If the grievance is denied, “[o]nly an issue that was
raised for initial review . . . may be appealed.” (
Id., § 2.A.c).
On June 13, Young submitted a lengthy and prolix grievance (No.
1038415), which was initially rejected on the grounds that it was not
presented in a “legible, understandable, and courteous manner” and
sought relief for issues that did not affect him and had occurred more
than 15 working days before. (Doc. 67-6 at 36-38). Young resubmitted the
grievance on June 17. In summary, this amended grievance alleged that
the PRC had placed Young in the RHU for someone’s “personal gain”; that
he should not have been placed in the RHU because of his mental illness
and 	attendant 	D-Code 	status; 	and 	that 	this 	placement 	reflected
negligence and deliberate indifference by “every staff member on [May
31]” and caused him to attempt self-harm. The grievance did not allege
excessive force during his physical extraction from his cell or discuss any
alleged error in removing the string from his self-harm attempt. It did
not 	mention 	defendants 	Johnson 	or 	Bollanger 	except 	to 	describe 	a
conversation in which Johnson told Young of the decision to remove him
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to the RHU. The grievance was denied on the basis that Young had been
temporarily removed to the RHU for his “disruptive behavior,” and that
all services offered to him in the DTU remained available to him.
See (
id.
at 30-33).
On appeal, Young essentially reiterated his prior position, but
raised an additional allegation about the extraction, without naming
Johnson or Bollanger: “My neck from hanging is in constant pain from
the yanking of the hang string, the misplace of the self-harm cut off tool.”
In 	response, 	Facility 	Manager 	J. 	Rivello 	acknowledged 	Young’s
allegations of pain in his neck, but did not address the allegations of
“yanking” of the string or the misplaced tool. Rivello denied the appeal
on the grounds previously explained, adding: “If you continue to have
pain, you should submit a sick call slip.”
See (
id. at 25-27). In response to
Young’s final appeal, SOIGA affirmed on essentially similar grounds. (
Id.
at 12).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
A. Excessive Force
Young was permitted to proceed on Eighth Amendment excessive
force claims against Johnson and Bollanger. However, the record shows
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that he did not exhaust administrative remedies as to these claims.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), prisoners complaining
about 	the 	conditions 	of 	their 	confinement 	must 	exhaust 	available
administrative remedies before they may file suit in federal court. 42
U.S.C. 	§ 	1997e(a). 	The 	PLRA requires 	proper 	exhaustion, 	meaning
plaintiffs must administratively grieve their claims in accordance with
the procedural rules of the prison in which they are incarcerated.6
Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 305 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006)). Therefore, exhaustion within
the DOC requires appeal to SOIGA, the third and final step of the
process.
See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 232 (3d Cir. 2004). To exhaust
remedies on a particular issue, the grievance must “alert prison officials
to [the] problem,” but need not “provide personal notice to a particular
official that he may be sued.”
Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 640 (3d
Cir. 2007) (quoting
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007)).
Here, Young filed a grievance complaining about the decision to
6 Although Young has since been released from custody, these rules
still apply to this case because he filed the operative complaint from
prison.
See (Doc. 35);
Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 88 (3d Cir.
2019).
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move him to the RHU, but that grievance7 did not allege excessive force
by Johnson, Bollanger, or any other officer. After the grievance was
denied, he made a vague statement in his appeal that could be construed
as an allegation of excessive force, but the grievance policy only permits
review 	of 	issues 	raised 	in 	the 	initial 	grievance. 	Therefore, 	the
respondents did not address this allegation, and the excessive force
claims were not exhausted.8
See,
e.g.,
Martin v. Gearhart, 712 F. App’x
179, 185-86 (3d Cir. 2017);
Jordan v. Murin, No. 1:18-CV-0228, 2020 WL
8675898, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2020) (“[T]he critical inquiry for purposes
7 The record also contains sick call requests dated June 11, 2023,
and June 30, 2023, in which Young alleged that he was “assaulted” by
“Deputy Spyker and many more,” and referred to the alleged “yanking”
of the string and the missing cut-off tool.
See (Doc. 35-3 at 1-2). However,
sick call requests are not grievances for PLRA exhaustion purposes.
See
DC-ADM 804, § 1.A.5, § 1.A.12 (“[T]he inmate must submit his/her
grievance . . . using [Form] DC-804.”);
Small v. Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d
265, 272 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Sick Call Requests are prospective requests for
medical services, they are not retrospective complaints.”).
8 In certain circumstances, a grievance can be deemed exhausted if
the prison declined to enforce its own rules and instead “fully examined
[the new issue] on the merits” during the appeal process.
See Rinaldi v.
United 	States, 	904 	F.3d 	257, 	271 	(3d 	Cir. 	2018) 	(quoting
	Camp 	v.
Brennan, 219 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir. 2000)). Here, the prison’s responses
merely reiterated that Young could seek medical care for pain in his neck;
it did not address any purported claim that his pain was caused by
excessive force.
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of determining exhaustion under the PLRA is to determine who was
named 	in 	the 	grievance 	and 	what 	claims 	were 	mentioned 	in 	the
grievance, 	not 	any 	appeal therefrom.”), 	report 	and recommendation
adopted, 2021 WL 808698 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2021);
Talley v. Gilmore, No.
2:16-CV-1318, 2018 WL 4029597, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2018) (“Talley’s
reliance on the language in his grievance appeals is misplaced . . . The
inmate-plaintiff is required to name [the] issue or claim . . . in the
operative grievance.”).
Even if the Court could consider Young’s claim, the record forecloses
any inference of excessive force by Johnson or Bollanger. It is undisputed
that the officers intervened for the legitimate purpose of stopping Young’s
attempt at self-harm. Contrary to Young’s allegations, the string holding
him to the door was cut from the door, not “yanked” back and forth while
he was still attached to it. The evidence does not support an inference
that the brief delays in cutting the string were imposed “maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm,”
Banks v. Meck, 531 F. App’x 205, 207 (3d Cir.
2013) (quotation omitted), and the medical evidence does not indicate
that Young sustained any significant injury to his neck. Accordingly, the
defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
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B. Conditions of Confinement
For his Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim, Young
would have to demonstrate that the defendants “deprived [him] of the
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” and “acted with deliberate
indifference in doing so, thereby exposing [him] to a substantial risk of
serious damage to [his] future health.”
Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209,
225 (3d Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). Young contends that his placement
in the RHU violated DOC policy9, but that is insufficient, because “a
violation of prison policy is not equivalent to a constitutional violation.”
9 The Court’s own review of the DOC’s written policies does not
clearly resolve whether Young’s placement was consistent with policy.
The policies provide as follows with respect to D-Code inmates:
If an exceptional circumstance exists preventing a D
Roster individual from being housed on the DTU . . .
[h]e/she shall be moved to the DTU within 13 days. If
circumstances prohibit the individual from being moved
into a DTU within the 13-day time period, notifications
will 	be 	made 	to 	the 	Executive 	Deputy 	Secretary,
Regional 	Deputy 	Secretary, 	Office 	of 	Population
Management (OPM), Office of Psychology, and the Office
of Chief Counsel.
Policy Statement 13.8.1, Access to Mental Health Care Manual (§ 14.C.2)
(internal citations omitted);
see also DC-ADM 801 (“Inmate Discipline”)
(§ 	4.B.4.b) 	(describing 	a 	similar 	procedure 	for 	RHU 	placement 	on
disciplinary grounds for inmates with a serious mental illness). It is
unclear whether that notification procedure was followed in this case.
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Washington v. Salamon, 2022 WL 4096877, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 2022)
(citations omitted);
see also Holloway v. Irwin, No. 1:23-CV-00278-SPB,
2024 WL 4980759, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2024) (alleged policy violations
did not “bolster [the plaintiff ’s] claims because DOC policies do not create
rights actionable under § 1983”).
Although Young was adamant that he should not be placed in the
RHU and that he would harm himself to avoid being placed there, his
threats 	do 	not 	themselves 	make 	his 	placement 	in 	the 	RHU
unconstitutional.
See,
e.g.,
Macon v. Gressel, No. 1:23-CV-00283-RAL,
2025 WL 1115724, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2025);
	Talley, 2018 WL
4029597, at *7 (inmate intermittently housed in RHU despite D-Code
status and threats of suicide). The Court understands Young to argue
that 	although 	he 	had 	access 	to 	the 	same 	mental 	health 	care 	and
programming, his mental health suffered because the RHU was not an
“appropriate setting.” In his grievance appeal, he alleged:
No matter who stops at my door . . . I believe Deputy
Spyker and PRC sent them. Every day I wake up I
believe the[y’re] going to move me back to the RHU . . .
Being on the RHU was hard on me mentally . . . the RHU
environment isn’t the DTU environment. Programs and
activities aren’t the only benefit of the DTU service[:] the
calm of the unit, the colors on the walls[,] the signs
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speaking 	directly 	to 	me 	talking 	about 	coping 	with
struggles of mental health ‘suicide prevention’ . . . even
the 	DTU 	COs 	are 	trained 	different. 	The 	constant
checking on you, the understanding when I see another
inmate in blues knowing I’m not alone in the fight . . .
Deputy Spyker and PRC took that away from me.
(Doc. 67-6 at 27). Accepting his point that the RHU was a more stressful
environment than the DTU, Young has not presented any evidence that
his health suffered significantly from being placed in the RHU for 20
days, that he was deprived any form of treatment, or that the defendants
otherwise disregarded a “substantial risk of serious damage” to his
health.
See,
e.g.,
Hinton v. Houser, No. 1:22-CV-00554, 2025 WL 2803773,
at *28-29 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2025);
Hickox v. Karabinos, No. 3:20-CV-
00980, 2021 WL 1297780, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2021);
Stanford v.
Walton, No. 16-CV-1584, 2019 WL 5068666, at *14 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 2019)
(“[T]here is no evidence that a one-month placement in the RHU exposed
Plaintiff to a particular risk because of his illness.”).
The evidence that Young was moved to the RHU for legitimate
disciplinary reasons10, having abused staff and/or inmates in both the
10 Young now claims that the disciplinary rationale was “fabricated”
and pretextual,
see (Doc. 51), but he presents no evidence in support of
these allegations.
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general population and the DTU, further belies any inference that the
placement reflected reckless disregard for his health.
	See 	Young v.
Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 364 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[A]s long as the conditions of
confinement 	are 	not 	foul, 	inhuman 	or 	totally 	without 	penological
justification[, segregated detention] may be a necessary tool of prison
discipline.”);
Hickox, 2021 WL 1297780, at *5-6;
Eden v. Rivello, No. 3:21-
CV-1966, 2024 WL 1604645, at *6-7 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 2024). On this
record, no reasonable jury could conclude that this temporary placement
violated his constitutional rights.
V. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted to the defendants.
An appropriate order follows.
Dated: March 3, 2026
	s/Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States District Judge
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